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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS USED 
1. Statement of the Problem 
The main problem of this dissertation is to compare and eval-
uate critically some of the salient aspects of elan vital, nisus, 
and creativity, as treated by Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, 
and Alflred North Whitehead. A subordinate purpose is present in 
that these doctrines will be viewed in relation to i mportant and 
interesting phases of their historical setting. 
2. Definitions of Terms Used 
The following definitions of the major terms used in this 
dissertation are herewith presented. The three terms which 
form its title, of course, will be discussed much more fully in 
the body of the dissertation. Therefore, a discussion of the 
etymologtcal aspects will be given here. 
i. Elan vital. 
»tlan vital" is the term used by the French philosopher 
Henri Bergson to denote the source, or impulse, of life, 
the creative principle immanent in all organisms which is 
responsible for evolution. The term "elan" has two chief 
meanings. They are (1) "spring, bound, dash, impetus," and 
( 2) 11 burst , outb1..1_rst (of feeling , etc. ). nl The term is 
related to the French r eflexi ve verb 11 s 1 elancer11 meaning 
(l) :t to spring , bound , dash, shoot forvmrd , rr and ( 2 ) "to 
shoot upn (of child , p l ant) . 2 It is this last meaning of 
tts ' ~lanc e rTT that is most similar to Be r gson 1 s meaning , 
2 
carrying , as it d oe s , the conno t a tion of li fe within itself . 
nv i tal , 11 comrnonly used i n Engli sh as pertain i ng to life , 
handly r equires a dditional note . 
ii . Nisus . 
A t erm of Latin orig in, 11 nisustt (Anglicized by Alex-
ander a nd now appearing i n 1'iebster ' s Ne-vv International 
Dictionary as an inglish word) is derived from t he Latin 
verb nn itorn wh i ch means (l) " to ex ert one ' s self , l abo r , 
make efforts or e ndeavors , endeavo r, n or "to strive after 
a thing , " ( 2) " t o make one ' s way with an effort , to pre s s 
f on,ra r d , a dvance , n ( 3 ) nto mount , climb by efforts or 
exertion , 11 ( 4 ) 11 to strain i n g ivin r4 birth , to or ing forth . n3 
It i s quite clear that Al exander l e an s heavily tmqard t h e 
l ast of these meanings , using on many occasions the very 
f i gure i mplied in t he meaning . 
iii . Cre at ivity . 
11 Creat ivity 11 is used by Whiteh ,ad . It is derived 
f rom nc r eatus, 11 the past pa. rt ic i ple of the La tin verb 
l . Mans ion , ~horter French and English ~ ic ti onary , 1940 . 
2 • I,o c • cit • 
J . White , A Lat in-~nglish Dictionary , 1888 . 
n cre o " neaning nto bring f or th , pro du c e , make , c reate , 
b e g e t, give orig in to . "4 The Eng lish vwrd ncreative , n 
meaning rrhaving t he power or quality of cre ating" is its 
imme diate source . Creativity · 1eans , then , "that v1hich 
has the p mver of bring i ng f orth , producing , et c. "5 
iv . Explanation . 
In view of the fact t hat the term occurs repeatedly 
3 
in the fo llowing di sc ussion , it is a dvi sabl e here to define 
th e term n explanat ion . IT 
In g ene r a l ' If exp l a na tioniT d e n ote s TT the process' a rt ' 
me a ns , or method of makinb a f a ct or statement intellig ible . " 
It also may denot e 11 a genet ic de scri pt i on , caus a l develop-
ment , systematic clarifi cat io n , rational exposition , scien-
t i fi c i nterp r etation , inte l lig ible connection , orde red mani -
t' 
fes tation o f the e l ements of a fact or a st a teme n t . " 0 
Mor e spe cific a lly , explanation has tended to center 
around 11 causal relati ons , rr a nd , here , in t h re e g eneral 
·ways : 
( l) g enet ic , or in t erms of the dire c t and imrnediate 
c ondi tions or causes pro du cin1c,; a phenonenon ( formal 
an1 eff icient cause) ; ( 2 ) descri~~ive , or i n terms 
of the mate r ial elements of the ohenomenon (material 
c ause) ; ( 3) teleolo 2: i c a l, or in terms of the ultimate 
end to be attained (final cau s e ), either in accordan c e 
with the nature of the event or -"d.th the i ntention 
4 . Lewi s , An Elementarv Latin Di c tionary , 1 890 , 191 5 . 
5 . Cf. Webste r ' s New I nte rnat i onal Dictionary . 
6 . Gre enwo od , · rt . (l942 ) , 104 . 
4 
of t h e a gent .7 
1v1ore formal ly, exp l ana tion has tende d to ward s n gen-
erali zation or the establishment o f a theory . " In this 
res p ect , it is 
th e p roc e ss of linking a statement of fact to its 
logi ca l impl ications and consequences ; or the p rocess 
of f itting a statement of fact i nto a coherent 8 system of statements extending beyond the g iven fact. 
In most ge ne ral terms , accordingly, the term Hexpl a na-
tion" may occur in a ny of t he above senses i n the course 
of the fo l l owing dis cussion. However, t he interpr e tation 
wh ich will be adopted as th e most adequa te one may , pe r haps , 
be formulated a s f ollows : ~xplana ti o n , to be a :i equa te , 
mu st be coherent, which means t hat there must be a g eneral-
ization wh ich (1) serves to interpret some aspect or as p e cts 
o ~ the da tum ( a c t1.a l consci ous experien ce), (2 ) is c onsis-
t ent with it ~eli' a n d with a ll asp ects o f t h e ~:atwn , a nd 
( 3) i s s uper i o r t o all c ompeting hypotheses as determined , 
i deally , b y consideration of all competing hypotheses , and , 
t her efore, beca use of (3) an d ( 2) , is something which (4) 
must r emain in the realm o f i n co mplet e verification . 9 
3 . A Review of the Li terature 
The research leading to this dissertation revealed 
7 . Greenwood , Art.(l942) , 104-105 . 
8. Gre enwoo d , Art.(l942 ), 105. 
9 . Cf . Brig htman , Art.(l946). 
5 
no v.ro r wh i ch d e a l s s ol ely wit h either t ·:te problem of th is 
di sse r tation or any one of the doc tri nes wh i ch compri s e 
t he pr oblem. There have b een , at va r i ous t ime s , howeve r, 
book s and ar t icl es which ha ve deal t in part with one o r 
mo r e of al l th r e e do ct r i nes . 
The volum e wh ich c omes the c losest t o deali ng with 
t he problem of the di s s e r t a t i on is ..S t all knecht , St udies 
in t h e Philosophy of Cr eat i on : Ni t h ~spe c ial Hef e r enc e to 
Be r gson and Whitehead , Prin ceton , 193 4. I n t his wo r k , 
whi ch deals i n much mor e detr;d. l wi th Ber gso!l tha n v.ri th any 
other thi nker, ~tallkne cht t rea ts the philos ophic a l point ~ 
of vi ew wh i ch he cons i ders form the ba ckground f or Bergson , 
e s pe c i ally t i1e r omanti c movement in German:: and .rran ce . 
Tne l ast pa rt of t he vol ume deals r elativ ely briefly with 
i\. l exanU.er , Croce , Gent i l e , and concludes Hi th a chapter 
on Whitehead ' s ph i l os ophy of orga ni sm . The main point o f 
the volume i s to support th e author ' s c ont ention that Be r g-
son has t wo t heo ries of c r eati on , an aes t het i c t h eory and 
a n irrationa l one . lhe latter is condemned and t he for me r 
is c ommended . 
Hi th re sp e c t to 3J r gson ' s ph ilo sophy , t he l iter a t ure 
i s ve r y ext ensive . Al so , mos t criti cal dis c ussio~ of 
Berg s on t en d s t o center upon his theo r y of knov-rl edge 
r ather t han UDOn the do ct r ine of t he el an vi tal. A c om-
1 -
I 
plete survey of a ll the Be r gs on l ite r ature i s out of the 
que st ion i n t he spa ce here allo t ted . However , the 110re 
importa~1t di scussions are mentioned . Lovejoy ' s article , 
i n 1909 , 11 The Metaphysic i an of the Life- Force , 11 v.,ra s one 
o f the f i rst to criticize the ~lan vital . Hi s lat e r mono-
g raph , Bergson and rtomantic ~volutionism , 1914, d eveloped 
fu~ther t hes e critici sms , the chief one being his belief 
t hat B2r ga on did not sufficiently clarify the rela tion 
between the elan vital and matter . Royce , in 1910 , criti-
cized Be r g son ' i i ntuition of novelty . Of consid era ble 
imp ortance i n this early pe rio d was Quic k ' s article in 
Mi nd , 1913, where he finds difficu~ty both wi t h Be r gs on 's 
doctrine of individuality an d 1-rith the elan vital . '.i'he 
relations of the elan vital to intuition ·were critic ized 
by Cun~1 ingham L1 A .Study of t he Philosophy of Bergson , 
6 
1916. In n10re re c ent y ear s , the work of t h e Bri tish wr it er , 
Clev.gh , on Ti me , 1937, revealed some i mportant as pects of 
this phase o f Be rgson ' s thought. In 1942 , a very scholarly 
work by ~ charfstein on The Root s of Bergson ' s Philoso phy 
a ppeared i n v..nic h some interesting insi ght s we r e ma d e i n to 
/ 
t ha orig in of the i dea o f the e lan vital . 
Lowe's article , in 1949 , in the Journal of t he History 
of I de as , entitled lf The I nfluence o f Be r gson , James a nd 
Al exander o:u Whit eheadn was desi g ned to discredit t h e op in-
ion t hat there was , instead of di r e ct a nd indi s pensible 
influence, a rela t i o n of encourag e r. ent and sympathy betwe en 
I 
these men . ~tahl, i n an unpubli s hed d i s sertation at Boston 
University , entitled 11 The Influence of Be r g son o n ~ih i tehead , n 
7 
1950, attempted to show that Lowe was in error here. 
Articles and books on Samuel Alexander's philosophy 
are by far fewer in number than for either of the other two 
men here discussed . None seem to treat, in any detail what-
ever, the doctrine of the nisus, with the exception of the 
British writer John Laird. In an article in 1942 which 
a ppeared in the Hibbert Journal, entitled ''Samuel Alexander's 
Theis~," Laird calls attention to some real weaknesses. 
There are, of course, the usual reviews of Alexander's mag-
num opus, Space, Time, and Deity. But treatment of the nisus 
is negligible. 
On Whitehead, there are numerous books and articles 
which deal with various aspects of his thought, and among 
them creativity. D. Bidney's article, "Spinoza and \Vhite-
head," in the Philosophical Review, 1936, sta~ted a dis-
cussi,on which resulted in A. H. Johnson's "Criticism of 
' D. Bidney's 'Spinoza and Whi tehead ,'" in the same journal 
in 1938 . With the publication, in 1941, of the vfuitehead 
volume of the Library of Living Philosophers, Schilpp (ed .), 
The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, a number of articles 
I 
a ppeared, some of which touched upon the doctrine of creati-
vity. None of them is important enough in this respect to 
merit mention here, except, perhaps, that of Lowe, "The 
Development of Whitehead's Philosophy," and Schilpp , " \IJhite-
head' s IVIoral Philosophy." Dorothy Emmet's book, Whitehead's 
Philosophy of Organism presents important criticisms and in-
sights into the problem of creativity. Ely, The Religious 
Availability of 1tlhit ehead's God , also has something t o say 
on th~ subject, as do Metz, A Hundred Years of British 
Philosophy, Wahl, "La philosophie speculative de Whj_tehead," 
in Revue Philosophigue, 1931, and :Moxley, "The Conception 
of God in the Philosophy of ·whitehead," Aristotelian Society 
Procee-dings, 1933-4. A. H. Johnson, " V'lhi tehead' s Theory of 
Actual Entities: Defence and Crit icism," whic-h a ppeared 
in Philosophy of Science in 1945, however, presented the 
clearest and most adequat e discussion of the problems and 
criticisms relating to creativity. Johnson's latest article 
entitled "Recent Discussions of Alfred North Whi tehe ad ," 
in The Review of Metaphysics, 19 5~, brings the reader up 
to date on t he literature on wnitehead in a brief but 
adequate manner. 
4. Method of Procedure 
'The remainder of the dissertation begins with a 
brief historical intrduct~on which is a imed at noting 
four ,classical t heories of creation, t he scientific reac-
tion to final causes, and t hree recent tendencies which 
tend to foreshadow the thought of the three thinkers whose 
ideas are the subject for this disserta tion. 
A chapter on Novelty follows which att empts to observe 
in the literature certain points of reference whi ch may 
l a ter s er ve as points of rapport among t he t hree doctr i nes 
- l 
\ 
of the dissertation. It is not intended that the conclus-
ions of either Chapter I or II are based upon exhaustive 
study of either the historical background or the subject 
of novelty. 
A chapter is given to each of the three doctrines, 
Bergson's elan vital, Alexander's nisus, and Whitehead's 
I 
creativity. After a brief biographical sketch of each 
philosopher, and some discussion of the immediate back-
I 
ground of the doctrine, the discussion enters the general 
philo1sophical system in which the doctrine lies. Next 
each doctrine is examined under several headings, or 
problems: epistemology, causality, individuality, nov elty, 
and G,od. Here critical observations on some of the more 
salieht features of each doctrine are made. 
Chapter VII, Evaluation and Conclusions, attempts 
in th~ ~valuation to set each docttine against the other 
with 1the aim of noting as many relations as appear warran-
ted ih the light of the preceding discussion. Some of the 
comparisons in Chapter VII are new, but they are based 
upon material which has been brought to light in the body 
of the dissertation. The conclusions represent the final 
appraisal of the three doctrines in the form of theses. 
9 
CHAPT_ti;H I I 
BHIEF HI o'J?U:tUC.AL IWI'RODu CTIO .. J 
Fro111 t he es. rl i est tit11es Iilen h ave b e en c u r ious about the 
ori g i n of t h i ngs t h a t lie about them, a n d h a ve shovm a n i m-
pul s e t o find some so l uti 011 for the 11ysteri ous events which 
they witness da i ly . For this r eason , c osmog oni e s , or theo -
ri es a bout the manne r a n d o r d e r in 'Vvhicl: the vi s i b l e world 
a n d the v a rious forms of life c a me into being , h a ve been 
found ~n n ..:; CJ. rly eve r y r a c e of pe ople . r.Iost oi these a re 
nsponta neous pr oduction s of fo l k-fancy ••• unsystemat ic •.• 
d isconn ected •.• crud e , c h ildi sh , Clnd even grotesque . n l 
I t is not within the p uq.J o s e of thi s d i sserta tion t o 
exami n e a ny of thes e e a rl:; , pre-phi lo s oph i c co smo gonie s . 
Suff i ce it to ~J oint out that nin Silite of g e o.;r a phic a l 
sep arat i o,s , his tor i cal and cultura l divi sio~s , and the 
ove r :srovrth of a lux uria nt i ma .;ina tion , the theor i e s of Lh e 
p ro duction of ea rth aw h eaven ••• exhi b i t s ubsta n t i a lly t he 
same t yp e s ev..:;ryN·he r e . n2 
One of the s e typ e3 may be terme d i n this co nne c tion 
the 11 t e olog i c a l " explanat i on . By this is weant an e::::}J l ana-
tio n wh i ch util i ze s t h e c once p t i on of so .1 e t L -d of s u p reEle 
being a s the source of , or a gent i n , t ha p hy s i ca l un i v e rse . 
l. Ca sanm.vicz , Art . (1916 ), 44 . 
2 . I bid ., 52 . 
10 
The f our most influentia l of these t heor i es wi ll be exanined 
briefly with the aim of esta bli shi ng points of r e f er enc e 
for the doc t rines of 8'1a n vi ta l , nisus , and cr,~ at i _vi ty 
which will be Lii s cussed in det ail bel mv. I n t h i s c onnection , 
th e cate gories of c au sality, time , and space wi ll be g i ven 
spe c i al attention s ince the y a r e t he ca te gor i es mos t relevant 
t o the a bove doctrines . 
1. Theologi c a l Expl anations of Creation . 
ll 
i . Pl a to ' s Demi u r g e -- Cosmo_gony by for111i ng pr e - ex ist i ng cha os . 
There a re i n the philosophica l writings of Pl at o two 
co s raogon i es , one of which d e ser ves more pr a i se pe r haps , but 
both of whi ch have been i nfluenti a l . They r epresent pe r haps 
the t vw most i mport ant s t a ge s of his cosmolog i cal out l ook . 
The fir st , and perhaps t h e less ad e qua t e vi ew , i s the 
one which a ppears i n Boo k VI of the Republi c. 3 Here 'l a ta , 
i n a di s cussion of the I dea of the Goo d a s the hi ghest ob-
ject of knowl edE;e , goe s beyond the t heory of " forms 11 --a 
vievr wh i ch attribut ed true Being only to the world of I deas 
(t:I<Sos ) and a relatively l e s.ser being to the wo r l d of phe -
I 
nomena (ycvccns) --to a view which cons i ders the I dea of the 
Goo d i n a uni que r e l ati on to the wo r l d of genera tion . 
3 . Hereinafter thi s will be r eferred to as Hep . 
Used i n t his study vras Jowett ( tr . ) , DOP , 2 vols . 
'I'he I dea of the Good is analogous to t h e Sun , which 
not only makes t h i ng8 we see vi s i ble , but a l so 
brings them i nto exi ster1ce and gi ves them grovrt h 
and nourishr ent .•• The objects of kn owl edge •.• 
d~rive from the Good not only their ~ower of 
bEr i ng k1 O\rn , but their r e a l be i ng and real i ty . 4 
This view, wh i le it presents the end or e oa l of creation i n 
a spleqd i d and ins~iring anne r , har dl y sett l es the bas ic 
question , Hovv does the et e r nal , absolut e , and i mmut ab l e 
I de a of t he Goo d effect the pr ocess of terrporal , non- abso -
lute , and chang i ng ·)henomena? 
Plato ' s answe r to t his problem, and t he ao re s atis -
f a ctory of the t wo cosmogoni es , is sket ched out i n his 
later di a logue , the Timaeus .5 Recognizing the need fo r 
some r esolution of the p r oblems of 11 effic i ent 11 causation 
and the ~~1utual exclus i veness of the worl d s of HB eingn a nd 
1 generat ion , n Pl a to deve l ops a vievl involving four creative 
factors . 6 Fi rst , i n or de r to ove r come the p roblem entailed 
by attributing eff icient caus ation to the I dea of the Good , 
he os -ulateu a Cre a tor- God , or Horld- Builder ( c5ryr-wup y6 s , 
Deui ur ge , l i terally : na rtisan11 ). 
4 . Rep~, VI , 5J E\ . 
5 . Here i nafter t h is v-w r k v-ril l be r ef erred to a s Tiu . 
6 . Cf . Demos , P0? , 3- 7. 
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Now everything that becomes or i s c r eated o us t 
of !necess i ty be cr eated by some cause , for 
wi thout a cause nothing can be created . 7 
Secondl1 , still r etai n i ng the con ce pt of t h e unchanging 
and ete~nal , r epr esented by t he i deas in the ea rlier 
I 
' ' d i alogues , · lato pre s ents the Patter n (cx:pXE-TV7rOV , a rche -
1-yTJe) .,_sf ~ 
u - a ~- creat i ve facto r . 
''lhich of the patterns had t h e a r tifi cer in view 
wht9n he made the world , ... t he 1)att e r n of the 
unchangeable , or of that which is creat ed? I f 
th~ worl d be indeed f a i r and the artifi cer good , 
i t / i s man ifest t hc t he uus t have l ooked to that 
whlch i s eternal . 8 I . 
Thirdl~~ i n or de r to find a p r incipl e of passivi ty or re -
I ' / 
cept i viry , Plato r ostul aces the Receptacle ( uno6oX'1) . 
Thi s prtncipl e re pre sents the primo r dial -chaos of space . 
Th~ mother and r eceJtac le of all creat ed and 
v i hible and in any way s ensible t h ings , •• . is 
an ~ invisible a~1d f or mle ss being whi ch re ceives 
a l l t h i ngs and in some mysterious vray pa_r-~akes 
of i ~he intel li ~ibl e , and i s most i n comprehens i -
bl ~ . 9 
The act~al wor l d , l as t l y , i s cause d by t he union of the 
I 
Patterns wi t h t he J.eceptac l e . 
I 
The 111other substa~1c e 
ea~th and a i r, in so 
i mSres sions of them 
I 
t he Re c ept ac le be comes 
far a s she receives the 
the Patterns . 10 
7 . Tim., 28 . It i s int erest i ng t o note that Uberweg , 
HOP , I, l l o , and VJebe r i n TAeb t.~ r and Pe r ry , HOP , 5 , be l i eve 
tha t Pl a to means the I dea of the Good in hi s use of the 
t ern "Der;li u r gen i 11 t Le Tim. Taylor , hoviever , i n Pl-S , 442 , 
says thht ni f ' God ' the Del!l i u r g e i n the Tim • . simp l y 
meant the same t h ing as the fo r ms or a supreJe form , i t 
would rewain a r.1ys t.:," r y vvhy t he re :3hould be anythin,s b1.:. t the 
forms , why there should be any ' becomi ng ' at a l l . n 
cl-. I b " d 2d· o 0 l ., '-' - 7 • 
9-1 Ib i d . , 51. 
1 0. 1 Ibid ., 51 . 
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The Rec e~tacle , in addition to bei ng characterized a s 
indefini~e pl asticity, a l so exerci ses an effe ct upon t he 
) / 
Demiurg ej, i~1 the forEl of mechan ic al ne ces s ity (cxvcxyK7 ) . 
This a ccbunts for the fa ct t hat the I deas n ever f ind 
c omple tel and pure represent ation i n i t .11 
I 
BEING 
lViATHEIViATICS 
World- Soul 
BECOHI NG Time, World 
MECHAN ICAL NECESSITY 
NOT- BEING 
Fi g . 1 - F'LATO' S COSMOGONY BY FORMING THE PRE-EXI STING CHAOS 
Ptato t hu s has , in the Ti maeus , three eterna l re ali -
ties : ~he Demiurge, the I dea s , and the Re cept a cle . The 
t v.ro natures , the wo rld of genera tion , and time , a re created . 
Time began wi t h t he world of g eneration and is described a s 
nthe moving i mage of et ernity . TT 12 
11 . Cf . Wi ndelband , HOP , 130 , 
12 . Tim. , 3 7. 
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The deta ils of the resulting cosmology a re irrelevant 
to t h is i nquiry . It suffices t o say t hat the Demiurge : 
fi fd i ng t he ~1ole s phere no t a t re s t , but moving 
i n
1
an irregular and d i s orderly fa shion , out of 
dLp order , he b r m.:t~ht order1 consi dering that t his Has bet t e r than t h e othe r . 3 
ii. Ar i $totle' s Prime .Mover -Co smogony by att r a ct i on . 
I 
Aff:, er having d i s tinguished four causes , formal , ma-
teria l, $ffic i ent , an d f inal , lh Ari stotle , in deve lopi ng h i s 
ol'm view, revert s a l most , if not ent ire l y , to the pre - Ti maeus 
view of i is t eacher by l umpi ng t he formal , final and effici-
ent CaUSyS i ntO one cat egory 11 f orm, !T and OlJPO Sing it to the 
rnate ria l l cause ·which he calls 11 mat ter . 11 Fo r m is h i ghe r than , 
and prior to, matter as 
I 
I in his i nd , the higher 
is a ctuality to ~otent ial ity . Since , 
mus t p recede the lower it must a l so 
I be it s qmse . Actuality , thus , i n it s pure state , is the 
15 
realizat i on of all pos s i bility , i m;:Ha teri al, ~ternal , supreme-
l y go o d , t he self- t h i nki ng Rea son , or absolute Spirit--Deity .l5 
On the other hand , pure matt er, or pure potentiality , 
I 
doe s not ex i s t . Rathe r, i n varying degr ees , it ~ as sesse s 
a ctualit~ , or f orm, which it rece ives by "longi ngn for the 
I 
De i ty . ~n t his sense , then , Ari stot l e cal ls t he De i ty t h e 
11 unrnoved l mo v er u wh o c auses moti on by virtue of it s own ab s o-
' 
lute per f ection . ffThe f i nal c aus e ••• produces motion a s 
be ing loved , but al l othe r t hings mo ve by be i ng r.w ved . ul 6 
13. Tim. , J OB . 15. Cf . Uberweg , HOP , I , 158. 
14. l•Iet • , I • 16. Met ., 8 , 1073 a 24 . 
I 
By /virtue of t h e fac t tha t po t ent i a lity i s "non- a ctu-
a l ity" ~at t er fil l s a p l ace in Ari s totle ' s sy s t em ana log ous 
I 
' to the 1·1 empty s pa c e 1 i n Pl at o ' s Tili1aeus , bot.h of :::.hem b ·3ing 
I 
charact~rized by wa~1 t , d eprivation , o r err: p ~11"1 S • 17 Cme 
I 
d i ffe ren ce i n the t vm v i ev.rs c oruists i n that for ? l ata th e 
Re c .3pcaqle i s et .::: rnal , Vfhile f or Ari stotle , r;otential i ty i s 
a h v-ays r.ll.Xe d with actuali cy in the i'orms of nature . Anothe r 
d . 'f I d l 1 eron ce, an a 
I 
tiality is not t he 
1 . d 1 I 1" ( l Yl OI d.Ct1..1.C.t l ty , 
I 
more bas ic one , i s not i ced i ~1 that p aten-
true opposite to ac t uality, but ra-ch e r a 
na~~ie ly , a nlon :~; in r.~ - t o -be 11 actu2.l ity . 1 8 
In thi s lre gard , i t a~}ear s that eff icient causat ion , ra~her 
t hCi.n be~_ng a qu :: Llity of t h e !' r i me l-'lover , i s really a quality 
I 
of t he matter . Ce r t a in l y it i s the 1 1 lo ~1gingn vl_-, ic ll moves 
I 
11 eff i ci kntly , 11 gr ant i n .;; , of cour se , tha.~ i.:.he Good i s th e 
ob je ct ~onged fo r " finally . 11 The obvi ous diff i culty with 
I 
thi s po ~i-ci0n is that Ari stotle fails ad e qu ately to explai n 
, ~,,, , ., ._, c-i "' 'l "· n c a u "'at i on '-'! diff iculty vihi ch P l ato earlie r \J .L ...... J~ - :..., 1 v 0 - ' '-· ., 
re cogni~c:d and at ter:tpt ed t o r er;ie dy , in t he 'i'i;llaeus , vri th the 
I 
c one e j_Jt ' of tb e De1i1i urge . 
I 
; r 1i stotle is ItlUcll 1~1ore explicit awl s cientific in h i s ex -
/ 
_p l anatipn of the forms i n nature than is Plato , sin ce he devel-
O _,j S <) h i era rchy of beings e a ch leve l of v.rhi ch p oss esses , in ad-
16 
dition t o matter or potentiality , a c ert~in ~ra~ e a~ a ctua lity , 
vJhich he c a lled r' ente l ec hy , 11 which r ec.;_li zes this pot ent i a li t y . 19 
IT 17 . Ube r weg , HOP , I , 157 . 
18. -\lhitehead , a s '14ill be s 1own fo llovrin .;~ , Eia.ke;;;; an 
import~nt issue out o: t his po i n t . 
19 . Cf . De An . 
Each hig~er level posses ses the entelechy of t he lower level 
I 
in addit :il on to i ts char acteri s tic entele chy , man ha ving 
I 
11 vegetatjjve , n 11 sentient , n and 11 rat ional TT entelechi es or 
I 
nsou.ls ~ 11 
,...-~- ....... 
/ ' I ' 
'l ' 
First Cause --<; 
- Rational Soul 
- Sentient Soul 
- Vegetative Soul 
- Inorganic \filorld 
i PURE \ -PbTENTIALITY Material Cause 
,\ 1 (Non-existent) 
' / I , ___ ,..... 
" 
Idea of the Good 
(Fihal Cause) 
Unmoved Ivlover 
(Efficient Cause) 
Pure Actuality 
(Formal Cause) 
> Organic World 
!Fig . 2 . - AHLS':c'GTLE' jj C031'/l0GONY BY ATTRACTION 
I 
I 
On !the matter of time , a difference i s a lso noted . 
I 
Plato fe~t that time had a beginning with the creat i on of 
I 
I 
the \"iorl~ . 
I 
Aristotle , on the other hand , felt tha t time is 
the measdre of mot ion. The 1vo rld a l ways was , is, and a l ways 
I 
v:ill be . Therefore time i s unlirni ted . 
17 
18 
.r~ s totle a lso reve rses ? l a t o ' s vie\ of s pace . Pl a to 
conceived of the Rec e~tacl e us unl~nit ud and ete r 1al . Aris -
totle vi ewec t ·1 e vJo rld u .s pos sessin g only a li11iited extension . 20 
iii. Pl o t inus 'sOn e --C osr., og o. ·' j y e:Ganat i on . 
Th e latonic L:.he is1;1 o.r the lil•1aeus, viith its e t e r na l , 
yet L .• u~ane~ 1t C o~1t ro lL:; r-God , aild t h e h.r i s t otel i. an e i su , 
id t .l i t{s a. b solut e , trc.n .s c en ent 1>rime Love. ·, lE1derwen t an 
atter;pt;ed synt l1e sis &t tLe h CJ.ncls of .i.) l ot i us . Go d , r or h i m, 
' i s bot ;1 t. r <.-Hls c e ;. det~t an d i Lm,a ne. t . B·Lct the i !.ll·lC:.l1 ence , 
r at 1er ,th 2.n det r a cting from 1i s t.rcm sce ;. ~.. en c e , only add.J to 
i t . r l ot i nus at.;l; eEr;rt. s to a \o i J inc onsist e~1 c ( sor11ething 
·mich 11 "' does aot succe ed in d oing ) lY·· seek i ng t o p r eserve 
I " 
the esse11ce of Goc. a s t h e . absolut e ly ' ne and t o .1ccount fo r 
t he Hor·ld of change by att riouting i t t o his "v.ro.~. k i i1;:; s . n 21 
Thus t he One , deity , i s 1beyond thou.:;ht ,: nd tlle b eing which , 
whi l e i d e11t ic a l \ it l1 i t , i s disti .nguisl Lab l e i n apprehensio n , ... 
t h e absolute unity the:tt is siupl y i dentic a l witb. i tseli . a22 
Th e "wo r. in·.,: s 11 --Hh ile nothj ng i ~ c apalJ l e oi' be i ng predi -
Ci::it ·J 9i' the One in the strict sens e 23-- t a ke th e f o r m of an 
n overf;J_o\ , H t.o u s e his analog y of t h e .,p rin E, , or n eJ:;lana t ions , u 
to u s e hit:> anal ogy oi' a centra l source of l i ght , Hh i ch lo ~~ic­
a lly , ·1ot te,.lf;ora lly , 24 p rocee d forul , a nd r 8 t rn to , the One . 
20 . Cf. liber web , HOP , I , 16 4; veber un d e rry , f · , 68 . 
21 . Cf . I, i ndel iJand , HGP , 244 . 
I 
22 . Hl1it t a i.::er , H? , 54 . 
23 . \/ inde1banc , Ht... P , 2/+4- 5. 
24 . Cf . \>Jhi tt aker, NP , 55 . 
I 
This Dr oboss of irr a .::iat i on i,s i d e .c n-:. ic al wi t i·t t h e 1·Jr oces .3 ~ I ~ 
of gener r t i o11 and ind iv i duat ion . The r etur n i s re - ab s orp -
t ioll , a iconce}Jt frei glYc.ed VviLL. e}J i s t eLio log ic a l and reli g:; -
i ouc; meu.r1ing , i nto the one . 
Tl-i.el l e vels , or ~Jtag;e s of b e i n t:; , ;,_re ·chree , c a l J .. i ng 
at te ntioh a t once to FLn,o ' s ndoctri ne of lev r~ls TT 2 5 and 
J.ri s"Got le ' s h i e r archy of soul s , ( De 1 n .) a,d clre r ough l y 
des cribed , i n or~er of their p r oxin ity t o the o~e , as : 
rat i o~&l sp iri t , s oul , and matte r . 
Ea9h of these a re u s has <.:.. s.::>e c i f ic 
a c.l j ~ .ce J.1"d a r e a . Rat lon a l ::;piri t , ~ in it s r e l a t i on t o e a ch re l a t i on to the 
On ~, c o r res)onds to the Pl atonic I j e Hs . I n rela~ ion to 
soul , . hc l \\·e ve ~, r :ti onal 
ity , -c,ne raovl ng Iorc e s (vol" 8uvb.~tl5 ) of lov;e r r e o.. l i t y . 
I n t l:lis li ue a , l' l otinus 
, .., ." 
. .-: ) ; 1·1 l. ""l I .L ' · l 
"Lll.n ... ~ 8 • 1 r. _ .r : ~ ' V 1 J. ., .1 _ ) c:. 0 a fun ct i on whic h ha .. s deten1inate 
co ntent d , and c a:cr i.e s p lura.lity vdthin i tss lf , i :3 tne i'o rrn 
through whi ch the ci e i ty c ause s al l er.1.p irical :ce ':,li t: to 
.c-' r oceed fort ii f r oD itse l f . a 27 
Soul , l i k e the mind , f r om vvh i ch i t s p r i n g s , 
I 
i s creal ive , but i ts :J r o du ct iv e pmve r i s l es s . 
Cons i d e:qed a s e:!1anat i ng from t h e One aud t he creative 
rational! spi r i t , and in i ts r elat i on to mat ter , s o u l 
I 
i s t h e fonaa t ive I 28 }J o w er ( fuo-1s ) of the Horld of s ense . 
25. 
I 
Rep ., iv, 436. 27 . '.Jindelband , HOP , 21+5- 6 . 
26> . Enn . v . l, 8 . 28 . I b i d . , 246 . 
I 
19 
i Consi dere1d in relation to the 
r ational _ls piri t, soul i s soul 
proper r
1 
.. T~~u-~~ !e1r/)' or contempl a tion . 
~~ v t h e farthest s tage 
from the b ne is not the Ari s -
1 ' 
totelian I'' formed 1~1a tter" but the 
Arist o te~ian "pure potent i al ity" 
1vhi ch, r dr him , did not exi st . 
I t is a l J o like the Pl aton ic 
"empt y s,ace , "29 absoluGe ~ega­
tivity , plure p riva tion (crrtp~<TIS), 
a substra:tmn. In i ts re l a tion to 
i / 
the lovre~ soul (tucns), ma t ter 
a ppears a:s body , whi ch His the 
copy or Jhadow of the I d e a which 
in it haJ shaped i tself to mat-
1 ter~JO '1 The One and Good ••• mu st 
be thougJt of and s p oken of , 
though i j re a lity beyond spee ch 
a nd t houJht , as creating it s elf 
by i ts mfll ene r gy before a l l be-
in a- n 31 
b . I 
I 
2 9 •. E nn • , I I I , 6 , 18 • 
3 0~ Windelband , HOP , 24g . 
THE · ONE 
RAT IONAL 
SP1RIT 
~loving Forces 
(vol. cSuv~~lS ) 
______ ::;.,..:._ _____ -
Contemplation 
( '/'~X~ ) 
S.OUL 
Formative Power 
(cfJuo-rs) 
Bodv ( 0' a> 1-'-a.) 
PURE 
JVIAf.TER (U>.I']) 
F i g . 3 
20 
THE 
NE 
PLOTIHU S ' CREATION BY El·IANA l'I ON 
31.1 Whittaker , NP , 60; Enn . v, 6 , 6 . 
I 
I 21 
. I 
To the question , Why should t he One create anyt hing be -
yond itse[f , Plotinus answers that "sin ce all t hings , even 
I 
those without life , i upart of themselves ~1at they can , the 
most perflct and t he first good cannot remain i n itself as 
envious, l nd the potency of all things as vvi thout power. 11 32 
In other l·mrds , Plotinus i s recogni zing that the \vorld is the 
result of the goodness of the One , going back to the Ide a of 
the Good · n Pl a to and t h e final cause of Ari s totle .33 But 
just 1-·;rhy goodne ss should des ire to ndegenerate itselfrr i s 
f h i ~' . r- Pl . 3 Lr Tl II ! I f one o t e many paraaoxes 111 ~eo - a ton1sm . 1e curse o 
this concept is t emp ered by the fa ct t hat all t h ings that 
emanate from h i ,n shoul d r eturn to him . Thus , vvhil e tl:1e One 
is at one the fir s t , final , and fonnal c ause , i n the Aris-
totelian sense , it doe s not pos sess efficient causation until 
the realn1 of mind is rea ched . It ultimately includes efficient 
and r,1at e1Jial causes as '"rell, however, since , in t h e l ast analy-
sis, the One is all- embrac i ng . 
Redarding time , ntime bel ongs to the soul , as eternity 
I 
to mind, 111 soul be i ng the connection bet "~:..re en eternal bei ng and 
the tempqral things Hhic h it generates by the ) Ower which it 
receives frol!J its cause.35 
3 2 .! ~vhi t "cake r, NP , 60 ; Enn. v, 4, 1. 
33J Note the similarity of t h is i dea to the Christian 
i dea of Jlove. 
34 j Note also the similarity of th is i dea to the He -
brevv-Chr~ st ian i dea of tt original sin . lf 
35 j Whitt ake r, NP , 64 ; Enn . iii, 7 , 4. 
I 
i v . 1-\. ou linas 's Deus -- Cr eation. ex ~ li hilo o 
I 
The ue ~lie val vie H of crea tL;n j_s ;x~ sed u JOG the con-
1 
cept : 11Go d a l one is -,dt ho ut !J e g inning on .Jt o 'lltomas ·· qui n as , 
I 
"~rw d e vq t.; ed pe r haps <:.ts .iluch s:;Ja. c e a s an y of th2 ::; c 1wl a~ti c s 
to t h e que :3t i on ( a questio11 vrhi cL d i d n o t con:3-'c i tv. te one of 
I 
·~he _, ore i ui)Ort ·.< n"c i s:.:5 ues oi.' tile L:L dC: l e Age s ) , he l d c l t.t God 
( Deus ) is the creaLu r of a ll 
I 
. 1 • 
"G ll l _  ;s . TLe Ch rL; t ia· Go d i s 
I 
a ll Chri 't ian ph i losophy , a nd i t 1va s not 1·1 a to , i t 1-'ms not 
even Ar Ls t o t l e , i t was I•.io s e s who put it l n p o s i t ion . n36 
I 
But vvh l le r ej e ctL1g the Je i ci es of - l ato a_ J Ari s -
r 
t o "G le , 1 qu:Lnas s till s h::..re d c e r t ain al l ie d conce .::Jt i o .. . s 0 
.r'irst , Lh,:; vJO rld of I cl e c.S , · r a. Lher than exis tin~ ii1d epend,~nt ­
l 
l y of t hing s ( Pl a.to ' s ~&rly vi evr) is 11 i a the d-; ·v ine r; in ' , 
i o e ., ay the th ou ght s wh ich Go d , before the c r e a t i on of L-~1e 
vmrl d , h ad of ·:::.he t hin c, s t o be crea ced . n 3 7 .Jec ond l y , 
A . I - l q u lildS S l C e s wi th ? l ato tho.t , God i s t he effici ent c a us e 
I 
of t h e vro r l d , i D di st ~n cti on both to a ri st ot l e ' s a n d 
lotinu~ ' v i e io·is tha t God creat es by att r acti on a nd emana-
t i on r espectively . Thirdly , Aqui n a s a cc ept s mo s t vig o r -
ous l y t h e v i ew that t h e pagan t hinker s , r athe r than e x -
1 plaini r\~ ~ t i1 e v.ro rld exis c;s s iixp ly e::1.1 l a i n v:hat i t is . 3 8 
------- ------
I 
3 6 . Gilso n , ~ 2 , 5 1 . 
3?
1
• Th i s , of cour s e , is a re :.:.,l ing of r l .:~t o i n the 
eyes of f lot i nus ~10 i nfl u en ced Aqui nas strong l y . 
I 
3 c' ij . Gil son , 0 ... . :P , .) ') 0 
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They are "speaki ng of be coo i ng in particular --that is , from 
form to fo lL:l . • • • But here Ne are s peak i ng of t hi ngs a ccord-
I 
ing t o t heir corn i ng f orth from the universal pri nciple of 
I 
being . TT 39 It seems here , however , that Aquinas is beggi ng 
I 
the ques t i on . For by call ing God aBe ing" from which noeingn 
come s (creat i o ) and forbi dding u s to inquire concerning t he 
23 
ground apd ) roces s b y ~orhich this is done , qu :i.nas , it appears , 
has even more s s riously f a iled to answer ~1y it exi st s . He 
has even failed to say what exists; i t simpl y is l 
In 'pursuance of this question , a t~te ntion must be called 
to a centra l di vergence of the ttangelic doctor" from the 
pa gan p~ilosophers , viz ., re gar ding the doctrine of creatio 
ex nih i io . I n ho l ding to this doctrine , i1. qui nas si ;-nply gives 
I 
argurr1ento to support conclusions vvhi ch we re i n t he Christi an 
I 
mi nd all along . Some of these rnight be expr esse d t his way : 
If matter were uncreated , it woul d be equal with 
God--and a second God . If t h ere were two first 
princip les , t hey ..,.,lOuld be inco r~u .mnicab le without 
a t h ird , vil'l i ch wou l d be the ultimate principle . 
? l a i nly the one must come f r om the other , and yet 
mor e J?lainly , mat ter from God r athe r t!:1an the re -
verse . To be Lord of all , God r1mst have created 
1 a tter . I f i t were uncreated , t he world could 
not be const r ucted out of it , for it could not 
be rec ept ive of the qu a lities v.rh i ch God \vished 
to i upose upon it , unless Go d himself had 1:1ade 
it such as he wish ed it t o be . 40 
39. Sw1 . Th ., I , q . 44 , a . 3 . 
40. J. Strachan , Art . (1928) , 229 . 
I 
In answe r to t he questi on 11 \ h et 1 er t o create is t o make 
something f r om not -ling ?" Aqu inas a nswe r s that 
I 
wha:t p roceeds by a particular emanat i on is n ot 
presu~posed t o t ha t ema nat ion ••• Hence i f t he 
emabat i on of the vvho l e unive r sal be i ng [ Not e 
nbe,ing TI is n o t TT Being . n J f r o r11 the f irst pr in -
cip l e be cons idered , it is i.. ,poss i ble that any 
be i ng should be presuJposed t o this emanation . 
Now not :_ing is t he s ame a s no - be i ng . Therefore as 
the creat ion of a nan p resupp oses t h e non- being , 
wh j;c h is non- man , so creation, whi ch is the emana -
tion of all
4
b e ing , p r esupposes t h e n on .,. be i ng v·Ihich 
is 1nothing . J.. 
It is obvious that discussion cou l d co n tinue ad in -
fj_nitum 1on t h is po i nt . But it -vvo u ld exceed the s c ope of the 
pre sent study . One more point reLlains , however , t o be 
b r ought out in c onc l usion . 
Tha t is that b.qu i as confirrns 
I 
h is d o c trine b y Scripture , cit-
ing Gen l 1:1 i n the V1.:lgate and 
apparent ly followi ng the g lossary 
i n ma intai n i ng that creare means 
I 
' absque 1rnater i a pr aejacen te ali-
. d . I , t 42 • ; 1 l qul l n esse p roQucere . \Iv a s 1 
ri,-orld & 
Time 
Fig . 4 
notes t hat St. Thomas Tlmad e n o AQUINA3 ' CREATI N EX NI HI LC 
mention of the e arly Lat in translation fe cit, and k new little 
) / 
of the Gr eek £TiOl."}uC:V and st.ill less of the orig i na l Hebrew 
bar an which 1 eans literally nto s p lit , d ivid e , or sepa rate . n43 
41 . Suu . Th . , I , q . 46 , a . 1. 
42 . Ibid ., I, 45 , a . 1, #3. Cited i n TJal sh , DOC , 13 . 
43 . Casanowicz , Art . (1916 ), 52 . 
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I n the light of chese fact s , it a p1Jears quite cert e:~ . i n t ho.t 
the a ut ..hb r i ty of rev~ lat ion cannot be cl a L 1ed a::> c onfirma -
1 
25 
tion for t:~ e d oc t r ine . C onseque~1 t ly , it s trut h a s r-ln e - p l a na ..:.. 
ti on mus
1
t n . st on i i::.s ovn1 va l u e i n rela ti on to othe r e ., l ana -
I 
~lit J. 1 r e gar d to nt :LI;le n .A.qu l nas f ollovvs clos e l y t he Pl a -
1 
t onic v i 2vr t.._at t::1e world h;.;s not existe d from a ll ete r nity . 
TT rJoth j_n,:::-. ax c e yt God c .s.n be ~:terna l . n h4 But , he c on-cin e: :s , 
I 
nit i s not "ch e:: r e fore n e ce s sary for the wo rl d t o oe a l way s ; 
hen c .a ne i the r can i t be proved demonstrat;ively . 11 4 5 On the 
c on c. r c:tr}i , i t v..ras c a lled in to e x isten c e out of noth inG by 
I 
Go ,_( ' 3 e:llmi1.,J.1ty .... ovr~; r c-tt a d et Jr"~dna te i nstant , vri t h v,;h ich I . " 
instaut 1t i me i t :s e l l begc.~ n . 46 This c onclu sio n j_s nacl. e c e r -
t ·• in oniy by J.~e ve lati on . 47 The adequa cy of thi .J view of 
I 
tiu e uitl be chaJlei\~>:d l a t er in th e c_li;:;s r.:;r t a tion . 
v. Swarra r y an d r r ob l C!I:1s . 
The four t y-') 0S of t h eological exp l anation Hhich have 
I b e en c Lo .:; e "1 and di s cussed e::.b ove cen Le r u nani mously about 
bei ng u s e i n 
a sense 1 so as to i nc 1 u d e e a ch thinLer' s i d e a of the 
s u p r e me Bein g . The cre c:.. t i ve p r i n c i p 1 e , i n so 
I 
far as ~ t can be d i:3cer 11e<.l i n thes e ti1inker s , i s n ot J efined 
as uucl:1, but 1,1 u s t be i nferred f r om. t h e c at e g o r i e s 
wh i ch t h ey use i n the ir ex 1)l anati uns of t he o r i g i n of t h e W1iverse . 
Swn . Th . , I , h6 , a • l. 46 . C -.0 ~ l Y't r_r ' l. • uU.!d • ~ • , 
45 . 
I 
Loc . cit . 47 . I bid ., I , 1~6 , a . 2 . 
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This search i s e l us i v e . It i s j_n v o l v e d , i n one vmy or ano ther , 
wi th eve~y ~art of t heir syst ems . Howe ver, t o d i s cove r the 
mos t rel ~ vant ~o i~ts of r efe rence for the t h ou 0 ht of Berg an , 
Alexande~ , a nd Whi tehead , the cate gori e s of c a usa lity , ti Je , 
I 
a n d spac~ , were s elected f or speci a l n ot ic e . 
1) . Agreeme_lt s of a ll four t h i nkers: 
i) . Th e de ity is to be t houg l1t of a s i n s orn e r ea l 
way i d en 1t i f ied wit h t h e e ter nal , i.e., \.vi t h t ha t v.rh ich is 
above cha n g e e:m J i rap erf ectio11 of any sort . ( Th is is t rue 
I 
more of l a ta ' s Repu b l i c tha n of the Tima eus .) 
ii). The })h e n omena l wor l d ha s a l es s e r p l a ce 
t han th~ d e ity. All a g r ee , hov:ever , tha t t h e world mu st 
d e p en d :i:n some way u p on t he de ity . 
I 
1
iii). Accepting th e princip le tha t t h e lowe r mu s t 
be de ri~ed f r om t h e high er , t h ey all a g r e e t hat t he d e ity 
is at l eas t t h e sou rc e and end of al l phe nomenal ex i st e n ce . 
2 ). Di ff e ren ces amon g the fo ur t h i nkers : 
i). Th ere i s d i sag reement reg d r d ing t he p r e s e n c e 
of anydling ot h e r t han t h e d e i t y out of wh i ch the , -orld i s 
I 
f ash ion e d . Aqu ina s and 1Jl ot inus deny t hat t he r e i s anyth ing 
e l s e bes i d es t he Jeity . · ri stot l e , wh i le holdi ~·1g t o a non-
ex i s t ent pure pat e t i ality , provi J es i t as a mere l y l o i c a l 
c ounte r ·Jart f o r t h e de i ty . Pl a to ~ lone p r ovi de s ( i n t he 
Tin a eus ) a Recep t a cl e , c o- et e r na l with the I d e a s a n d t he 
D egiurg~ , out of ~1i ch t he world i s made . Bu t even he r e the 
i d ea of n ot - Bein g , or em ty cha otic s pa ce , is i n t e nde d ~1i ch 
r e nde r s t he concep t l ess cl e a r. 
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ii). Disagreement is not ic e d wi th resp e c ~ to t h e 
nature of the 11 s t uffH out of vJhi ch the unive r se i s made . 
Th e view~ v a ry from the eternal an d chaot ic empt y spa ce of 
P l ato , t h e non- exi stent p ot entia lity that cra v es to be a ctua l 
of Arist1b tle , and t he d eity itself who over flm;s ou t of its 
I 
sup erabuf1danc e of be i ng of Plotinus , t o t he absolute noth i ng 
of Aquinlas . 
I 
jiii) Furthe r di s a~re emen t i s found i n t h e v i ews of ti lli e . or P~ ato and Aquinas time appear s to ) e created 
v;hen t h e, world 1-ms created . For Plotinus, time belongs t o 
Soul, · oJ e of t Le ema n <::. tion s of the ntirn e le ss:r · ..,n e . Time 
is real ,I it seems for Ari s tot l e only, sinc e . the \•rorld , and 
t h u s 1.1oJ ion , has a l ways exi st-ed although no t in pure forrn ; 
t hus til.e , as t he mea sure of moti on , has a l v.Jays e x i s ted . 
I iv). Re g a r d ing space, the ancien t cosmolog i es 
showed ~reat variat ion a l so . P l a t o' s R~ cept acl e no t only 
was the : e mpty void of Democ ritus , but it al so was c 1aotic 
as Demdcritus ' s 1nras not and p ossef:;sed t h e ,'OVIer to r ea c t 
I n h • l ' t ' • ' -'- ] - f • t by :11e c:~nr oi n ee an1ca ne ces s l y . 1-l.rl S"GOv .e s v1ew , s e para · -
. 
1t d ' ' h 'd (.> d t ' . l't ' d d 1ng a s 1 1a t e 1 ea o r space an· ~o encl a 1 y , cons 1 ere 
I 
spa c e tb be bot h f i n i t e in s ize and eternal. Plotinus a nd 
Aqui n a s conceive s· ac e t o h ave been the p roduct of the ac ti v-
ity of ~he deity . 
I 
3) I. Probl ems : 
I i). Does an expl anatio n o f the ul tiuate orig i n of 
t h i ngs l uffice to explai n the ongoing p roce ss , the d e v e l opment 
and nov~ lty which is found in the worl d? 
I 
I 
I 
2$ 
ii) . Given a n eterna l a n d - c; r fe c t, b~ ing a.:o the 
ori g i n a , d e:1.d of t l1 e wor l d 1Jrocess , d oe s t his s at i sL:tctor-
ily ex1Jl a i n the T e sence of anytlli ng oth e r t han the }le r fe ct 
c-~nd t n e .e ternal ? 
iii) . I n v i e1-v· of the v ,~ ry g r ea t div :~ rge n c e of o p i n i on 
re ga rdi~g space an d t i me , how shoul d these co ace~ts be re -
gar d ed? , 
Th ~se ~ro b lems a re a few of thos2 w1 i ch a re encou n t e r ed 
i n t h e t h o u gl1 t of l:. t ese g r e at c osmolog i s ~s . To be m-m re 
of t hese p roblems i ci n e c e .:o s a ry i f t he t h r ee rec en t c om olo-
g ie s to be d i s cus s e d l ate r a re t o be under s t ood . 
2 . ·Th e Scienti f ic React ions · ga i nst FL1al Ca uses 
The "divine te l e o logy" wh :L cl1 had been be5un by Pl a to , 
had b e en r a i se d to i ts highest poiu t by Aris totle , a nd had 
been la~e r 11.odif i e d by Pl oti nus and Aquina0 , enc 01.:tr1-ce re d i n 
t h e se v e nt eenth cent u r y st r ong o_t,> po s i ti on- - a n op p osition 
which via s a l most t o eclip se the r e i gn of Ufi nal c a uses" 
i a @an ' s understan d i ng of n a ture . The s o urce of this 
opposit~ on c c..u1 e f r ora the d evelopment of mode r n science . 4$ 
·\. t . l eas t t wo factors , bo t h of whi ch p l a yed a key role 
i n t hi s ' sc i en ti f ic r eaction , d eserve me n t i on h ere . 
48. For an excellen t d i s cussion of the s ci e ntif ic a nd 
phi lo soph ical c urrents prevaili~g i n t his ~eri od , 1hitehead ' s 
.:3 \1\J is i n v a luab l e . 
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The fi rst , vrhich d i ffe r ed r ad ica lly from t h e aut h ori t, a t i ve 
::m d dedu,ctive r:1ethoJ. o f Sc ho l o.s ticism, vms seen i n the 
a ·J )eal l'lh ich 1'ra;;; mad e e s)ecially b ,- Bac on an J Gal ileo t o the 
autho rity of "brute fa c t ;:;tt \illich , while still re cog 1i z i n g 
I 
t he v a lue C::.nd ne e d of r e e. son , nev e rthele ss rega r d e d it self 
as the sta rti:1g p oL 1t of invest i gation c: nd i t.3 fi n a l a r b i -
ter . 49 'Galileo ' s work s t ovved t hat t h e S ch olast ic and l··ri s -
totelian concepti on of the wo rld , i. e ., as a p2 r fe c t un i on 
of TTfac t sn a.'1d nvalues , n t o use mode rn ter mi nology , was n o 
lo 1ge r adaquate , s i n ce obsGrva t i o n a.11d experi1 1ent had re -
veal ed the r (jc:.;_ l vm rld ·t,o b e no t h1ng but parti cles of 1 atte r 
i .n notion . 50 
The s e c ond f a c t or v-.rhic h p l ayed so i L1portdnt a part i n 
the ri Sy of modern science 1·.ras t he de velopr.1en t v.rhj_ ch took 
~lace i h t h e fie l d of 1atheoa~ics . This d eve lopment , and 
espe cia lly th e 
do11 i n a nce of the i dea of f w.l.c t i on a lit y i n the ab -
stra ct s phere of mathematics f ou nd it s elf refle c-
ted i n tl~ ord er o nature und er the gui s e of 
ma:ther,lat ic all- · expres s ed l a i,TS or na ·cure . .A. _~.;a rt 
fro;,n t hi.s prog r es s of matheraatics , th e seven-
te enth century d evelopme nts o i.' ;:; cien ce would have 
b e e n L apossible . 51 
The effe c t of t hi s La t he nat i c a l d e v e lopment , a 11o ng other 
t h i ngs , uas t o ) rovid e o ·oportunity for the shift~ v>~b.ich c arne 
about f row Ari stotelian d octri 1e of class i f icatio n to the 
moder~ 1 d oct rine of measureHtent , 52 and by t he end of t h e 
49 . Cf . Damp i er , HOu , x v. 51. Vlh i ·t e h e a d , SI--M , 46 . 
50 . Dm;1pier, I-IU.J , xvi. 52 . Cf . 1Jh i t ._head , 01:!<. -, / / oo . 
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seventeenth centur y ~hy s ic s was ~rovi ded with a sati3factory 
b a s i s of measur eme1t . 
I t \vas .Sir I saac Ne i.vton , born the v ery year that Gal i -
' 
leo J i ed , wlw c a rri ed o ... 1 the wo r k 1vhich Gali l eo llad c on1 ;1en c ed . 
I n the ? ;rin cip i a , which a ,J_tJear ed i n 1687 , the ~hy sic al <:Eld 
uathematic a l basis was r; i ven to the cosmology whi c h v.ras t o 
dou i na·ce s cience fo r t vm hund red yaar s . 53 Briefly , Newton ' s 
vie\'i co11ce i vcd of t h e unive r s e a s an i nfi nit e and abso l ute 
I 
s pa ce i n ~tich bodies , o r masses , move a ccor d i ng to fi~ed 
.athematic al laws i mp osed by Di v in e de cree , it an absolute ly 
uniforrt~ , ILtathernati c al th1e . Th:;_s v i ew, appea ling a s it 
does to metaphysical speculation only by j o i i~g space \ i th 
the 11 senso ri-urn of the divi ne nature , ·1' nvvi l l s "ca nd for al l 
tiue as a clea.r an;J d i s Li uct ::>~~/stem of i d e a s , Hi th l arg e 
a p l i cat.ions . ny c osmo logy must ba ca?ab l e of ~ t e r~ret ing 
Such , t hen , vias the result of t h e seventeenth "centur y 
of tt en i usn 2 s \ihi t;ehead ca ll::> it . 55 Tlhat are the i nmlic a -
~=> . .I. 
t ions .lor the ... r oblern of this d i ssertation? 
Fir 3 t of al l , there was a s h ift f r om the rned i eval 
considerat i on of fin a l c auses to t he neglected s phere of 
effie ient c a uses . With t hi,::; chane e in empha sis at te:1t i on 
53 . l'.ria ch , De r He chanik i n i h r e r Entwickelung , 1883 , 
ac cording to Damp i e r , H00 , 1 5 5 , vras t h e fir st se r ious l y to 
quest ion Ne-iton ' s uncl e rlyL1g assumptions . 
54 . Whi tehead , AI, 168 . 
55 . SI.:vi , Ch . III . 
v>as J irec ted f r o1.1 inqui r y re garding the ultir ate o r igin o f 
t l1e worl J to ob servatio11s c o c e r ning the nature of t e vio rld 
an.d the ue lief th c.,.t these L110 quest i G.1S are not only of un -
2qu <J.l imp ortaace bu t are qt e stio~::; i·vh:ich it, is not •3ven 
1ecedsa r y to render c on s i d~ent . 
· e c on .lly , and i n c un ::J8q_uenc e of t his ohift of a t ten-
tion and va:::..u a tion , and s upport ed by 0he Ne1·r .. :.mian me chanics , 
d er.:; u. evelO_!..J 8d a ille chan ica l philoso:)hy , aCC OI' ' ll1[; to Hhicll 
1;a s t Ec11 J fu vt.re -vw re t~1e oretic ally c alculab l e , 56 a nd a ma-
'-'7 t ,J riali ~tic pLilosop~ y oi' :;h e c rv.dest ::;o rt . J 
I t Hill b e ne c es::>dr y here to p o ... nt out some of t h e 
un J erlying as .:n.J.EJpti o~ls mad e by seventeentl1 c entury science 
bec c.use to a l u r go .1 egr e ·;j they h 2,ve beo ll r~ sp o.J.t;il.Jle f or 
error ._, t- o VJ'" ic~~ nany 1, h ilos o p~_e rs of tll:~ so - ca ll ed .11 0d e r n 
wllich the txnnker s to be l:.re a t e el in t His d L .3 :::~c rt <..J. ti OJl h ~.:ye 
se em :;h o need t o r id L;hel1ls e l ve s . 
Tlle fir st <'.:. S3t' 1pti on f ol loHs f r on1 tho c on c e 1.] t o:' l:- :.•. 11e 
c s u.0 ::;olute : tin e is coLmos ed of &!1 infini te s1~ cc es::> i 011 of 
ins t anc s . 'l1hi .J idea wa..:; first exr-res ,::; ed by Zeno , an - ? 
ir ac ce", te d , a tlt.l r i ~:~ i c' ly a cLered tu , re suh:; s i n tile r i l1t Lo 
uedy chc-H1g e any reali ty . 
57 . ' hitehead , AI , 155 , 1)6 . 
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The I s ec ond a ssmnption follows f r oi, the c oncep t of sp a ce 
as ab solu te : spa ce i s an infinit e vo i d , e~~endi~g i n a l l 
dire c tio~ s , i n tfu i c h t h ing s are s i mp l y loca t ed . This con-
------~------
cept i s sL_ply the r e stat8Elent of t h e vo i d of De mocritus , 
I 
t h e Recerrt a cle of PLrt o , the p ure ( but non - existent) lJ Oten-
ti a lity bf Lri s totle , t h e matter o f P l ot i n u s , a n d the n i h il 
I 
of Aquina s . 
I 
r he l t hi r d asSUl~lption follov!S f r ou t he c on cep t of matt e r 
as c o11crete : matter is _f ull y i tse l f in an y r-iven i n .st _<:Ult 
of tira e . Th i s a s s w:nption ma y be t r aced t h r out£h Hobbe s bc:. c k 
to Demo c:r·i tu:3 c.n cl ~cL e I onian phys ici s t s . 
I 
'l'h e four·th a ssumption fo llovm t h e ear l i e r S c holast ic 
and Ari stoteli a n doct rine of s ubstan ce: sub s~ance id ~ 
.s ub ::;cr·a L UJ~l i n vvhi c > ov.a l itie s i nhere . 58 
I 
It cLs t h e contention of 1,-Jh j_ t e hea d t ha t the a ttril:rution 
of 11 u i s p l a c e d conc r eten e s sa to t he a ::; s tra ctions of nma G t e r 
I 
I 
·with it s s i npl e lo c a tion i n spac e and time , n a nd " ;-nind , 
~ erceivih 7 sufferin~ rea s onin ~ , but n o~ i n te r fe ring , " ~J j o ' · o ' ,~ -~ 
ha :s been t he n.: ina t ion of mo dern p hi losop h y a n d ha s for ce d 
it t o o s ,cilla te be t vleen dual i sw, i de a l i s1.1, a nd ;,1ateri a l i s m 
ever s i 11ce . 59 
58 . Cf . 1Hhit e head , 3 -i\·~' , CH. III, 1ivhe r e the se a s sum-
tio. ~are re du ce d i n ntmilie r t o two : viz ., the f al l a cy of 
n si;·,lp le loc ;::.. t i onn a n d t i1 e 11 .falla c y of L> i sp l aced co n crete -
ness . n 
59 . , I b i d ., 51-82 . 
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I t Hi l l be emb u.r Li ng upon a d i 6 r e s sion i f ad e:L.t ended 
Jj_s cussi on i s Eia:i e here of the philo s op~w rs of ~he ei;:;llteent :! 
ce n·tur y . I t v1:i. l l s1..~ffi c e to sa.y t .1 at:; fo r the i"l103t a r t they 
a t te .1_r: t:.:d to r e con cile t h ,3 r eJ. c:t i o ~1 of ilt&cte r and rtl i wl ·vii1ile 
2.t tl1e sa1;1e t i 1r1e i:. l1 ey a. cc e pte d Uw G.SSU.ul) t i o ,ls not ed c_bov e 
anJ , i n son1e Fay a t l east , uaintai ned t he i d Ga of t he cle i ty 
i n s o1;1e k i n d of relat i on to the univ er s e . Tl:..e sy s t eus of 
D e ~c rates , SpinG ~a , Le i bni z , Be r k eley, and He s e l , t oge t he r 
v.;ith t h e .Jri l liant c r iti c isms of Lo c . ~ e, Hu 11e , a.nJ Ka_r , had 
~uc c e e · e d , i a varyi n cc; <.l eg re e s , i n f r ee i ng the 111o J. ern I: i n<.l 
f r om tl te .:.>.utlw ri ty of 0c h olas ticism. They h i:tcl no t y et , 
t he n evr rnatllerJlatic a l s ci e c e heLl. a c cc;pt e d .10 r in i ute g r at -
wh icn -~lle ne ~: scie ,lt i fi c .. 1..:'~ s c overi e :.> v1ere b r i lliant l y d is-
~J lay in;:·; . 
::::> !lf.lari z i n~_, thEi: ,3ff e ct of d1e s c i en t i..L i c r ::: a cti o""l c.::.,:;a in ~t 
t !te · se of f j_nal causes by t he .S c hoLl :s ~ i c s a~r.i the i r 11re d e -
c essor i , it way be sai~ t n2t : 
1) . HGi:;entiol s1tiftcJ , L-1 lar~~J pc;_r t , b1..t ~ -ot e .lt i r.;;ly , 
frow ·~h,e que.J t i b~l c f the ori g i n of t he univer ~->e t o t ... 1e ques -
t i on of t he na t ure of the unive r se . 
2) • Th e co:1fusion whi c £.1 haJ b een O.)·' a r ent r gc..rd i n g 
s pace G.nd t i me "~!vas d i ss i ~J<-1.t.eci. SOi11et·rhat i)y i nves ti ng t he.:.;e 
conc epts vlit,h t h e s c:~He qu ali t y of aosolut ene s s wh ich t h e 
an c i ent co snolo6 i sts ha J &0t r i buted t o t 1e de ity . 6o 
60 . Cf . l e:;-_ande r t s S'l'D. 
J ). Tl e p1ys i ca l worlJ , r~~h e r t h an be i ng r a ~ard e d a s 
s ohl ethi ng to b e J e~re ciated , was c ons i de red at l e&s~ eternal 
i n Ju r at i on a n · infini te in extens i on , i f no t of as rnuch 
va l u e a s t h e ·e i ty . 
4 ). 11e eterna l _ I c.e as o' the ancie ts b e e · 1e ~ rc.tns ­
fornied into t he i d ea of na·u r al l a w which ' o ve r ned t he b e -
havi or of t he oa teria l worl d . 
I t May be t~ st ion a d , howe v er , whet he r t h e p r oblems 
whic "·1 w8 re n oted vii th r 2 s1)e ct to the t L eo l o · ,ic a l v i e1.·1s h <oL ve 
a ll bee n an~wered b: t he s cientific view. 
Firs t of a ll , v.rhile an e x.t-J l c.mation of t :1e ultiLlate 
ori,~in of t ilL g s J o 2s n ot ;:;e r se s uff ice t o e:.;:-)la i n t he on-
g o i n g ) r o cess Hi th i · s n ovelty and deve lopment , it is no t 
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at a l l c 'e rt <:: i n th a t the Ile[dect of the ult :L:..,at e ori g i n vlill 
mak thaL. 8XiJ l anation any e as i er ol~ rao re accura ~ e . Rctthe r 
t-h e;_n c ent ering at, te n t i o n Ui j On tl-1e lJartic, l a nd one - s i d e d s tudy 
of the 1) rob le11t , i t is mo re coherent to t a ke b o t h sides of 
~he pr obl em into accoun t . 
3ecolldly , ilnJ i n c o ·1se quence o' t h e 1ec:-; l ect o .:· fina l 
ca u ses , h ow i s it possible at all to a cc ount for de v e l opnent 
and n ov e lty i n the world if a ll i s under the r e i gn of n a tur a l 
lav.r vrh i c ~l i s f i xed '"_nd et'"' r n a l? 
It mu !::i t b e a wti t ·ce d , hm·reve r , that tl1e s c ie_ l~ i fic att i -
tuJe i w rove d u ·j o : the p r e - s ci entifi c spe culm~io ns i n t ha t 
i freed thou f; 1t about th e world f r om the d ic t at i on of h rHan 
autho r i ty ancl p l i:..ce cl. thought 'Jefore the 3l.J.thority ofe.xper.i.enced f a ct . 
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I t r end:3red ::::pace <::•. nc.l t-iLle rttore c oherent anc[ b y fr ee i n e; t lOU0 ht 
f r om th0 conlines of l og ic and i n t r oduc i ng i t to weasu r ement 
i t ope:aed new a venues oi' de v e l opment b (.; f ore undr e2 ..ned of . 
Thi r J l y , the p r oblem of the um·mr ranted a s surJ"Jtious 1·Jh i c ·_ 
v e r e me.:. .. : e by mo de r u s c i enc e and mo d ern philo s ophy stil l r e -
lila i ns . It was for the th ought in t he l a t e r nin e t eenth c e n -
tur y and ea r l y tuent i e t b c entur y to r e v eal these weakne sses . 
J . Re c ent Te nde n c i es 
I n the gr eat advan c e whi ch .ta r ked t he n ineteenth c en-
t u r y , the fo c a l p o i n t of i nte r est shif t ed f r Ol!l a st r onoL y 
and 1Jhy ..::> i C.:> to c; eo logy , b i ol ogy , an d the ;>he 10mena of lL. e . 
c.t nvL1 , des cri be d :. s !!the 1Jm·.rton of bi o l o6. , " h'6.3 t he cer1t ral 
f isure of ninete ·:::nth c e:·1tury thou,;ht . 61 Th i s n e1-1 i fil,t) c tus 
vvllic !. v.ras felt fro,_ b iolO c'S vk:J b ourd t o .:; i v e i'resh c a ·s e 
for re1m .al of ~ ~e ~g e - old con~ rov ersy , genera lly kno~~ i n 
b i ology C.Jl _; _ _r)hi l o s ojJh- as the 111ae c 1a11i sr:l- v i tali sm 11 i ssu e . 
Hi.::>toric .... lly , the 11 vi nli.sts n h& ve lL; l d st r ong ly to the exi s -
t.en c e of a :J1J ecia l 'vi t 2l 11 o r " li f e - r.; i v i n :_!; 11 fo rc e vrhic h i s 
the suurce of t h e ch :.: r acteri 0t :Lc p h en omena of l if e ; 1-,rhe rea s 
the '11:1e c hc.mist:s' h ;~_ve ,_~ u ~t as st. r on ; l y h e l d no t only tha t 
such · "fo rc e 11 i s unne c essar y, but a l so th a t ulti:.tE•. t e l y 
al l th e p!t ellOI11 ena of 11 lif e n "''rill fL1d a phys ic o- ch eu i cal 
exp lanat ion . 
It i s of s 1)e c i a l i,lte r est to the p r esent study to exan i n e 
b r i efl _, O!le of c. h0 uost inge .liou s , un J cert i..5nl y the Tl!O.Jt 
c elebra~ed , e ;~ampl es of n e o- v i L cl i sm , the vie1·.r of Ha 1s !Jri es ch . 
61 . Damp i e r - 'l'Jhe tha11 , I O.j , 269 . 
The iollowi n g; ske tc l1 i s 1)rese nted n o t , b = a ny Elea:n::; , as a11 
a Jequat2 t r8u~~aJt of a i · h · ~ r ~ rie s ch ' s v iews or o f neo -
v i t <:d i 3iil . It i 3 r c.;_ t:.he r t o S c rv,:~ a s a typ ica l L odel 0 n the 
vi t,::.listic rno ve,nen t vih:i_ch macl e c.... s "ci r i::1 bi o l o,:; ic a l Etnd 
philos o~~ic al c ircles Jurin g Lhe f ir J ~ two or t h r ee d e c aJe s 
of the t v.Ja n t i e t h century . I t i s ho~:J ecl t hat there \•ri l l a ri s e 
i n the f o llov;ing; , · L:;cus si on c e rt e:~ iil p r o b l eElS wh ic l1 a r e b :::..Gic 
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to Berg Gon ' s doctri ne of tha ~lan v i tal , l a ter to be di s cusse d . 
Not in1lil'lt 1e f r o :1 -c. . e se J i s ct .. ss i.o:1s , vr 1ici~ oc cu)ie d a g r eat 
d e u l of ti~ ~ , du ri ~g the fi r s t part o f t he t went i eth century , 
were t Lo::;e vwo souf;ht to i nvrove on t he theorie ::> o r' e volu-
tion vrhi ch , u1..~ t o t ~ .. e -ct:r'1 of the c entur y had been l a r ge l y 
Jomi 1 <-:tte ~l by me chan :i_s t ic t l'link i ng ;me had ignor ed l u. r ge ly t h e 
c l a i uls of l)hilos ophe r::; fo r consiJe r at i on of fi nal causes . 
·--er ht.;~ps the 1110 ,,; t i ra1jort ant of these nev.J t he ories , · and c e rta i n -
l y t h e one whi c h h.:l3 t he g r ea est sLti lari t y to t.;' e v i ev..rs of 
b at,1ue l Ale:~anu e r , i 3 the v i ew of " era<3 r g.:: n t ..:: volut i on n of t h e 
v2 r i e ty ma d e ~opula r by LloyJ Worg~n . The r ei'ore a brier 
loo K ', ·rili be t c:,k e n a t the v i evJ of Horg :..:. n v;i th the aL1, a~~a in 
not of i11 any w&y exlib.US -cing it , but with the llop e of l ocat -
i ng c c: r t .. ti n problelil3 whi c h l exan c r ' ;:; vi c:'H u i ght ha ve to l<J. ce . 
The l a .::; -c tenJ enc y i::.o d e c erve 111e n tion in t h i ::; h i .:J t.orical 
survey , and one whid1 affect s p :::rt icul ,.1 rly h.lexand2 r :_;_ i.1d 
Hhi teheal , i s ~:; e en i n the J eve l o}Jr, ::;nt \vh:L c i1 has L. aken ·:, l a ce 
i n th8 fio l ... . of )ll r::; ic s . Obviou3l y , L-hi s c e_:-1 only b8 rno3 t 
hastil y sketch e d . 
i . Dr i esch ' s Doct r ine of ''Ente l e chy . rr 
The neo - vit2.li sa Oi~ Hans Dr i es ch , 1 867 - 1 941 , h ::t. s been 
r efe r red to as the st ro nges~ d efense of the p osit ion , and 
on e t h e ing enui t y ,.;. _.1d c mL.si sten cy of -V':hi ch com1::anc:_ atlr,t i r a -
;- _; 0 ~'l 62 
u . L - • Born the s on a He a lthy ae r chant , J r ie::; c l i·J&D 
allow~d full libert.· t o d evot e h i m3 e l f to s c1en ce . e 
found hiL1se l f a.nt ::,gonistic both to oux a nd his p re - forma -
tio 1 thec r ' Etn.J t o Dar wi nisH", w~ 1ich l·'rl1e n still a youth he 
d e clc..;_re cJ.' to b e a t h L1g of th e }:)cl. St . li s untir i n g ze&l fo r 
experiLl8Jl t a l re s e a rc h and l1Ls e..n·c i - De.rivi ·lism t og e ther a ccoun-
ted f or h i s k een i ns i gi1 t into the v.;eakne s ses oi t h e o l d e r 
bi ologica l s ch ool . I n add i t i on , his ~ r onounce d s ~e cul a~ive 
t i on h::-1v2 cont ributed l c.l r gely t o the effectiveness of his 
- 63 vm r k . 
Dries ch 1'ras a very pr olifi c 1-ITi'l; e r . Hi ,::.; f i r st H8 r k , 
Analytis che f h e o r i e des Qrqc::..nische .l , l C9 4 , made h i u t he f i rst 
eXlJone lTt of the neo - v i talisti c 1::ovement . Nmne r ou.::; o t.h •: r 
I 
mo.:1o g r c..:..p l1.::3 and ;:n ·tic l es i n both Ent:; l i sh a nd Genrtad have 
a)Jpe a red a h10 2t cons t ant ly unt i l o n ly & f e1-r ye a r .:..> before 
·Io __;t no ·ce:1b le a r e his G i i.fo.~. d Lectur .~ s , T.1e 
.Sc i enc e ;:.nJ r.Ll i loso,)hy ol' t he Orgc=~nisrJ , 2 v ols .' LO i. l d O l l , 
62 . Cf . ~Je rkme i ster, PuJ , 1 6 :J ; cf. als o J . A . Thomson , 
;:) l i'J , 153 -
63 . ITorcl enskH3ld , HL- B, 608 . 
64 . Here inaft c~r thi s will be r efe rred t .o as 3PO. 
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The be~t summary of his position is found in the series of 
four l~ctures delivered at the University of London in 1913, 
The Prdblem of Individuality, London, 1914. 65 
I 
I 1). The "autonomy of life-phenomena." Driesch's now 
famous !experiment with the blastula of the sea-urchin 
, I 
revealed that when certain destructive operations, such as 
I . 
halving, application of pressure, etc., are performed upon 
the bl~stula, the injured organism would reconstitute itself 
and re~ult in a normal organism. On these grounds Driesch 
I 
assert~d that a living being forms a "harmoniously equipoten-
; 66 
tial SYjStem." On these grounds Driesch asserts that life-
phenom~na are "autonomous." This is the "first proof" of 
vitalidm. 67 The second and third "proofs,n or the argument 
from tJe genesis of the complex-equipotential systems and 
I 
' 
the ar~ument from the behavior of the organism, respectively, 
need nqt be dealt with since they all point to the same 
I 
conclu~ion, viz., that the animal is not a machine, for a 
I 
machin~ does not evolve out of its parts.68 
I 2). The "entelechy." In order to account for the 
impossJbility. of deriving the animate from the inanimate, 
' 
Driescl1 postulates the existence of an agency VJhich, 
I 
I 
borrow~ng an expression from Aristotle, he calls "entelechy." 
I 
6~. Hereinafter this will be referred to as POI. 
66. Driesch, SPO, I, 121; all citations in this section 
are fro~ Driesch unless otherwise noted. 
Cf. SPO, II, 95. 
SPO, II, 95; cf. also, Nordenski8ld, HOB, 609. 
Thi s TTentelechy 11 oe s not occur i n non- l i ving t ings , but i s 
confined to organ i sms , whe re it op e r ates in certa i1 ca ses , 
directin g t he cheru ico- _ysical process es s o t ha t thei r re -
sul ts are di ffe r ent f rom vrhat they v·:ould have been apart 
r9 fror.1 i ts i nt :: rv .;ntion . 0 
Fi g . 5 - I1J_,U3'.i'i:U l'I0 1~ GF &:e •'Rll· El' TS (Jlj .t£CHII·Tl.J0?0 
a
1 
and b~ - Nor mal gast rula and no r .1al p lutenus . 
a 2 and b - " Half" gastrula a nd nh2. lfn 1;l utenus , 
that ought to r esult from one of t 1e 
f irst. two blastomeres , when iso l a ted , 
a ccordir1g to tr e t heory of Tt evolut i o . 11 
a3 and b3 - The s mall but whole gast r 1:cla and pl uteus 
t ha t a ctual ly do r e sult . 
69 . Cf . dPO , II , 192 ff . 
70 . dapted f ro~ J PO , I , 62 . 
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' 
One ls i gnifica:tlt p o i nt must be not ed \vith resp e ct to 
Driesch ' s c oncept ion o f en t e lechy . Dri esch is ext remely 
reluct an~ t o make po sit ive statements about it . He speaks 
about i t 
1
i n ne ga-c i v e t e r m::; ul mo.st exclusively . For exar.1ple , 
I 
h e says : 
Ent~lechy i s no t en Gr gy , no t for c e , not i n t en-
sity , and n ot a constant , but-- entelechy . Furth e r , 
it ~ s not spa~ial , •.. it ~.i~es not possess extension ••. 
it ~nly acts 1n to spac e . 7 
Not onl y does he e ny tha t ente l e c hy is physico-chem ic a l , but 
it is a ls1 o ''not ' _psy chical ' . rt It do es not cn~ate en ;:; r gy , nor 
is it d eHer1dent up on e:rw r gy . 72 
I 
1 •T"\. I • t . . t. - t' t J:' vv11en 1·t comes to s t a ·1n 6 po s1 -lve l y -n.e na· u r e O.L the 
entele chy , the best Drie s ch seems a b l e t o do is to s a y 
I 
nit has to do ~-~ith t ll e ::;.rrangenLent of a raariif•) l dne ss 11 73 
th <..:.t 
t hus creating an orgE,nism . But t h i s arr angen-:::nt i s not to 
be whought oi as the ffect o f some power . Rath::; r i t has a 
I 
r1egat i ve 1 ei'i.'e ct, L1 that i t nmay suspend s uc h k i nd of h app en-
i ng a s v'Iot,ld occtr ii' not so sus 1Jenclecln and ;,1ay ·chen 11rela:; 
I 
i ts s u Sj_:J Jnso ry I)OHe r . 11 74 
40 
I n ih e l a ter sections of Vol . II of SPO , Driesch d evelop s 
h i s f ou r th p r oof of vitalism, the c::crgt~l!lent f r o:·:~ -v.rha t he c a lls 
n t h e in t rospective ana l ysi s o i ' compl ete g i ve ness . n 7 5 He not 
only a cl!ni ts thE,t this a pproa ch is a , i_epar t u re f r o111 -che p r ovince 
71 . 3PO , II , 201- 7 . 74 - Cf . POI , 3EL 
I 
72 . I P· I , 33 , 36 . 75 . 267 . 
73 . 
I 
Ibid . , 3 5. 
I 
I 
of biology , but he allows it to ca r ry him into "a Qaze of 
a bstr&ct i s ) ecula t i ons'1 th e ;_~ i st of v-~hich is th a:t lris o-,m 
pe rsonal ! c ond c i ousness l eads d irect l y to v i t &lism, at any 
r a te a. a fc.:. r GS h~ s ov'm bo dy i s con e erned . The sw.1e c o ~1 -
l 
clLS l O .. ls drc:-nv-:1 for other living b odies . 76 . 
I 
H.at ~1er th an a ttempti ng to ana l yze the me ri t 3 <:m·_;L de -
fe cts of j Dri esch ' s pos i t i on , it _m i g~1t b e a dvi sab l e to 
s ·ce:~ te sowe Ol the :tJ roblems which .are invo l v ed in t:.he ex ceed-
! 
I 
i 11gly comp lex co:1t roversy whi ch Dri e s ch revived betFeen 
I 
mechaniahl and '.Jit a l i sm. 77 I1·iany points of c .:.mt act Hith the 
I 
vieH oi' Be r g:son cc:m t lL: ~ r eby be est ::,b l ish ed for refe r enc e 
later v.:hbre the aclequc:ccy of t he vi t a. listic 1J o ~->it iod c an be 
i 
d eten; L1ed . 
I 
I 
The fol l ov-iln6 questions or p ro blems c;.r e c ert .:.tLlly 
I 
I 
i n vol veJ 1 by the me chani sc ic - vi tc:-lli s-~:.ic co nt. rov e r sy v.rhi ch 
r aged an
1
bw clur L1g ~he _,:'i r st J e c ad e or so of the :_, \ientiet~1 
centur y : 
1 
I 
l . ~[hat is 1•tea11t b•. "l!le chan i sm 11 ? 
2 . I Hl1<'l-t ;::ere che li~JL,s , if a~1y , of a mech c:m istic 
ex) l a112,t i o ~ 1 of nat ural phenoL:ena? 
3 . 
.)• 
/ o . 
7. 
8 . 
76 . 
I-lo1il u a11y ci. i ff e r ent theories s ;_dl u nder the coLlmon 
name of 11 vi t a lisi;1rr ? 
Do living b e i n t::: s in thei r stru c ture , g r o\v-th , b e -
h a vio r , e.::.;_h i bi t f eat ·u_res i n capab le ol' be i ng e: ~ ­
~; lai ned i n ~phy sic o - ch emi c a l t e rms ? 
I.:' 00 , ~Jus t 1re refer them t o a s p e c i a l vi tal force ? 
Hhat is the n2.t u:ce of this fore e? 
~lh :.-1. t is it:, s moJ e of ope r at i o:n? 
Can any theo r y Oil this p o .i.r1"t:. b e -~c:; sted a:n:J ve ri -
f i e d by ax)erima~t? 
C_,_, J. • Nord enskiBld , HOB , 609 . 
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?7 •· This li st is de rived froM Ho e rnl~ in his Art . (1918) , 
628 . 
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9. If not, is such a vital force anything more t han a 
fiction, at least for a science ~vhich seeks to be 
empirical? . 
10. Yet, without such a factor, is there any 'tfvay of 
accounting for the difference between the living 
and the non-living? 
11. vfuat, again, is the relation of biology to physics 
and chemistry? 
12. Is it a department of these latter sciences, or is 
it autonomous, vdth a field of facts and wi th char-
acteristic concepts of its own? 
13. Suppose we decide for its autonomy, how does this 
affect the i deal of a unified theory of nature? 
14 . Is there any relation between vitalism and human 
freedom? 
It might be said in conclusion that at least two major 
problems stand out from among those listed above . They are 
#4 and #5. A negative ans,>~er to the former constitutes the 
ho pe of mechanistic materialism; an affirmative answer to the 
latter is the ho pe of vitalism. It must be remembered that 
the disproof of one is not the proof of the other. 
ii. Morgan's "Emergent Evolution." 
Arising as a dual protest, i.e., against both mechanism 
and vitalism, the emergent evolution of C. Lloyd Morgan is 
one of the most conspicuous varieties of present-day evolu-
tionism. Morgan, 1852-1936, was a British scholar who, in 
addi tidn to a chieving fame as a philosopher, had earlier 
distinguished himself as a biologist and comparative psycholo-
gist. r"lorgan was greatly influenced by his study and work 
under T. H. Huxley, through whose encouragement the younger 
man turned his mind toward some of the problems which find 
exoression in his Emergent Evolution,78 the Gifford Lectures 
' 78; Hereinafter this will be referred~ as EE. 
for 1 922 . ? 9 In the p r es·ent d iscussio.:.1 , aft er establislli.ng 
sore definit i o~s , the wa i n outline s of Mo r gan ' s v i ew will 
be b riefly sket d1ed , a r1d s or,le of the re l a tions v1hi ch c-; ' : i s t 
be t we 8n ·energent e voluti on and vita lism and me chan i sm will 
be .wtecl . 
l ). 11 Evolutionn : 11 Evol ution , i n the b ro c.d s ..::n .3 e of 
hendi ve Jlan of seque n c e in a l l natur al so events . 11 r~rorgan 
l ate .r· d i st in~::;uishe s two sens es i n whj_ch t h e t~rm i s used : 
a ) 11 t l G• unfoldi ng o .L' tha t ••JhicJ.1 is enfolded ; t he r E:nd ering 
ex1Jl ici,t of tl:w.t whici} · s h i th Jrto i mp l i cit , nSl and b) 11 not 
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t h e v.nfolding of SOi:1eth L1g al r eaciy i 11 be i ng but •.. the out -
s print; :Lng of s maeth ing t hat has hith-2 rto not b ·:: en i n be L1g . ,~82 
' 
2 ): . nEme r g ent n : The c oncept of e r:1e r genc e is ac l ~ n owle d:;e d 
to g o ba ck a t l east as f e.r as J . S . lv ill who , i n hi s Lo ?~ic 83 
di scL:..sses it under t h e h2ad i ng of tThc t e ropat hic l a1·rs 11 in 
causat i oa . S4 The tern "er,Je rg~nt 17 v.ras fir.3t used by G. H . 
s ~ S6 Lewes ) i n 1 87 4 , v1h o co nt r asted i t wi th Tl re sul t ant . 11 
79 . E organ ' s E~ "~das pub l ished i n 1 923 , s ome s i x y ears 
ai'te r ' a~,me l Alexande r ' s GifforL.i Le ctur es , 0 pace , Ti,_, e , a ; d 
Ds i ty , vrere d e l ivered i 11 1917 and lC) l f~ , an d follo1 s the ua in 
feat~r~s of Al exand er ' s wo r k . In f a ct "the two exh i bit per-
haps t h e wo :.:;t u i d es.i.Jr eacl a gre ernent.s of any t,1·.:o naj or 1Jhiloso -
pl~e rs of our day , 11 ac cord i ng to Conger , H · . .:.: , 19 5. Hou e ver 
t hey 11or k ed :i:ndepend ently , 1'10rgan ' s vi e'\"J h a v ing "L"'lcen s h ap e 
pri or to t -1e p"C.bl icati on of the l at t er' s ( Al exdnde r ' s ) Gif-
for~...t Le ctures . 11 a l ston , E~ , 33 . 
SO . Z£ , l . 84. Cf . EE , 2 . 
81 . I b i d , lll . 
82 . I b i d , 112 . 
<:53 . Bk . II I . ch . v i., l/ 2 . 
8 5. ?roblews of LL:'e and r.I i nd, 
Vol . l.I , ? ro b ., V. Ch . 111 , 4 J2 . 
86 . EE , 2- 3 . 
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Horgan s a ys t hat 11 e111e r g ent 11 r e f :; r s to t.1e 11 d oc t ri11e "L.:.n tiri ngly 
a d vo c a ted by _ Pro r' es sor Ber gso n . n 8? For l·lor gan , c. l1en 
t he r e may oft tm be re :::; ult <:~n t.s v.rithou.'c eiilergents ; bu t 
t 12re are no er;1 ergents t ha,:, d o not involve r i::::! Sultant 
efi'e c ts also . Re sultants g i ve qudnt i 'L.a Gi v e c on tinu -
ity whi ch und e r l i e s n -av.J c on.st itu t i ve .s ·~ 2p :3 L1 em r-
g er1ce . Alld th2 el:1 Cor ge1lt ste;> , · · h o ··r~;ll i t I:ia y se er,l mo_ e 
or l e ss s -.<1 a cory , i s b eGt re g.c, r ' .e d as a qual it.a"t.:;ive 
c lla :1~2 of di r e c t i on , o ~n-c ri·L ic al t Lr : i ·lg po i r1t , i n 
t h e c our3 e of e v an ts . oo 
Fur tl e r, Hhile it may be trt-.e t hat befo r e t he event n e i t h e r re -
sulta n t s or ewar gent c a n be for e t old wi t hoUt p r e vious experi -
ence , it i s Iv:lorga n ' s c ontenti on tha t 11Hl1a t ••• one c c:-u.mot !1 r e -
·' ict •.• i s t h e e 11erg e ut expr 2s sion of so 11e _le .-r k il1d of rela t ed-
ness amon r.:; p1·e - exi .s tent events . nS9 'l' 1is , l·Iorgan belie v es , 
is true becaus e there a re l e vel s of exi s t ~-3n ce which c Ome 
i n to being at dif f:..; r cmt t i we s , a nd sin Ge bef ore a gi veu l e v e l 
nemerges , n t here are " 0 ••• eve .1.1 ts as y e cc i ·1 e::-~i s t e~1ce" u ·;o. 
vini c ~ - to base a p r edic t ion . 9° 
3) • The n · yramida l Sc h eme 1 : He cogniz i :ng c.he n r esolut e 
a0ter:l1Y t 11 of _.le::-:ande r to .fo r rh a theory of e;;1 e r g ent evol u -
is nmvi s e res~J onsible , 11 as na s ynopt i c e~ pression , or com-
r osi te g r a..:Jil , of a v a:s t 11m l t i tud e of i 1d i v i du al .::Jy r ami ds . rr 91 
I t :lis s c l:IeL e , tl~2re a r e a . .o ceridi ng l ev 8ls f rom the bot t o:1 
t o t he to .J of t; i l8 ..:lYr aJ :Ji c.L. TJ.1e b o t t ou i s s p a ce - tiE1e . 
8'7. ~z , 3 . 90 . Lo c . , 9i t . 
s·"" o . I b i c ~ , 5 . 91 . Ib i d ., 11 . 
~ 9 L, • I bid . , 6 . 
The top i s d e ity . No a tte1apt 
is r.1acle t o lis t. a l l of t lle 
l eve ls , but t~e s a lient l evels 
; · 
\·.Jhi ch l,Iorgan u entio ::1s are t~wse 
of &t omicity , ool~ c ~lQri ty , 
cryst a l s , vital i t y , ment al ity , 
"and , near the toj_J , ou r hunan 
c•elV•"'~ IT 
'.J ....._. ,":) • I 
92 
,ach level or stage 
of e volut i on re p r 2sents 11 wo r en 
D 
Mind 
Life 
s N T 
Fig . 6 
-;:;han ~. Jhat was p r ecede n t t o it but ne ve rtheless i s L1volve d 
- l· -r- ·1 -·1 "" a -1 C 01+--ill1l ' '"' +o C O-=> "' l·.-. +- -,--; ~-1 ... , •- 93 ' v .c __ 1_, · . 1 ~ L v _ ,-.., ;:) v v.t\.. u v \J_L,. _ __ L, . But t h e h i :::;l1 e r 
i s .le v e r to be ini...e r ) r e t Gd i 1 ten.:1s of t l·_e l m·.-er . 94 
The c a·use of eu ergence , and r e pr e sent ed by the arrov.r, 
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( foJ. lov~L1g 1. l exanr.5. :r ) is Vlh;_,t 1-:organ ca ll s n-l isuslT ( t h e Lat i n 
I 
fo r s t r l v L lf; ) . lJi::ms is not to be conf used vri t h a ny lf e:;~t ra-
n a t u r a l !! p ~1 enomenon btct , for Ho r gan , i s r a t her i d e ·· t i f' i eel 
1/lith t.ne LuJa11ent a. ct :,_v_ty of God . 95 
92~ ~.E , l l. 
93. I b i d ., 15 . 
94 . I b i d . 
' 
297- 8. 
, 5. ~.Corgan , 1vhile agr eeL1,g for t h e most _part "'Ti t h 
Al exan der ' s vie 1vs, (li fi' e r :..: V·J j_th rL~~l i n the mat te r of ni s us 
and i n se v 0r e:c l otl1 c:: r L lp orL :_nt re s 1J •.::: c 1~s . .3 i r:..c (:) stu ·::1v i s 
l a ter t.o be , :la ~.l e cmi c ernin~ ni sus i n t he t h oug:Tt of ;aJ_~ el 
i lexanJer, ft r t lle r Lli 3 cussioil he re is unn ec e ssary . 
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I t a •. ~)eCJT:J thc.n; IIorgan ' s e!Jw rg .~ nt e volution is an att empt 
to synthes ize scienc e , J_Jh ilo s ophy , &. Ll r eligi o1 vrit.wut clo ing 
a n i n ju..,ti ce to an: of these d i s ci11lines . I t se8ks to avo i d 
t h e da~1;;ers oi the ued1anis t ic po i 21t of vi ev.; whic h pl~ecludes 
Li k~\dse i t seaks to avo i d 
the Jange1·s of et.1)_pealin g to an 11 ext r a - n a t u r alff ( i.e . , 11 ext r a -
physico - c lle;:~1i c a ln ) sourc e of en er ,; · 2. s d o the v i talis t s , 
and , 1'artJ1 ,_:: r back , th e s "U.i_.)G r nat u r a li sts . Go:l i s not c onsi d.e re.d 
e i t :1e r tot3.ll-r L -'lna :<1f:mt or t oto.ll tran s c e~~de ~1t . He is Dot ' c. ; 
at l east l·.for gan hope.:> th :~lt he is . There ~r e diff i cul~i as 
Hi tl1 tLi,::; c once) ti un . But t }ley will be )Ostpolle d unt il the 
,~iscl~ ssio~ l of Al exan::-l e r whic h fo l lmvs . 
i ii. The NeH Develo JLle n·ts i n :e 1ysics . 
By way of rev.:81·.r , it Nill be reHl elilbe red tha t the r e vo -
l u tion in sc i ence, usherGll L1 by Gali l eo a nci Ne \.:to il , 1) il:t-
1) l i e d a r e st r i c ti on of k;wvvledg 2 t o t h e phenor:leil '' 1 1,-orld 
.::.:.nd to T:-he q-v.c..nt ic :.,t ive ""sr.ects of t his vm:clJ , &ild 2 ) su~::Jple -
IHenc ed rc.ticual a. a l ysis witrJ. pa i n stak i ng ob s e rvut io n 2..H.l 
Th e . '. l l.il !8CLl -
t :L onal co _1 ce ; ti o11 of ~·o r e.::; . I n bo t;, of tr1es -.: COll Cept, .::> :ill 
r ai' e r en ce s to t l1 e analog}' of 38.1Sl OUS cle3ire cc11d hill an wil l 
vrere a!~anJ o . led , anLi., ins ce ;_;_,l , J.:;Le wo rl , i·.Jas c u~1ce i v e d "' s a 
n co ;.c, r,l i c Jaa c LLte 11 J ri ve n b force s , a t yp i C<L l cleij_ui t ion 
96 . Cf . -~.Jeri<;ne i ste r , 2 U.J , 39 ; a l l ref~ren c es i n t his 
sectio ll ar3 to ·i erh1e i s ·ce r , unless ot:. h_:; r ,ri .:J e n vted . 
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of \fh ich ;.-ov.ld Y~ , 11 ot t:.;_11g but n ur:1cric a l valu es \'·ihj_c h '' e -
t e r e ine qua:1ti tati ve l y t h e mutual a c cel •2 r a-c i on of' the bo- iesn 
v1i th i n i t . 97 
l ) . IJe,.: Conception of •1atter . E . 11'Iach 1 s cr _:_ t ici sr 
of th e Newton i a n me c ha~ i c s ( noted ab ove ) success~ulb showe d 
that 1" h.:as s 1 can be U.e.:' i ned only t llr oug h uynar~i c a l r e l ations . n98 
"
1J-Ia ss- 1Jo.Lnts , 1 therefo re , have no corp oreal r eal i t y , but 
1 exi st 1 onl; as c onceptua l elenents of a ? Os tul a t ed ~yst em 
of a ctions . a nc[ counteractions , ~m d ••• ;,vi t h i n th i s sy ~::; cc J , t h e 
!netaphysical dualiSi!l of 1 raatte r 1 a nd 1 for c e ' i s e l i L i nc.: te • n99 
Th e hi s"cory of rJodern chemi st r y , even a l mo s t u n t i l t .h e 
tu rn of the cent u r y , s h ou e J r e l u ct ance t o a cc~ ~J t the ato nic 
t~ ... eory ~ 100 However , e}:::)e ri: ,ent al evi d e n c e in ~)llysi c s v e r y 
soon y rovid e J sufi:'icie. rl:. bc:ses not only for tll.:: e. tomic vi e \"1 
Out also I'or tl.1e view t :1a t I11i:l t ter and e l ec t r i ci ty a re not ling 
but Gr a nules of electricity - - elec t r ons . 101 T'1e re c e n t d i s -
co vc;r i e s of r e:.cLioacti ve elefaentG Cli.lcl 0he c onseqv.e ... 1t L; heo r y 
of trc.:~nsforraa t i oil of eleuent s , t og e t ll2: r vii t h the doc cri e 
of i so t op i s r:. , c c:. st ftlrth e r l i r;Lt u1:J on t ~ e t!1e or y Lh8.t .ia tte r 
is re &l l y ene r gy . 102 Th e sub s eque nt r amar ka J l e and ra~id 
de velopment of Ul'tb - al:.o; .. ic theori :~ .::; 11eed ao t be dL.iCl<3 Se d 
97 . t 'U,_; , L1-l ; fror~ J . Boscovi vc h , Ti·1e T11G 01.:L_Of Uatu.r a l 
Phi lo s o,iLy , 0 e c t io n C) , c . 1752 . 
9EL l\J.a ch , Hi E , 23 9- 4J ; quot e d i n ? OS , 42 . 
99 . POS , 42 . 
1 00 . Cf . ~00 , 23 1 . 
101 . Cf . I b i d ., 233 . 
102 . I b i d ., 235 ff . 
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h ere i r or :l.er t o po ::..1 t out that. t h e:·- i ~1 no 1.vay d .:;t ract f r ou 
t h is bas i c t2ne-c . 
2 ). Nmv Concept i on of ::>pace . Tl1e i· ewto n i c- d ue ch :.::.11i c s 
1·w.s ba::.; e d , i t Ji ll be r e cal led , v l1 the c onc ept s of ab .:., olute 
s 1-•ace & J.H.l ab so l ute tiEi e , e a cl1 o f t h eril bei ..c[; c o11c e ived -::i S i n -
f init2 , ho17log eneot_s meG. i a i n which .:o~ t t e r . i s sin p l y loc c:,tod ~ 
Novr t h i s v i ew of s 1Ja ce was , in tur n , 1J __ s ed U'Jon Euclide " n 
§:; eowe t r y which , f or centuri e s , had been a c c ep t e d a s t he 
true d esc ripti9 n of ob j e ctive space . Nineteenth cenc.ury 
€:eomet r y , ho He ve r , h a c!. s .:._ own that an :Lnfini t e nw,lb e r of 
cl ifie rem~ g eor,letri 8S i s ma cher,l<.:1t ically p o;3s i b le . A.ad , i t1 
c oru2CfL' .. 'e .. c e , i - l [-t.J 'no l o.2g::: r self - evi dent that t 1e •'u cli -
d ea.n sys "ceu is the only one appli c ::~b le t o j or :l e :.:> cr:L:;t i ve 
of , t. iw s -.Jace about us . n l OJ ~ 
Galileo ' s ·· riHc iple of' re lat ivi t y had s ll o'V'm b ~ )rond 
d oubt th~t "we ha ve no me c hi~lical me ans of dist i n gu i sh i ng 
unifo r m r e c-c iliil2ar t:lo ti on f r o .1 ab so l ute r es t . 11 1 0 4 The 
r:~ l ative t o t h.:; ~3 tatio nc.:. ry ' etho r' by find i n g out 11o>:r the 
earth ' s W> tio l1 uJ..':'e c t ;::; t h e a J:)pD.ren t veloci t :~- of l i _c;Lt , 11 
.i l i:id giv el l b . Hegative , aud unexpe c t. e U. , r esv.l t , a.ncl lilade i t 
103 . PCS , 197- 8. 
l j 4 . I b i d ., 199 . 
r e c t i l i near uni f orm li otion I r OI.i absolute r e3 t . Hl O) Ti1e 
diff i cul t y e :1 c ou~1t e r ed b. thi.::; turn of events was t he f a ct 
t hb t t h e Ga lilean ; rin c iple of r e l 2tivi ty as cont r ad ic t ed 
by t n e negc.t i v e r esults of t he i'-~ i c he l so :.1 -l'. l orley expe ri-
HGnt . 106 
At t;1· s ) o i nt llb ert Einste i ·1 began to re s olve the 
diffi cu l ty . 
He r easone d that since b oth princip l e s a r e equa l ly 
we l l su_~;_1J orte :t b-- fac t,.:; , and s i n e e r e a l ity ca n Hot 
b -.: c on r aJi c tor i n i tse l f , the antinomy u s t a -
r i se I r .):;l .::J O"le Um 'a rra!lt ed a u GWJ ... :) t i on .· 11)lied in 
the COilCeijLS V·I~ , u.Je in in t-::r"_, r et.Lng c.1w e;::_pc r i men-
t a uvidenc e .l0 7 -
U on a11alysi s of t he basi c c on cep t s of phys ic s , 
i1e f o-u.11d ( l) that t h e n e t i on of a n ' ab:::>o lute :3 h 1-
ul t C''12i cy ' \-;Q.:; r8o. - ~1y r es ... ~o .1sible fo r L.he a ."tinor.:y , 
an<J. ( 2 ) t h a t t h:.i.s .lo t iofl was c :.~.pty anc' uea li n ,2;le ss . 
··!ihen ·i t v-ra :J r e _tJ l a ced b / t h e ide a of ' rel ~~tive s ir:l-
u l t a :·leity ,' th e c onflict b e tt-leen the t 1-ro 1:; rLl c i p l 9s 
dL:;a .:_J}j ;a r ed- - but. S.) cl i d ' a b solut -.; ti.11e ' and ' ab 3olu t~ e 
spa c e . 1 Ti.1e b r eak v1itn lJ e\vto~1ian Llec i.L-;_:. lics v.ras a c -
co~:l") l ishe d . ' rtel c.i_ti vity Il1e c j1 unic s 1 too k i t.3 p l a c e , 
and t he r e c ;.~ rge d a a~w conce) t i oQ of the space -
t i Hie worl d about us . J.. Ut5 
ti :le 1·-1ere r e :)la c ed nby t h e idea of a 1 s pa c e - tL1e c on ti.nu1J.f.1 ' 
' - . l t l . l 1 09 Ql lll8ilS:LOlla W 1012 . Eindtein 1 s "spe cia l t ~eory of 
rela t ivity" of v-lll i c}; the a i)ove is a s i __ ~ ) le stc~ i.:. euent; , "'. ias to 
be l'ollowed b: t he ng ene r a l t h8o r y of r e l at i v i tyrr whi ch 
10 5 . POu , 2U l . 1 08 . I bid ., 2.02 . 
186. Loc • . 9it . 1 09 . I b i d . , 213-. 
10? . Loc . cit . 
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r evea l ed an even close r i n tervmvenness of space and t i 1 e a nd 
t h i ng s . I n this I110re universa l form , by s howi ng tha t 
a ll systems o f re f renee a r e equivalent i f we 
a s s ocia te t1em with appropria tely c ho se n g r a v i-
t a t i onal fields , Einstein ha s fin a l l y ~ut us in-
t o ,a posi i or1 \'lh i c h e nab l es u s to express adequate -
l y the ' absolut enes s ' of t he l avrs of na ture , i.e., 
t e i n va r i ance O.L t h e mathematic a l fo r mul ae , by 
mak i n g ev e r yth i ,g else rela t iyi0to a r b itra rily selec ted points of r e f e rence . 
The ir11plications of this vi ev1 a r e t hat S)ace is ncurved11 
( i . e ., it p re s en t s a d evia tion o f actu a lly meas ure d s pat i a l 
rel at io~s from t e r a t i os deman d ed by the theorem s of Eucli -
dean g e0111etry ), and sin ce space i s i lltimat <:; l y bou nd u"· 1,..-i th 
t . • ' t . ' .. t ~ ' IT d \T lll -u ne , c11e s r a c e - l J,le con ·clnu tu:n i,n;.s · a .1 s o oe cu rve • 
Even nor e . t han t his , it a l s o 'lead s t o t h e c on c ept ion of a 
' f i ni te u ive r s e 1 -- be t hl s the ' cy li dri c a l unive r se ' of 
EL1st ein , or t he ' sp" eric a l uni v e r 0e ' of d e Si t t e r . n l l 2 
Th (~ ef f r:} ct of s o t remendous a revo l ut i on i n t how; h t as 
t h e r evis i on of suc h ba s ic i ~eas as s p a ce a n d -time can a rdl y 
be exagge r ated . Ch anges i n the con ce pt i on of t h e nature of 
ma t t er , the n a t u r e of lL:'e , and t h e empha s i s up o jl t h e c on-
cep t of no v e lty, c omb i ned with t h e nev.r v i ews of s p a ce a nd 
till1e ' to pr epa re t he world for t h e d oc t rine s of ela n vi t 2.1 ' 
n isus , a n creat ivity. 
110 . P00 , 219- 20 . 
111. Cf . I b i d ., 2 22 . 
112 . !b i d ., 224 . 
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CH1 PT..::R III 
THE PROBLEH OF NOV ELTY 
Throughout the history of human attempts to under-
stand the universe there has persisted a tendency which 
can be traced through both theological and scientific 
cosmologies. This has been called "the tendency to con-
ceive of the causal relation as explanatory and theref ore 
to ass imilate it to the logical relations of i nclusion , 
implication, or equivalence . "1 That this is true with 
r espe ct to theology will be .remembered by the fact t ·hat 
the thinkers discussed unanimously appealed to an eter-
nal cause (or causes) in which is (or are) somehow con-
tained eternally all the novelty found in the na tural order 
--in fact, the entire natural order it s elf. Li kewise, it 
was observed that the scientific reaction to this ty pe of 
exp l anation substituted th~ concept of eff icient causal ity 
for tha t of final causality because the latter fa iled to 
make any simpler the t a sk of understand ing the universe. 
51 
However, this scie ntific reaction not only i gnored completely 
the problem of the origin of the univers e , but even embarked 
upon a program of reducing all novelty to the interaction 
of simpler elements which have always existed . Furthermore, 
l. Lovejoy , Art.(l927), 20 . Th is article h a s proved 
most helpful to the pr esent discussion, although it contai ns 
some i dea s which are que s tionable . 
- . ·--- .. 
- .. ... -
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as h a s , been noticed , since the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury there ha ve been several definite movem ents \vhich have 
re cogn iz ed the failure of both of these ma jor efforts to 
ac count adequate ly for novelty. Among these a re neo-vi talism 
and the various forms of eme r g ent evolution . The recen t 
de ve lopments i n physics have a lso lent considera ble support 
to furthe r s pe cula tion along this line. 
In the light of these developments and to facilit a te 
the discussion to follovT, it appears advisable a t this point 
to d iscuss three acute questions since they be a r hea vily 
up on al l th ree doctrine s, elan vi tal, nisus , a nd creat i vi ty. 
Thes e questions are : 1. What is novelty? 2. Does nov e lty 
exist ? and 3. Why is novelty a p roblem? 
l. What is Novelty? 
It would be helpful, p erhaps, at the outset, to dis-
cuss brief ly novelty in general. To d o this adequately, two 
prelimina ry ideas must be recognized. First , and a priori 
to an; discussion of n ovelty , is the con cep t of real time , 
i.e., the noti on that chang e, process, e vents , et c., are real, 
and are no t just appearances or illusions. Secondly , for 
heuristic reas ons, let us distinguish between two phase s 
of this temporal order, viz., t he present phase (c a lled Ph. N) 
and any antecedent phase (c a l led Ph . A). 2 
~ow , with these two ideas clea rly i n mind , i.e., the 
2 . Cf . Lovejoy , Art.(l927 ), 26ff . 
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realit~ of time and distinction between Ph. A and Ph. N, it 
may be: said that novelty in general occurs when a state of 
affairls exists in Ph. N which did not exist in Ph. A, and 
I 
I 
could not be predicted from it. It is hoped that this def-
inition will serve as the least common denominator for the 
discuslsion to follow concerning the types of novelty, and 
I . 
that i~ will have presupposed no more than is necessa ry to 
I 
the un~erstanding of them. 
I 
I 
i. Su!bjecti ve novelty.· 
Subjective novelty, if it exists, might be characterized 
as tha
1
t · form of novelty in which both Ph. A and Ph. N are 
experi;ences in the mind of a conscious subject. A novel situ-
ation lof this type, for example, might occur in what is some-
times 1termed "insight." Here a subject has been given a prob-
lem in which all factors are the same in both Ph. A and Ph. N. 
However, in Ph. N a relation appears which was not present 
in Ph.
1 
A. The nsubjectivityn of this form of novelty refers 
to the; fact that the novelty in question is relative only to 
the t~o states of experiencing of the same subject and not 
to something objective. Or, since, in the example just gi ve!}, 
other persons may already have experienced the same relation, 
subjec
1
tive novelty might be eJ<P ressed as possessing only 
I 
subjective significance. The presence of subjective novelty, 
then, 1involves necessariiy no assertion whatever concerning 
I 
the ob1jecti ve significance of any experience or Ph. N. It 
invol~es only the assertions 1). that a relation, absent in 
Ph. A of a conscious subject, appears in Ph. N of the same 
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subject, among f a ctors present in both phas es; and 2). that 
this rela tion possesses necessa ry significance for that sub-
ject only, since its occurrence might have been predicted 
from a knowledge of the factors involved and their lavvs. 3 
ii. Obj ective novelty. 
The amount of discussion which has surrounded the objec-
tive form of novelty has been considerable, and whether this 
form of novelty actually exists is a matter to be discussed 
later. However, since there are several types of occurrences 
which, if they do occur, would d eserve to be terme d "ob jective 
novel~y, 11 a bro ad definition would be in order. Gene rally 
sp eak~ng , objective novelty may be considered to exist quite 
' inde pendent of any knowing process which might reveal it, a nd 
• I 
would indic a te t hat the state of affairs which exi s ts in 
Ph. N (but not i n Ph. A) is alvJays ot her than t he immediate 
ex perience of a conscious subject, i.e., it is always something 
which must be inferred from the experience of a con scious 
subj ect. An example of t his typ e of novelty mi ght be seen 
in the a ssertion that there exists i n Ph. N of the world's 
history a type of existent which was non-existent in Ph. A. 
In othe r words, while subjective novelty is signific ant only 
3. Cf. Whitmore, Art.(l93S), 141; ~ organ, EN, 32, 
whe re he discus ses what he terms "secondary novelty" as that 
form of novelty vvhich falls <,vi thin the rang e of actua rial 
expectation; Stace, Art.(l939), where he discusses "relative 
novel t ,y ." 
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for the subject , the significance of objective novelty is 
directed toward the world a t l a r ge. 
In addition to its objective reference, however , objective 
novelty possesses another characteristic which distinguishes 
it f rom the subjective form --obj ective novelty is inca pable 
of being predicted . Subjective novelty indicat e s simply that 
prediction had not occurred, although it might have; obj e c-
tive novelty indicates that p r edicti on could not have occurred. 
Two ma i n categories might be said to apply to objective 
novelt~: the functional , and the existential. The s e will be 
dealt with in order . 
l). Functional novelty ma y be defined a s taking pl a ce \"lhen 
instances of some general type of change admittedly 
common to both phases •.• , · of which instances the manner 
or condit ions of occurren ce could not be described in 
terms of , nor predict ed from , l aws which would have been 
sur'f icient for the de scription and ••. the prediction of 
all changes of tha t type occurring in Ph. A.4 
More simp l y , and in Lovejoy's terms , this may be called the 
nevolutionary emergence of l aws ," and nimplies no quantitative 
variability of the prime or irreducible existents (o th er than 
t h e r ela tions) in the syst em und e r consider ation . n5 An example 
of this mi ght be t he laws of music . Given vibra tions in some 
di aphanous medium such as air , in which the prime or irraduc-
ible existents are the mo l ecules and the type of change com-
4. Lovejoy, Art .(l927) , 27 . 
5 . Ibid ., 26 . 
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mon to both phases is vibration, there is no way in which the 
l aws of music in Ph. N can be described in terms of, nor p re-
dicte d from , laws wh ich would have been sufficient f or the 
description and p rediction of al l kinds of vibra tions of a ir 
molecules. 
2). Existential novelty might be said to occur if the 
following features c an coherently be inferred a s applying 
to the Ph . N: 
i). New qualitie s, espe cially cl as ses of qualities , 
attachabl e as ad jectives to existents present in both Ph . A 
an d Ph. N, such a s the quality of "unlikeness" which mai be 
i nferred to obta in between present and previous expe ri ence. 
The seconda ry qualities would illustrate a cla s s of qu a lities 
which may be s a i d to be novel. 
ii). New types of a ctivity , event, or process, 
irreduciblJ diffe rent from a ny kind occurring i n Ph. A, such 
as the a ctivity of thought p rocess as distinct fro~ pure ly 
biolog ical a ctivity. 
iii). Particula r existents not p ossessing al l the 
ess ential attribut es cha r a cteristic of thos e found i n Ph . A, 
and h aving d i stinct ive type s of att ribut es (not merely con-
fi gurational) of their own , such a s the pr e sence of ind ivi du a ls 
which re pr e sent a new s pecies. 
iv). A g reater qua ntity, or number of instances, 
not exp licable by transfer f ro m outside the s ystem, of any 
one or more t ype s of p rime exi stent common to both phases . 
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This might be illustrated by calling attention to the likeness 
of suc~eeding experiences as well as to the likenesses of indi-
viduals of the same species.6 
2. Does Novelty Exist? 
With the various types or modes of novelty clearly 
delineated, the question naturally follows, Does novelty 
actually exist? The answer to this question involves the 
answers to several subsidiary questions which will be taken 
up in order. 
i. Does subjective novelty exist? 
According to Stace, only the Eleatics would deny the 
existence of subjective novelty.7 The truth of this asser-
tion may be seen by the fact that subjective novelty denotes 
only tbe existence of changing relations among existents 
already present in a gi ven system. Whether this phenomenon 
is properly called "novelty" may, perhaps, be determined by 
recognizing two facts, viz., that finite knowing mind s are 
present in the universe, and that, until only comparatively 
recent times, any other kind of novelty was either taken for 
granted (by the theological explanations), or explicitly 
denied (by the scientific explanations}. The implications of 
these assertions will be examined later. It may be agreed then, 
that, at least for the finite knowing mind, subjective novelty 
6. Cf. Lovejoy, Art.(l927), 27. To avoid presupposing 
an atomistic theory of entities, the term "entity," which 
Lo vejoy uses, was replaced by the term "existentn which is less 
presumptuous. · 
7. Stace, Art.(l939), 300. 
exists. 
ii. Is objective novelty a property of the universe as a 
whole? 
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Without as suming beforehand the existence of any form of 
objective novelty, it is useful to approach the question by 
inquiring as to the scope of the alleged novelty in question. 
The problem might be phrased in the following hypothetical 
manner: If novelty, of the type which has been termed nobjective" 
in the sense above defined, exists, then is it true to assert 
that this novelty is a character which belongs to the universe 
as a whole, but not necessarily to every part? 8 Now Lovejoy 
believes that if it is possible to predicate novelty as a prop-
erty of the universe as a whole such would refute any theo-
logical explanation which would postulate a "metempirical cause 
or causes v;hich somehow pre-contain 'all that is in the effects. rn9 
Let us examine his arguments. 
There are three possible variations which such a view 
may take. The universal cause or causes may be 1) a temporal 
prius, 2) an eternal which contains the temporal effects as its 
parts., or 3) an e.ternal extraneous to those effects. 10 
8. Cf. Lovejoy, Art.(l927), 33n. It appears in the 
absence of explicitness, however, that Lovejoy, by his use of 
the term nwhole" means the universe in its entirety since 
lesser "wholes" vmuld be cases to which the term "specific" 
would apply. See below. 
9. Ibid., 22. 
10. Cf. Lovejoy, BRE, where he lists four views, the 
Platonic, Aristotelian and the Neoplatonist views apparently 
being combined in #3 above, the others representing the 
commonly held and the Absolute idealist views respectively. 
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l j . A ntemporal prius, 11 since it cannot mean that the 
I • ) effects themselves are 1n the cause , is invalid because a it 
I 
is imp0ssible to dete r mine a Priori 
I 
that the effects collectively do not differ either 
q~alitatively or quantitatively from the prius •.• or 
.•• in some relational property which is regarded as 
u~important .•• or b) that they are neve r of a higher 
m~taphysical rank or excellence than the cause.Il 
I 
I 2i. An eternal which contains the temporal effects as 
I 
its parts would certai nl y deny that novelty could be a prope rty 
I 
of the universe as a whole, since an 11 eternaln cannot grovv or 
improve. It would seem, in the first place then, that, since 
it i mpiies a "true inclusion of real succession in a toturn 
I 
simul," this conception is a self-contradiction. 12 Further, 
I 
J 
s1nce the temporal world is admitted to be in some sense 
I 
real, the whole of that world may in that same sense 
cbn ceivably differ at different moments in the number of 
its elements or in their value.l3 
.And, l a stly, 
i~ the Cause by which 'all that is in the effects' 
i~ said to be possessed as an eternal that does not 
contain those effects within its being ••• the sam_e_ 
difficulties pre s ent themselves as in the first case, t~gether with some additional ones.l4 
3). An existent which is at once alien to all succession 
or change, and yet is the efficient cause of a series 
o:L temporal changes, is .•• elusive; and ••• that that 
c~use must ' possess' all that is in the temporal effe cts s ~ems not only gratuitous ••• but also self-contradictory. 1 5 
11. Lovejoy, Art.(l927), 23. 
12 . Ibid., 24. 
13. Loc. cit. 
14. Loc. cit. 
15 • Lo c • cit • 
60 
~et us examine these arguments in detail. First, it is 
clear that they are directed against the adequacy of certain 
traditional theological conceptions, and~ more particularly, 
against the apparent incompatibility of t he t wo i dea s of the 
tempora l and the eternal. Lovejoy, it may be observed, calls 
attention rightly to a real difficulty, if by a n "eternal prius" 
is means a "timeless prius" which is at once the efficient 
cause and/or the container of the series of t emporal changes 
with its nove lty. Secondly, his s tatement that a temporal 
prius could not mean that "the effects themselves a re in the 
cause" is reasonable certainly if time is to have the meaning 
which usually applies to it. 
There are, it appears, t wo assumptions in Lovejoy's argu-
ments which are unwarranted. First, he assumes tha t the term 
"eternal" as a. "timeless" something is the only poss ible meaning 
assignable to it, and, secondly, that a temporal prius can-
not be the cause of the temporal series unless it can be 
shown a priori that it is so. The first assumption leads to 
a misconception of the nature of the cause; the second lead s 
to misconc eption of how that cause could be known . 
The clue to the problem may be seen by noting that the 
term "eternal" may also mean "timeful, 11 that whi ch is without 
beginning and wi t .hout ending, or nthat which is t r ue at' all 
times. n 16 
~6. Brightman, POR, 385~ 
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This is an i mportant distinction because the eternal cause 
may then be conceived as in direct rapport with the temporal 
process, since they are at all times co-extensive . If t his is 
true, may it further b e sugg est ed that if the cause is a tem-
poral one the existence of such a cause cannot be refuted by a 
failure to employ a priori methods but must instead be based 
upon the coherent analysis of the temporal effects . 
Thus , the two points which Lovejoy has shown seem to be 
1). the eternal cause cannot be a timeless one, and 2). novel 
effects cannot pre-exist within the cause. He has not shown 
that the concept of a n eternal cause must necessarily be aban-
doned, nor ha s h e shown that a temporal cause re quires a n 
a priori proof. 
What is the result, then, of Lovejoy's arguments upon the 
existence of novelty as a property of the universe as a whole? 
His orig i na l proposition wa s t hat if it is possible to pr edic a te 
n ovelty as a property of the un iverse as a whole, then the 
theological explanation which postulates a "metempiric al cause 
or causes which somehow pre -contain ' all that is in the ef fects' 11 
would be invalidated . To accomplish t h is, Lovejoy has shown 
t hat "pre-containment" of .t he effects i n a metemp irica l cause 
is contradictory. But , while the affirmation of the consequent 
cannot result in an aff irmation of the antecedent , one fact does 
emerge which bea rs upon the point i n question . While the possi-
bility , of novelty as a property of the uni verse a s a whole can-
not be shovm conclusively , it is not refuted , i.e., the af f irmation 
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of the consequent leave s open the ques tion of the ante c edent. 
There f ore , t he possibility of novelty a s a property of the 
universe a s a whole is an open ques tion and cannot be denied 
cat egoric a lly. 
iii. I s obj ective novelty a s pe cific something? 
The following hypothetical proposition may be f ormul a ted 
concerning s pecific novelty·. If the novelty wh ich has be en 
termed '"objective" in the sense defined above, exist s , then 
is it t 'rue to ass ert .that this novelty is a property which 
is predicable of some part or parts, and, pe rhaps , in some 
senses of t he whol e , but not necessarily of the whole of the 
universe? 17 In simple terms t his is the a ssertion on empiri-
cal grounds of the occurrence of s pecific cases of novelty 
among the phe nomena investigable by science. Ne gat ively, this 
thesis means a denial of the scientific expl anat ion which holds 
that nthere is nothing substantive in the conse quent ·whi ch was 
not i n the antecedentTT situa tion. Positively, i f it can be 
shown tha t spe cific ca ses of any of the f ive type s of ob jective 
novelty refe rred to above actually exist , t he scientific expl an-
at ion \D ll be refuted.l8 
17. Cf. Love j oy, Art.(l927), 33n. 
18 . Ibid ., 25, ital. Lovej oy's; cf . below. Note : It is 
not necessary that one accept the notion of universal novelty 
just be cause one ac cepts tha t of specific novelty . In fact , 
it is at least logically possible, Lovejoy declares , to mai ntain 
belief in the existence of spe cific novelty along vli th a belief 
i n some f orm of theological explanation. However , if the idea 
of a universal cause is excluded, any i nstance of specific nov-
el ty would obviously i mply un iversal novelty, since there would 
be "an au gmentat ion of the t otal sum of things . " 
iv. The objections to objective novelty. 
The existence of the functional type of novelty has been 
denied on the ground that 
our inability ••• to discover , or even conceive of the 
gen eral nature of, any single l avf or set of joint la-vrs 
from which all the L.totions of matter in its differing 
integrations would be deducible! is not conclusive proof 
tha t no such law is formulable. 9 
In answer to this objection, Lovejoy replies that even sup-
posing tha t the objection be true, 11 it would no t fol low tha t 
the emergence of laws can be said to be improbable.n Such an 
occurrence would simply nimply the impossibility of a com-
plete un ification of science" someth ing which is nothing but 
a h euristic rule rather than a statement of fact. Therefore, 
although it may not be possible to establish the existence of 
functional novelty by means of rigorous proof, its probabi lity 
is open to determination.20 
The reality of existential nove lty has been criticized 
on the g rounds that to chara cterize an effect as novel is to 
explain it away or at least to g ive up the attempt to explain 
it. And, since science cannot give up this attempt, the use 
of the term "novel 11 can only refer to the present state of 
human inability to nexplain" the effects in que st ion . 21 To 
this objection Lovejoy quest ions the meaning of this use of 
19. Lovejoy, Art .(l927 ), 27. 
20 . Ibid., 27-2 8 . 
21 . Ibid., 28 ; cf. also Sta ce, op. cit., 299 . 
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"explanat ion." If ncausa l explanationn (or "the as sumption 
that every event f ollows upon some ot her nach einer Regel,") 
is meant , one is faced with the determinism of the expe ri-
mentali s t, a belief \vh ich, as will be seen shortly, is ent irely 
compat ible with belief in object ive no velty . The only sort 
of explanation which is excluded here is simply that demanded 
by the s cientific - mechan istic group, viz., "the co nce ption of 
an event as neither a ) manif estin g any l aw, or mode of uniform 
b ehavio~ , nor b) cont a i ni ng a ny exis t ent, not found in t he 
antecedent phase of the co nsequence to which it belong s. 22 
This objection i mp l ies tha t 
there is to be f ound i n the pr e sent state of t erres-
tr,i a l history no existence vrhatever-- no qual ity , type 
of entity, or k i nd of process--which could not already 
have been discerned by a scientific angel ob servi ng 
the cold-gaseous - nebula stag e of the development of 
our so l ar system . 
This pr oposition does not pos sess a "high degre e of pri ma 
f a cie pl ausibilit y" and , the refore, "its truth cannot be 
asS1 .. illled a prior~. n23 
Summarizing , then, f unctiona l novelty cannot cogent ly 
be obj e cted to on the grounds merely that it reflects human 
inability t o formul at e explanations f or events . This ob je ction 
assur.11e s tha t the principl e of the co mplete unification of 
science is a statement of fact wh en in reality it is only 
as assumpt ion . Li ke-,;•lise , exi stent i al novelty cannot be dis-
22 . Lovej oy, Art .(l927 ), 29 . 
2 3 . Lo c . ci t • 
missed a priori merely because its contrary is "one of t wo 
conceivable ways of satisfying the demand f or a speci a l type 
of so-c a lled 'explanation' which is not practically indis-
pens i ble to science.n 24 
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It appears , from Lovejoy's discussion , tha t he is attempt -
ing to build a case for a view which , while allmving the appea r-
ance of consciousness as a novelty , would not presuppose con-
sciousness in the universal cause. ny detailed discussion of 
this point would le ad from metaphysics to philosophy of relig ion. 
However, a few i mportant comments should be mad e in passing 
upon this problem. 
F~ · t h , . d ' d 2 5 1rs , as as oee n 1n lcate , any propositions con-
cerning the existence and n ature of the univers a l cause 
must be coherent with the temporal eff ects which are found 
in experience. Now the only propositions which Love joy has 
shown i nvolving the universal cause a r e that the universal 
cause c aimot be a timeless one, that novel eff ects themselves 
ca1mot be pre-containe d in the universal cau se , that i f s pecific 
novelty exists , the scientific exp lanation will be refuted, and 
that the objections to objective novelty are baseless. There -
fore , i£ Lovejoy uses these premises upon which to base the 
conclusion that consciousness as a novel effect ca nnot be in 
the universal cause, he is not warranted i n doing so. This 
is true f or the rea sons l) that Lovejoy ha s not established 
tha t t he consciousness which is a novel eff ect is actually 
24 . Love joy , Art.(l927 ), 29 . 25 . Abo ve, 61. 
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11 pre -con t a i ned11 in the universal cause, and 2). t hat, if 
it were pre -contained, it mi ght still exhibit the cha racter-
is t ics of n ovelty i n that it represents an a dditional qu a n-
tit y of the s ame type of existent a s the un iversal cause rep re-
sents. Therefore, ev en if it cannot be show-n tha t conscious-
ness in the univers a l c a use is an hypothesis which is c oher-
ent with the presence of the novel effects which may be f ound, 
Love j oy's a r gume nts certain l J have neither destroyed the pos-
s i b ility of its being s h own nor have they rendere d such more 
i mprobaple . Further, there are many phi lo sophers who be lieve 
that su,ch an hyp othesis is coherent with the facts . 26 The 
f urthe r p rog r e ss of this diss ertat ion will bring to light more 
on this subject . 
v. By what means may the existence of ~ecti ve novelty be 
d i s cove red? 
To 1 this que stion there are, o f those who a cknowl e dg e 
that this type of novelty exists , three primary types of 
answe rs1. These three g roup s mi ght be called for convenience: 
the 11 a priorists," the 11 i n tuition ists, 11 and the 11 empiricists . 11 
1). The " apriorist" approach. Thinkers who use t his 
method b el i eve that novelty must be assumed a s existing s i nce 
it f ollows logically from the nature of an a ll-in c l usive or 
an i nfinite ( and therefore ubiquitous) g enera l caus e . The 
th eolog~cal expl anat ions, e. g ., illustra te this po i nt of view. 
26 . Cf . Morgan , Bri ght man , and Whitehead . 
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As t h e f ore going d iscuss ion i n Chapter II of this d i s ser-
tation has i nd icated , there was unanimous a g reeme nt amon g the 
the ologfc a l thinkers discus s ed con cerning the e x i stence of a 
universa l cause (or c auses), which, log icall y , at l east , satis-
f ied their mi nds a s to the p rime orig in of everyth ing which 
could no t p ro perly be t e r med iden tical with it. The ap riorism 
of t h is type of expl anat ion lies not so muc h i n the e rrors which 
it po s s esse s r egard i ng the n a t ure of t h i s cause as i n the assu mp-
tion th a t ~1atever novelty t h ere is i n t he phenomenal r e a l m 
must of necessity i n s ome f ashion be antecedent ly contained i n 
t h is c ause . The errors i n volved i n t h is view o f the unive r-
sal c ause have alre ady been indica ted. The error of the me thod 
of a rriving a t the exist ence of novelty may be seen i n the fa ct 
tha t i f the universal caus e is simpl y a p e r f ec t def i n ition , what 
r eason is there t o suppose that a perfe ct d e f i n i tion o f i tself 
can p ro duc e anything empiric a lly rea l l e t a lone a novelty? 
The wh ole history of t he on tologic a l a r gument sh01:vs tha t there 
is n one. Therefore, it may be concluded that apriori sm is 
uns a tisfa c t ory a s a metho d f or d iscovering nove lty. 
2 ). The TTintuition ist 11 approa ch . Wh ile it mi ght be d oing 
Schiller a n in j ustice t o g ive him t h e l abe l of "intuitioni s t , " 
i t c ert a i n ly appe ar s t hat he falls within the g roup who regard 
it n ece s s a r y to bel i e ve i n novelty a s a !!fact of experience , 11 
an d a s suc h , a s i rmnedi a te ly known to exist . 27 He says in his 
early ar ticle , e . g ., that 11 it is a simple p sych ical fac t 
27 .• Cf . Schill er's tvm articles, · rt. (1922 ), and rt. (1930). 
28 
tha t our experience never quite repeats itself," · l.e., 
there is some novelty every moment . In his later article , he 
sa> s tha t nit [ novelty J is indubitably a fact . 11 29 Now 
Schille r is not alone i n this vie w. As it will become evi -
dent as this discussi on p roceeds, Henri Bergson disp l a ys a 
similar .b e lief. It suffices at this point to observe that 
the e p istemic monism which is involved i n this i ntuitionist 
assumption is subject to the criticism which , e. g ., Royce 
raised when he a sks in a most penetrating article: 
How shall I immediately feel or see or otherwise 
s ense th e truth, if it be indeed a truth, that this 
fact of sense never wa s a fact for me , or f or any-
body else bef ore? I ••• p resupp ose this actual i n d i-
vidu a lity and this novelty, of each and every fact 
of expe rience •.•• But this presupposition is not an 
immediate datwn of sense. It is precisely an inter-
pr e t a tion.30 
It is clear , then, that the intuitionist must f a c e the objec-
tions r a i sed a g a i nst a monistic e p istemology --objections 
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which are sufficient to discredit at le ast th e mon istic i mpli-
cations of tha t app roach. On the other hand , the i ntui -
tionist pe rforms a distin ct service to the cause of nov e lty 
by h is fnsistence that experience be appealed to in its d is-
cove r y . For, a s all, excspt perhaps the aprioris t s, would 
acknowledg e, expe rience must be the point of depa rture for 
all met~physical specul ation. 
28 . Schiller, Art.(l922), 2. 
29 . Art.(l930), 244. 
30. RoJce, Art.(l910), 263-4 . 
3). The 11 empiricist 11 approach includes a large group of 
thinkers! who agree on the point that the existence of novelty 
I 
is to be ' considered neither as an assumption nor as a fact of 
experience, but rather a s an hypothesis which must be warran-
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t ed by a careful examination of the facts of experience. Atten-
tion will now be g iven to these positive aspects of the prob-
lem. By! far the most de tailed and cle a r exposition of this 
! 
rriethod3 1 j which the present writer has found is g iven by Love-
joy in hii..s oft-refe rred-to article. "Both assertors and deniers 
of any such hypotheses of s pecif ic existential no velty must 
address themselves to an analysis of def i nite empiric al data . n3 2 
I These dat a are f urther clarified. For example, the assertor 
must 1 
I 
poi~t out some type of observable ent ity, event , or 
quality--call it E--existent in Ph. N pr esent phase 
which does not appear to be adequately des cribable i n 
the same terms as would describe any entity, event, 
etc., which we can vvith probability suppose to have 
exi~ted in Ph. A.33 
On the oither hand , the denier must 
I 
I 
att
1
empt to shovl that everythi ng in E is describab le 
in lthe same t e r ms as some class of enti tie s , events, 
or 
1
qualities in Ph. A; to this end he may employ either 
of t wo methods, which may be t e rmed the reduc t ive and 
the retrotensive; i.e., he may either i) seek by analysis 
to ~educe E to the same descriptive terms as are suffici-
ent for certain events , etc., admittedly found in Ph. A; 
or ii) admitting that E has the charact ers attributed 
I 
31.
1 
Although based upon an inadequate definition of 
" emergenrt , 11 Baylis's art icle ( 1929 ), presents another method 
which is suggestive. 
32. Lovejoy, Art.(l927), 29. 
3 3 • Lo c • c it • 
to it by the assertor ••• of no ve lty, he may mainta in 
that these characters were a lr~?dy present in all 
earlier phases of the process. 4 
I~ will not be necessary to enter upon a discussion at 
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this ttme of an actual experiment designed to utilize the above 
mentioned principles. If . suffices f or the present purpose to 
indicate t hat, by a use of methods of differing ade quacy, 
novelty is recognized by a great many contemporar y thinkers as 
actually existing. In the chapters to follow there will be 
ample opportunity for further discussion of this point. 
4). The "dialectical" approa9h to the existence of 
novelty was given its important place in the history of phil-
osophy by Hegel. In a s ense the dialectical method builds 
·-( 
upon the insights of the a priori and the int uitionist-
empirica l approaches. Thu s , it might be termed a variation 
of the 'empirical a pproach which, howe ver, a i ms a t synopsis and 
wholeness. 
As Hegel expounded it in his Smaller Logic, t hought, and 
realit y as well, undergoes a ceaseless development in which 
t hr e e phases can be distinguished--pha ses which repeat t hem-
s e lve s ' i n ever-widening circle s until all is included in one 
org an ic whole. A brief discussion of the si mple st phases of 
this process will r eveal, perhaps , the essence of the conc ept, 
as well as its relation to the idea of nove lty. (Cf . Will i am 
Wallace ttr.,J , The Logic of Hegel, Oxford: At the University 
Press, , l 874, 135-144 ). 
34 . Lovejoy, Art.(l927), 29. 
'. 
In t he first place, Hegel starts with "mere Being" by 
which h'e means "mere thought" and "immediacy itself vvi thout 
difference and without any characteristics." But "this mere 
Being , as it is mere abstraction is therefore absolutely neg-
ative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect of it, is just 
what may be said of Nothing.n 
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Thus rrNothing" is "conversely the same as Being is," or 
the antithesis of Being. Here is seen the principle of "neg-
ativity" which apparently drives the dialectic. The thesis is 
taken in r elation to what it is not. 
"The truth of Being and of Nothing," according to Hegel, 
"is accordingly the unity of the t wo: and this unity is 
Becoming." Becoming, then, is the synthesis of the dialectic, 
and forms the "first truthful category of thought," Even the 
action bf Becoming, however, if "taken in the whole of its 
significance, is a category with ve·ry little in it, and needs 
to be further deepened and completed." The levels of Life 
and Min~, notes Hegel, express Becoming, but in a manner 
"richer and more intensive than mere logical Becoming." With 
this concept, comes the notion that for Hegel the synthesis 
which is achieved is not only constitutive of a novel some-
thing not present in either the thesis or antithesis, but also 
begins a new thesis which r enews the process once more and on 
a higher and richer level. 
The position which Hegel maintains historically as an 
Absolutist may lead to an inadequate appreciation of the 
insight whic h the concept of the dialectic presents. For 
' 
I 
an Absolutist Hegel falls into the difficulty whi ch ha s beset 
every t hinker since Heraclitus in his conce pt of time as 
basically unreal. If, on the other hand , time be t aken as 
real an~ no t as mere appearance or illusion, the way is 
opened for the dialectic to take on real signi f icance. In 
I 
turn novelty becomes real and is not something which is 
simply swallowed up in the Absolute. 
I 
I 
3. Why is Novelty a Problem? 
The Concept of novelty, associated as it is with 
such re!ated concepts as evolution, creation, and emergence, 
and invplved frequently in discussions on determinism and 
indeterminism, predictability, intelligibility, etc., has 
become F problem for cont emporary thought because it 
conflic~ s vnth the predictable uniformity of the mechan-
ical explanation. In order to clarify some of these issues, 
this section will deal with a few of the mor e important 
implicat ions of novelty. 
i. Doe~ evolution imply complexity of identical elements or 
I 
novelty'? 
It has become commonplace to hear the statement that 
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"the un~verse started at some indefinite time from very simple 
beginnings ••• and the greater compl~xity we now find to be a 
73 
product of evolution. 1135 Various vvajs of treating the result-
ant complexity by various exponents of this view may be noted. 
But many are agreed on the subsequent appearance in time of 
11 levels 11 of structures which a re more complex than those which 
have preceded, and that this appearance i ndicat es the direc-
tion of the whole process. Now why is complexity the aim of 
evolution? Gotshalk believes, for example, that 11 evolution 
does not necessarily i nvolve trans ition to complexity, but 
only transition to novelty, 11 and the supposition of the 
emergentist, that "the trend of material ch anges in the con-
sequence of time ha s been towar d the eme r gence of life out 
of matte r, 11 may very well be the reverse "as the l aw of 
entropy i ndicates.n36 Baylis contends similarly that ''evolu-
tion may proceed a considerable way along one line of advance 
and scarcely at all along other lines . It may then cease in 
the fir~t line and develop rapidly at a different point .u 37 
And all through this process not only integr a tion but a lso 
disintegration occurs whenever complexes are f ormed.3 8 
The above opinions are presented only as an indicat ion 
35. Gotshalk, Art.(l932), 92; cf. Spencer's famous 
definition of evolution as "an integration of matter and con-
comitant dissipation of motion; during which the matt er passes 
from a telatively i ndef inite, i n coherent homogeneity to a rela-
tively definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the 
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.'' Spencer, 
First Pr i nciples, (lasted.), Vol. 2, 321; cit. Hastings (ed.), 
ERE , x i, 765. 
36. Gotshalk,. rt.(l932), 93. 
37. Baylis, Art.(l929), 379. 
38. Ibid., 375. 
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tha t while complexity is not necessarily the product of evolu-
tionary processes, though, of course, it may be and often is, 
novelty is a term which may apply to all types of de velopme nt 
allegedly 11 evolutim'lary. 11 
ii. Does emergence i mply novelty? 
'I'he eme r gentist has insistently demanded that emergence 
i mplies novelty. I"'lorgan, e. g ., phr ases it t hus: " The manne r 
of the origin of novelties 11 may be interpreted "in relationa l 
t e r ms on the hypothesis of emergence.u3 9 This contention ha s 
been den ied , however, on several grounds . Semantically, the 
t e rra is undesirable, according t_o Schiller, who s a ys that 
emergence, rather than being an explanat ion of the occurrence 
of novelties, is only the name of a fact, not an expl anat ion 
of it. It i mplie s e ither that the novelties a re not truly nev;, 
or simply con cea l s from us the fact that it is only a 11 gr andi-
loquent des cription of a very familiar experience, viz., the 
occurren ce of novelties .n40 This occurren ce, as has been 
seen , cannot be determined a priori by the generalization 
that emergence ex ists, but r ather by a detailed study and 
analysis which reveals that specific cases of novelty a ctually 
do exist. 
Another obj e ction , one which arises from a confusion of 
emergence with t he process of its reco gnition, is g iven by 
39. l\ organ, nrt.(l929), 611. 
40. Schill er, Art.(l930), 243; italics mi ne . 
Stace.41 The assertion by emergent ists that " eme r gent effects 
are novel, n 1r1h ile 11 non-emergent effects are non-noveln is the 
result, he says, of a '' confusion of the unexpe ct ed with the 
novel. " Therefor e the "conc ep t of novelty has nothing to hope 
for from an a llia nc e with the concept of emergence." Stace 
does not deny th at absolute (obj e ctive) novelties may occur. 
He does deny tha t emergence i mplies the exi stence of t his type 
of novelty. 
It is obvious t hat , if by "novelty" Stace means only 
"the unex pected , 11 novelty can r.nean only "subjective novel ty" 
75 
for which emergence can ha r dly be said to be r e quired . However, 
novelty need no t mean only the unexpec t ed since, if novelty 
can mean more ~han subjective novelty (something which Stace 
also admits is possible), then novelty can mean more than 
simply "the unexpected ." For examp le, one may exp ect a sur-
pr ise , a nd yet what happens can be a novelty . And i f this 
"more" can be asse r ted coherently to refe r to an obj e ct ive 
state of affa ir s , viz. , to " objective novelty," vlhy is it 
unreasonable to a ssert that emerg ence has occurred? 
It appears t rue to assert , therefore, that objective 
nov elty i mplies emergen ce , a nd , although emergence may or Qay 
not i mply ob jective novelty , at le ast it remains a possibility. 
iii . D.oes nov el t y correspond to law? 
This qu estion is one of the most a i ff icult t o answer , 
41. Stace , Art .(l939 ), 306-310. 
sine e it has i mpl ication s that a re both e pistemic and meta-
physical. The r efore only th e most salient phases of it can 
be di scussed i n the s pace available here. 
It is asse r ted by opponents of ob jective novelty that 
the ter m "nov elty'' serves only to illustrat e our i gnoran ce 
of l mvs which cou l d , i f t hey vre re known , make pr ediction pos-
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sible . This view, e. g ., would reduce all the l aws of the biolo-
gica l r ealm to t ho se of physics and chemi stry;42 all novelty 
would be subjecti ve, not ob jective. This view i s opposed by 
most emergentists,43 who contend t hat compl ete knowledge of 
all l aws and/ or existents , etc., which mi ght apply to a given 
ant e ced'ent situat ion, vvould not suffice to expl a in fully the 
conse quent or alleged novel situation. 44 This l atte r position, 
as ha s been notic ed ,45 does not deny the corre sp onden c e of 
novelty to l aw , but r a ther denies that the s pecific ca s es of 
nov elty are able to be predict ed from a knowl edge of the l aws, 
etc ., ,.,Th ic h would apply to t he ant e cedent s i t uation. 
The diffi cu l ties with th e reductionist view have r ece ived 
ample attention in the fore going d iscuss ion . Anot her, and 
rnore subtle , obj ection , however, appears in an a rticle by 
Stace . Admitted the appearan ce of l aws which a re irreducible 
to lower l aws, v iz ., the above contention of t he emergentists, 
42 . This is the vi ew above described a s "reductive.n 
43 . Certainly , Morgan, Alexander, and Love joy. 
44. Above, 55 · Love j oy, r t.(l927). 
45. Above, 64 . 
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if everything is g overned by law, even "then everything 
will be the oretically pre dictable, and there will be n o genuine 
n ov e lty in the universe . 1146 The difficulty with this objec-
tion will be seen by noting the fact t ha t laws do not " govern 
the universe , 11 but r a ther are fomulas, humanly devise d , to 
make prediction p os sible . How in eve ry case , l aws must of 
necessity be bas e d u pon facts. And if the f a cts ( wh ich might 
includ e novelty), upon which the existence of an al l eged l aw is 
to be ba sed, have not a s yet occurred, how can it be truly 
• I 
s a i d tha t "everything ( which admittedly i n cludes _these f a cts) 
will be theoretically p redictablen: 
From the a bove d is cussion it appears that there is no 
val id reas on to d eny the e xistence of objective novelty on 
the g round that conf ormity to law would make prediction pos-
sible . Nove lty may both conform to law and rema in unp r edic-
table . 
The metaphysical i mplications to which the alleged con-
f ormity of n ovelty to law g ive rise also needs to be notic e d. 
Pe r hpas c h ief among these i s the indet e r mi n ism- de termin ism 
controve rsy . For exrunple, it is held by some philosophers of 
nove lty that there are occurren ces of novelty 11 "\vhich are 
reducible to n o causal law; n o f i xed occ asions c a n be f ormu-
l a t ed u p on which they i nvari ably occur. n47 Th i s , of course , 
46. Stace , Art .( l93 9 ), 299 . 
47. Love joy, Art .( l 927 ) , 25-6. Cf . Dri esch ' s v i ew 
abov e , 37:f;f. 
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i s i ndeterminism. On the ot he r h and , the r e a re othe r ph i l o-
s ophers of novelty 1.-.rho maint a i n t hat , whene ver c erta i n s pe ci-
f i e occ a s i ons of novelty appe ar , a s pe cif ic var i e t y of novelty 
uni f onniy a rises.4a 
I n r ep l y t o t h e inde t e r mi nist s , St a ce a sks , "D oe s i nde -
t ermi n i sm i mply , or e ven make possibl e , nov elty in t h i s sen s e 
of absolut e ob j ective novelty?" He ans wers i n t he n ega t i ve . 
Granted , e . g . , Tr that the war ld is , ei the r i n r egar d to t he whole 
of it or i n r .:::ga r d t o some part of it, i ndet e r min i s tic ..• t hen 
••• will such determinism ca r ry with it novelty of the ki nd 
demanded obj ective ?Tr Novelty is not nec e ssar y becaus e 
the e l ect ro n , e . g ., by its j umping one way or an othe r , i nt ra-
duc es nothi ng which has not occur red bef ore. Only the unex-
pect e d has oc cur re d , not the nove l , i n the s en se us ed by the se 
philo s ophers . Li ke \,Ti se , Stac e d eni es t ha t de t er rni ni sm renders 
novelty pos sible . " For i n point of f a ct novelty is a s much 
po s s ibl e i n a dete rmini s tic worl d a s i n an in_det er mi ni s ti c 
one . Tr Two evid enc e s a r e pr e s ente d to support t h is contention , 
vi z ., t h e f a cts of chemic al synthe s is , a nd the pr esence of 
det e r mi n i sm i n the t hough t of a philosopher of novelty , S . Al ex-
ande r . ' Without prejudg i ng the ade qua cy of t he l at t e r point , 
sin ce it will be d iscus sed lat er, it may be noted tha t t he 
f acts of chemical synt h esis have not been universally a ccepted 
by ph ilo s ophers of novelty a s exhibiting objective nov elty.49 
4a . Cf . Love joy, Art .(l927 ), 26 . 
49 . St a c e , Art .(l939) , 303 - 305; cf . Dries ch , Art .( l 927 ) , 
2- 3 . 
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This as i de , t h ou 0 h , one mus t guard a ga i nst the tempt at ion 
to r e g ard l aw as causal . As has been notic e d above , l aw is 
det e r mi nat ive only af t e r the facts u pon which i t is based have 
been exa,m i ne d . For this re as on ab solut e p r edict i on c annot 
occur; law i s n ot causal but exp l m1atory. 
For exrunple , whe re p rediction of an event o ccur s suc c e ss-
fully , a ll that may be sai d with r e gar d t o i t s b eing a d et e rmin -
a t e situation is that s uch a p re diction was based up on pro p e r 
u se of kn owl e dge , p rese n t to a con scious mi nd , o f all t he l aws 
whic h a re r e l e van t to tha t s itua tion . Where p rediction fails 
to a g re e with subsequent eve n t s , such failure may be the r esult 
of ei the r a l ack o f , or i mp ro pe r use of , knovdedg e of such laws . 
I n n ei t-1!-e r case, howev er , c an one as sert tha t d e t ermi n i sm or 
i ndetermi n i sm caused the s ubsequ ent event , or that e i t her may 
p roduc e n ove l ty . Determin ism a nd i nd eterminism r efe r r a th e r 
I 
t o the ac curacy of t he p redi ctin g mi nd than t o the c a use of 
the e ven t, much less to t h e metaphys ic a l s t a tus of s u ch e v ents 
that may be c a ll ed novelties . 
That the determinist ki nd of theory is a t l east compa -
tible wi th eme r gence i s a ssert e d by Lovejoy . 5° He a l s o d eni e s 
that this ki nd of det ermini sm is contradict e d by the r educ t ion-
i st . 5l 
Th~refore, p rovided that l aw is not re garde d a s causal , 
50 . Lovejoy , Art .(l927) , 26 . 
51 . I b i d ., 29 . 
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there a ppe a rs to be no valid reason why novel t y should not 
be consid ered a s existing i n accordance with l aw , and , i n this 
sense , f or e ither det erminate or i n d et e rmi nate situat ions to 
exis t , dependi ng up on the occurrence (or n on -occurrence ) of 
nove l ty . 
iv. Is 'novelty unintelli g i b le? 
The unintellig ibility of novelty is anot h e r o f the con-
tentions of nove l t y ph iloso phers, various t erms and trea t -
ments b e i n g used t o indica te this belief. The use o f the 
term 11 u n i n t e llig iblett refe r s here to tha t which the intell e ct 
is i n cap able of apprehend i ng as dist i ngui shed from that which 
may be g rasp ed through sympathy or app r e ci a ted. Thus , it 
is as s e r ted by soLe t h a t obj ective novelty cann ot be d e f i ned 
in purely d escriptive terms , but only in t e rms which are more 
or le s s a pprec i ative . This i s true , they say , b e cause its 
u n i quenes s would b e destroyed by being a ble to describ e it.52 
I 
This con clusion may lead to a t · lea s t three possible attitudes , 
as will be seen i n the chap~ e rs to fo llow. For t he p r e s ent, 
howeve r, the truth of the ab ove a ssertion vall be ex ami n ed . 
It ma~,~ be observe d , f ir s t o f all, that whe n it is asserted 
tha t t h e real det e rmines intellig i b ility, wha t is mea nt is th a t 
"wha t is thought is dependent upon wha t is irmnedi a tely g iven ; 
we cannot create our idea s out of nothin g , but our i de as must 
run with f act . " 53 Vlhe n , on the other h and , it i s asserted 
52. Cf . Be r g son , Alex a nder , and Morgan , e s p e cially . 
53. Cunningham, Art.(l929 } , 1 61. 
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that 11 wha t is real is d et e rmined by i ntelligence , n what is 
mean t i s that 
the inW~ediately g iven i s not al l that there is to the 
obj e ct of thoug h t , that the datum orig i nally and d irectly 
presented demands correction i n the light of it s i mpli-
cative con text, and that this light i s revealed only 
through the p rocesses of i ntellig e n c e .54 
It i s q~ite obvious that predictability presupp oses intelli-
g ibility and is impossible apart from it. Now, g r anted that 
the statement that obj e ctive novelty is unpredictable i s true, 
is it als o true to assert that the n on - predictable i s also 
u nintellig ible? Pred ictability, which i n this case means 
"foresi'gh t , on the basis of vvhat n ovi exists int o that which 
does not novi exist but vri ll exist in the futur e , n does not 
of i tself increase i ntell i gibility. 55 Intellig ibili ty is 
increase d only by , and i s dependent upon, the f i n ding and 
desc rip tion of the system of facts i n qu e stion. It may be 
co nc l uded , therefore , that n ovelty is i n capable of being ren-
dered i .n explanatory terms , or defined, or p r edict ed , wnic h -
ever term may be app ro priate , prior to i ts occurrence. Sub-
se quent to i ts occurren c e , it may be subject to all o f these 
act ivi ties of mi nd. Bu t even though the unpredictability which 
exists p rior to a novel event r eally means tha t to t h a t extent 
it i s n ot complete l y kn own, i.e., a new datum an d it s correc-
ti on by the proc esses of coherent thought h as n ot yet appear ed , 
54. Cunning ham, Art.(l929), 1 61. 
55. Ibid ., 163. 
' 
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it is not correct to infer from this that no such process is 
possible, i.e., that any existent specimen of novelty is 
unintelligible. 
v. Novelty and value. 
Novelty is declared by some to be "almost useless" or to 
have lost "most of its significance.n56 Various reasons ha ve 
been given for these conclusions. Among them are the fact of 
its ubiquity, the difficulty in discovering exactly when an 
occasion of novelty exists, and the belief that it is consis-
tent with almost any philosophy. To r efute these contentions 
is not part of the present purpose. If suffices only to point 
out that if man is able to know that genuinely novel events 
are continuously occurring in the universe, he knows something 
extremely important about it, however ubiquitous, or hard to 
discover, it is, or however congenial a doctrine it may be. 
That this is true will be seen by remembering the defini-
tion of novelty itself. It has been seen (above, 104f) that 
both subjective and objective novelty are relevant to experi-
ence and that each possesses significance, either subjective 
or objective. Since objective significance occupies the 
attention of the philosopher it is usually the type of novelty 
to which reference is most frequently made. C. E. Whitmore 
states that we attach more importance to objective novelty 
56. Cf. Baylis, Art.(l929), 377, and Stac e , Art.(l939), 
310. 
is "because it is a symptom of significance and what we mo st 
value is in the la st ana lysis the significance, not the nov-
elty.n57 
There are, of course, those who would contend that the 
existence of objective novelty indicates unlimited opportunity 
for progress. As was i ndicated above, there is no reason to 
suppose a uriori that t he occurrence of novelty necessarily 
indicates complexity or the atta inment of higher and higher 
levels , since entropy and disintegr ation can al so represent 
types of novelty. "Si gnificance" can indicate either "value" 
or ''disvalue." Therefore, novelty ultimately resolves itself 
into a question of valuation--valuation being considered as 
including disvalue as well. Schiller makes this very observa-
tion. Two opposite valuations are possible. If we a pprove of 
the novelty which occur s , we shall value it. If we disa pprove 
of it, we s hall disvalue it.58 However, the ground for choice 
betwe en these possibilities must be sought outside t he sphere 
of nove lty itself. 
4. Summary 
In summarizing this discussion, the following points 
concerning novelty are to be noted: 
i. Developments in 20th century philosophy ha ve re-opened 
the problem of novelty--a problem before both a s sumed and 
57. Whitmore, Art.(l938 ), 149 . 
58. Schiller, Art.(l922), 22. 
.. ;, 
d en ied. 
ii. In answer to the qu e s tion : Vfhat is nove lty? subjective 
and objective novelty were distinguished . 
iii. Objective novelty may be eithe r functional or exis-
tential. Functional novelty refe rs to the occurrence of nove l 
laws; existent ial ' novelty refers to the occurrence of new 
qualities, unique exi s tents, new types of proce sses, and/ or a 
g reate r n umber of existents. 
iv. I n answe r to the qu e stion:Does novelty exist? subjec -
tive novelty was found to be almost universally accepted; 
objective n ove lty was examined more fully . 
v . There wa s found to be n o valid a priori argument 
against the p ossibility of g enera l novelty to be d r awn from 
the notion of causality; further , if n ove lty can be f ound to 
be spe cific, t he scientific -mechanistic vi ew will be re f uted. 
vi. The obj e ctions to functional and e x istential novelty 
were shown to be without support since they entail unjust ified 
a ssumpti,on s. 
vii. Th ree pri11ary methods for disclosing the existen ce 
of objective novelty were observe d: the "apriorist," the 
" intuitionis t , !! and the !!empiricist.n 
found to be superior. 
Of t hes e , the l ast wa s 
viii . Five p rimary probl ems were noted and dis cus sed. 
1). !! Novelty" wa s found to be a more adequat e term 
than "complexity" to apply to the result s of evolution. 
2) . Emerg enc e was found to i mply novelty p rovi ded 
I 
emergen ce is not considered to be the cause of novelty but 
instead only a description of it. 
J). No valid reason was found to deny the existence 
of objective novelty on the ground that conformity to l aw 
vmuld make prediction possible . Novelty rna- both conform to 
l aw and rema i n unpredictable. Also, provi ded law is not 
re ga r ded ' as causal, there appears to be no valid reason why 
novelty should not be r dgarded as existing in accordance with 
l aw . 
4). It is not corre ct to i nfe r that novelty is 
unintelligible since intelligibility is not incre a sed by an 
increase of predictability, but rat her by a descr- i ption of 
the facts in question. 
5). Novel ty wa s found ultimately to resolve i tself 
i~to a question of valuation. 
l 
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_CHAPTER II/ 
, 
HENRI BERGSON'S ELAN VITAL 
1. Introduction 
i. Biographical sketch of Henri Bergson. 1 
Henri Bergson was born on October 12, 1859, in Paris, 
of ang~o-Jewish parentage of Polish extraction. This was 
I 
an eventful philosophical year for it saw also the birth 
of the ,American philosopher John Dewey and the publication 
of Daro/in's Origin of Species. 
I 
Entering the Lycee Condorcet at the a r,e of nine, \.vhere 
he was an extremely brilliant student, he showed special 
gifts ~n science, literature, and mathematics. At e ighteen 
I 
he won a prize for solving a mathematical problem, and his 
paper ~as published in full in the Annales de Math~matigues. 
/ On obt~ining his baccalaureat, and after some hesitation, he 
chose philosophy as his life work. 
After entering the Ecole Normale Superieure, vvhere he 
studiea under the idealists Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Bou-
troux, Bergson distinguished himself as a Hellenist, and, 
after three year~, taught at the lycee in Angers for a two 
year period. 
I 
In 1883, Bergson was promoted and taught philosophy in 
the Lycee Blaise Pascal of Clermont-Fer:rand until 1888. While 
here he delivered his popular lecture on "Laughter" which t-vas 
11• For most of the follovring biographical data, Kuni zt 
and Ha;ycroft ( ed.), Twentieth Century Authors, was used. 
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Bologna , xford , an d Birmingham (1911) , at t h e Unive rsity of 
London ( 1912), an d at Columbia Un iversity ( 1 913). I n 1 914 
he was elected to the l rench Acad emy an d i n 1 9 27 he was av,ra r d ed 
th e JJ ob el Prize 11 i n re co gn~i tion of h i s rich and life - giving 
i deas and res plendent a rt vl ith which they a re presente d . 1 
Be r g son t s p opula rity ex ceede d by fa r hi .s wishes a nd in 
1921 h e r e signed his position to de vote his t i me to writin g , 
poli t ics , and working for interna tional co - operation . In 
hi s l ater y ea r .:.3 he live d quietly at Passy . .i!:v en as a n octo-
g e narian , he v,ra s known f or t h e same fasti d i -ous dress h e alvmys 
use d . -e v"VOre a close - buttone d cutaway , d erby hat and straight 
standi n g; coll a r with cushioned cravat , round cuffs , white pa sse 
poil , anO. co ngres s gaiters. His eyes ne ve r lost cheir pensive 
brill i an ce . 
During his last years i t is s a id t hat he leaned toward 
Catholicism. This belief wa s i nspi red ch iefly by t he publi -
ca tio 1 , i n 1932, of h is las t 11ajor \vo r k , Les dem~ sources de 
la morale et d e la re ligion . Be r g son , h owe ver, was e x c e edingly 
proud o f his J ewi sh b loo d , refusing exempti on f rom certain 
anti - J ewish reg ulat i ons impos e d by the Vichy government , 
I 
resigntng an honorary c hair at the C o :l~ge de Fr a nc e , a nd , even 
t h ough eighty- one an d feeble , risi ng f r om a si c k b ed and in a 
d r ess i n g gown and slippers, supported by his valet and nurse , 
' 
he stood i n line t o · b e r egistered with other Jews . As the 
Nevl Yoi?k Herald 'i' r ibune sai d : nrt was a brave a n d supreme ly 
tragic termination to a g reat career . !! 'l'h e eff ort may well 
have hast en,ed his death, which occurred shortly afte r,qar d. s 
from pulmonar y conge stion on Jan . 4, 1941. 
ii. Background f or the doctrine . 
" Henri Berg son 's doctrine of the elan vi t al represent s 
what is in many ways a clas sic exp ression, and perhap s also 
a culmina tion , of many tendencies which fulminated during 
most of the n ineteenth century . The influence of the Roman-
tic movement ,3 for example, especially Hegel an d 3chelling , 
was fe lt in the f ield of b iology . Johann Friedr ich Blumen -
ba ch's nnisus f ormativus," the 11 unconsc i ous f ormative p owern 
of Ludol f 'Jreviranus, the " organic creative force 11 of Johannes 
l'ii ller, represent the i deas of only a few of the e arly biolo-
gists. Schopenhauer and Eduard vo n Hartmann wer e notable phi -
losophical members of this group .4 
In France ,Lamarck's view that nall life is moti on and the 
evolution of animals is cau sed by their inner effort f or per-
fe ctio n , " Paul Joseph Barthez ' " general li fe principle, " and , 
lat er, Bichat ' s d ef i nition of life as TT t he sum of f unctions 
that resist death, 11 indicate a co rrelative grovrth. 5 
The growth of modern vitalism in t h e last quarter of the 
ninet eenth century provided 11 gri st e nough f or the mill of any 
philosopher o f Be r gson ' s f rame of mind . 11 6 Gustav Wolf f's exper i -
ment wi-bh t he ey e of t he v-rater newt? and - riesch's experiment 
J . Cf . Love j oy , Be r gson a nd Romanti c ~volutionism. 
4. 3charfs tein , rloots of Be rgson ' s Phi loso phy , 73. 
5. Loc . cit. 
6. Ibid ., 76. 
7 . Bergson, Cr eative Evolution, 84n , h e reinaf ter r eferred 
to as CE . Pa ge s r efer t o the Modern Library edition. 
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with t h2 blastula of the sea urchin8 cert ainly did litt le 
to d iscoura g e his belief th a t late nt in any part of a n organ-
ism i s th e i mpul se i' rom which the 1-vhole was produced. 9 
That Ber g son ma y be c a lled a nvitalist n may b e n oted by 
his ovm admission . 10 Hov.re v e r, Bergson is n ot i nclined , in t h e 
CE to stand 1..rith t h e prevailing neo-vi talistic posi t.ion of 
Driesch and Re i nke . As will be noted l a ter, whi le . r efrain i ng 
f rom g ivi n g the usua l reproach t hat the " vi tal p r inci ple" i s 
a s ort of label a f f i x e d to our i g n orance , he rejects their 
f orm of neo -vitali sm on th e g round that it woul d s eek to a d d 
suc h a prin ci pl e to the me chan ism of t h e p hysico-chemical 
realm·. Howev er, there is no h e s itat i on on Be r g son ' s pa rt to 
acce pt tha t part o f t he ne o-vitalistic co ntent ion which h old s 
tha t pure mechanism i s i ns uff icient. Also, he is awa re of 
some of the di f fi culti e s p e culiar to neo-vi talism, a n av·.rare-
ness which ai d ed his escape f rom many of t he criti ci sms which 
t h is s chool r e c eived . 11 
iii. Ge nera l i dea of ncreative evoluti on . " 
The tit l e o f n creative evolution" \'las g iven by Be r g son to 
h is cosmog ony . As r e capitula t ed in h is Les deux sources d e la 
l d l l . . 12 h. f h /1 . l mora e et e a re lglon, lS argument or t e e an v1ta , 
8 . CE , 48n ; cited above, )7!\ 
9. CE , 84- 85 ; cf . Bergson's approving list o f Driesch's 
and e i n ke ' s work s , CE , 48- 9n . 
10. In a lette r to H. HBffd ing , reprint e d in HBffding , PB , 
1 61. 
11. Cf . t h e illmninating articl es i n Phil . Re v., 27(191 8 ). 
12 . The Two Sources o: I1·.i orali ty and Religion , he reinafter 
r e ferred t o as TSl\iR , 101-105. 
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presented under nine points, are co ndensed here as an i ntroduc-
tion to the detailed discussion of the argument vvhich vvi ll fo llo\'4 
1). The physico -chemical expl anation of life p r e sents only 
the rule s of a method , and not a fa ct. " Neither one nor the 
other o f these t wo theorie s ... can claim the authority of exper-
i ment. rr l3 
2 ) . Life , as a fact , counter to other evolutionary the o-
ries , e vo l ves i n certa i n def inite directions . " ~volution has 
actual ly taken place through mill i ons of indi vi ctual s , on 
dive r gent li ne s, each e nding at a cro ss ing f rom which new 
paths radiate , a nd so on indefinitely . 11 14 
3) . It proceeds by an inwar d i mpulse t hat pas ses f rom germ 
to g e r tl to war ds an e ve r-increasing comp lexity . "We cannot help 
believing that these d iffer ence s are th ~ development of an i m-
pulsio n vJhich passes f rom g erm to germ a cros s the i ndi victuals . nl5 
4). It operates neithe r a ccording to mechan ism nor a ccor-
ding t 'o final ism. "We mu st get beyond both points of view , 
both me chan ism and fina lisrn being , at bottom, standpoints to 
which t h e hwnan mind h as been led by cons idering the work of 
man . Hl6 
5). It can better be unders too d f rom within as a n indi-
vi ded act. "If I raise my hand f rom A to B, t his movem ent •.• 
13. Th e fol l owing quotations are f rom C~ ; this one is from 
CE , 42; cf. TSMR, 101. 
14. CE, 61; cf . TSIVIR, 102. Cf . orthogenesis . 
15. CE , 95; cf . TSMR , 102-lOJ. Throughout this a r gument , 
Berg son tends toward t he view tha t elan vital, life , and evolu-
tion denote more or less the ident i cal re al i ty . 
16. CE , 99; cf. TSHR , 103-104 . 
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fe lt from vlithin •.• is a s imple indivisible a ct . n17 
6) . Rather than defining it positively , i t is better seen 
by noting the ob stacles which it has circu~1vented . 
l he t ruth is tha t there has been merely one indivisible 
act , that of the hand passing t hrough the filings: the 
inexhaustible detail of the movement of t he gr <:l.ins as 
well a s the order of their fina l a rrangement , expresses 
ne gatively ... this undi vi ded movement .15 
7) . Operating a s a spec i al c ause, i t di vides v.Jhat it de-
f i nes and thus create s . "There i s s i mply t h e ge neral movement 
of lif e , which on diverging lines is creating fo r ms ever new. "l9 
8). It contained in the be gi nning , i n a s~ate of r e cipro-
cal implication , instinct a nd i ntelligence . These were not 
comb d..n ed but were rather two ways of viewing a simple reality . 
"The f orc e i mmanent L1 life in ge . eral appears to us again as 
a l~nited principle, in which ori i nally two di ff erent and 
even divergent modes o i' knowing coexi sted and intermi ng led . n20 
9) . The forms vlhich life vlill create are i mpossible to 
f oresee . "It is quite certain •• • that if we co ul d view the 
evolution of lif e i n its entirety, the s pontaneity of its 
movement and the unforeseeability of its procedures would 
thrust themselves upon our attention . it 21 
As is ea sily seen from the e.b ove outline , the major 
premis s of Ber g son t s doctrine of the ~lan vital , is the reality_ 
18 . CE , 105; cf . TSlliiR. , 104. 
19 . CE , 112; cf . T0lliiR , 104. 
20 . CE , 164; cf . TSJ.vlli , 104-105 . 
21. CE, 245 ; cf . T.Sr.m , 105 . 
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of change . Berg son hi~ ,_self desc ribe s his e ffort s whic h lead 
to the present view in the followi ng way: 
Nmv the cons i dera tions .set 1 orth i n my Essai sur l e s 
donn~es imn1~d iates transla t ed into Engl ish as Time and 
Free Will resul t i n b r ingi ng to lig ht t h e f act of 
f ree d om; those o f l'iat iere et h 6moire point di~ e ctly , 
I 'h ope , t o the r eality o f s pirit; tho-22 of 1' Bvolut ion 
CPeatr i ce exhibit creation a s a fact . 
I n a very r eal sense, therefore, the f a cts of fr e edom and 
s p irit f orm the f oundati on u p on wh ich c oul d be e recte d t h e 
' doctrine o f the crea tion o f n ovelty . ~ropos of t his , he 
i n troduce s , a t t h e outset o f CE , a n anal y sis of cons c ious-
ness an d dur a tion whic h aims t o shov1 t he r e l a tion of life 
to both o f these fa c ts . 
, 
2 . The Ar gmnent f or t he El an Vital . 
i . 'l'he ·emp iri c a l b a s is f or the a r gument . 
1), . Cons ciousness experien ce . Be r g so n is a n emp i ric a l 
ph i l osopher . The outstanding f a c t of experi ence , and the o n e 
which most intrigues the philoso p h e r from Paris, is the fac t 
f - - /' / 11 . o t h e · duree ree .J.Le, or re a l du r a t i on , which he defi nes a s 11 the 
conti nuous prog ress o f t h e pas t whic h gn aws into the f uture 
and whi c h S¥vells a s it a d van c es . 112 .3 Be cause of t hi s fact --the 
fact tl1at the pas t survives- - " cons ciousness c annot g o through 
t he same s tate twice . The circumst anc e s may sti l l be the same , 
but they wi ll a ct n o l onger o n th e same pe r son , since they will 
f i nd him a t a new momen t of his h istor y . n 24 
22 . 
514- 515; 
23 . 
24 . 
; 
Letter to Fa~her J . d e Tonquedec , in Etud es , 1.30(1912), 
c i t . H.uhe and Paul, Hen ri Be r g son , 4.3 - 4-4 . 
CE , 7 . 
Ibid . , 8 . 
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This irreversibi lity of dura t ion lead s h i m to a second 
fact 1.vhi ch is also cen tral to Berg so n 's doctri n e , viz , the 
fa ct of an unforesee able novelty . 11 0ur personality, n h e s ay s , 
"shoots , g rovlS an d rip ens vlithout ceasing . Each of its 
moments is someth i ng new a dded to what was before . . • s omething 
' 25 
unforese eable . n 
2) . Li f e and dura tion. With the empirical evi den c e of 
the enduring and novel character of his own exper i ence in 
hand , Be r gson asks vvhether the same ca n be said o f existe n c e 
in g eneral . To this question h e g ive s an affi r mative answer , 
at leas t i n relation to t h e part of the universe t h a t can be 
d es cri be d as "living . " " The uni vers e e ndures . The more we 
study th e nature o f t i me , t he more we sh all co mp rehen d t hat 
durat i on means invent ion , the c reation o f f orms , the co ntin-
ual elab oration of the a b solutely new . u2 6 
In contrast to matter , wh i ch he define s as 11 a tend en cy 
to co nstitute isol able systems , that c an b e treat ed g e ometri -
cal l y , 11 t he living body i s n composed of unlik e parts tha t 
cornpl,ete e a ch oth e r . It performs diverse functions tha t 
i n volve each o ther . It i s an i n d iv i dual , n 27 an d i t mani f ests 
"a search fo r i ndividuality as if it st r ov e to co ns t i tute 
systems naturally isolated , naturally clo sed . 1128 
Living b o di e s, thus , ar e not nob jects 11 in the strict 
sense of the wo r d , since 
25 . CE , 8 . 27 . CE , 13 , 15 . 
26 . CE , 14 . 28 . CE , 1 8 . 
the orc:,anism which lives is a thin6 that endures •••• 
.. Jherever anything lives, there is , open so~~where , a 
re~ister i n which time is being inscribed . ~ 
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Chan ge, r a ther t han being simpl s omething which i s nr;;;ducible 
to an arrangement or rear r·ang ement of parts; or ..• an appear-
ance r~ lative to our i gnora,nc e ; or ••• on ly t h e inabili ty of 
man to p u t thi ngs i n p l a ce a gain , 11 3° is r e.the r the result of 
a hidd en c ause . 
'l'here is t:.nb roken continuity betvleen the evo l ut ion 
of the embryo and t hat of the comp l ete organism . 
The i mpe tus [",Joussee J which c au i:l e s a living being 
to g r ov.J" l arg er , to deve l op and to a g e , is the s ame 
th~t c~~se d1it t o pass through the phases of en br y -ornc l 1.1.. e . j 
In life , the present mom ent of a living body finds its exp l a -
nation not in the immed i ate l y pre c eding moment , but r a ther in 
all of it s very l on g history . Thu s Be r g son c onceives of a 
world where there is 11 continuity of chang e , preserva tion of 
the past i n the p resellt , r aa l duration11 -- a world whi c h living 
bei n g s seem to share wi th consc i ousness . 3 2 
3 ). Life and creat ion . The se c o n d part o f the quest i on 
must now be studied . I s life , like co ns cious a c t ivi t y , 
i ncreasin[>; creation? To ansv.rer this question Be r g son d i scusses 
the i dea of transformism , an i dea wh ich he a ccepts as more or 
less s 'nonymous wi th the idea of the f a ct of evolut i on b ut yet 
relatively independent of a ll t heori es respect i n g the manner 
I 
of e vo lution.33 
29 . c~ , 19 , 20. 32 . C.c. , 27 . 
30 . c~ , 21. 33 . CE , 29- 30 . 
31. CE , 22 . 
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· Thus , i f crec.t ion , or transforr:r1ism , t akes ;>l a ce , h m-J does 
it com e to pas s? Be r g so .. d escribes the g enes i s o f 11 Jife in 
g eneral" as f o llows : 
At a certain moment , in certain points of s pa ce , a 
visible curre nt [ courant bien visible J has take n rise; 
this current of life , traversing the b od i es it h as 
org anized one after t h e o th e r, pa s sin g from g enera tion 
to g eneration , has be co me d ivided amon gst speci es and 
dis tributed among st individu als without losi ng anything 
of its force , r a t her in t ens i fying in proportion to its 
a d v ance . .54 
This passag e , \.v'nile i t do e s not use the · term 1 1 ~lan vitaln 
specific <ti l y , is certainl y a n a l l usion to its act ivity and 
indicates that Berg son i nt e n d s to identify t h e ~lan very 
closely with the p henome n on of l i f e. It alsd b r ing s to atten-
t ion a fur t he r point wh ich mi ght be r ::=;me mbere d for l a ter r efer -
e n ce . Lif e i s stated a s b e g inn ing nat a certain moment 11 and 
nin certain points of space . 11 Here Bergson can h a rdly mean 
the a b so l ute time o f Newton. It i s qu ite clear that he does 
me an 'his a b solute s pac e. It appears , howe v er , t ha t h e is 
i nvolved i n a serious inconsistency r e ga r d ing t ime . Absolute 
time , vrh ich i s t h e time of Descartes a l s o, he h as already 
criticized as a place whe re e v olut ion c an never t a ke p lace . 35 
Ac tua lly , Berg son is say i n g that life ha s a beg inning in s p ace 
and time, but i f it begins in time , life must no t b e the same 
' 
as time . Therefore , the time spoken of here c a nnot be the 
duration s p oken of abo ve. Bu t Be r g son s p ends a g reat de a l of 
time arguing a g ainst a bsolut e time and for his own c on c ept of 
34 . C.:<.; , 31 . 35 . CE , 27 . 
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duration . It a ppears, then , that there is a n eed for fur -
ther ciarif ication at this point. 
B:e r g son , vJh ile r e j ecting t he Weismann do ctr i ne of t he 
continuity of the germ- plasm, ho l ds to the "continuity of 
genet i c energy . n He s ay s t hat t h is energy is 
expende d only at certain i nstants , f or j us t enough ti me 
to gi ve the requis ite impuls ion to the embryonic l ife, 
and :(.is) ••• r e couped as soon as po s sible i n new sexual 
element s , i n •Hhich , a gai n , it bides it s time ••.. Life 
is like a curre nt pass i ng .f rom germ to germ thro'U'gfl 
the mediwn of a developed organism •••• The essential 
thing is t h e continuous prog ress ind ef i nite ly pursue d .36 
I n summarizing , then , Bergson ' s presentat ion of h is t hesis , 
s ever,a l points shoul d be noted . (1) Berg son desire s t o ba se his 
arg umen t upon em piri ca l gr ounds , i.e., upon the f a ct s of consci-
ous experien ce, of which t he most outstanding is real duration . 
( 2) Rea l du r at ion is incapable of be i ng r e versed an d therefore 
i n volve s unforese e able n ovelty . ( 3) Just as experien ce endures 
and cr eates , so living forms endure and create. (4) Throughout 
th e very long his to r y of living forms , t he re is seen at work a 
hi dden cause, (a pous s ee , a courant, a n elan,) who s e e ne r gy i m-
pe l s embryonic life , produc es growth , developmen t , a nd a ge , and 
is transmL, ted f ro m ge rm t o g erm by means of t he d eveloped or gan-
ism. (5) At t h is ear ly stage of the discus s i on , Be r gson ' s dis-
cu s s i on of time i s somewha t unclea r. Tha t h e intends to i mply 
t he ti me o f Ne\vton is hardly possible i n the l i gh t o f his expl i -
cit st a temen t s el sevvhere . He may mean t ha t while biologic a l lif e 
be gan , co smic life d id not . If t his i s wh at he mea ns , his posi-
tion i s mo re tenab l e . 
36 . CE , 31 , 32 ; italics Ber gs on ' s . 
ii. The negat ive phase of t he argu1r1en t. 
l) . The i nad equacy of physics a nd chemist r y . ot il l intent 
u pon the empirical approach , Bergson examin es t h e alternatives 
to hi s thesis. F i rst amon g these is the scientific , i . e ., the 
physico-chemical~ expl anation of e volution . Th i s scientifi c 
attitude , foll owing , as i t does, the essential pattern o f the 
i ntel l e c t , is based u p on the f ollowi n g p r in ciples : ( a ) selection 
I 
i n a g iven situa tion of whate ver is like somethi ng a lready known ; 
(b ) a ppl ica tion o f t h e pri n ciple that ' like produce s like '; (c) 
a na l y s i s o f t he whole into e lements , which must be abl e to be r e -
peat ed .3 7 As a co nsequenc e , biological phenomena a re nresolved 
[ by scienc e 1 ... into physico -ch emical f actors," and , i f one d eniES 
this resol uti on , one is "arbitrarily affirming that living mat -
t er is not mad e u p of the same elements a s o ther ma t ter . 11 3 8 
Berg son ' s reply to t h is me cha nistic p osition --a pos i tion 
vvh ic h at the t i me he was wri ting and f or at le ast two centuries 
earlier , had been t he pr evailing view am ong all scientists and 
ma1 y philosophers --is no t whether the explana tion of life 
shal l u s e an analogy or not e , but c o n cerns which analogy should 
be u sed i n th i s explana tion . Be r g son be l ieve s ( at l east a t 
t h i s point) in "the fundamental i dentity o f inert matter and 
org an ized ma t t er . u39 The po i n t which h e believ es i s doubtful 
is whe t he r l ivi ng bei n g s shall be "assimilat e d t o th3 artifi-
cial systems that sc ien ce cut s out within inert matter, or 
37 . Cf . 34 . 
38 . CE , 35- 6 . 
3 9 . CE , 36 . 
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whether they must not rather be compa r ed t o that natural system 
which is the wh ole of the universe . 11 4° He admits that analys is 
11 11vil l resolve t he p roc ess of org a n ic creat i on i n t o an e ver-
g rowin g numb er of physi c o- chemi ca l phenomena . " Bu t , he co n -
eludes , that d oes not mean that "chemistry a nd physics 1vi 11 
e ver g ive us the key t o life . n4lr--------------------r 
To i llustr ate t h is co nt en-
tion , Berg son uses the analo gy 
o f the curve which , wh i le a 
s mall part o f i t ma y approxi -
mate a stra i ght line, a nd 
each ,point in it c o incides 
Fi g . 7 
vri ·h its tangent , is n ever BERGSON ' S ANALOGY OF THE CURVE 
composed of straight lines . Vitali t y· , whi le "tang ent at 
every p o i nt, to p hysical and chemical forces , " is lik ewise 
not co mposed of physi c a l and ch emical forces . 42 
As further p roof , Be rgson p oi nts out that "the p e culiarly 
active plastic substanc e s obstinately defy synthesis"43 and , 
sti l l f urthe r , does also the chemi cal compounding o f p roto-
p lasm . 44 Rathe r t han findin g evid enc e in h istologic a l pheno-
mena for narrowin g the g ap be t wee n the org a n ic and the inor-
ganic , Bergson fin d s reason to widen t he gap . He cites the 
40. CE , 36 . 
41 . CE , 36 . 
42 . CE , 36-7. 
43 . CE , 40 . 
44. CE , 41 . 
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conclusions ·of Cope45 that there are two orders of phenomena 
ob servable i n living tissues : a nagenesis and k1ttagenesis . 
It i s with t he latter alone, i.e ., t he dead and not the living , 
s ays Berg son , that physics and c hemistry deal. 4 ,) Physics and 
chemistry have to do wi th "phenomena tha t a re r ·:!peated conti nu-
ally i n the living bein g , as i n a chemic a l retor-t." On t h e 
co nt rary, those who are conc erned with the 11 minute structure 
of l ivin6 tissues, on their g en esis and e volution •.. a r e inter-
ested i n the r e tort its e lf, not mer ely it s co ntents. They find 
that t his r etort creates its o"m form thr ough a unique series 
of a cts t hat really constitute a history .n47 
By way o f summary , Berg son finds that life , in a ddition 
to p ossessing the qualities of e ndurance and nc-velty , is also 
irreducible to the p hysi cal and chemical orde r. Be r gson does 
n o t fe.e l that he has p ro duced a 11 f i nal r efutat :.on." Instead 
it is dr awn ITf r om the c onsider ation of r eal ti n e ... ..... rh ich is ... 
t he on l y refut ati on possi ble. n48 l•Iechanism n arti f icially 
deta ches [ its s ystems) f rom the wholeTI and thu :> claims "that 
all is given. n This Laplacean dogma deprive s - ~ime of it s effi-
cacy, "and i f it does nothing , it is nothing . 1H·9 On the con-
tra r y, Tlwe perceive duratj_on as a stream a g ainst which we can-
not go.n This 
is the f oundat ion of our o eing , and , as .,.1e feel , the very 
45 . Cit ., CE , 40 . 
46 . CE , 40. 
48 . CE , 43. 
49 . C£ , 43 - 5 . 
4 7 . C.2: , 41, 42 . 
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s ubstanc e of the world i n wh ic h we live •... VJe cannot sac-
r i f ic e experience t o the r equirements of a s ys t em . That 
i s vihy v·le r eje ct radi ca l mechanism. 5U 
2). The i nad ~quacy of r a dical finalism. I f one i s t empted 
t o t h i pk t hat Ber gs on 's bril l i ant and f orceful r epudiatio n of 
me chanism indi c ates t hat i t is i nt ending to emt rac e t r a ditional 
teleo l ogy, that te mpt ation is ill-founded . Lif e no more can be 
explain e d by traditiona l teleology t han by me cban i srn , a nd f or 
t he sam e r e a son, a ccording t o Berg son . Finali :3m , nwhi ch is 
t he t er m, along wi th TTf i nality ," f or teleology i n Ber gson 's 
terminology ) of whic h Leibniz' doc t rin e o f " pr:!- establ ished 
ha r rnonyu is an example, holds t hat nall i s g iv enn i n that it 
supposes t ha t 11 t hing s a nd b ei ngs me rely realiz e a pro gr am pre-
viou sly a rranged.u Accordi ng to this vi ew, " t he re i s •.• no ••• 
creation in t he un i verse , time is useless. n5l The onl y diffe r-
en ce b e t vreen me chan ism and f i nalism i s t hat f jnali sm TTsub s ti-
t ut e s t he attrac t ion o f the f uture f or t h e i mr,ulsion of t h e past. n 52 
Nor i s i t to any ad vant age, i n Be r gson 1 s mind , t o " t h in 
out t he Leibnizian f i na l i sm by break i ng i t i nto an infi nite 
number of pieces , n 53 as finali s t s t r y to d o when t h ey recog-
n ize the i mpossibility of d emonstrating t he d Jctr ine empiri-
cally . w ~ at r e sults i s a s hif t f rom an 11 ext e cnal f i nality " 
to an " i nt e rnal fi nality' r: ea ch bei ng i s ma d e f or itself , all 
50 . CE , 45. 
51. CE , 45. 
52 . CE , 45; not e he re t h e similarity of "attra ction of 
t h e future" to Ar is t ot l e ' s posit ion a bo ve . 
53 . CE , 46. 
102 
its pa rts con s pire from the g reat e st g ood o f the whole a n d are 
intell igently organized i n view of that end .54 
The examp l e s whic.h illustrat e this secon d form of finali t y 
are the neo-vit ali s tic the ories . Since the neo-vitali s tic 
positidn of J riesch has b een di s cuss ed above 55 :Lt would be 
profitab le a t t hi s point to note vrhat Bergson do scribes as 
the 11 stumbl i ng b loc k" of these vitalist i c d octr:i_ nes . 
The probl em "v'n ich inte r nal final ity must f a ce is th e fact 
that t he co mp lex organ i sms are t hemselv es compo3ed of other 
smaller organ isms , an d , al t ho ugh i nternal finality may be a ttri-
buted to the g r e a ter organism, wh e n the smaller ones a re sub-
ordinatcd to the g re a t er , the pri nciple o f external finality 
is accepted . lhu s , argues Be r g son, "the idea o f a final ity 
that is always int e rnal is a self- de struc t ive notion," and 
individuality is present, to a cert ain deg ree at l east . 56 
As an illus tration of t he assert i on of this ind ivi duality , 
Be r g son cite s the f acts of r egeneration 57 where 11 an e l ement 
or g roup o f elements suddenly r e veals that , ho~Bver limited 
its nor mal space and function , i t can transcend them occasion-
ally; it may even , i n certain cases, be regarded as the e quiva-
l ent of the whole . n58 
'fhe f a c t that tr i n nature , there is neither purely internal 
finalit y nor absolute ind i viclu ali t y n renders tLe p o s ition o f 
54 . CE , 47 . 
5'5 . o e e Ch . II . 
5'6 . CE , 47 - 8 . 
57 . Cf . DrieschT s exp eriment , d escrib ed .s.bove j ·?j f . 
58 . CE , 48 . 
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vitaliSI:I v ery d i ff icult in Berg son' s opinion. The re would be 
(i f pure internal fi nality 1,ve re t he case) both a n immense num-
ber o f "vital pr incip l e 11 s , on t h e one hand , e a c h adhering to 
one o f the org a nized e lements o f t h e individual , and a l so an 
ind ividual without a ''vital principle , " on the other, since 
th e in'd i v idual cannot completely be isolat ed f r om h is anc e :3tors. 59 
' 
'i'he on l y es c ape f r om t h is se l f - de structive p osit ion o f 
vitalism, in a~ rg son ' s mind , is t he r e j e ction o f the view of 
i nternal f inality and t h e a cceptanc e of the exte rnal v a ri e t y . 
He s a ys : "If there is finality in t he wo r ld o f l i f e , i "'c i nc l ude s 
t h vJh ol e of life i n a sin gle i n d ivisibl e emb rac e . n "hi s com-
ma n l i fe does not d e ny ga ps a n d inc-oh e ren ces, n or does i t d e ny 
i n d ividual i ty "to a c ertain d e g r e e . But it forms a sing le 
who l e , n one t h e l ess . u60 
f r oo the f or e goi n g di scus sion i t c a n r eadily be s een tha t 
Bergso n i s wr a stl i ng with t he problems of caus al i ty a nd indivi -
duality . Both of' these p r obl ems are v ery d i f ficu l t f or h i m 
to solve , a s will b ec ome app a ren t i n t h e dis cussion to f ollow. 
3) . ~xamination o f t he t h eories o f e volut i on . lhe crucial 
stag e of Be r gson ' s neg a tive a r gume nt a r rives vihen he examines 
t he v a rious t heori es of e volution. He sets f or hiu s elf the 
f ollowi ng obje ctive: 
Pure me chanism , then , ·v1ould b e refut a ble , an d final ity, 
59 . 
60 . 
C' l' .w , 
Ci.!: , 
49 • 
50 ; i t a lics Berg son ' s . 
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in( th e special sen se i n which we understan d it, would be 
d e1nonstrable in a certain aspect , if it co u.l d be proved 
that lif e may manufacture the like apparatus , by unlike 
me;ans , on diverge~It line s o f evolution; an d the st rength 
of l the proof_ ·would be proportional bot h to the divergen cy 
be~ween the lines of e volution thus chosen an d to the com-
plexity of the similar st ructures found in them. & r 
It [ must not be thought that Bergson's use of the term 
I 
I 
lfdemonsf rable" indic a tes his intention of lapsing into an 
a prioriL a r gument f or he qualifies the term vvith t he phrase 
"in a ckrtain aspect ." However , the i mpression v.rhich h e give s 
I 
I 
le ads ope to suspe ct t hat there is to be very little room for 
doubt 
type s 
I 
I 
wh en the argument is finish e d. He analyzes f our m.ain 
I 
o f evolutionary theories: a dap tation to outsi de condi-
1 
tions, i;l. ccidental and inner causes, dira ct a ction of outer 
I 
causes, I and inheritance of variations derived f rom int c; rna l and 
I 
externaiL causes. 
I 
I 
• ) I l • Evolution by a daptation t o outsid e conditions. The 
i 
views of 3 im e r and Darwin are repre s e ntative of this attitud e. 
I 
Darwi ni ~m utilizes t h e negat ive princ i ple o f evolution by the 
I 
eliminafion of v a ria tions. Eimer hold s to th e principle of 
evolution by the positive influen ce of outer condi tions . Both 
of thes k views make inadequate use of the i de a of nadaptat ion. 11 62 I L -
I 
Th~ Darl"rinian i dea , while unequivoc a l, h as " g re a t d i ff iculty 
i n acc ounting for the progr ess ive ••• rectilinear development of 
' / 
complex apparatus." 0 3 It a ppears that acc ide nt is the only 
61~ CE , 62; italics Ber gson's. 
62 1. CE , 63 . 
63 [. Loc . cit., 63. 
I 
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explana'~ ion. To this Be rgoo n answers: 
How can a ccidental causes , occuring in an a ccid ental 
order, be supposed to have repeatedly come to the same 
result, the causes being inf~nitely numerous an d t he ef-
fe~t infin ite l y complicated? 4 
Tile vie v.r of Eimer is equivocal i n that it uses the term 
"adaptation" in two different senses, i.e., as (a) me chanical 
adjustment of matter to a pre -existent f orm, and a s ( b ) self-
adjust~ent o f life ~1ic h creates a form for itself as i t builds 
u p a machine h aving no resemblances to outer a ctions. 65 The 
first d efiu i tion d oesn t t g o fa r e n ough; the se cond goes too 
far. Th e second , or finalistic explanation is used with reg ard 
to the , particular, while t l1e firs t, or mechanical explanation, 
is used when dealing with gene r a lities.66 
ii). Evolution by accidental and inner causes. 1 o better 
view t h e problem Bergson bring s i n the example of t he e y e. 
The e y e is s elect e d since it is a structure which i s extremely 
complicat e d and we ll-co-ordinated and since it occurs both i n 
the vertebrat e and a mollusk such as the Pe cten . The problem 
may now be formul a ted thus: 1. The e y e of the vertebrate and 
the e y e of the ?e ct en are co mposed of the nsarne ess en t i a l 
parts'; and 11 analo g ous elements." 2. n all are a gre ed that 
mol lusks and vertebrates s e parated f rom their pa rent-stem 
long ~efore the appearance of an eye so compl ex as that o f 
64 . CE , 64. 
65 . CE, 6 5. 
66 . Cf . 66-7. 
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t he Pe ct en . 11 3. 'l'heref ore, "wh en ce ••• the st r uctur a l analogy? " 67 
The Darwinian view of "insens i ble va ri ations" i s dis cussed 
a nQ i s r 2 j ected on threa co unts. (a) " I f t he va ria t i on s a re 
a ccidental, h m·,; can they ever a gr ee to a ris e in e very part of 
the organ at t he s ame time, i n suc h a way that t h e organ will 
continue t o perform it s function?n (b) " Hovv could t he s ame 
small yariations, incalculab le i n number, have ever occurred 
in the s ame order on two i ndependent l i nes of evolut ion , if 
t h ey were purely accidental?" (c) ft How could they have been 
p r eserve d by selection and acc urnula te d in both ca ses , i n t h e 
same o r der, when eac h of them, taken separa tely , was of no 
/" 1<"> 
us e? noo 
The view of Bat eson and iJeVri es o f " sudd en variations " 
ma kes i t eas ier t o unders t and how the e ye o f t h e v ert ebr a te and 
t hat of the mollusk ~ay have b een r a i s e d to their pr e sent f orm 
than doe s the Darwin ian :nypothesis. Howe ver, i f t hey a l l must 
ch ang e su ddenly , i t is l ess able t o exp lain co-ordination of 
t h e va r i ous part s wi t hout destroyi ng vision . Furt he r , the s ame 
probl em of t he a cciden t al oc curing on di vergent lines of e volu-
tion is unanswered . Bot h vie ws must rely upon " some good genius" 
either nto obtain cont i nui t y of direction or success ive va ria-
ti ons n (Darwin ), or "to obtain t he converge nce of simultaneous 
changesn (Bat e son and DeVries). Neither i s a ble t o explain the 
parallel development of t he eye on independent lines of evolu-
67 . CE, 70. 
68 . CE , 72- 3 . 
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tion. 69 
iJ..i) • .~volution by direct a ction of oute r c ircurnstanc es . 
The view of Eimer explains the development of the eye by the 
continuous a ction of li ght. This view eliminates the element 
of chance , explains resemblance of the two effect s by the i den-
tity of the c ause , and explains complexi ty by the Tl depth11 of 
it s imprint . 70 
Be r gs on find s t hat Eimer's view suff ers from the same 
d i f fi culty mentioned above as belonging to !!adaptation": viz., 
that between passivit y an d a ctivity . Gr anted that the eye may 
have begun pass ively as a pigment-spot, as in the case of the 
Infusorian, the r e is as much· diff erence between the p i gment-
spot and the eye as thlere is between a ''photo :o:;raph an d a photo-
graphic ap paratus . n71 
A cause may act by impelling , releasing, or unwinding •••• 
Only in t he firs t case ••• does caus e explai n effect; in the 
others, t h e effect is more or less give n in advance , an~ 
t h e antecedent i s •.• its occasion rather t han its cause. 2 
Ei mer d oes not use "cause" in t h e fir st, but in t h e lat ter two 
senses. The result is a view vlh ich is not only as my ste rious as 
the view of t he most confirmed final i st , but it is a lso contrary 
to the mechanical view since t he eye of t he mollusk would come 
f rom lig ht re acting on chemical substances quite different from 
t hose of the vertebrate. In f act eyes develop i n other crea-
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
CE, 
c _,!_, , 
CE, 
CE, 
77; 
78 . 
80 . 
83 . 
italics Be r gson 's. 
tures from a great many different combinations of causes. 
Therefore this view is quite inadequate. 
10~ 
iv). Evolution by inheritance by variations deri ved from 
internal and external causes. Neo-Lamarckism, of all the 
later forms of evolutionism, is the only one "capable of 
admitting an internal and psychological principle of de vel-
opment, although it is ot bound to do so.n73 Further it 
seems to be the only means of accounting for the parallel de v-
elopment of identical complex organs. Bergson, not wishing to 
involve himself in the more technical aspects of evolution, 
singles out for notice the idea of "effort" which the neo-
Lamarckians have recognized. However, Bergson is of the 
opinion that this internal activity "must be something quite 
different from what we usually call effort, for ne ver has an 
effort been known to produce the slightest complication of 
an organ"; further, granted the application of the t e rm to 
animals, in plants "variatio!ls of form do not seem to imply, 
nor always lead to, functional changes." The cause of the 
variation, even though it be of a psychological nature, 
' 
could hardly be called an effort without giving an unusual 
extension to the meaning of the t e rm. Therefore, Bergson 
concludes that it is necessary "to dig beneath the effort 
itself and look for a deeper cause,n74 a conclusion which 
is also indicated by the most favorable view of the 
theory of the transmissability of acquired character-
73. CE, 86. 
'74. CE, 87. 
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istics.75 
Tn rejecting the various forms of evolutionism, then, 
Bergson 's agreements and differences may be tabulated as fol-
76 lows: 
Bergs on 's Arguments: Bergson's Differences: 
I 
' 
Neo-Dar- "The essential causes of The differences inheren t 
winians variation are the differ- in the germ are purely 
ences inherent in the germ accidental and indivi-
borne by the individual, dual. 
and not the experiences or 
behavior in the course of 
his career. n 
' Eimer "The variations of differ- Physical and chemical 
ent characters continue causes in combination 
from generation to gener~ are sufficient to se-
at ion in definite direc- cure the result. 
tions." 
i 
Neo-Lam- The existence of a "cause The psychological cause 
arckists of a psychological nat- is simply the conscious 
ure. " effort of indivi duals, 
and the transmission of 
acquired characteristic 
is the rule rather than 
the exc eption . 
Fig. 8 - BERGSON'S VIEW OF OPPOSING EVOLUTIONARY COIJCEPTIONS 
4). The thesis of the Blan vital. Following this more 
or less negative discussion, Bergson r eturns to the thesis 
which he originally made, viz ., "that of an '9lan originel.n77 
Before embarking upon the aspects of his argument of a more 
positive nature, Bergson's thesis of the ~lan itself is elabor-
ated upon somewhat and should be noted at this point. 
75. CE, 87-94. 
76. cr. 95-97. 
77. CE , 97. 
' 
s 
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It should alwa y s be reme mbered that Bergson considers 
the ~lan vital as able to be experienced. He says at the v ery 
beg inn ing of CE that t h e " i mpulsen [ pous£ee"J of our past 11 is 
felt h1 the form of tende:1.c y . 11 78 It has already been d escribed 
as a "vi s ible current," a " g enetic energyn v.rhic h is conti nuous 
but is e xpended only at such time a nd for so long as to g ive 
t he pr op er impulsion to embryonic life. 79 Now it is seen t hat 
t he e volution of new forms , rather than fol l owing either the 
neo - .u9-rwinians , Eimer, or the n eo-Lamarckians, 
must certainly be r e lated to some s ort of effort, but to 
an effort o f f ar g reater depth than the individual effort, 
far more independent o f circumstances, an effort co mmon 
t o most rep r e senta tives of t he s ame species, i nhe rent i n 
the g erms t hey be a r rather than in their substances a lone, 
~n effort t hg:reby a s suring of being pas sed on to t he ir 
aescendants. ~U 
A very important chara cteristic of the ~lan v i tal, which 
heretof ore has b een only touched u pon , 8l is its principle of 
dissocia tion. Evolution t ake s place along diverging line s. 
These d iverg i ng lines are the r esult of the division of the 
~lan vita 1. 82 Gene r a lly, this divergence i s . accentua ted as 
speci,es p r ogress in their evolution. However , if the hypo -
t h esis of a common i mpetus b e ac cepted, it is ne c essary to 
supp ose that they r1ay e volve i dentically. The appe a rance on 
diverging lines of e volution o f the eyes of the mollusk and t he 
7 8 . 
79. 
80 . 
en. 
82. 
CE , 
CE, 
C.~::; , 
C£ , 
•'"'H' v.w , 
8 . 
31; cf. above 9~. 
97 . 
xxii , 62 . 
98. 
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vertebrate ill ustrate this fact . "Life does not pro .ceed by the 
as so cia tion and addition of elements , but by dis soc iation and 
d ivision . n 83 
"rom these passages , it may be s een that B'"" r g son is devel-
op i ng the thes i s that the ~lan vi tal is the uco.usal explana tion 11 
of e volution . Furthe r attention and clarif i cation of t h i s the s is 
i s seen as he ente rs a gain i nto the me chanistic - finalistic con-
trover'sy . He s eems qui te defin it e l y t o h old a posi tion- some -
where bet ween the t wo views above ment ioned , a l thou ,.,h i t is one 
11'lhich is "nearer the second [ f inalisticJ doctrine t han the f irst . n 
' For example , he says , the raisi ng of a ha nd f r om A to B, when 
felt f rom within , "is a simpl e , indivisible act . "84 Outvrardly , 
however , it t r anscr ibes a curve i n whic h a n infi ite numbe r of 
positions and their order may be n oted. Now 
me chan i sm , h ere , woul d consist in seeing only the p ositions. 
Finali sm woul d take thei r order into account . Bu t both 
inechanism and finalism would lg.;;ve on one side the Inove-
ment , which i s real ity itself . ? 
It appea r s , thus , that Berg so n re ga r ds the c ausality involved 
i n creation , to u se i ri stotle's te r ms , as "eff icient" o nly , 
and not "fon1a ln (me chanist ic) or "final . " 
iii . 'l'he posi t ive phase of the argument . 
The d evelopment of the positive p has e o f the a r gument 
83 . CE , 99 ; i ta lics Bergson ' s . 
84 . CE , 1 01 . 
85 . CE , 101 . 
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i nvolves a more de t ailed dis c~ssion of the process of e vo l ution 
an d th ~ divergent dire ct ions i nto which it has d eveloped . 
l) . '~h e proce s s o f e voluti on . Th e ~lan vi ta l i s n ot wit h -
out obs t a cles to its activity . This opposition has been repre -
I 
sented various ly , e . g ., as a "des c entn opposed t o the elan ' s 
ascen t, as an trunvri nding " of a ro l l already prepared , 86 and as 
a "tend enc y to repro du cen which is opposed t o the ~lan ' s tendency 
t o ind:lviduate . 87 More or le .ss metaphorical concepts suc h- as 
these a re eluci dated upon by the s i mpl e statement i n Chapt e r II 
th a t ''the r esi s ten ce of i nert matter was the obst acle that had 
f i r st to be overcome . n88 
Howe ver , and more p rofoundl y , t here is also a n i nwar d 
source of division , that 
of " t he explosive force --
due to an unstable balance 
of t e ndencies--which l i fe 
b ears within its elf . n89 
Thes e ntlvo se r ies of 
caus es,17 whi ch are illus -
t rat a~ by t he ana logy of 
t he metal and the explosive 
powde r of a bursting shel l 
respectively , cause the 
86 . CE , 14 . 
87 . c~ , 16 . 
aa . cz , 109 . 
S9 . oc . c i t . 
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~lan vital to divide . Life conquers matter first by be-
com i n extremely smal l a nd simple , and then by growing 
as much as possible . But living matte r divides when it 
reaches a certain point . Therefore , a f ter ages o f effort, 
the copplex org anism is made to funct i on as would a continuous 
living mass which had simpl y g rovm bigger . 9° 
The sources of d ivision within the ~lan vital itself , 
howe ver , are noted, say s Be r gson , in the fact t hat "lif2 is 
a tende n cy , and the essence of a tendency is to d evelop in 
the i' o rm of a sheaf , creating , by its very g r ovv-th , di v e r g e n t 
dire c ti ons among Vlhich its i mpe tus i s divided .n9l This p rocess , 
beside s p roducin g the two or thre e main h i ghways , als o pro -
duced numerous b l ind alleys . 92 The d irection o f th i s d ive r-
' 
g ence; h owever , may or may no t be in a s traight line . It 
may be a f orvmrd movem ent; it may be simply a marking - time ; 
i c may , an d stil l more often is , be a devi at ion or turr.ing 
b a c k . 93 Berg son is impress e d b y the fact of di sord er ~nd 
incoheren ce in nature . But d espit e these minor paths , the 
main dire ctions of e volut ionary d evelopment a r e the pri-
mary concern , an d so he proc eeds to clarify these . 
2) . Divergent and complementa r y tendencies. If tend e n -
90. 
91. 
92 . 
93 . 
C., .c.. , 
CE , 
eli' 
"" ' CE, 
110 . 
110 . 
111. 
115 . 
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cies, rathe r t ha n st ates, are taken into account, the t wo main 
divergent developments of life, plants and animals, may be 
distinguished . This divergence is shovm by three observa-
tions: (1) the method of alimentation; ( 2) the c a p acity for 
locomotion; and (3) the development of the nervous system 
and t h e capacit y for co nsciousness. 
The v ege t ab le manufactures organic substances d ire ctly 
v.ri th mineral substances ; as a rule, this aptitude enables 
it to dispense v;ith movement and so vvi th feeling . Ani-
ma l s , which are obliged to g o in search of their f ood , 
have evolved in the di r e ction o f locomotor activity , and 
consequently of a con~ c iousness more and more dist inct, 
m'ore and more ample . 94 
Howe ver, Ber gson consid ers it 
most probabl e that the an i mal cell and the ve getable 
cell are derived f rom a c ommon stock and ... that the 
c haracteristic ten dencies of the evolut ion of the 
two k i ngdoms , a lthough di vergent , co~~ist even now , 
both i n the plant and in t h e animal.~' 
Thus , there is 
no need , i n order to explain t h is d ividing into two , 
to br ing in a ny myste rious for c e .... The l ivi ng being 
leans naturally toward what i s most convenient t o 
i t .... The same ~lan that has led the animal t o g ive 
itself nerve s aYJ.d ne rve centers mu s t have enc;led , in 
the plant , in the cholorophyll i an f unction.9° 
It a ppears , how ever, that Bergson himself b r ings in 
11 a mys terious force . n For he says i n this s a.rne conne ction 
that the eff ort at the root o f life nc annot result in the 
94 . c~, 118-125. 
95 . CE , 125. 
96 . CE , 126-127 . 
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creatio n o f r physical ) energy •••• All tha t the effort can d o, 
then; is to make the best of a pre - existing energy vkl ic h it 
finds at its d isp osal. n The only way i t can secure this po-
tential energy is 11 simply by pulling a trigge rll which releases 
the e nergy f rom its principal source on the surface of t his 
planet--the s un . 97 The question which comes up here is Hhere 
did the sun g et its energy? Is the sun a material some t h ing 
wh ich is inert as other matter , o r is it anot her kind of 
matter vvhich retains it s energy f rom its creator, or, still 
a gain , is the sun mat t er at all? Thes e are problems wh ich 
wi l l be d iscussed later a nd have a v Gr y definite be a rin g upon 
the e ntire hypothesis of the ~lan vi tal. At any rate, Berg -
son must assume that the sun existed before living fo r ms 
a ppeared . 
The harmony displayed by the plant an d a ni mal k ing doms, 
then, is due to their orig inal source to whose g rov.rth t 1-eir 
diverg e n ce owes it s elf . Might it not, h owe ver, be ask ed 
t hat if this harmony is complete only at t he st a r t , when ce 
arises the p rinciple of d i ssociation? This is a n other p ro b -
lem wh ich :aergso n mus"c answer . 
It has been said that one illustration is worth a 
thousand words . At least as f a r as Be r g son is concerned 
this may be true. ' 'h erefore h i s thea r y o f t h e main lin es 
oi evolution is h e rewith i llustrated with the chief character-
istics of each n o ted . 
97 . CE , 127-128 ; ita lics mine. 
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I n the cours e of the d evelopment of animal lif e , several 
facts eo n cerning the elan vi tal become a p parent . Firs t , Tfthe 
force wh ich is evolving throughout the organized world i:;; a 
lirnite(i f orce, which is a l way s seeking to transcend itself and 
always , remains inadequate to the work it woul d fain p ro duce . n98 
Amon g the reasons f or this ar e a paralysis b r ought on by c on -
trary f orces, among \'fh ich is "the mat eriality y.rhic h it has 
had to a s sume , n and an hypno s is \·rh ic h result s from being 
11 ab s o~bed by th e f orm it i s eng a g e d in taking . n99 However, t .he 
profound cause of this d iscordance lies i n an irreme di-
able di f fere n c e o f r hythm. Life i n genera l is mobility 
itself; particular ma nifesta tions of life a cce p t this 
mob i lity reluct antly, an d constantly l a g behind . It is 
a lways going ahead ; they want to mark time . ~volution 
i n s e neral woul d fain go in a straig ht lin e; e a ch s p e cial 
e volution i s a kind of circle.lOO 
Continuing this distincti on, Bergson sees in the ~lan vital 
itself " t wo diff erent an d o f ten a nt a gonistic mov ements" : 
t h e act by wh ich l ife go e s f orwar d to t he creation of 
l)e·w form , and t h e a ct by wh ich this form is sh a ped •••. 
The f ir s t is c ontinuous with the second , but c annot con-
tinue in it without be i ng d ravm asid e f rom it s direc -
t ion.lOl 
Now, i n a ddition (i t is n ot a t all clea r th a t B8r g son 
believes that the two antag on i st ic mov ements j ust .cited cor-
r espond with t h e t wo which are now to be p resent e d) t o 
thes e movements, t here are a lso t wo other movement s within 
the elan vital, movements which, orig i nally inte r ming led, 
;9 8 . CE , 140. 
99 . CE , 141. 
1,00 . C.B; , 141 . 
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were bound to part company i n the course of growth, viz., i . 
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instinct' and i n t ellig ence . The di s cussion of these two i d eas 
could lead t h e present discussion f a r a f ield . Therefore , Wh ile 
neither one len ds itself to rig id definition, it will be s~ffi-
I 
cient to i ndicate briefly t he c hief differences between them . 
Summarizing the discussion o f diver ge nt a nd complementary 
tenden cies , Ber g son believes t hat two p rimary d iver gence s h ave 
taken pl 'ac e a long t he line of evolution : plants from a ni mals, 
a nd , aldng the latter lin e , hyme noptera from vertebr a tes . The 
f irst d ivergence a p.;_Jarently r e sulted from the eff ect of sola r 
en ergy J.pon certai n "natural i ncl inations 11 of th e creatures. 
That this is insuffic i ent as an explana tion has already been 
i ndicated . The second d ivergence, however , seems to ha ve resul-
ted f rom moyements , ori ginally intermingled, but which , after 
parting , s e em to culminate in the hyme noptera which man i f est 
instinct and the vertebrates which manifest intelligence . And , 
final l y,, t here is a pparent i n t h e elan vital itsel f an intrinsic 
limita t :il on which may be seen in its being thwarted by matter, 
and , vrhi:ch, by being d ifferent from, and often a ntagonistic to, 
the iinpulse to create new forms, dravrs it a side f r om its direc -
tion . 
These observations l ead one t o believe that t here may be 
within t he elan it s elf a complexity which , if not able t o nul-
lify , is certainly able to jeopardize the continuity Wl.ich 
Bergson is most anx ious to preserve i n t he realm of lif e . 
J)~ Int ellig ence and i nstin ct. Just as vegetable a nd 
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animal life are both mutua lly antagonistic and muta lly comple-
mentary , so i n the dire ction in whi ch an ir.J.al life de veloped 
both i ntelli gence and i nstinct f orm opposite and compl ernen t a r y 
t endencies . They do not di ffer i n i nt ensity , or ~n degree, 
nor a re they of t he s ~ me order , nor d o t h ey hav e di f f ere nt 
grades . Thei rs is a 11 difference ... of ki nd . n102 
Despite the se qualitative differences~ h oit'ie ve r, both 
TT ret a i n somet hing of their common origin ••• neither being 
ever found i n a pure stat e . nl03 r------------------, 
INT.C:LLIG.!!d'.JC~ TIJSTHiCT 
To rep~esent this i dea , Berg-
son f requent l y makes use of 
the fi gure of a 11 core 11 sur-
rounded by a 11 f ringe . 11 \-Jhen 
de s cribing one line , e . g ., 
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the i nse ct s , there is the core of i nstinct104 11 s urrounde d by a 
frin ge of intelligence . 11 10 5 When referring t o vert ebra tes , h e 
describes i ntelligen ce as a " l uminous nucleus aro und \'l'n ich 
• t • t n " b 1 • t !1 106 1ns 1nc •.. I orms on..Ly a vague ne u os1 y . Ber gson insists 
t hat i n s t inct and i ntelligen ce 
ac company e a ch oth er only b e cause th ey are complementary , 
and t hey a re compl emen tary only because they are di ffe r -
ent wha t i s i nstinctive in instinct being opposite t o 
\-·.;hat is i ntelligent in intelligen ce .107 
Als o , ne i ·her i ntell i gen ce nor instinct a r e t hings capable of 
102 . CE , 149 .• 
103 . CE, 149 . 
104 . Cf . Cli' 53 ' TS!ViR , 23 8 . 
""' ' 105 . CE, 1 50 . 
106 . C"" 195 . ' I w, 
107 . CE , 1 50 . 
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rig i d defi11ition, but are tendencies which " go out of life 
h . h d . ]... l . ,,lOS w 1c epo s1ts t r1em a ong 1ts course. Thus, while 
acknovdedgi ng both as ''two modes of psychical a ctivity" a nd 
ntwo d i ffe r ent me t hods of a ction on inert matter ," Ber gson 
recogn izes t he narrowness of t his point of view which g ives 
us only 11 intellige n ce in g eneral. and ••• instinct in g enera l, 
only t he mean position a bove a nd belov; wh ich both c onstantly 
os cillate . nl09 
Furt her discussion reve als t hat t h e essential di f erence 
between instinct . and i nt elligence is that 
i nstinct perfe ct e d is a faculty of using and even con-
structing organ iz ed instruments; intelligence perfe cted 
i s . the f a culty of making and using unorganized i nstru-
ments.llO 
We would f ind both of these t ypes of activity at on ce i ncluded 
i n the "orig i nal psychical activity " and , if we vve nt ba ck far 
enough into t h e past , \·.re s hould find less and less s p ec i aliza-
tion of either t ype of activity . The very limita tion of t he 
" elan vital made ne ce s sary t he choice between t he two v;ays 
of acting on the materia l world . Therefore, instinct a ~d intel-
ligen ce , diverge , a nd "represent two divergent so l utions , equally 
fitti ng , of one and t h e scu11e probl em. nlll 
At this point, Bergson brings i n a discussion of "c on-
s ciousness in general." The d i stinction between "conscious-
ness ••• absent" and "consciousness •.• nullified,'' though equal 
108 . CE , 151. 
109 . CE , 1 51 . 
110 . CE , 15 5 ; ita l. Bergson's. 
lll . CE , 1 58 ; ita l. Be r gs on '· s. 
to zero in either ca se , illustra tes the difference between 
the uncons cious stone and t he unconsciousness which accom-
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panies instinct respect ively . In the l atter ca se , the nullifi-
cation results from f act that action and wh atever i dea t h ere 
might be coincide perfectly. Thus there is no consciousness . 
If, ho wever, there is a discrepancy between a ct and i de a , con-
. 1~ 112 sc1ousness resu GS. 
It i s not necessary to pursue this d istinction fart her 
a t this point ex cept to note that Bergson infers f rom .it that 
i nte l l i gence is likely to p oint toward consciousness , and 
i nsti nct towa rd unconsciousness •... \flhi le i nstinct and 
i ntellig·8nce both involve k no wledge , t hi s knowledge is 
r a ther a cted and uncons cious i n the case of instinct~ 
thought and conscious in the case of intellig ence.~l~ 
Further, t he objects d i f f er. 
'f he knowledge [ which insects possess], i f kn owledge there 
be, is onl y i mplicit . It is reflected outwardly i n exact 
movements .... [ I tJ evolves t h e i dea of definite t hi ngs 
existing •.. in definite points of sp a ce and time ... without 
having learned them.ll4 . 
I ntelligence , on the othe r hand, though inherited al so , 11 knmvs 
n o o bj.e ct in particular, 11 but naturally seizes relations •1 15 
gain , a nd more precisely, " intelligence, in so f ar as 
it is i nnate , is knowledge of a f orm; i nstinct i~plies the 
116 kno1-vledp;e of a matter . n 
This d iscussion comes to the primar y d i fference between 
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i n st inct and _Lnt e llig ence : 
~here a r e thing s tha t i n t e lligence alone is ab le to 
seek , but which , b y i t self , it \~~rill never f ind . These 
t h i ngs i n stinct alone cou.l d f ind ; but it will never 
seek them.ll7 
r' ro m this b a sic d istin ction , Berg son t hen pr o cee d s to 
its applica tion to the matt er at hand . Intellig ence , h e s ays , 
11 h a s f .or its chi ef obje ct t h e unorganiz e d solid . nl l8 It is 
able to "for m a clea r i dea •.. of the d iscontinuous •.. of immo-
b ility: alon e. nll9 In other word s , nthe intellect i s ch arac -
terized by the unlimited p ower of d ecomposing according to 
any l a 1.•1 a nd of r e c ompos i ng into any s y stem.n 120 
Intellect , on t h e othe r hand , 
cannot, \~thou t reversing its natu ral d irect i on and twi s t -
t ng a bout on itael f , think true co ntinuity , real n'.obility , 
recip rocal penetration--in a \>D r d , that creati v e e volu-
ti on wh ich is life .l21 . 
F'urth e rrnore , not onl y does i n t e llect f a il to a dJn i t r eal be -
comi n g , i t a l s o f ai ls to admit comp l ete novelty . F or 
becauae i t is a l ways try i ng t o reco nsti tute in e a ch 
moment o f h i story with wh at is g iven , the i ntelle ct 
lets what i s nev.r escap e . It do e s n ot admi t t h e unfo re-
se e a b l e . It r e j e ct s a l l cre at i on .l22 
'l'he r efor e , li t h e inte ll e ct i s c ha r a ct e riz ed by a natur al 
inability to comprehend 1 i f e . nl23 
117. CE, 167. 121. CE , 178 . 
118 . CE , 1 69 . 1 22 . CE, 1 80 . 
119 . CE , 171. 123. CE , 182 . 
120 . C i~ ' D) 173. 
Nov1 ins tin c 'c is "mould ed on the very form of l if c:; •..• 
It · proce eds organi cally . n1 24 The es sentia l p rimary in-
stin cts , a re really vi t a l pro ce s ses . Instin c t " vvoul d only 
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h a v e to expand rnore vvi d e l y , and t hen d ive into it s mvn d e p th 
co mpletely, to be one wit h the g ene r a tive f orce of l i f e .n 12 5 
I n s ome c ases , t h e s ame i ns tinct v-rh ich a n i mates the indi -
vi <iual i s TT i n d i stingL.: i shable f rom the fo rc e that anima t es 
t he ce1l , or is o n l y a p rolo ngation of that f orc e . 11126 
·~:jhat e ver t h e f orce may be which gen e r a tes life , i t 
must be disce r ned from within nby an intuition (lived rather 
than r e2_r e s e :1t ed ), wh i ch is p robably like vrh at v,re cal l d i vin -
ing syrnpat hy . " 127 By 11 int u i tion11 Berg son me a11s 11 i nstinct 
that, h ,p. s be come d isinterested , self -conscious , c ap a ble of 
r efle ctin g up on it s ob je ct a nd of enla r ging it i n definitel y , n 
an act i vity not u nlik e ae s thetic sympathy . 128 
3 . P roblems Re l a t e d to Be r gson ' s Doctrine of t h e ~lan Vi tal . 
. i!:f t er t he f ore go ing r athe r leng t hy exp osition of the a r gu -
ment u n derlying th e d oct r i . e of t h e ~lan v it a l , a cons i de ra-
tio n in d etail o f some of t h e more s a lient pro blems which b e a r 
upo n the doctrine is in ord er . 3 i nce Ber g son r egar d s the 
ela n vi t a l as t he p rime cau se o f all life , th e s e arch f or 
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t h e exi s t en ce of this p r ime caus e, as well as the inquiry as 
t o i t s na t u re a nd fun ction, i nvolve certai n defin ite e p i s te-
molog ica l presu ppositions, a s \te ll a s d e f i n ite c onclusion s 
on t h e 1:1at t ers of c a usation, ind ividuality , a n d on t h e n ost 
i mp ortant matt e r o f t h e n a t u r e of the expla na tory prin cip le. 
I t is to the examin a tion o f the s e pr ob l ems t hat t h e pr e s e n t 
section ' ·will be devot e d . 
i . The problem of ep i s temology . 
One of t he most cont r ove rsi a l p oin t s which Be r g s on ' s 
ph ilo s op hy has r a ised has b een that of hi s e pi s t emology . 
It do es not f a l l wi t hin t he province of this stu dy to di s -
cuss i n d etail this a spec t o f h i s thought . Hovre ver, i n Be r g -
so n ' s t ,houg h t th ere is a pe culia r se n se i n whic h e i s t emology 
bears u pon the d octrine of elan vital, in t hat t he ela n vit a l 
is a n obj e c t of knowledge . In thi s respe ct, then , h i s e pi s te-
mo logy ,will be exami n e d. 
Hov..r i s t h e ela n vita l knovm t o exist? Bro a dly S~Jeak ing , 
and as has be en i nd ic a ted above, Berg son holds t ha t t her e are 
t wo ways of kn owi ng--in stinct and int ellec t . ''Int ell e ct, n he 
say s , TT is c harac t erized b y a natural inab ilitv to compr ehend 
l ·ro !1129 n } ' h ' d 1.1.e. un t _l e otner ana , instinct, an partic t.ll arly v.rhen 
it has b een nen l arged a nd puri f i ed i n t o i n-tlUi tion, 1113° "is 
I 
moulded on t i1e very f orm o f l i fe . nl3l 
' 129. C~ , 182; ital. Ber g s on's . 
1 30 . CE , 195 . 
1 31. c~ , ;I-94. 
Int uition or n i n stinct 
' 
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that has be come disinterested, self-cons cious, c apable of 
reflectin~ upon its object a ~d of enlargi ng it i nd ef i n i tely ," 
leads us hto the ve r y i nwardness of life."132 
Now, ' pos t poning temporarily th e d iscussion of the k nmvl-
edge of lif e, is the ~lan vital, or the i mpetus of life , kn own 
by t he s ame manne r as li fe itself? To this question Bergson 
answers tha t t he ~lan is known by 1). the analogy of our exper-
ience of volit ion ; 2). i nf e r en ce from th e exami nation of the 
evidence ,o f biology ; and 3). the immediate expe ri ence of intui-
tion . Th e i mpl ications of these alle ged v.ra ys of knowing t he 
elan vi t a l 'Vii ll 110\v be examined i n order. 
l). 'The . analogy of our experience of volition . Perhaps 
Bergson' s clearest st a tement on this point is found in his 
contra st of the phys ic al and vital orders. " Th e pb ysica l 
order is . ' automatic'; t he vit a l o r der is, I will not s ay volun-
tary , but analogous to i... he order ' willed . '" 133 Fr o .1 t hi s , one 
coul d r es t at e t he a r gument to r ea d : If will characterizes 
t he human order , then someth ing a ki n to vvi ll . cha racterizes 
t he vit al orde r. Obviously , t he strength of the analogy dep ends 
u.pon t e i m:p ortanc e of t he r e s emblances and d i ffe r en ce s between 
the t e r ms which co~po se the ana logy . The human order , it is 
true, has many poi nts i n common with the vital order. Th ere 
ar e alimentat ion, gr owth, r epr oduction , s ens itivity t o s timuli, 
to mention only some of t hem. Hmv:.:;ver, th ere are i mportant 
13 2 . C""' , 194 . 
133~ CE, 253. 
-~-----
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diffe ren c e s , e . g ., t h e powe rs of locomoti on , lea rning , memory , 
the pov,rer to th i nk r ationally, an d the power consciously t o 
cho ose between i deal ends . Of these , the last t wo ment ioned 
are usually r .::;garded as dist i nctively hurnan , i . e ., they a re not 
posse s s:ed by a ny other members of th e vital order . The r e are, 
t h en, i~portant diffe r en ces be tween the . human or der and th e 
vi tal o'r der. But even r ore i mp ortant than th i s , t he pov·rer 
cons ciously to choo s e between i deal e nds, or "will , " i n the 
hmnan order , i s stated in the analogy t o be a ki n to something 
like it i n the vital orde r . I t is ver y di ffi c·o.lt to under-
st and how t his coul d be true unle s s the term 11 willTT v1ere u sed 
i n an entirely diff ere nt sens e in t he l a tter case. I n t he light 
of this fact , the analogy appears to be weak and i ts signifi -
can ce considerably r educed . 
A pos s ible a lte r native a nalogy mi ght be s ubstituted which 
may g ive more strength t o the co ncept at which Bergson is aim-
i ng : If impul se or drive i s cha r a ct eri st ic of the human order , 
then something akin to i mpulse or drive is c ha r a ct eristic of 
the vi.tal order. An analysis of thi s analogy r eveal s that , 
whi l e the r e are diffe rences between the i mpus les or drive s of 
the two orders , such as ·would involve their number and/ or 
ki nds , yet these diffe r ences a r e superfic i a l. Also , the simi-
larities woul d b e bas i c , since all creatures, human and sub-
human , exhibit drive s 1,vhich a re aimed at self-preservation , 
growth, al i ment a tio n , and repro duction , etc . The refore , if 
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Bergson's use of the term "wi lJ!' can be i nterpreted i n t he 
above described manner , this analogy might appear to be more 
fruitful . 
There are reasons which support such an hypothesis . 
Early i n CE, he uses the term "tendencyn to i ndicat e the sub-
jective state to which t he universal te ndency is analogous.l34 
His use in the same way of !!ripening or creating ," terms cer-
tainly more closely as so ci a ted with n i mpulse" than with " con-
scious volition,tr fur ther bear out this co nclusion .l35 Hov.;-
eve r , the g rea t est sup.i.'Jort for this position lies , perhaps , in 
/ Be r gso n ' s oft-repeated contention t hat t h e elan vital exhibits 
ne i ther mechanica l nor fi nal causality , but a middle ground , 
where r1 ei ther blind necessity nor conscious purpose but nblind 
purpose" reigns . Blind purpose certainly represents the char-
acter v.rhich Ber g son i s attributing. to the ~lan vi tal. [ There 
are other passages which might indicate a d ifferent conclusion. 
These will be covered in the section which treats intuition.] 
It may be concluded , then , that the analogy of our experi-
en ce of volition is weak , i f volition is t aken to mean ncon-
scious cho i ce of i deal ends . " It is stronger, i f volition mean s 
TTimpuls e or d rive. " There i s some evidence to support the view 
that the l atter is vnat Bergson re ally means . 
2) . The i nf e ren ce f r om the examination of the evidence of 
/ f or the elan vit al, as i t was called bio log·y . The argmnent 
' I 
r34 . CE , 8 , 16 . 
13 5 . em, 14 , 54. 
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above~3~ is designed to prov ide evi dence for the exist en ce of 
t h e ~lan vital. During t he cour s e of the arg~~ent at least 
three ma jor point s emerged which were t nought by Bergs on to 
bea r f a vorably upon t h i s t hesis . Firs t of all , the argum ent 
h a s an enpiric a l f oundatio n , i.e., it is ba sed upon a~1 ana l y sis 
of t he f a ct of dur a t ion . Secondly , the argumen t presents cer-
tain inadequacies i n the viev.;s of scientific - me chanism, r adi ca l 
fi nalism, a nd t h e v arious t he or ies of evol ution . Thirdl y , the 
t h esis 'of the ~lan vital is pres ented a s t he true solut ion, 
and the f ollowin g rea sons for its truth are presented: t he 
elan vita l a ccount s for the main diverg ent lines of evolut ion 
(vegetable, insect, and vert ebrate) as expressions of diverse 
tendencies originally within t he elan ; it a ccounts f or the 
har mony of t he lines of e volut ion ( e . g ., the pre se nc e of a n 
ey e on divergen t lines) by the s am e means --a common sour ce ; 
i t ac counts f or t he two modes of kno\dng , viz., instinct and 
inte llect, l'lhich illustrate the lines of evolut io n i n v.Jh i ch 
t h ey occur. 'rhe a dequacy of these points themselves will be 
ex amined l a ter . The present consideration involves the a de-
quacy of the procedure which he follows . 
On the surfa ce, i t appears that an empirica l ba sis , the 
1t~eaknesses of opposing views, and a thesis \vh ich s olves the 
problems involved would provide a sound method. There are weak-
nesses , hov.;e ver, in the way in wh ich Ber gson pursue s hi s task. 
First; Bergson by no means establi shes tha t the sub j ective 
I 
I 
13 6 . Cf. CE , Ch. I , II; T.:iMR, 101-105 , 237 . 
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exp erience of dura t i on , if i t c an be exp erien ced at al l , is 
j usti f iably applic ab le t o the vm rl d a t l a r g e . Wh i le it may 
be t ru~ that e a ch moment bring s novelt y with it, 137 to infe r 
f r om t ,h is a lone tha t the u n iv e r se as a wh ole i s bur s t ing vvi th 
n ovel ties i s hardly j ust ifie d . ~- s the p revious chapte r i nd i-
c ated , his can be d one on l y after a carefu l ex~tination of 
a l l the ernp ir :;_ ca l evi cien c e and a coherent evaluat i on are ma d e . 
'l1hese ,Berg son doe s not expl ic it ly d o . He r a · her assmnes that 
evolut io n nm s t me an no velty . 1ind , since there i s evolut ion , 
t herefore there is n ovelty. 
r'urther, gr ant e d t hat hi s critic i sms of s c ientif ic - me chan -
i sm , ~ad ic al finali sm , an d o t her evolut ionary vi ews are just i -
f i e d (an d t h ere is ample room f or cri ticism o f his vie\"l of 
r adi c a l fi n ali sm) , these c r i tic isms wo uld har dl y just i f y his 
a s sump·t io n t hat his vi ew is the on l y po ssib le v i e"'' r emai n ing . 
Th ia criticism is r aised by ~lliott . 1 J8 
Lastly , t he r easons g iven f or t h e ~lan vital r epr e se nt a 
r eal effor t to b a se this t hesis up on the f ac ts of e volutio n . 
And so , fro m· a p r o c edural p oint o f v ie·•v , this part of t he 
me tho d is , p e r haps , justif ied . 
' .:3ummar i zing t he argument b y inf erence , it may be said that 
Bergson ' s empiri c a l grounds for e x t end i ng t he idea of duration 
i nto ; a uni v e rsa l ~ lan ar e exce eding ly few , and , a lthoug h he 
make ~ an attemp t to base his v iew upon t he evid e n c e o f b iology , 
137 . Cf •;7;,above . Al s o , c f . below t he s e ction on time a n d 
n ove l ty . 
138 . ~ll iott , MBIB , 100 . 
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his argument omits suf fici ent cons i derat ion of a l ternat ive views. 
3)' . The i rmnediate e xp erience of i nst inct and intuit ion . 
I t is by means o f immediate experi en ce t hat Be r g son beli eves 
/ ' k t h e elan vital can best be nown . Atte ntion has already been 
ca lled to h i s bel i ef tha t intu i tion "leads to the ve r y inward-
ness of li f e . nl3 9 l'h ;:; r e lation of the i deas of i ns tinc t and 
i n tuition needs to be further clarified . Bri efly , i nstinct 
and i ntui t ion are r e l at iv e mtegories f or nergsonts epi s temo-
logy . Inst inct is a corruption , or a 11 debased" intuition, 14° and , 
converse l y , intuition i .:> a npur ifi ed" instin ct . 1 41 l•,iysti c ism , 
deal t vvith in the m0I,m , is a " continu at i on" o :.. intuit ion , and 
c learly go e s beyond t he f a ct s and co n clusi ons of t he C~ . This 
wi l l b e dis cussed later. For novJ, hovm ver , l et us exami ne 
th e t lD.e si s t ha t intuitio ~1 i s that f rom which Hthe l ie;ht mu s t 
co me , i f e ver the inne r work i ng of t he vita l i mpetus is •.• 
to be mad e clea r in i ts sign i fi can ce and i ts ob je ct . u1 42 
l<irs t of al l , v.Jhat does Bergso n mea" by ni n t u i ti on 11 ? 
Basica lly, intuition is knowledge 11 f rorn wi thin 11 r at he r t han 
knowledge ''fr om wi thoutn as is applied to in t e llec t •143 It 
is so'n.eth :i.ng "lived rather tha n r epr esented •.• probably like 
v.rhat I<Ve call divin ing s:,rmpathy.nl44 Explicitly , Ber g son say s , 
;by i ntuition I mean instinct that has be come disinter-
0Sted, self- cons cious , c apable of re f lec t ing upon its 
object ~nd of enl a r ging indefinitel y . l45 
: 139 . CE, 194 . 143 . CB , 193 . 
140 . Cf . T::>HR , 238. 144 . ,... . ,.., 193 . v l:!.. , 
141 . CE , 195 . 145 . CE , 194 . 
142 . T .::iJ.i 1-t., 238 . 
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This effort is not un l ike esthetic intuition , in which the art-
ist strives to r egain the i ntention of l ife "by pl acing him-
' 
self back within the ob j ect by . a kind of s ympathy , in breaking 
I d ovm , b r an eff ort of intui t ion , the ba rrier t hat s pace puts 
up between him and hi:s mode l. n146 How, s ay s Bergson , if 11 life 
i n general" is t aken a s the object , 
by ,the sympathetic communication which it establis hes 
betwee~ us and the rest of t he living , by the expans ion 
of our co nsciousness whi ch it brings about , it i nt ro duces 
us , i nto life 1 s mm domain, wh ich i s reci r:·roc al interpene-
tration, endlessly continued creation.l47 
This is not all. Ber g son be comes even more explicit vvh.en 
he declares that 
i n order th at our consciousness shall coincide vrith some-
thd..ng of it>:> principle , it must detach it self f rom t he 
already- made and a ttach it self to the being- made . It 
needs t h at , turning bac k on it se l f and t wisting on itself, 
the f a culty of seeing should be made one ~~th the a ct of 
~rfi ,lling ••.• Let us try •.• to install ourse lves 'Within it 
[th e current that runs through matter , or the elan vitall 
i~ only f or a moment •.•• To get the principle of all life , 
as also of all materiality, we must go further still .... 
There i§ no durable system that is not vivifi ed by intui -
ti1on.l48 
The f ollowing t h ings , then, may be observed from t hese 
r emar ks concerning Be r gson's theory of how the ~lan vi tal is 
known. First of all, it is a painful, and , at best, a very 
temporary , process. Se condly , it is a detachment from the 
"already- maden and an a ttachment to the "being- made . 11 Thirdly, 
it is an expansion of our consciousness vrhich seeks to nput 
I 
1J.j.6. CE , 194 . 
147. CE, 19 5. 
1~~ - CE, 259 , 60 . 
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b8.ck our b eing into our will , a n d our wi ll itself into the 
impul sion i t prolong;s . 11 149 Four t h l y , ''we feel" as a result , 
"that r eality is a pe r petua l g rowth, a creation p ursued 
without end . 111 5° 
Wh~t a re th e merits of thi s thesis? Firs t , Bergson recog -
n iz es t he emp iricist cont en tion that the knowledg e of t he real 
i n volve s intuition . Most modern e r:1p iricists, h owever , g ener-
a lly re g :;rd I! intui -r.ion" as denoting an y i mmediate experien ce 
rather than som e })articular kind of i mmediate e xp eri ence which 
is Ber gson 1 s contention . In this r e s p ect , th eref ol~e, it appears 
tha t Be~gson has unduly restrict e d the date of experienc e and 
con sequently th e resulting knowledg e . 
Se condl y , i t is probable t hat the ·prolonged cont i nuation 
of a ny particula.r cont ent of immediate e xperience is impossible . 
The fact that Be r g son r e co gnizes that experience endu~es , i f only 
a few i ri s tants , i s consisten t with t he co ntention o f such think-
ers a s ames , Royce , Brightman , \ihitehead and the Ge sta ltists . 1 51 
Thirdly , i t is true that attention to the r eal must be 
directed f rom t he "already- made!! to the 11 being - mad e , 11 i f the 
r ea lm of life is to be understood . Berg son , however, r e cog -
n ize s that both a re somehow kinds of r eality . This i d e a will 
be di s cussed later i n g reater detail . 
149 . CE , 261 . 
150 . CE , 261 . 
1 51 . Cf . J ames ' TTspe c i ous present; Royce ' s 11 time-span11 ; 
Brightman ' s Tlda t um self" ; ·whi t ehead ' s 11 a ctual o cca.:;ion 11 ; the 
Ge st a lti sts ' "Ge stalt . " 
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Fourthly , Be r gs on's contention that nwilln i s at least 
relat ed to th e i dea of cause is likewise true . Onl y i n voli-
tion do e s man directly experien ce causation . 1 52 Hov,rever, to 
assume from this fact tha t our will is a " prolongation" o f the 
un iversa l v'.d..ll is unwa rranted . Attention may be direct e d to 
the poin t noted above that Berg son 's doctrine o f " willn is most 
unclear. I f Berg son means that to know the ~lan vital one must 
id~ntify his "con scious volition " with the underlying purpose 
of the unive rse, he may be correct, but in any mse this asser-
tion is an ethical and not an epistemolog ical one. However, 
nwill,Tf as vvas seen above, most likely means nimpulse or drive ,n 
which, of co urse, i s a blind striving , and not something pur-
p oseful. In this sense , then, to ex tend one's co nsciousness 
backward s, i. e ., to its unconscious beginning s , with the aim 
of getting within the elan itself which produced it, mi ght 
conceivably produce feeling , but it scarcely w uld produce 
k nowledg e , and much less could it ever p rod uce anything but 
the e xperienc e of the individual himaelf. 
This bring s into focus the basic defect of Berg son's theory 
of knovrledg e . This defect takes t he form of an assumption , 
viz., that k nowledg e not only starts with the i mmediate but 
also end s there as well. It is n ot necessary to a mplify the 
defects of this assumption since they have been discussed at 
length :elsevv-h ere • 1 5J It suf fices t o observe that the initial 
152. Cf . Brightman , I TP , ( Rev . e d .), 298f . 
1 5£3 . Cf . Stevmrt, CEBP ; Cunn i ngham , SPB . 
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experience of i mmediacy , which present s a p roblem, must remain 
a problem if the immediacy be not at l east organized r efere n -
tially by intellectual processes . This , h owever, Be r gso n 
f orbids, , Hence, how t he r emainder can be distingu ished f rom 
the initi a l confusion remains a mystery . It i s true that 
Bergson recognizes that intuitio n is ai ded somewhat by the 
intellect. But this is on l y a negative ai d , i n that intellect 
succeeds i n f re e i ng inst i nct f rom its p reoccupation with itself 
only i n order th a t it may return to t h e inn er potentialities 
of intuition. 1 54 
Further, Be r g s6n 's initial assumption has a corollary . 
Intuitio n , or i mmediate experienc e , not only reveals t h e 
elan vi tal as u n iversal caus e, but it also reveals it as 
creati ve of novelty. Now, a s the pr evious chap t e r indicat e d, 
although novelty has been consid ered by some to be knowable 
by in~ediate experience, this intuitionist approach has been 
de clared to be inadequate for defini te reasons.l55 Bergson's 
use of ,this me thod p r e sent s no visible exception to t h e strength 
of the se arguments , and , therefore, is itsel f untenable . 
There are other e p istemic objections which mi ght be inclu-
ded here , such as tha_t of Hurs t that the elan vi tal is inc a pable 
of genetic experiment . 1 56 ·'hi s charge is, of course , true, 
but it is hardly r e levant. Bergson recognizes th e significance 
I 
154. Cf. CE , 200. 
l$5. Cf ., a bove, 68. 
156. l'·'iCE , xviii. 
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of genetic experiment whe n dealing "~:vith particulars, but 1i'Jhen 
dealing v.ri th ttlife i n generaltt this method is useless. It is 
a case whe re the s ub ject matter must determi ne t he appro priate-
ness of metho d select ed. This does not mean that Bergson has 
select ed the most ap propr:i,ate me t hod , but rather t hat he cannot 
I bS dis mi s sed be cause he did not e mploy genetic experiment. 
The general criticism of Be r gson' s anti-in t ellectualism i s , 
perhap~ , the nost vehement of al l. It appli es , of course , to 
Bergsoh ' s whole ph iloso phical position rather t h<3..n t o his doc-
trine ~f ~lan vital in particular. Ivlos t of these criti cisms 
are j us tified . Reiteration of the reasons whic h underlie t hen , 1 57 
therefore , will not require further d i s cu ssion than has been 
and will be g iven i n connection with other prob l ems. 
Surmnarizing Ber gso n 's doctrine of intuitionism, then , it 
may be s a i d , l) that "Wh ile knovJledg e of subje ctive cause may be 
imme diately felt in co ns cious volitio n , thi s in itself is suf-
f icient evidence to warrant a~serting neither t he existence of 
a n ob jective cause itself nor the . nature of this alleged objec-
tive cause; 2) the confusion over the nature of will r enders 
, the p :r;-ecise nature of in tuition itself most uncle ar; 3) the 
claim that Bergson 's ~lan vital is i ncapable of genetic experi-
ment is t rue , but irrelevant; although 4) his g e neral anti-
i ntelle ctualism is a n error \hich pervade s his entire system. 
In general, then, it may be concluded that Ber gson's handling 
of t he epis temi c problem is not very strong . As has been seen, 
'157. Ve r y able and fair critici sms of Ber gson's anti-intel-
lectualism are g iven by ' tewart, CEBP , a nd Cunningham , SPB . 
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I 
his analogy , h i s a r gument, and h i s intuitionism a ll possess 
weakness. Bergson has c a lled at t ention , however, to will, to 
the facts of bi ology , and to intuition as pointing to war d an 
I' 
elan vital . It may be a greed that \"lell they might, but first 
they must be freed from t he difficulties which beset t h ern and 
augmented b y fur t her support. 
ii. The problem o f causality. 
In a particularly si gnificant sense , the c ausal problem 
i s crucial for Be rgson ' s d octrine of the ~lan vital. For , 
/ 
whatever else t h e elan may d en ote, it certainly denotes the 
idea of ' cause.l58 The problem wh ic h Bergso n faces , hm.,e ver , 
is not the relative l y simple one of merel y accounting for c hange 
i n a coherent manner , but rather is a problem complica ted by 
the deep ly rooted c onvic tion that some of t he chang e , a t least, 
is no vel c hang e . In this sense , then , the problem of caus ality 
must aim at so lvin g t he proble;n o f no velty, rather tha n merely 
as s uming i t or deny i n g the problem altogethe r , as earlier explan-
ations ,had done . i!ith t h is b a ckg round cle a rly i n mi nd , attent ion 
shou l d ~ first be g iven to t he views which Ber gson rejects. 
1). B~rgson ' s rejection o f me chani sm and finalism . It has 
b een noted abovei59 that Be rgson fi nd s neithe r mechanism nor 
radical finalism accep t a ble explanations of causality . His 
ob je ct i ons to these explana tions center around his contention 
that both hold that nal l is g iven , 11 --mechanism holding to the 
158. Cf . a bove,92• 
1 59 . See above, 101-104. 
givenness of an ni mpulsion of the past , " and r ud ical final ism 
1 '~ 0 holding to t he att r a ction of t he future." 0 Bergson r easons 
t hat , if all is given, then tiQe is deprive d of its effi ca cy , 
a :1d the r esult i s that t here is no r ee3.l durat io n and no crea-
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tion of novelty . On the contrary , continues B'ergs on , Tl~>,re per-
cei ve dur a tion as a stream against whi ch w e cannot go ... and we 
cannot sacrifice expe ri ence to the requi rements of a Cme chani ca l] 
system . 11161 .:.:.:xactly v-rhat it is t hat is experien ced in this 
conne ct ion ' has already been discus s ed i n t he previous section . 162 
This a s i de , t he re still remain to note certa in implic ations of 
this charge that f or both me chani sm and finalism "All is g iven. n 
In t he f irst place , t here woul d be little ob je ction, per-
haps , from the mechanist over this charge , since it has already 
be en noted ' t hat obj ective novelty , either functional or ex isten-
tial, is c a tegoric ally denied on the basis that its occurrence 
would admit some thing previously not accounted for . Th is obvi -
ously is only another way of saying that 11 all is given . 11 
However , is Be rgson corre ct in c harging the r ad ica l final-
, 
· st vd th the same i ndi ctment? In reply to this que s tion, it 
ill be n ecessary to recall that the traditional theological 
I 
xpl anations , discus sed abo ve, .,,rere guilty of postulating the 
1givenness 11 of everything . But i t was not Tlin the future" 
hat the g ivenness takes pl a ce , but rather in "eternity ," or 
n a r ealm1 where there is ho reference whatever to t he temporal 
I 
160. CE , 45. 
1 61. Lo.c. cit. 
162. See 91-2. 
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process • The deity , t he perfe c t fulfillment of a ll , was 
thought to contain eternally all grades of being . And , since 
eternity was used by t hese finalists as an explanation for a ll 
phases of t he temporal process , this form of fina lism does hold 
that all i s given ; although not g iven in the future , as Berg-
son conta~ ds , it is given , nevertheless . But , and here is the 
r11 ore important point , does the reje ction of the c o ntainment 
t h eorias o f t he classi cal theo l ogians either dispose of tele -
ology as s u ch , or e st ablish the view, ·which he describes as 
the !!special form" of fina lism , as either the onl y other pos -
sible or the most coherent exvlanati on of the facts at hand? 
These questions will now b e considered in order . 
Against Bergson , it appears that te l eology as such has 
not been refuted . Several consider ations support this inter-
pretation . First , the evidenc e whi ch he presents a gainst it 
i s r e st-rict ed to varieties of finalism which are inadequate 
for other reasons . Leibniz ' view , e . g ., is said to reduc e time 
''to a <:;onf used pe rce _[) tion , relative to the human s tandpoint 
vfhich would vanish , like a rising mist , for a mind sea ted at 
the cent er of t hings . " 163 There is no doubt that this is a 
potent criticism of Leibniz ' view of time . Al so , there is 
l i ttle room for doubt that t h e determini sm in Leibniz ' do c-
trine of pre - establi shed harmony goes bey ond the fa cts in i ts 
aim to est ablish t e leology as the causal pattern f or the uni -
' I 
I 
verse .: But these observations can scar cely be call2d an argu-
16). . CE , 46 . 
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ment a gainst the existence of purp ose either in the deity or 
i n cre a t Gd beings . Ber gs on al so takes ti me t o criticize the 
ne o-vitali sm of Driesch as prov i di ng onl y for "internal 
finali ty . 11 The difficult ies with Driesch ' s vi ew can hard l y 
be considered as applying to teleology as a whole j ust because 
Driesch makes a n inadequate application of the pr :!..n c i ple. 
Furthermore , Ber gson does n ot s how that his variety of 
finalism is the onl y possible al t e r nat ive expl anation . The 
vie-w vihich he puts forth postul a tes the ~lan vital wh i ch 
ii.1cludes t h e ~<·;hole of life in a s i ngle embrace . ;-nhis life 
common to all t he l i ving undoubtedly presents many gaps 
a nd incohere nces , and a gain i t is n ot so mathematically 
one that i t cannot a llovv ea ch be i ng to be come i ndividua l-
ized to a certain degree . But it forms a singl e vvhole , 
none the less; and we h av e to c hoose between t he ant -
and- out negation of finalit y an d t he hypothes i s v;hi ch 
co-ordinates not only t he parts of a n organism wi th t he 
orga nism itself , but a l s o e ac~ ,living being with the col-
l e ctive whole of a ll others.~o4 
Bergson , thus , is att empt ing t o fo r mulate a causal pri nci ple 
1hich ;,vi 11 exercise control ext ernally over i ndi victuals (as 
Leibni z hoped hi s pre - est i:.ibl i shed harmony would) but \'Vh ich 
would al low some individual i za tion, imperfect ion , and discord , 
amon g the individuals. As h e s a ys , a bit l a t er.: 
Like r a d.ic a l finalism , althou gh i n a vaguer fo r m, our 
p hilo sophy rep r e sent s t he organized '"10 rld as a ha r monious 
whole . But this harmony i s f a r f r om be ing a s pe r fe ct as 
it has b e en cla i med to be . It a dmi t s of muc h d i s cord , 
becaus e each spe c ies , e a ch individual even , r etains onl y 
a c ertain i mpetus from the universal i Lpulsion a nd t ends 
to use this energy in its own interest ...• Harmony ••• is 
rathe r beh ind us than before . It i s due to 1g. i denti ty 
of i mpulsion and not to a co~ilo n asniration. 5 
. . 
16·r, . CE 
"+ ,; ' 1 6 ,5. C.u ' 
50 . 
58. 
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Now there is n o d enying that there are facts of d isco rd , 
etc. Th'ese ce r t ai ly i ndic a te the abse_ c e of a per fe ctly 
real ized p l an . : urther, t he presen ce of su ch fa cts i s t h e st ro ng -
est possible argument a gainst the teleolog istTs conte ntion . 
But they d o not by any means prove that no p l an exists . They 
on l y p r ov e that su ch a plan is not perfectly r eal ized. Hen ce 
the statement \rJhich Be rgson makes im.<·nediately f ollov.ring the 
a bove quot a tion seems entirely unjustified: 
It would be futile to t r y t o ass i gn to life an end, in 
the hwnan s ense of the wo r d . To speak of a n e nd is to 
~hink of a pre-existing mode l wh ich has on l y to be real ized. 
j_t i s to s uppose, therefore , t hat a ll is g iven , and that 
t~~ f utur e can be r ead in the present. It i s to bel i e ve 
t hat l i f e, in its aovement a nd in i ts en t irety , g oes to 
work like our int ellect, vvhi ch is only a mo tionless and 
f r a gmentar y view of life L and 1-vhich naturally takes i ts 
st'and outs i d e of time. bu 
Therefore, the alternative which Be r gson offe r s to the Le ib-
nizian .and n e e -vitali s tic forms of final isrn , viz. , th at of an 
~lan vital wh ich pos s esses no p l an beforehand , but wh ose act ivity 
can be c ons i dered as pursuing an en d only aft e r or n12ari passu 
vlith t h e a ct, n16 7 is not t h e only alternative which i s left . 
It i s at lea st log i c a l ly poss ible , from the f acts -v . h ich he 
pre sents , that t here exists a d eity , Vlho , having a p l an in 
mind , and seeking to realize th a t p lan , finds th a t h is purposes 
a re h i nde r e d by certai n fa ctors. Nor is it ne c essary , by such 
16.6. c.s ' 58 . 
l pJ. C:i:, 59 
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a do ctrine , to r egard time a s unreal to t he d eity , but r a ther 
t hat time i s a f a c t or every bit as r ea l as Bergson t hinks t hat 
l. t . 16~~ l S . 
It is now time to exami ne i n g reater d eta il t~e o ore s al ien t 
/ di f ficulties which appear when the elan vital is regar ded in 
it s causal r ole . It vlill be see n , in th e c ours e of t he fo llow-
i ng exposition , tha t there a re in re al i t y tl'lO causal theo ries 
I 
v-.rh i ch Be r gson tries u nsucc essfully t o h a r monize . For purposes 
of si mp l if ica t i on , t h ese t h eo ries will be c a lle d nthe causal 
mo n i sm theo r y 11 and t h e 11 causal dualism theory . n Tile shall dis -
cu ss t he, causal dual ism t.h eo r y first . 
2) . The c ausal dualiSln th eory . Caus a l dual i s m i s defin e d 
' 
as tne ass ertion that the ad e quate e xp lanat i on o f causati o n 
r e qu ire s the assumption of t wo basically an tag oni stic causal 
princ i p l e s . rf ow among the most patent features of Be r gson 1 s 
whole ph ilosophy are h i s dualisms . Li fe is opposed by ma-tter ; 
time b ~1 space ; intu i tion b y int elle c t ; the dynamic by the 
sta tic; c reation by re p etition ; indet e r mini s m b i det e r minism ; 
freedom by n e c essity ; g e nerality by indi vidual i t y ; wi lled ord er 
by automat i c order; etc ., etc . It is n ot n e cessa r y to d i s cus s 
a ll of these dualisms , since, for t he most part , they hav e 
already bee n touched upon . However, a discus sion of t h e dual-
l 6 l . Cf . t he i dea of God i n Brightman , POR , and Berto c ci, 
I POR . 'l'his view , h owe v er , finds certain d efini te limita tions 
t o the p ower of God which t h e t r ad i t iona l theolog ical explana-
tions would d e ny . However , th is view d oe s avoid the rational-
ism of these o l d er views while r emai ning closer to empirica l 
f a c t s . 
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i sm of ' the 11 ascending and O. escending move ment sn would best 
illustrate the theory of causal dualism which s e ems to present 
itself i n Ber gson's thought. 
In most of Bergson 1 s writing , he h olds th a t life and i nert 
/ 
matter are r e ciprocal causes ,-- life, or the elan vital , exert-
ing an ascending movement , and inert matter exerting a des -
' 
cending movement . 169 For examp le, he s ay s, 11 In the unive r se 
i t.:..elf two opposite movements a re to be dist inguished , ••• 
' de scent ' and ' ascent .' "l70 Fur t h er o n he says , 11 '1'here is , 
i n re a ,lity , o nl y a current of existence and the opposing cur-
rent; thence pro cedes tl!e v.h ole evoiLution of life . ul7l 
l gain , nbehind ' sp irituality ' on t he one hand , and ' materiality ' 
v1ith j_nt ellectua lity on the other , there are then two proc e sses 
opp ostte in their di rection, and we pass from t he first to the 
s e co nd by inversion . n17 2 Just h o w seriou s Be r gson can be about 
the d ua lism here indicated i s seen i n his saying t hat "the 
-.,-vhole present study strive s to prove that the vita l is in the 
direction of t he voluntary ••• i n o pposition t o •.• that of the 
inert ano_ the automat ic.rrl73 
With this i dea cle a rly i n mind , Be rgs on a ttempts to show 
that these two kinds of orde r a re in a relation to e a ch othe r 
of te nsion and extens io n , the latter being an interruption or 
169. Cf . t he di a g ram above~l6. 
170. CE , 14 . 
i71. CE , 203. 
172. CE , 220 . 
173. CE , 245 . 
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inversion of t he form er . TTLife i s a movernent ,n he says , 
mate riality is t he inve rse 
mov~ment , and each of these 
two mo ve ments is simp l e , the 
ma -c. t er Hhi ch forms a vw r ld 
b e ing an undivided flux , and 
undivi ded a l so the l ife tha t 
r uns t h rough it, c·ut ting out 
i n ,it livi ng beings a ll a long 
i ts tra ck •.. l i ke t he f iery 
path t orn by t he l a st r ocket of 
a firevvo rks disp l ay through 
t h e b l a ck cinders of the spent 
rodkets tha t are ·falling 
dead .l74 
Very similar , and al s o convey-
ing t he ,i dea of causa l dua lism, is 
t he ~na1ogy of t h ~ wave. Here he 
represents '1life as a whole 11 as a 
"Have which rises , and is opposed 
.· ·: ·. ')g:'t)%"! . 
" :· , ((._ ·. / .',.. Dead 
.. ·,., . . · · ·, C:J..nders 
. ...,, , , ' . 
·· '. ·._::- '- • f al l ing ~•/ I / ' I - -
.<·/~/ /!t :' 
E'ety_ Pqtth of 
Rocket 
M; cending 
Fig . 12. - BERG~0 1 ' S ROCKET 
ANALOGY 
.., 
by the d'escending movement of ma.tter. 11 As Fig . i2/ i ndicates, 
on the grea ter part of its surface, at different heights 
the current is converted by mat ter 
i nto a vortex. At one point alone 
it pa s~ses freely , dr aggi ng wi th it 
Man the obsta cles which will weigh on 
its pro gress but will not s top it. 
of At thi~ ~ oint is.huma~ityi· ~t is 
our p r1v1le ged s1tuat1on . 75 
Fi g . l3 - BERGSON ' S WAVE 
A ~ALOGY , 
174. CE , 272-4. 
17:5. Ci:;; , 293 . 
It needs only to be i ndicated 
that this dual ism i n the r ealm of 
epi stemology between j_ntuition and 
i ntellect, f or Bergson says that 
nthe problem of knowledge •.• is 
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I 
one vdth t h e metaphysic a l problem •••• The double form of con -
sciousne'ss is due to the double form o f t he real, and the 
theory o,f kno wledge is depend e ~1t upon metaphysi cs. 11 176 
I-1any other pas sages could be c ited whic h would similarly 
i nd icate the mutual antag onism a nd inc ompatibility of t h ese 
tv·m realities. These must suffice , hmve ver . It seems diffi -
cult to co n ceive of a dualism any more comp l ete . In essence, 
Bergson seems to be say i ng that i nert matt er with it s type 
of causality (viz., me chanical ne c e ssity ), and its p redil ec -
tion for t h e intellect a nd s patiality , is one thing ; life with 
its t y pe of causal i t y (viz ., s pontaneous freedom) , and i ts 
p r edilection for i ntuition and duration , is another . 177 How-
ever before ent ering i nto the critical phase of the d iscu s-
s i o n of this dualisti c theory of c ausation, it shoul d be not -
iced th a t Be rgso n a ppears to ho l d a n other view of causation 
I 
quit e at o d ds with t h is one. 
3) • 'l'he c ausal monism thea ry . Causal _,1onism diffe rs 
from causal dualism in t hat the exi s ten ce of one basic caus e 
is ass eTted instead of two . It will be noted that th ere are 
numerou.s p assages i n Be r g son wh ich lead one to bel i e ve th at 
he is atte .1pt i ng to find s uc h a causal principle which will 
resolve the dualism just discus sed . F or example, he say s , 
uBot h [ int elle ctuality and materiality] are d erived from a 
wide r and higher form o f existen ce. It is h ere t hat we must 
17.6 . CE, 196 . 
177. Cf . CE , 216f . 
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re p l a ce t hem in or der to see t hem issue forth . "l78 
The d evice of terminology i s sometimes employ e d to indi -
c a te th~ c ausal mon i sm i dea . For example , Be r g son u ses such 
terms as "orig inal i mpe t us , n 1 79 or Hprimitive i mpetus . n l SO 
'l'hese t erms 11 orig inal 11 a nd "pri;nit ive" ill1p l y , no do ubt, a 
log ica l beg inning of thing s. The inability of me re v e r bal 
de vice s , h owever , to effect tempora l cause is admi tted by 
Be r gs ort himsel f . 1 81 This i s e specially true wi t h r espect 
I 
to the elan vital as the prima r y causal princi ple , since the re 
are s o many r eferences to ma t t er as a comp leme ntary c ause. 
There i s furt her e vid ence to supp ort the monism theory . 
For examp l e , Be r gs on says , "Postulate th e f i rs t, [ i mmobility] 
you cann ot b ring the s e cond [ mobility] out of i t , any more 
t h a n you c a11 f rom o n e or se v er a l p o s i t ions of a moveable 
b ody derive motion . 11 Hm,.,e ver , h e continue s , 11movement i n clude s 
i mmobility , e ac h p ositi on t r a versed b y t he movin g obje c t being 
conceived a n ci e ven p erceive d a s a virtual s t op . nl 82 
But i n order to est a b li sh a sa -c~isfa c to ry caus a l monism , 
Berg son must shov.r in s o me sat i sfa c to r y vvay t hat matte r is 
71 d e r i ve d 11 f rom l i fe . The cl osest approach to accompli shing 
th i s is seen in the doc trine of th e tr i d eal g ene si s of mat ter . 11 1 8.3 
In ord er to support this do c t rine , Bergs on g oes to some len gt h 
1zs. cE , 2 0 5 . 
1 1 9 · CE , 97 ; i tal ic s mine. 
1 80 . CE , 6 1; ita lic s mine . 
nn . c I • T .il·-IR , 2 51 • 
~ 8 2 • T SKR , 50 ; it ali c s ni n e • 
1 83 . Th i s phr ase appears in the tab l e of co n tents of CE . 
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to s hmv t ha t TT t he g eometri c a l ord er has no n eed o f explan a -
tio n , b eing purely an d siL:p l y t he s up p r e ssio n of t h e inverse 
order. nl84 I n o ther wo r ds, th e mathema t i c a l order is nothing 
po sitive, 11 but rather 11 is t he form to ward which a certain 
i n t e rrup tio n t ends of itse l f . 11 The r e s ult is h i s be l i ef that 
"material i t y consists p r e c isely i n an i nt e rruption o f t hi s 
kind . nl85 He cont inues: " All our anal y s is shows u.s , i n l i fe , 
an e ff or t t o r e - mount t he i n c l ine that matt er desc ends . nl 86 
It is n ow clear, f rom the a b o v e pas s a g es , that Bergson's 
atte npt t o fi nd a single ca usa l r eal ity redu ces to t h e p osi-
tio n that, sinc e life is a n as cending movement , one wh ich is 
co ntinually ma k i ng i tse lf, matter must be simp l y t he i nt:. er-
r uptio n o f t hat movement , one "\vh ic h is descend i n g and thus 
unmaki ng i t self. Th e priorit,- of l i fe i s seen in the l og ic a l 
p riority o f n goi ng up " to " c omi n g do"\m . " One must have t h e 
f ormer before on e c an have the latter . 
4) . Critic a l evaluation of Ber gson 's causal t h eo ri es . 
An ove r - all look a t Be r g son ' s doctrine o f causality wi l l re call 
t h a t Be r gso n is rightly o pposed l) , to a ny vi evl which h o l d s 
that "all is g iven" either i n t h e past or i n etern i ty . Both 
mechanism and the t radi t ional t h eological expl anation s which 
contend for t hi s i d ea, therefore , a re vulnerable at t h is point ; 
2 ) . to a ny view which disregard s the facts of discord , i mper-
fe c tion, or se emin g l ac k of pur p ose ; 3) . t o any vi ew which 
184. CE , 25 8 . 
1 85 . CE , 240 ; it a lics Ber g s on ' s. 
186 . CE , 268f . 
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regards \time as less real than eternity. 
I 
I 
Ho~ever, there are, as has been observed, two accounts 
of causJ which he substitutes for t he ones he considers 
I 
I 
. d I lna equate. These have be en termed, for pur poses of t he 
I 
pre sent !discussion , the c au sal dualism and t he causal monism 
' I 
theories!. The merits of the dualism t heo ry may be noted 
I 
now. 1) ; It supplies an explaration to the fact that life 
has oppos ition; 2) it also explains in a way why life becomes 
i 
split in~o diver ging lines of evolution. 187 The d efects of 
I 
this vie¥ , though are considerable. It fails l) to explain 
how that \o pp os ition can t ake place unless there b~ some com-
1 
mon bond ! (tertium quid) which mediates betvvee n the two oppos-
1 
I 
ing caus $s ; 2) to explain h ow matter can exert i nfluence 
if, as Ber gson s ays , it is truly "inert. n 
I 
The \th eory of c a:usal monism, on the ot her hand , is de signed, 
though, rlo doubt, uncon s ciously in Ber gson t s mind, to remedy 
the defed t s of the dualistic account. It undertakes to accom-
: 
I 
plish th~ s by r ecognizing t he origina l movement as life, or 
I 
the ~lan 1vital, or duratio n , t he common bond being supplied 
I 
by t he i dea of origin. However, while t h is view i s strong 
I 
I 
where the, other on e is weak, it is weak where the other one 
is strong . For, on the bas is of what he calls the 11 ideal 
I 
generatio~ of matter," there is precisely no r eas on g iven at 
all why tl;l e ascending movement of life ever becomes i nvert ed . 
I 
187. : Cf . above , ll5ff. 
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Bergson doe s s ay t hat "it t ends of it se lf,Tt but that is either 
no exp l anation at all or, a s will be seen shortly, an admission 
of something wh ich he would not ca re to make on other g rounds. 
A fur ther diffi culty with t he monis tic account, and one which 
I' is o nly i mp lied in it , is the fact that if t he elan vital begins 
its . activity unimpeded , vb ich it wo uld if it were ne cessary 
for ma tter already to exist in order to i mpede it, then how 
woul d the proce ss of i mpeding e ve r get started? The only 
ans1ver which appears in a ny vvay evident is the idea that the 
~lan vital must of itself contain the seeds of its own opposi-
tion.l8S r his vie1v, wh ile it may be t h e o nly l'lay out of the 
dilemma , involve s, it s 2ems, an admission of the very same 
containment theory vJhi ch Bergson so clearl y desires to avoid . 
Further, since there is evidence that Ber gson really 
holds to both views, the problem of the incompatibility of 
the t vw vievvs arises . Matter is then v ievmd a s both "inert tt 
and yet exerting a definite influence up on the effort of life 
and also being an 11 inte rruption11 of the vi tal order which 
occurs for no particular reason. Li fe must be the source of 
novelty , duration, f reedom, etc ., and a lso the source of the 
very opposite of these : repetition , extension, necessity • 
.Summarizing the defe cts of Bergson's doctrine of c au;;.al-
ity, the f ollowing observati ons appear to be i n order : l). The 
anti-intellectualistic position whi ch Bergson assumes , which 
1 8 ~. Cf . above, 113. 
has been noted above in the section on the problem of 
epistemology , drives him to the denial of conscious purpos e 
on the part of the over-a l l causal a gency . 2). r.lh e sar.'Tie 
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anti-intellectuali sm , when confronted by common sense and the 
I 
claims of coherence fo r a unified account of causality, causes 
him to o s cillate between a dual istic and a mon i s tic doctrine 
of cause . Such indeci si veness approa ches contradiction and 
renders his vvhole pos iti on most pre carious. 
iii. The . problem of indivi dual ity. 
Another problem, one v.rhich is always present to spe cula-
tive philos ophers , a nd one which is especially pertinent to 
Be rgson ' ~s doctrine of the ~lan vital, i s t he problem of i ndivi-
duality . \ny cosmogony must face the difficulties v.rhich it 
pr esents, and , for Bergson Ts though t , r ea l diff iculties are 
presented. 
l) •· The mutual antagonism of oneness and multiplicity , 
vvhi ch, s ince the time of armenides , has been recognized 
by all serious thinkers, has not escaped the a t tent ion of 
Bergson . His anti-intelle c tuali sm , although it is not the 
only weapon which he could use, brings a r ea dy r ejection of 
the abstra ct kind of unit y which had been bequffithed by ancient 
and mode r n phi losophers al i ke . However, ins tead of reject ing 
I • 
the i dea of un i ty and. succumbing to atomism , he recognize s 
the v alue to be gained i n the co ncept , and he s eeks to dis -
' . 
cover nthe true , imva rd and living unity . "l89 
1 8 '9. CE , 218 . 
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? e r11a p s i t mi ght be said that the i nfluen ce of Plotinus 
mi ght have b een f elt on this point. But i n any case the prin-
ciple vvhi ch has be en so very useful to Bergso n i n othe r dif-
f iculties a gain c omes to the fo re as the so lution of the 
I problem o f unity--the elan vital. For examp le, the f ollow-
in g passa g e is typ ical of this attitude. It is in 
the ' unity of t h e impulse [elan vital] which, pas s i n g 
throu g h gene r a tions, links indiv i duals \.vi th individuals, 
spec i es with s pecies, a nd makes of th ~ . whole series of 
t he livi ng one sin g le i mmense wa ve.l90 
/ For the sake of argwnent , let us g rant th a t t he elan vital 
is t h e explanation of unity in livino things . How i s the unity 
conferred? Bergson g ives severa l a11swers to t hi s question . 
In the f irs t place , he s ays it is Tl cont inuous pro gress i nd e f -
initely pursued , an invi s ible pr ogres s , on which each visi-
ble o r gan ism r i des during t h e short interval of time given 
to it to live.nl90.. It i s very d i fficult , however , t o under-
stand how "pro,sressn per se can unify a nything . Organisms 
Tf ridin g on progress, n so to speak , is met aphoric a l t o say 
t he leas t. What t h is a ctually means , therefore , i s mos t 
obscu re. 
Then, a ga i n , Ber gs on mi ght mean tha t t h e unity desired 
comes from t he f a ct that t he ~lan vital is t he p r ime s ource 
of all life . The diffi cul tie s of this view have been dis-
c ~ssed above i n t he section on h i s causal theory . This 
I 
aside , howe ver, i t i s doubtful i f th e elan vital could serve 
198. 
191. 
CE, 
Ci.? .u , 
272 -3. 
32 . 
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as an expl ana tion of u11ity even if it Here t he sole caus e . 
The f ollowing r easons a r e g iven to support this con tention: 1 92 
1). If b y " i mp etus" Ber g son mean s a physic a l impetus as whe n 
an i npul.s e is given t o a s tone vih e n it is t h rown into the 
air, the i dea of unity mi ght be conv eyed, but t h e n t he i d ea 
of spontaneity 1'l0uld b e destroyed by the me chanism involved. l 9 ) 
i'her2fore , it would seem t hat t h i s is not :ae r g son' s true op in-
ion i n the mat ter. 194 2). If the ttimpetus" of the ~lan vital 
is not literal but metaphor i ca l in that really "life is of 
the p s y cho log ica l order, and i t is of the essen ce o f the p sy-
chica l to enfold a confused p lurality of int e r penetrating 
/ 
terms," then t he elan , as f a r a s experience g oes, is a nchar-
acteristic only ._c;lf in di vidt:_al mi nd a nd t ells us n othi ng of 
the nat u r e of a universal p sychic life enfold i n g the i ndividu-
als . nl9 '5 Thi s view, while preserving s pontaneity i n indivi-
duals , g ive s us no a ccount of t heir unity . 3). It mi gh t be 
true tha t Berg so:1 intends to poin t out by the term "impetus" 
that "the farther bac k vve tra ce th e streams of evolution , 
the less mar ked are the differentiations and the less d e f ined 
t l..,l e · d' 'd l't nl9n lJ l n l Vl ua l y . Ho"!frever, if this process is continued 
to its log ic a l con clusion , what i s found is a n i mpetus vvithout 
any characteristics at all. ince all characte ristics are , 
l9B. Cf. Quick, Art.(l913). 
19}. Cf . CE , 82f. 
194. Quick , Art.(l913), 222-3. 
1 95. Quick , lrt .(l913), 223 - 4 . 
1 96. Qui c k , Art.(l913 ), 224 . 
relatively at least, individual i n th at they all belong to 
special forms of li fe , the orig inal a ctivity rrust also be 
a spe cial ·form of lif e . But t hen it cannot be the unity 
that underlies the s pe cial forrns . 1 97 4). If the TTirnpetus" 
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be considered in the ba re princi ple of spontaneity itself , 
this also is doomed to failure . For how could a character-
less s pontaneity determine the character of spontaneities? 
It is a)parent, then , that , ·when i t comes to the matter 
of exp laining how unity i s conferred by the ~lan vital , t h ere 
are d ifficult ies which are ap parently insuperab le. 
2). Despite these d i ff icu lties i n the attempt to exp l a in 
unity , Berg son ' s eff orts cant inue in the a rea of ind ividuality . 
In order to develop this side of t h e p ro blem , s everal ideas 
emerg e which are d esigned t o clear l.lp the difficulty. First 
of all , it appears t hat individuality and life a re not so 
much o ppo sed to each other a s i t would seem. TTLife •.. mani-
fests a search f or ind ividuality , as if it strove to c onsti-
tute syst ems naturally isolated, naturally closed. nl98 "The 
te ndency to individua te is everyv;here prese nt in t he or gan-
ized world . However, two things complicate this position . 
In the first p lace, Bergson contends that individuality is 
never complete in living beings . Se condl y , ind ividuality 
is apparently a joint product of life and matter . Let us 
look ore closely at these as ~ertions. 
199. Quick, Art.(l913), 224 . 
19 8. CE , 18. 
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That individuality is never comp lete seems to be the 
une quivocal p osition of Be r gson.l99 Several factors co ntri-
bute to this belief. Individuality is de clared to be opposed 
by reproduction, an d , since reprodu ction occurs, t h is f a ct 
i ndi ca tes that individuality is not completely perfect. 200 
Further, individuality "is opposed and at the same time com-
plet ed by an antagoni s tic and co mpl ementary tende ncy t o associ-
ate, a ? if the manifold unity of life dravm in t he direction 
of multiplicity , made so much the more effort to vvi. thdr aw 
i tsel f on to it self . n 201 Such is t h e rea soning which leads 
to t he, conclusion that there is in the elan vital "neither 
pure u nity nor pure multip licity ... individuality and associ-
a tion ••• [ being ] due to the very nature of life. 11202 Thus, 
in t h is passage, Bergson a dmits that t h e elan vi tal cannot 
function as p ure u n ity but must co ntain the p ossibility of 
both unity and mult i plicity within it self. 203 
However, t he situation is not to remain clear very long . 
For lest we thi nk that all individuality and association are 
within the elan vital, there are other passages which i ndi c a te 
that t h is i s not t he whole of t he mat t er. It is true t hat 
the elan contains "an i mmensit y of potentiality" but ttcontact 
vvi. th matte r i s what det e rmines th is d issociation." He con tin-
ues with the view that 
I 
I 
I 
I 
: 199. Cf . CE , xx , 1 5-18, 49, 283-4 . 
200 . Cf . CE , 16 . 
201. CE , 282 . 
202. C.t; , 284. 
203 . Cf. CE , 281. Cf. below Whitehead ' s treatment of 
ind ividuality. 
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matter d ivi des actually wha t was but potent i ally mani-
fol d · and i n this s ense, individuation is i n fact the 
Hork ' Qf m~tter, in part the re sult of life ' s 0\·m i n clina-
tiO'n . '2-0 4 
There a ppears , therefore , i n Ber g son ' s d octrine of indi -
vidual i ty the familiar alternation b etwee :-1 a dualism and a 
mo n i sm W'-1 ich appeared i n his trea tme 1t of the problem of 
c a usali ty . When he is concerned most a bout prese rving b oth 
/ 
unit y a nd multiplicity , the elan is the deposito~ · for both 
in a potential fo r m, which a vvaits t h e touch o f matt e r to c a ll 
them forth i nto a ctuality . / Thus matter and the elan vi tal 
co-op e r a te i n the crGation of individuals. But when Berg so n 
se e s t h e n eed f or pre s erving the "true , inwar d , and living 
u nity" i t is t he ~lan vital a lon e which is ab le to accomplish 
t his. 
In corr:: lus ion, . it should be observed that t he closest 
that Be r gs on comes to an a d e quat e solution of the problem 
i s i n his r e cogn itio n that a n analysis of cons ciousness 
furnishes t he only clue . Hi s sta tement that " I am •.• a unity 
that is multiple a n d a multiplicity that is one •.. 0uch is 
my inn e r l i fe , and such a l so i s l i f e i n g eneral" s hould have 
been p ursued furt he r. The f c;.ilure to do this and the r e sult -
ant a ccount of matte r as the "efficient caus e" i n the e nsuing 
d i s cus~ion brings i n the element of confusion 'vvhich a more 
c a r eful emp irical i nv e s tigation would have h elp ed to dispel . 
I 
' 
204. CE, 281-2 ; cf, 294 . 
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iv. The p roblem of novelty. 
The previous chapter has attempted t o bring clarificat ion 
of some of the main issues which bear on t he pr oblem o novelty 
itself . Also, to some extent, it has been n ece s s a r y to ant i-
cipate t h e a ttitude of Bergson on some of t h ese issue s in 
t h e preced i ng p age s o f t he present chapter . However, in t h i s 
section , an attempt will be made to find out ·whe t her t h e ~lan 
vit a l is a b l e to p rovi d e an a dequa te expl anation of no v e lty 
in t he univers e. 
It goes almost without s aying , sinc e it has b een mctd e 
emi n en tly clear a lready , that Ber g s on is a champi on of n ove l ty . 
~he ques tion at hand is not particularly dire cted at Be r g son' s 
in t e ntion . Rath e r it i s d irected at hi s suc c es s i n r eal izing 
it. 
l). Til. e and 11ovelty . Perhaps for the firs t time since 
Heraclitus; tir;1e p ro mi sed , in the thou ght of Bergson, to come 
in t o its ovm . 20 ~5 The p revious exp o s itio ~1 o f Berg son's vie\vs 206 
has already revealed his assertion t hat ti me , or r e a l durat ion, 
is an emp irica l f act. No reason was found to chal l eng e this 
cont ention . Earlier, it was seen 207 that n ovelty was incom-
patible v~i.th an eternity , i f by that term one d enotes a 
"tirneless" somethi ng . I n other wor d s , the ex istence of n ov-
elty i mplies t he ex i s tence of real time, or real duration , 
205.. Cf. L9vej oy , Art.(l909 ), 301. 
20o. Cf . a bove,9J, 
209. Cf . Chap . I II, 60f. 
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to use B'e r gson' s terms . I t becomes n ecessary, t h en , t o 
inqu ire :a t thi s point, whether or not Berg son a s serts the 
converse of this prop osition, and , if so , wh ether he i s j u s ti-
f i ed i n so d oing . 
There are many passag es in Ber g son which a r c suf ficient 
to e s t a b l ish the contentio n t hat he d oe s believe th a t dur a tion 
i mplies n ovelty . Early in CE he says , " The more we s t udy the 
t h e natu re of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration 
me a n s invent ion , t h e creation of forms, t he elaborat ion of 
208 the a b s olutely nevv . n Later on, he reit e r a tes, even more 
forcefully , the s ane i d ea . "Ti me, 11 h :; s ays , ''i s i n ventio n or 
it is nb thing at all. •.. At eve ry moment [it] puts on n ew form 
an d ••• communicat e s to ••• [ e ventsJ somethi ng o f its novelty . n209 
The se quota tions are typ ic a l o f Berg son's belief that duration 
i mplies creation, invention, and novelty. 
With this i n mind , then, is Bergson justified i n his con-
te nt iort t hat dur a tion i mplies novelt y ? First, as has been 
stated i m..rnedi a t e l y above, t he previous ch apter has determined 
the f act t ha t t h e e x i s ten c e of n ovelty i mp lie s the ex i stence 
of time , or real duration. Now log ic t e lls us that t h ere are 
only tvm valid forms of this implication: either a). if 
novelty e x ists, then tin1e exists , or b). if time does not 
ex i s t, then novelty does no t ex ist. It is i nvalid either 
to d e -ry the a nteced e n t or to a ff irm the con se quent , and , it 
208 . CE , 14; i talics mine. 
209. C~ , 371; italics Berg s on' s . 
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appears, Ber g son does t h e l atter 1Jvh en he asserts that s i n ce 
time ( or duration ) ex ists , then novelty exis t s . There is, 
however, one way of escape f ro m t h i s diff i c ulty w1: ich is o pen 
to Bergs on. He must show t hat n ovelty mu s t be the sole con-
di tion on l'rh i c h time d e p ends . In other word s , there can b e 
no time , ( dur at ion ) wh ich contains non- novelty. But Berg son 's 
own words t est i fy ag a inst t his supposition, f or durat ion is 
n ot s i mp l y and sole l y t h e carrier of novelty . It a l s o carries 
t h e ent ire past with i t , and the past canno t possibly be new. 
"The o ~gani sm wt ich lives ..• endures. Its pas t, i n i ts entirety , 
is prolong e d i nto its p r esent, an d abides t h ere, ac tual a nd 
acting . n 210 Also, n i n the real , co ncrete duration •.• t h e past 
remains bound up with the present . n 2ll Thus , the very natu re 
of re a;l time involves a "real pasttt as well a s a 11 real pres -
e n t , 11 and , as s uch , cannot e scape the un chang i n g , non- n ove l char-
act e ri s tics which the past p resents a long \"li th a ny novelty wh ich 
the p resent may bring t o i t . It c a n n ow be seen t hat , g iven 
Be r g son t s p r e s upp osit ions rega rdi ng the pas t , the re is n o reason 
why the concep t of duration ne cessar i l y mean s or i mp l i es novelty . 
2) • Ber g son and the prob lems pe cu liar to novelty . Dis -
cussion has already r e vealed that Bergson employs sev e r a l 
/ 
method s by wh ich he believes the exis ten ce of the elan vital 
can be disclosed . 212 In a d dition , the t end ency to suppos e 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
210 . 
211 . 
212 . 
c;::; , 
CH' J.:J ' 
See 
19 ; ital ics , 
26 . 
ab ove , 12·5. 
Berg so n t s . 
that re a l time i mp lies novelty has also been examined . 
T1e re r emains to d iscuss Bergson ' s pos itio n with regard to 
/ 
the re lat ion of the elan vital to l aw , intelligibility , 
and va lue . 
Now t he pos i t io n which Ber gson t akes with r egard to t he 
rela t iori. of t he ~lan vi tal to lmv i.'3 seen in the c o:1t r ast 
v.rh ich he drav.rs between u l aws" and 11 gen era . 11 Laws , on the 
one hand , pe rtain t o the "domain of inert matter11 ana genera 
to the Tl domain of life . n213. He c i tes the con usio n between 
the two ' as due , i n the ca se of the ancients , to a reduction 
of laws to g enera , and , in t he case of mod erns , to a r educ -
ti on of genera to laws . 214 This re ductio n , i n turn , is due 
to the fact that 
t he ' vi tal ' order , v.rh i ch is essentially creation , is 
mani f ested to us less in its essence t han i n ~orn e of 
it s accidents , those v.rhi ch i mitate the physi cal a nd geo -
metri cal order ; like it they present to us repet i tions 
that make g enera l i zation possible . 215 
By i mplic ation , thus, Bergson is saying that the essence of 
l i fe is manifested in g enera whi l e it s acci den ts are mani-
fest ed i n what appears to be repetition t hat make s possible 
laws . ~ssentially , then , l ife , and its i mpetus , do not conform 
at lea st to the " l awsn v.rhich Berg son appl i es to the physi c a l 
a ;1d the geometrical order . But , does this mean tha t a l l law 
I 
I / • i s ali~n to the elan v1tal? 
213.. CE , 248 . 
214. CE , 359 ; cf . 248 . 
215. CE , 252 . 
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To answer this, the t erm " law" must be widened to in«::lude 
what is meant by "order." If this is done, it will be s een 
that the ~lan vital is not alien to the idea of order, a s 
such, but still it must be se en in its "ascending" function 
in contrast to t he "descending" function of "inert matter." 
Further discussion on this point is hardly required , except 
to point out that Bergson resorts to a mere verbalism to 
resolve t he difficulty, since, in the absence of his unreason-
able attitude toward the intellectual, order would be seen as 
embodying law, not only of the physical r ealm, but al s o that 
of novelty. 
In r egard to the relation of the Blan vital and int elligi-
bility, the que stion is more complicated. Cunningham notes 
that "Bergson's criticism of intelligence is never in fact 
216 denotati ve.'' If this observation is correct, and there 
is ampl e evidence to support such a conclu sion, 217 t hen intel-
ligence can never directly grasp the real. And, given the 
f h . h t th / 1 . 1 . h 1 218 J.. t urt er assumptJ.on t a e e an vJ.ta J.s t e rea , 
follows that i ntellectual processes a r e incapable of grasp-
ing, or knowing the elan vital. In short, the elan vita l is 
in fact unintelligible. 
Now why does Berg son draw this inference ? The closest 
a pproach to the truth of the matter that the present vlri ter 
I 
:216. Cunningham, Art.(l929 ), 163. 
217 I o 
mology. 
Cf. the above discussion of the problem of episte-
218 . Cf. the above 
ality and individuality. 
discussion of the problems of caus-
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can make t o the answer is that he is des irous o f preserving 
the eleme n t of n ovelty or sheer "unforeseeableness" \vh ich 
t h e ~lan exemplifies in its creat ive activity. 219 Now it 
220 
will be remembered from the discussion of novelty - tha t 
p redictab ility does presuppose i n telligibility . Thi s d is-
cussion , however, also revealed that to reverse this propo si-
tion, v1z., to assert that non - p r edictability p resuppose s 
unintelligibility is n ot warran t ed , since intel ligibility is 
ne ither increased nor de creased by p redict ability or unpredic -
t abili t 'y , but, r ather, by t he finding and the description of 
the system o f facts in question . 221 I n the light , t h en, of 
this c onclusion, it may be seen that t he "unforeseeableness" 
/ 
which is attributed to the elan vital, and which Berg son is 
concer 1ed to p reserve, need not necessarily have demanded its 
unintellig ibility. In other words, and contrary to Bergson, 
intellig e n ce can be i n fact d enota tive as long as intelligen ce 
does n o t attempt to predict but confines its activity to facts 
which have occurred. 
One further problem which ne eds clarification i s the 
matter of novelty and value. There are so me indications tha t 
Bergson, more or less, assumes that creation o f no velty is 
alway~ a crea tion of the g ood , or value in the narrow sense 
I 
of t hel term. In the essay , "Creation the Goal of Life ," for 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
219. Cf. above, 94, 
220. Above, 78f:L. 
22J_. Cf . above, '; 8l. 
example, he a sserts tha t 11 creation •.• [ i s] an effort whi ch 
drm·,rs much f ror11 little, something from nothing , and adds 
unceasingl y to whatever wea l th the world contains .n 222 
Despite passages s u ch as these, and there are many of them, 
Bergson is not unmi ndful of the fact s of evi l. • s has been 
po i nted out 223 they ex ist. They are due to the inner fini -
I 
tude of the elan vital itself and to the obstacles whi ch it 
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me ets . 224 But d espite these f acts of e vil, Bergson i s opti-
mistic. 
Such t hen will be our c onc lus ion. Attributing the place 
we do i n man , and the signi fi can c e we do to l i fe it may 
weil a ppear optimistic •••• But t here is an empirica l opti-
mism vrhich consists simply i n noting tvvo fact s : first 
that humani t y finds life, on the Whole, goo d , since it 
clings to it; and then, tha t there is an unmixed j oy , 
lying beyond pleasure and pain, which is t h e fina l state 
of the mystic soul. In this t\vofold sense, and from 
both point s of vie-~v, optimism must be admi tted .22? 
Thus, Bergson affirms an ultimate optimism, but he is awa re 
of the facts of disva l ue which accompany t he achievement of 
value. 
J). The ~lan vital and novelty. So far i n the present 
discussion , the a ttempt has been made to ke e p the con cepts 
,I 
of the el a n vit al and no velty distinct f rom each other. It 
is now ti ne to exami ne t he relation that exists bet\'leen them 
,I 
i n t he mi nd of Bergson. First, how does the elan bring no velty 
' I 
to pass? Berg son is n ot very cle ar on this po i nt. But several 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 2 2 • Carr ( t r • ) , l' 1.!: , 3 0 • 
223. Above,ll7~ 
224 . Cf . ·t he di s cussion in '.i.' 'MR, 248f . 
225, . TSiviR , 248- 9 . 
i deas a re pre sented which may shed some l i g ht on t he subje ct. 
I n an s wer to this , Bergson s ay s that novelty i s d e pendent 
I 
upon t ime or r eal du ration.226 The pa s t pr e sses itse l f , a s 
it we r e , into t h e p r e s ent. 227 It may be a s swned t hat the 
" p r essure" comes from t he ~lan_yi tal, f or Be r gs on ha s indi-
cated nb oth e r source from wh ich i t might come. In this c on-
nection , it mi g ht be n ot ed that , f r om this po int of view, 
there a re indications that duration and the elan vital are 
t wo way's of lo oking at t h e same reality . 
Hdwever , when it c omes to whether or not the elan vital 
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re quire s something besides itself to work on i n i ts crea tive 
activity , Berg son is l ess cle ar . 2 28 He s ays , f or example , that 
norg anizatio n ... b e g ins in a p o i nt that is almos t a mathematical 
point .~ .. It needs at the beg i nn i n g the smallest possible space, 
a minimum of rna t ter . " 229 Hmvever , he als o contends to the 
contrary t hat 11 creation ..• d r av.;rs much f rom li t tle , s omething 
f rom nothing . 1123° This would seem to i mply t hat t h ere is 
actual l y creatio ex nihilo , as Aquinas bel i e ved . 23 l There is, 
therefor e an ambi gui t y as to wheth er t he creative pro c ess 
require s matte r or space or anyth i n g else than the e l a n vital. 
The nature o f t he i nteractio n between t he i mpetus of 
l i f e and i ts a nta g onist , matt e r, i s d escribed as "an effort 
226 . Cf . CE , 8 . 
227 . cr . c~ , 19 , 219 . 
2~8 . Refe rence here may be made to h i s o s cilla tion between 
causal monism and c ausal dual i s m, d ealt wi th &bovc ,··l4lff. 
229 . CE , 1 03 . 
230 . Carr , ME , 30 ; ital i c s n ind. 
23 1. ~ee above , 2Zff. 
t o eng r aft o.ll t o the necessit y of physical .forces 'the l argest 
amount of indetermination . 112 32 11 indeterminismu or 11 unfore -
see ableness 11 or "lib erty" describe the nature of this a ctivity . 
These t e rms are evi dently s y nonymous . 233 
F~rther , matter , i n i ts conta ct wi th the i mp etus of life 
" divides actually what was but p otentially mani fo l d 11 in the 
impetus . 234 Thus , i t is se en that the ~ lan functions i n a 
manner simi l ar to Ari stotle ' s "mat t.e r 11 i n tha t it furnish e s 
t he "potentialit y 11 v~hich r equir e s rea l izatio n . The problem 
here , ·wh ich Ber gson apparently doe s not realiz e , is tha t 
t h e elan is thereby po s tulat e d a s the source both of potential-
ity ari d actualit y . To s ay the l eas t , t here is n e ed of furthe r 
cl arif ication he re . 
'i'he end r esult of this process is cons c i ousne ss , v.,rh i c h 
Be r gson def i ne s as a "need o f creat ion . " Th i s cons c i ousness 
either s leeps or is e::Pdakened when t he possi hili ty of a cho i ce 
appears . 235 But Be r g son doe s no t intend to i mpl y that the r e 
is a plan of goal i n view in th i s creative process . ~an , a s f ree , 
is one of t he t wo maj or ends to date o f e volutio n , but he is not 
a p re - f i gur ed go a l . 236 Bergson , howe ver , r efers t o t he creative 
process , in s orne places , as though it we r e an a rti sti c achi e vement, 
I 
an .d. ,! in thi s r e s pe c t present s a view similar to Pl ato 's con-
:232 . CE , 1 27 ; cf . 13 9 , 274; italics Bergson ' s . 
1233 . Cf . 13 9 , 27 4 . 
' 234 . Cf . CE , 282 . 
235 . Cf . CE , 285 . 
236 . Cf . CE , 287 - 9 . 
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ception of the ndemi urge . n 237 His en phasis u yon intuition. 
an d feeling in general \I'Tould tend to su pport SL<.ch a thesi s, 
though his r ejection of intelle ctu~lity and the i nert would 
tend to d e ny it. 
Th~oughout Ci , Be r g son nev e r clearly a sse r ts t hat t h e 
/ 
elan v i t al is God, a lthough in one p l ace he define s God a s 
!! u n c easing l ife; a ction, f reedom. n 238 It is not until he 
writes the T.::)IviR t hat the ~lan vi t al is clea rly· referred to as 
Go d . He re t h e ~l an is r e defined as "love" and is ide ntified as God . 
Bein,;;s h a ve be en cal l e d into exis tence v.rho •dere d e stine d 
to l ove a n d be loved , since crea t ive energy is to be 
d e f i ned as love . Di s tinc t f rom God , Who is this energy 
i t self , they could spr~1g into being only i n a universe , 
a nd therefore t he universe sprang into b e i n g . 239 
This vi?W whic h has j us t b e e n quot ed illustrates a gain the 
des ire of Berg son to re st h i s ca se i n s o me f orm of monism . 
God seems necessary to exp lain the matt er of ultimat e orig in 
and l i ke·wi s e of u ltimate return . Ther e i s s een i n this f inal 
work of Be r gson n ot o n l y t he influence s of Aqui na s an d ? loti-
nus , ~reatly modi f ied , it i s t r u e , by his a ssertion th a t God 
posses s e s f ini te poHer and fo r esight , but , a nd more imp o r tantly , 
t he beli e f that in the last an aly sis some f orm of p ersonali t y 
und erl ies the whol e co smi c proc e s s. 
A~y critici sm of t he ~lan vital a s th 2 explanation of 
I 
I 237 . Cf . CE , 194; cf . a l s o Jt allknecht , SPC, where the 
thesis ;i s develop ed that Bergson derives his doct r ine o f 
the creat ive proces s f rom the con temp l ation of aest hetic pro -
d ue tion . 
2j 8 . Ct.: , 271. 
2J9 . T0MR , 24.5 - 6 . 
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n ovelty mu st con sider t h e ambi guities and t he c ont r adi ctory 
I 
character of th e elan itse lf. These, perhaps , have been men-
tioned sufficiently and need no furth er re petition . The basic 
question, and t h e on e which i s c h iefly r a i sed a g ainst t h e e n tire 
do ctri1e , mi ght be ph r ased somewhat li k e this : VJhat does the 
~lan vi tal cont r i bute to the explanat io n of novelt y \vh ich 
could not other v-rise be as well or better explained? In r ep ly , 
Be r g s on n i g ht s ay , i ) . nit is a fact. It cam1ot be denied . " 
But , it has b een sh ow~1 that t h is c ontention i s not strict l y 
t r ue . Life is a fact, duration and novelty may be facts , 
but th e ~lan vital clearly is an hypothesis , since it r e pre-
sen t s a d eparture from immediate expe rien c e i n t h e lif e of 
individuals to l i fe in g en e ral. He might s till contend 
ii). that it is necessaD' as a causal explanation . Bu t here , 
Bergson s howed by h is wavering that the ~lan vital cannot 
sup p l y en ough cohe r en c e to the c a usal p roblem. iii. No fur-
ther suppo r t was se cured from t h e direction of i nd ividu a lity 
f or s i milar reasons. But, as a l ast r e so r t, Ber g son mi ght 
re p l y i n the f ollowing fashion : i v). "Certainly t here nust 
b e some exp l a nation for the creat ion of novelty i n re a l t i me. 
Hea l time i mpl i es novelt y , and , in t h e l ast analysis , no velty 
i s undetermined , unpre d ictable. .::.:.i ince whatever is able to 
accoun~ fo r these effe c ts must itself po s se s s them, a nd the 
I 
I 
~lan vital posses ses them , the ~lan vital is the exp l anation. " 
To t h i J hypothetical , but not unrepresentat ive ~ st a tement of 
Bergson , i t may be rep lied that real t i me does not ne cessar-
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ily i mply novelty, though, of course, it by no means excludes 
it. Also, novelty is not nec e ssarily incompatible with either 
det erm~nism or predictability. Further, there is no reason 
to suppose either that cause s necessarily resemble t heir 
effects or tha t causes necessarily contain their eff ects. In 
fact, despite the fact that Bergson asserts this latter point 
himself, 24° he seems to violate it when he implies tha t the 
elan vital is the source of everything.241 
I~ the light of the above considerations, it appears 
doubtful that Bergson has established the elan vital as either 
the ne~essary or the most adequate explanation of novelty. How-
ever, ~e has called attention to many important concepts which, 
while not a l wa ys treated coherently, may vvell point to an ad-
equate solution of the problem--concepts such as real time, 
consci9usness, feeling or intuition, freedom, value, and God. 
4. Summary and Evaluation 
i. The merits of Bergson's epistemology, in so far as it bears 
upon the problem of this dissertation, are seen in the empir-
ical approach, i.e., the recognition of the supremacy of 
"brute fact"; his bringing of volition to a place of metaphys-
ical importance as analogous to the elan .vital; his willingness 
to inspect the scientific data, e.g., those of biology, and to 
treat them in their larger perspective; his belief that immed-
1 
I 
iate experience is the source of all knowledge of the real. 
240. Cf. above, i-ll.• 241. C f. above , ].:i!~f., 
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ii. Bergson's caus a l theory rightly o pposes any view which 
hold~ that "all is given , " and which disregards the facts 
of d i svalue. 
iii. The closest Bergson come s to a solution of t he pro blem 
of i n d.i viduali ty is onl y a su ggestion : viz., that co n-
sc i ousness furnishes t he clue. 
iv. He h~s called attention to many important conce pts which, 
while no t alway s treated coherently, may well point t o an 
a de quat e solut ion of the problem--concepts such a s real time, 
consciousness , feeling or intuition, f re edom, va lue, and God. 
v. Berg son's handling of the epist emi c problem is r a t he r ~>veak . 
His a nalogy of t he ~lan v i t al and the experi ence of volition 
vms f ound to be ambiguous; his argume nt from the facts of 
biology was foun d to b e based u pon limited evi den ce and t o 
omit sufficient cons i de r a tion of opposing vie ws; his intui-
tionism and a nti-int ell e ct ua l ism, wh i le provi ding knowledge 
of subje ctive c a use , fail to provide sufficient evidence 
I 
to warrant assertions regardin g either the existen ce of an 
obj e ctive existence or t h e nature of such a caus e. 
vi. The a nti-int ellectuali sm of Ber gson lead to a denial of 
co ns cious purpose i n t he over-all causal a gency and to 
os ci llate between a dualistic a nd monistic doctrine of 
ca use, di ffic ulties which r ender hi s entire position , i f 
not contradi ctory , cert ainl y pr e ca r i ous • 
. vii. The doctrine of in dividuality is a pparently vitiated by 
t he same os cillation betwee n dualism and mo nism which charac-
168 
te 'ri zed his causal t heory . 
viii. While novelty i mplies t i me , time , given Bergson's pre -
suppositions regardi ng the pa r t , d oes no t ne cessarily 
impl y novel t y , as Ber gson seems to t hink . 
ix . Berg son ' s arguments do not appear to have established 
/ 
t he elan vital either a s t he ne ces s a r y or as the most 
adequate explana tion of novel ty . 
CHAP TEH. V 
SA1'11U EL ALEXAN1JEB. ' S NISUS 
1 . Introduction 
i . Bibgraphical Sketch of Samuel Alexander . l 
I 
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Samuel !-~.lexan der was born i n .Sydney , N. S . 'JJ., ;custralia, 
i 
on J a~lUary 6 , 1 8 59 , t he s ame year a s, an d ab out n ine months 
I 
p rior ito , the birth of Henri Bergson . 2 This i nte resting 
I 
coinc ide nc e is augmen t e d by t he fact that both o f t he se 
philo ~ ophers came f rom Jewish ancestry . 3 
1 lexander ' s early educ ation b e gan in 1 ust ralia i n t h e 
I 
I 
En gli sh manne r . He was t utored u ntil he was 12 or 13 and 
I 
then l ttended We sley Colle g e from 1 8 71 to 187 5 where h e 
stud i~d the Cl assics , Mathemat ics , i:ng lish, Frenc h , and some 
s ci en de . The two ye a rs follov.rin g hi s stay at \'ies ley Colle g e 
I 
were 1 ell s pent at the universi t y , a f t e r which he left for 
LI:n g lanci. , neve r a gai n to return to h is native land . 
I 
l t was a f ter s ome perplexity that Al exand e r d e cid ed 
to ap pl y f or t h e Ballio l scholarsh i p at Oxford r s.ther t han 
at Cambri dg e . I n 187 ? , he was mvarded t he Balliol scholar-
sh i p where he t u tore d under such men as Fo rb es , .:> trachan 
1 \ La ird , Art . (1939 ) , is the p rimar y s ource for this 
b iog r aphic a l ske tch . 
2L 'l'his y ear was a l s o the occ as ion of t he birth of John 
Dewey ~nd the year o f th~ publication o f Darwin ' s Origin of 
the 0P~ cies . 
3 '· Jm·;ish ph ilosophe rs are co mpar ativel y rare . Ph ilo , 
Ma imoni d es , and J p inoz a a re t he outstandin g examp l e s . I • J 
Davidso n , a nd A. C. Br a dley . T. H. Gre en and R. L. Net t le-
ship weFe a l so t utors of Ba l l i ol at t he time. 
I n 1882 Alexander was elected to a Fellowship a t Lin-
coln College, t he fir s t J ew to obtain th i s honor since the 
pa ssing of t h e Test Act in 1870. He r emained a Fellow of 
Lincoln unt il 1893. During t hi s time Alexander d i d ph iloso-
phica l t ea ch i ng at Lincoln , Oriel College, and Worce s t e r 
College, Oxfor d , lecturing ma i nly on sub jects connected 
with me t aphysics and e t hics. 
I n 1885 Alexander wa s appointed Examiner i n the Honour 
School o!f Litera e Hmnaniores, an d 1887 he was a war ded the 
Green I•'lo]ral ?hilosophy Prize f or a diss ert a tion i n ethics 
vvhich became the· foundation for a s yst ematic -vrork published 
i n 1889 under t he titl e of £,-J:oral Order and Progress. 4 
At the end of 1888 , wishing t o obta i n more time a nd free-
dam for priva te study , Alexander l e ft Oxford . Until his r eturn 
i n 1891, he s pent t he maj or part of his time s t udy i ng psy cho-
logy , vmrk i ng during the wi nter o f 1890-91 i n the psycholo-
gical l ab ora tory of MUns t e rberg at Freibu~g , and engag i ng i n 
study and pr a ctica l 0ork i n phys i ology and b i ology. The 
years 1891 to 1893 were spen t, in addition to t h e work as 
Examiner \at Oxford , i n lecturing i n p sy chology an d tutoring 
i n philoqophy. 
Ale~ander wa s not wholly s atisfi ed with Oxford's int el-
\ 
4. This boo k led t o a long and c lo s e f ri ends hip be t ween 
Alexander a nd Lloyd Morgan who r eviewed it f or Nature. 
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lectu.al climate and , a l thoug h returning after h i s period of 
study in p s y cholo gy , he end eavored to ap pl y fo r a professor-
ship some·where else . As a result, and after three unsuccess -
ful application s , he succeeded in 1 893 in securing the profes -
sorsh~p at t he Univ ersity of Manchester . Th i s p osition he 
retained until his retirement in 1 924 . 
!i. s a man , Alexand er was war ml y admired by a vvide circle 
of f riends . His Wednesday eve ning par ti es wer e an esta blished 
feat ure of University life . Although he ne ver married , h e 
was "the best-loved man in Iviancheste r, in all circles of that 
city . 11 He had a 11 human-hearte dne s sTT \"Jhich , while fl owing from 
him naturally, was b ound to p leas e others . It was dee p , but 
i t wa s also gay , almost f rivolous a t times . But i t vras al,,ray s 
g enerous, not with himself but itvith others. 
Teaching was something whi ch Al exander l oved. It is 
said that he manag ed to convey to his pupils t h a t what he 
was l e cturing about ma ttered a g reat d eal , tha t it was of 
i mportance to find out v.rhat o ther philosophers had thought 
about i t , and to concentrate upon t h i nki ng it out for oneself . 
He ,,ras not particu l ar l y syst ematic in his courses, but he 
created g rea t r esp ect for his subje ct a nd reverenc e for him-
self. I 
Ex cept f or the litt le essay on Locke, no bo ok came f rom 
I 
the pen of Alexander f r om the time of his appo intment to lVian-
cheste~ until Space , Ti me, and ue i ty appeared i n 1 920 . It is 
true that he held offices i n the Ari s totelian Society and con -
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tri bu.ted many artie les to its Pro ceedi~1gs , as well a s to other 
journals . However , it is cert ain that the Gifford Lectures5 
const itute the supreme achievement of Alexander ' s lifetime . 
~After his ret i rement , to v1hich he looked forward with 
expectancy , Alexand er devoted most of his time to writing 
articles and one book , Beaut v and Other Forms of Value , which 
appeared in 1933 . Among t he many honors he receiv ed , the elec-
t i on t o the Briti sh Academy in 1 913 gave h i m the g reates t joy . 
He al s o received the LL . D. of Bi rmingham in 1924 , and in the 
s&~e year t h e Oxford honorary D. Litt . ; this latter degree 
he r e ceived also of Durham in 1923 , the Litt . D. of Liverpool 
i n 1925, aYJ.d of Cam·o ri dge i n 1934 . He was made honorary 
fello1N of Lincoln Colleg e in 1918 , and of Balliol College 
in 1 925 . A bust by Ep stein , "Which now stands i n the hall of 
the Arts Bui l dings of the University of Manchester , vvas pre-
sent ed to him in No vember , 1925, an honor which moved him 
ve r y d eeply . His g rea test honor vms bestowed in 1930 when 
he r e ceived the Order of Merit . 
Af ter a prol onged period of gradual weakening , from which 
there wa s n o escape , Alexander died on September 13 , 1938 . 
i i . Backgr ound for the doctrine of nisus . 
Ip shar p contrast to the celebrat ed "elan vita1fl of 
Bergsoh , the "nisus" of .Samue l Alexander is comparative l y l i tt l e 
I 
develope d . Ber gson , as has been seen , d evoted the maj or portion 
I 
5. Space , Time , and J e ity, 2 vols ., the Gi ff ord Lectm~e s , 
1916-1918, hereinafter referred t o &s 3TD , I or JTD , II . 
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of an entire voltrr.1e ( CE ) to developing his conception. Alex-
ander, however , fails to mention his corre sponding principle 
before the last chapter of his two-volurne work , JTD . Further 
di scu ssion of nisus occurs in s ome later articles , 6 but, even 
"~>vi th t hese additions, his writing on the sub ject coul d not 
be consi dered extensive , a n d neve r once is t he doctrine d ealt 
~ovi th explicitly or systematically as such. 7 
The foregoing observations a re not intended , however , 
to detract f rom the philos ophica l i mportance of ni sus because , 
as it will a ppe ar in subse quent pages , there is a considerable 
pl a ce which nisus occu p i es i n Al e xander ' s system. 
2 . The General Idea of Alexander 's Eme r ge nt i!:volution 
The concept of ''emergent evolut io n" has been mentioned 
earlier8 as illustrating one of the three r ecent tendencies 
vmich co ncern the present dissertation . To Lloyd 1\'Iorgan goes 
the credit for br i n gi ng i nto cu rrent usage the idea of "emer-
gence , 11 since, at lea st as early a s 1899, he had used t he term . 9 
Consideration has a lready been given}O to some of t he salient 
features of Morgan ' s emerge nt evolutio11. The examination 
of Al exander's variation of this conception is now in or der. 
I 61• Cf . Art. (1921), (1922 )1 , (1927 )J, (1927 ) 2 , and (1927 )i. 7
1
• The possible exception mi ght be LJhe last s e ct ion of his 
Ar t •. (l921), "Spinoza and Time . " 
8t Cf . above, 42. 
9 Cf. Morgan , ~rt.(l899), 543; c£. a lso, Ralston , EEP , 33. 
10. ~ee above,42ff. 
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i. Space-Time. 
According to Alexander, the ult imate reality , "the matrix 
of all bei'ng" is Space-Time, 11 not Space and Time, for these 
latter are abstractions from the one reality Space-Time, a con-
ception which, although Al exander claims it is derived by the 
process of analytic thought upon experienced data, is assumed 
to be ultimate . 12 This "real existance ••• is ••• the continum of 
point-instants or pure events.n13 Further, Space and Time imply 
each other for "Space in its very nature is temporal and Time is 
spatial."14 "Space supplies ••• t he ••• continuity needed to save 
Time from being a mere 'now' •••• Time is discovered to supply 
the element in Space without which Space would be a blank.nl5 
This Space-Time may be called "Motion," and Time, as the 
"source of movement, " generates Space. Space could "be imaged 
as t he trail of time" provided it is remembered that "there 
6ould be no Time wit~out a Space in whi ch the trail is left.n16 
It is important, however, to recognize that Alexander emphati-
cally asserts the infinity of Space-Time, and thus dispels 
the idea that Time generates "fresh Space." On the contrary, 
"growth in~me" consists of a "continuous redistribution of 
. 17 instants of Time among points of Space." Empty Space is not 
11. STD, I, 61. 
12. Cf. STD, I, 35, l. 7-9. 
13. STD, I, 48 . 
14. STD, I, 44. 
15. STD, I, 46, 47. 
16. STD, I, 61· cf. the Chinese concept of Yang and Yin. 
' Also, cf. Bergson. 
17. STD , I, 62, 63. 
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ne cessary to t his conception f or "motion means merely that the 
time - coeffici ent s of ••• spatial outlines change . 111 8 
I'here is mu ch in this concept which allovrs for comparison 
with othe r thinkers . Alexander himself believes that i t is 
nthe f ormless void" of Genesis . l9 From the point of view of 
Motion, the bare Space-Time app r ox imates, thou.gh i n varying 
degre e s , Plato' s "Receptacle , " Ar i stotle ' s and Plotinus ' 
"matte r.-'120 Even the "non- r a tiona l Given" of Brightman c an 
be seen i n it, provided , of course, the co nscious element of 
the l atter conc ept is not include d. That there are ~imilari-
ties with Spinoza's do ctrine of "Substance" may be seen by 
Alexander ' s ovvn admi s sion , rrovided Ti me be substituted for 
Thought in Spi noza ' s scheme~21 Alexander ' s Space - Time also 
has relat ions with t he absolute space and time of Ne\vton , 22 
and part i cularly to the Newtoni an i dea of absolute motion , 23 
provided the absolute space and time of i'il"e\ovt on , interpret ed 
as "total Space and Time , " are r egarded as "wit hin the one 
Space - Time ..• f rom which they never do exist i n abstra ction . n 2 4 
lexander objects strongly , however , to the Newt oni an i dea of 
"resting places , 11 since "if a nything could be absolutely at 
rest, everythi ng must be at rest . n25 Therefore , Al exander 
1 8 . STD , I, 65 . 
19 0 1 Cf . .:lTD , I , 65 . 
20 .1 See above , Chapte r II . 
21 .1 Gf . Art . (l921). 
22 .1 See above, 3lf:f. 
2J . STD , I , 83f . 
24 . STD , I , 87. 
25 . STD , I , 84. 
continues, "we speak of r e st only whenever the motion is 
irrelevant for our purpose s . n26 
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Alexander ho pes that his lack of technical knowledge 
i n mathematics and physi c s does not render his view at odds 
with the current princi ples of relativity and the fourth 
dimension . 
In the r emaining part of Bo ok One, Alexander contends that 
whether in physic s , in psychology , or L 1 mathematics, we 
are dealing in di f ferent degr~es of directness v.ri th one 
and the same Space and Time; and that t h ese tvm , Jpa ce 
an d 'l, i me , are in reality one: that they are the same 
r eali t y considered under di ff erent attributes . VJhat is 
contemplate~ as physical Space-Time is enjoyed as mental 
space-time. 7 
ii. The categories 
Alexander's discussion of the categories, although per-
haps not s o import c..n t as those of Kant and Hege l, i s one of 
t he most thorough to be found in contemporary literature. 2g 
It is Alexander's contention that the categories a re Hpervas-
iven characters of existents in distinction from the variable 
qualities or "empirical characters" of existents. 29 'rhese 
categories are a priori (universal} or perva sive not because 
they a re due to mind ,30 but because they are "fundamental 
26. STD , I , a4. 
27 . STD, I , 180; Alexander us es capitals when Space-Time 
in g eneral is denot ed , and employ s lower case when a ny portion 
of them i s intended . The distincti on betv.reen contemplation and 
enjoyment wi 11 be treated lat er. 
~8 . Cf . Leighton , f.>J:AC, 134 . 
29. STD, I, 184-185 . How Alexander gets all of these cate-
gories out of a Space- Time which is a "formless void" is hard to see. 
30 . Cf. Kant. 
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properti 2s or determinations of Space - Time itself, not t aken 
as a whole, but i n ever y portion of it •.•. The categories a re 
••• begotten by 'r i me on Space.n3l 
J:~ compl ete discussion of t he categories would be out of 
place here. However, a list of the categories whic h Al exande r 
presents would aid in the later discuss ion of the problems . 
They are: i dent i ty, div er si t y , exi stence ; unive r sal, parti-
cular, individual; r elation ; order; substance , caus ality , 
reciproci t y ; quantity and intensity; whole and part s ; numb er; 
mo tion. The preci s e numbe r of categories appears to be doubt-
ful since the discuss i on o f the c ategories in gene r al shows a 
differing number of t hem . The ab ove li st shows seventeen . 
Later on, Alexander appea rs to have condensed each group 
(-wi thin semicolons) to o ne category . Howe v er, he does not 
g ive t he complete list here . Therefor e this ca nnot be assume d 
to be his precise intention. 
The categories are sus-
ce ptibl e of classif i cati on 
i nto thre e " gr ades . 11 As 
Fig . {y shows, they are gra-
ded from those closest to 
I 
i nf in f t y t o those closest 
to fi nites. The first grade 
i 
or nthe maj or categories" 
I 
31. 3TD, I , 189 . 
G P A C i:: '.i.' I ]· . 1 ,· 
llajor 1. i.,'xistence 2 . Univ ersal ity I . 
I I. 
Cate-
" Hc1ati on gories _) . h. Or deJ:' 
!) . Substance 
6 . Cau sality 
'7 . Rec i l'J;t."'ocity , 
p ,;., , -'-.' o . ,,, u.anvrc.y 
9 . rhi.tub e r 
III . 
Fi g . 11~ - AL.&'LANDEii ' .3 CII. T:2:G0RI AL 
SCHElVIE. 
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communicate with e ach other . The n ext group communicat e vvith 
ea ch other a nd with the major group . The last g roup , or 
motion, presupposes the other cat egories an d communic a tes with 
t hem. Thus n o g roup communica tes wi th a g roup on a lower l evel.~ 
Alexand er omit s both change and qualit y f r om h is list of 
ca t egori e s . ~o uality i s omitted because 11 expe rien ce does not 
acquaint us with quality as such. 11 Quali ty is ua colle ctive name 
••• but not a unive rsal,n and the r efore is "not ca tegorial but 
empirical. n3 3 Change is omitted, contra r y to Bergson, be cause 
change 11 is not pervasiverr a nd b e caus e it 11 a l ways involves empiri-
cal elements . n 34 For Bergs on chang e is t he stuff of things. 
Alexander observes, hov~Te ver, that no t unl ess ch an ge and movement 
are i dent ified, a possibility which he d enie s , could change be 
the stuff of th ings . For chan ge involves a "processn not nmere 
di f ference . n Therefore, motion, not change , i s c ategorial, s i n ce 
motion c an be c onceived as anterior to ~chings which , t hen , are can-
plexes of movements. Chang e , t h en, is not possible until thing s 
appear a t which time it is seen a s implying a relation betweenihem.35 
On the mat te r of the origi n of the categories , Al exander 
cont ends that they nhave their origin in Space-Time i tself .n 
They a re fea tures which a ll complexes of .Space-Time exhibit, 
but they a r e not due to mind.36 
32 . STD , I , 322f. 'rhe t e r m 11 communi cate' he r e r efers to 
Plato 's concep tion o f t he communion of the f orms . 
33. STD , I, 326- 8 . One wonders i f any category is manife st ed 
"as s u ch .'' 
34 . JTJ , I , 23 Sf . 
35 . Cf • .::.i'I'D , I , 238- 9 . Aga in one wonde r s i f change is to 
be limited to external relations alone . 
36 . STD , I , 330-3 31 . 
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In concluding Volume One of STD , hlexander deals with 
t h e qu~stion of the One and the Many. Th i s que s tion i s rela-
ted to 
1
one of the pr oblems l ater to b e discussed, and , t he re -
fore , its discussion , tog ether with that of the ca t egories 
will be postponed until t hen. 
iii. Th~ order of empirical ex i s tence. 
Ou1ts i de of the concept of Space- Time as t he 11mat rix of 
all things, 'the nurse of a ll bec omi ng ,tn37 ·t he uniqueness of 
Al exande r 's metaphysics r ests upon his c oncept of the emergence 
of qualitie s,together with t he i mplica tions of t his i dea for 
the particular co ncern o f t h is dissertation--the doctrine of 
nisus. Therefore a great deal of discussion which deal s ~vi th 
ep i s temology will of ne cess ity be omi t ted here , although cer-
tain aspe cts of it. will be dealt with l ater . 
The 11 formula for Space - Ti me , 11 \"lhi ch is highly i mportant 
for the i dea of emergence , state s that 
Time as a whole and its parts bears to Space as a whol e 
and it s corres ponding parts a r elat io n analogous to t he 
re l~tiQU of mind to it s equivalent bodily or nervous 
basls.j t5 
I n other , and s i mpler , words, as ha s been already indicated , 
TTT i me i s the mind of Space anci Space the body of Ti me. n39 
Thi s means , not t hat t he pat t ern that we find in ourselves 
is the st andard o f t h ings , but r ather that "we are examples 
of a pattern whi ch is w1iv ersal a nd i s fo llowed not only by 
\ 
I 
37~ STD , I, 331. 
3 8. S TD , I I , 3 8 . 
39 . STD , II , 38. 
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t hin;;s but by Spa ce-Til-.1e i t self . " 4 'J l-~ors ""v.r i ll be sai d L . t e r 
cr~Jl c erJ:Ling this i dea o 
The quc-,li ti es , e1·1pirica l ch c:tr <:t cters Fhi ch be l o lf.; to 
exi :3t.ent thi11g:e. , a re r epr ese. t ed ir1 various wRys y :~ lox<'tnder . 
They are n t he spec i a l forr,i 1-1h j_ch oa ea ch succ ess i'-_~e l s-vo l o f 
existenc e the Elind e l ement assumes . " 41 They a r e l ikened to 
!t forr.1n in the P.n ci ent d istj_nction bet ·,~-eeE fort'' nnd r;la t te r: 
The k i nd of exi s t ent f r om v.rhich the 11eN qu2 li t y c~merge s 
is t he 1 ,no.tt er' tJhic:h. assn.Jnes E'< cert ;:dn con~)le:d t2r of 
c onfi~urati n a n rt to this ~ntte[B or universGl corres-
ponc~s the ce1,-r eme r g ent que li ty . t ·-
';t.ta lity , is , h o-;,._rev er , no t abstrGct form, ~)Ut <:tn "en!;) iric . ,_l 
fact vrhic b ·!,,8 :.: c ce~zJt . nh J I t is u nt ;:_;ub j e cti ve , bl t ;q)e l ours 
novelty 0n1-.e rs. t he 1 .ror l d . ore ~-:i ll be ?b out th~s l 2 t a r . 
Before unde rt~king the ~xamin2tion of the v~rio11s l eve l s 
.g r y coD -=; i cr:3 r a ticms . In t-.he fi r s t _oln c e , _r~ l e::u-=:nde r bPlie.,.res 
that ttempiric ~l l l.hinc;s come i 11to ezist en c e , , e c cruse 3:)~'Ct~ ­
,ime of i ts 01.-m nnture breaks up into fini t ':': s . nLr 5 ll o·v , .,..,lli l e 
e ithe r 3 ~)!1 Ce or Tine coElc. , en rJ. r• o es , c re2"te rl ifferPnces in 
the otht-::r or cnuld bre<•k it up , it i s 'Time wt:'.. c l . " i u c:1 s:lP C~La l 
40 . STD , I I, 39 . 
~ 1 • S TlJ , I I , 3 9 • 
42 . STD , II , 47 ; cf . ubove , Chapt er II , for t he P l tonic 
vie ~,r of the Timc:1 eus c.tnd :~ri stot le ' :3 v i e1;r of !1att r Act:'..nn . 11 
14 3 . ~ TD , I I , 4 '7 • r4 • . ) TD , I I , 4 7 • 
~5 . STD, II , 4 7 . 
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sense •.. is t he author of f initude, for it is t he transit ion 
intrinsic to TL ie which in the f irst pl ace makes motion possible, 
and secondly provides for the ceaseless re a rrangements i n Space 
through Which groupings o f motions are possible . n46 It is 
Time whic h is "the principle of moti on and chang e" and which 
. 
11 brings the future into present be i ng and dismisses the p r esent 
into the past ••.. Ti me is in truth the ab i di ng pr i nciple o f 
impermanen ce whi ch is the real crea t or . n47 
I n the se cond place, anticipating the objection as to 
the i mpossibility for Space - Time to be anterior to things, 
Alexand er replies t hat Space- Ti me is not mat eria l, or , as 
popularly regarded, physical substance . But he does not deny 
that it is a 11 stuff , '' in fact , he affirms it often . Thus , 
Spa ce- Ti oe as "stuff" is matter i n the philosophic al sense 
of the term , i.e . , i n the Greek usage i n cont r a st to f orrn . 
"Space-Time then is the stuff whi ch r eceives de termination in 
the qualities it assumes as its complexity of grouping develops 
in Time . As stuff it is the r e cipient of quality in it s various 
empirical or finite forms .n48 
With the s e prelimi nar y consi dera tions ln the background, 
viz ., the creative function of time, and the "form-matter" 
relation betvveen qual i ty and Space- Ti me , the st age is set for 
t he description of the emergent ~rocess . 
I 
I 
4q . STD , II, 47- 8 . 
4~. 3TD, II, 48 . 
48. STD , II, 49. 
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The levels which a ppear within pro cess of emergence , 
vlhi ch Alexander de scribes as the " orcler of qua l ities ," are 
not given wi t h any air of finality . On t he contrary , one 
feels t 1hat there is considerable uncertainty in his own mind 
about them , e spe cially a bout the l evels which deal with matter. 
The lowest l evel, mot ion , is t reated either as a category or 
as t h e firs t k i nd of quality . 49 But "from simple motion to 
matter is a far cry . " In fact , says Al exander , nit is most 
probable that there a re intervening levels . n50 The question 
a t hand i s settled (with some uncertainty ) by assuming that 
matter does po ssess a d istinctive qual ity , e . g ., mass, iner-
tia , and energy , which can be expressed in terms of motion 
(or the lower l evel ). To ask hmv matter emerge s would be 
answered by the words , ni do not know. n5 l The t r aditional 
primary qualities of size , shape, motion, and number are n ot 
strictly qualities for Alexander. These are on the lmver 
· l eve l o f the ca t egori es . Ivlass , inertia, and energy may be 
called "primary qualities" provided we add 'of matter.'5 2 
The next level , that of t he se condar y qual i ties of matter, 
is one point which distinguishes Alexa nder ' s doctrine f r om 
that of Lloyd Morgan.53 Alexander believes that such charac-
ters as Ttcolor , temperature , t as t e , and the l i ke , are qualit i es," 
I 
I 
4.9 ·j 
50.! 
51.1 52 . 
53. 
STlJ II 
' ' STD , II , 
STD, II, 
Cf . STD , 
Cf • .::>'l'D , 
53 . 
53. 
5 L~ ' 
II, 
II, 
55. 
57 ' 58 . 
46n ; cf. Morgan , EE, 92 . 
and tha t t hey are a "set of new qual i ti .:;s v•Thic h move ments 
of a certain order of complexity have taken on, or which 
emerge vvith t hem . "54 The obje ction that qualities such as 
these requi re t he mind for their e~isten c e is an swered by 
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the assertion t hat co lor, e . g ., "exists as color i n the a bsence 
of th e eye •••• Thus a movement or proces s or a ct occurring in 
a material thing i f it is of the right sort , is red or sound s 
or is f ragrant; suc h bodily acts have no longer merely cate-
gorial a nd materi al charac t ers but possess s e con dary qua lity . n55 
Wh en i' l exander c ames to t h e quality of life , he she ds his 
uncertai n t y and b e come s mu ch more a s sured of his ground . Thus; 
life wo uld b e an emer gent quality t a ken on by a complex 
of phy s i co-chemica l p roce ss es belong ing to t he materi a l 
l evel, t he s e p roc es ses t al ~ ing pl a ce i n a structure of 
a certain order6of complexity , of which t he processes are fun ctions.:; 
Li ving organi sms d is p lay behavior whic h is of a char a cter · 
d i f fere nt from th at wit h which physics a nd chemistry deal. 
In t h i s res pect, Alex ander i s i n agre ement wi th most vital-
i st s a nj emergentists . However, he a pparently d i f fers f r om 
most ex ponents of these positions i n t h at for him the high e r 
leve l of life (a s well as the other levels) is both novel 
a nd able to 11be exhibited without r emainder in physico-chemi-
ca l terms , 
known . ~' 57 
provided only t h e na ture of the constellation is 
I 
5 ~ -
55. 
56. 
57. 
However, wh ile life "is expressible i n material 
3TD , 
'"' 'l'i:l , 
3TD, 
STD , 
II , 
II , 
II , 
II , 
59. 
58 , 
61. 
62 . 
59 . 
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58. Ahy dia gramatic rep r esen tation such as this is always 
ubject to intrins ic difficulties . The d i agr am in the u pper 
e f t, which forms the first st age of the evolutionary process 
lower le f t) shows t he c orre s pond e n ce of Space to Time . Cf. STD , ~ 
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terms, •.• it is not purely material . Life is not an e p iphono -
menon of matter but a n emerg ent from it . n59 i\'lore will be said 
of this later • 
11Hi nd , , Alexander sunm1arizes , "is the las t e mpiri cal 
qual ity of finites that we know.,60 -
It has to be a ccep ted as a n empirical fact that a neur al 
p rocess of a certain l e vel o f development possesses the 
que.lity o f consciousness and is thereby a mental p rocess; 
and , a l ternately , a I]lental process is also a vital one 
of a c e rt a in o rd e r. n b l 
In summary of this view of emergence , it may b e said 
that quality is always sol,: ethi ng empirical , a h.rays ( except in 
the c ase of motion ) emerg es f r om a level of exist ence lower 
than itself, and a l ways , when it emerg e s, is "expressible 
completely or without r e sidue i n terms of all lower stag es . n6 2 
There are , h owever , se veral oth er observations of a g eneral 
nature 0hich ought to be noted before passing on to the p rob-
lems. 
Firs t of all, there is the analogy of "mindn and nbody" 
which Alexand er us es i n his treatment of all of the var i ous 
l evels including that of Space-Time. It is obvious tha t Al ex-
a :nde r is using an anal ogy which i s based upon observation of 
50-64. [The triangle is used to rep resent (obviously incor-
rectly) !1the three dimen sions , a nd the arrov1 to shovv the prog -
ress of time . The circle might h a ve been used in s t ead of 
t h e triangle since the universe a s a w-hole i s eternal. The 
tr .ianglJ is more useful to illustrate the i dea of 1 evels. 
Cf . Ch . IVII . 
59 • S TD , I I , 6 4 • 
60 . STD , II, 67 . 
61. STD, II, 5- 6 . 
62 . 0 TD , II , 67 . 
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of the
1
highest level, i.e., the hurnan . 63 However, he cautions 
a gainst taking the i dea of mind literally on a ny l evel lower 
than m~nd ; r ather it should be thought of analogically. With 
this qual ification' then, it may be seen that "the soul r or 
mind of each l evel is the soul of a body which is the stuff 
I 
of which it may be c all ed the form . n64 Likewise 1.1 
t he body or stuff of e a ch new quality or t yp e of soul 
hats itself already its ovm type of soul, and ultimat ely 
th~ body of everything is a ' pie ce of Space-Ti me , the 
time of '-vhich is the soul..:consg:j,tuent which is i denti -
cal with t he body -constituent . ) 
Seco ndly, it is i mport ant to note that the nmindsn of 
these va rious l e vel s differ in "kind or quality and not f in I 
i 6f degree . ~' 0 Al exander vli l l not be drawn into an i dealism. 
I n fa ct 1, he says that "it is t r uer to call mi nd the ti me of 
our body than to call time the mind nf its s pace.n67 
Fi~ally , it foll ows that " the empirical qualities of 
the ' mate rial' are carrie d up into the body of the hi gher 
level b l.!.l t not i n to its ne1,v quality . " Life , e.g., '-'Thile 
based upo n ma terial ex istents whi ch are colored and have smell, 
is i t s elf not colored . On th e l e vel o f mind , this distinc-
tion is I mad e clearer by noting that 
ou} minds enj oy t hemselves .•. and cont emplate external 
things on the level of life and lower levels •..• Thus 
the same thing which a s contempl ated i s a living 
63 . Cf . STD , 
6L~ . STD , II, 
65 . STD , II , 
66 . STD , II , 
67 . STD, II , 
II , 
68 · 
' 69 . 
69 . 
70 . 
67 - 68 ; al so 38-3 9 . 
cf. Fi g . 14. 
t. l LLns6gr 1 j o ~rs i 1-,s (,; l f i n it s :J i st i nct i ve '"' U ::' li t y of mi ud . :> 
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~3uch i s t he con c c :) t of Otne r g Gnt evolnt.i on .iLi c:h ',.lc;:x:-
s n der CJ r e s ent s . It is not iclealism; i t is rAot w-=t t e ri a lism. 
It i s evolution ::'l.ry n a tur2li sm, r)ut a nC'l t ura li sm r.m c h 1:1ore 
a k L : t o He.q:e l tha n to Democritus or Hob~ es . Suc h i s t lle 
ba ck ~~ rouncl_ for r.h e do ctd .ne of u i sns . B ut t h e ,'! n c trine of 
nisu ~ i s closely a l li ed t o h~s C )D C00t of God 2nd d Git y . 
To the s e att ·~ntion !".ru s t ,_,ou b e r;: i v e n . 
iv . D,e i t y. 
It is ~: n t until -~-lexEmder c ·xnes to .Bool: IV of t he Sr::'D 
t h a t t he prob l e~ s pe c uli a r to r e li ~ion cn rl G o~ a ~ e ~ i s c u s s ed . 
He r e hi s 1. oJ1..·J f 8mou s c:_ i pt .i n ction be tl·' :~ en Goc; an d de i ty i s ~le •! G l-
' - -~ t t r:3n t i on v.rill ;.w1·J be E_; i'." en to these i mport 2.n t as •)e c ts of 
-·~ lex· n d •::; r. 1 s c:::ne r cr;;n t ev o l ution . 
··l e cl · r' ""' S t l.-1'1 t· c·, cl·· •· 'Yro~ c 1• ~ c· t o r,_r o· ~ ·-' ',1. ~ "'. ~.~ .,., c;.. ..... .. 1 .:. ... .. ~. :.. ~ r.t ':_-·-· - ,.!, _c-; .. J - ,- -;; only iw Lire ct . '!'he 
thre e , 1::-r <. < ~iti oH D l c:;r r;umrm t s fo:c 11 o ·l. l=: i th ,:~ r emp l oy n oll- cnpiri-
c CJ l a ::J.riori con c .:::pt i ons , or f .:1 il t o s:1o··r l10\ ! sue} '· b e ~. n ~ ; 
is wonsLi pful . 69 The r e fo re , t o vo i d t hs 0G :.~iffi cult, i e:-~ , .'.lex -
1 
anc~ e r ~ ch o o ses t o i:t1Y;)ro :.cl1 t he pro b l em by a ) asl::: i nr, n-v.ih e i·.!-J.2 r 
t}-.s r c 1 i~.> ~- -o L . c e i a t he .;-o:c l d J>n~ 1·.1le qua lity of l.:·! it,y 11 ; 
! 
6 8 • 3 TD , I I , 71 • 
69 . 3TD, II , 3~1- 345 . 
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b) pro c ~ edi ng t o " verify t he reality of the being whic h · p os-
se ss e s it" ; and c) consulting "the relig ious consc i ousnes s 
to se e J1he t he r thi s bein g coincid es with t h e obje c t o f vwr-
' 
ship." 70 
I. 
Re.fl erring to the sy stem o f levels whi c h , within t h e 
all-emb nacing s tuff of Space-Time, h a ve emerged in fi nite 
e x ist enc e , each v-li th i ts char acterist ic qu a lit y , the highest 
v-ih ich we. kno w bei ng mind, Al exander d eclare s t hat "deity is 
t h e next : higher empirical quality to the hi ghest we know . n7l 
More thap that, n for any leve l o f ex i s ten ce, deity i s the 
next h i gper empirical quality. n7 2 This concep t, says Al exan-
de r, is n ecessary to the co n cep t of real Ti me as ''the p rin-
cipl e of 1 g ro Hth" and as an "infinite.n73 Al s o, and most 
i mportant l y , dei t y is a 
qual ity ••• we ca nnot know; fo r i'le ca n n either e njoy nor 
.. S:ill l ess contemplate it .••• If we could k n ow what 
deity is, h ow it feels to be divine , we shou l d f irs t 
hav e to b e come as g od s. What we know of i t is but its 
relatio n to the other emp irical qualities whi ch precede 
it i n tirne. Its n a ture we c annot p enetrate. We can re pre-
sen t it to ourselves only b y analogy.74 
It is very doubtful, at l eas t at first g lanc e , whether this 
unknovvab le object of vm rsh i p tha t Al exander i s really s eek-
i ng to p ortray is a ctually what p eople do ·worship. 75 
70 . 
71. 
72 . 
73 -
74 . 
7 5-
1
c.: TD r-- , II , 345 . 
bTD , II , 345. 
STD II , 348 . 
' ' oTD II, 346 . 
bTJ) ' II 3 47 p ' ' . • Cf . Bri ghtma n , POH , 152 . 
myste ry i n re li r~ i or l , h o\cJeve r . 
':"h e re i s CJ. l Pays an e l crw nt of 
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Throughout the discussion of the ord er o f t he emp irical 
qualiti~s, Alexander implied his inability to exp l a in the 
I 
re ason the v arious qual i tat ive levels a ppeared.7 6 • Now he 
sheds s gm e light on the subject. 11 There is a n isus i n Space-
1 
Time -vihich, as it has borne its creatur e s fon\rard through 
matter ~nd life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher 
I 
l e vel o ~ existence.n77 Thus, there is mad e explicit a con-
cept heretofore only implicit, viz., that the universe is 
constantii..y "bringing to birth, 11 or "pregnant ~:vi th11 quality . 78 
There appears to be a fine distinction here b e t ween the func-
tion of Time and the function of nisus . This v'lill be dealt 
vri th lat ~r and is of g reat importance. 
I 
Witt deity pr e sented in this fashion, it may be seen 
that for Alexander deity is "a variable quality, and as the 
vvo rld g row:s in ti:.ile, d eity change s v.rith it. On each level 
a new quality looms ahead, awfully, which plays to it the 
part of de ity . n79 For exarnple , on our level, that of mind , 
I 
we can c~ll it just rr deity.n But for creatures on the level 
of life, deity is what for us c an be kn own as mind . Creatures 
I 
possessing only the pri mary qualities (me r e emp irica l con -
fi gurations of space-time) would call d eity that v~hich l a ter 
appeared a s materiality . 80. It is obvious to the thoughtful 
I 
i 
I 
76. ~f . above,lSO. 
77. £TD , II , 346; italics mine. 
78. a f. STD , II, 347, 353f, 354, 378 , 427 . 
79. STD , II, 348 . 
80 . Cf. STD , II, 348. 
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ob ser,ver of this idea that this i s a conjectural extension 
of h~s hypothesis and i s in n o way emp irically ve rifiable. a 1 
£;Iore ~ill be said of this also. 
While we cannot be certain j u st what dei t y is , nwe c an 
b e certain that it is n ot mind , or ••• spirit as equ i valent to 
mind .•• but somethi n g d i fferent from. it in k ind . "g2 This f ol-
lows f rom h i s p resupposition that a ny new quality d i ffers 
from what pre c edes no t in degr ee but i n kind.a3 Thus , 
that complexity and refinement of spirit which is equi-
valen t to d eity is something new , and v.hi le it is a l so 
spirit it is not merely spirit •••• Spirit , p ersonality, 
J!lind , all these human or mental characte r s be~9ng to 
Go d but not to his deity • •• but t o his ' body .' ~ 
I 
God , therefore , is d efined , in the light of the p reced-
ing discussion, a s 
the whole wor l d as possessing the qua l ity of d ej_ty . Of 
such a being the whole world is the ' body ' and d eity is 
t he ' mind .' But this posse s sor of deity is n ot a ctual 
but i deal . As an actual existent , God i s ·t he infinite 
world wi th it s nisus towards deity , or ••• as big or in 
travail with deity . ~5 . 
Des pite t he obvious difficulty , allud ed to above , that 
most pe o ple do n ot actually worship a n unknovm or unkn owable 
God , Jiilexander ma i n t ains that t h e object of t he relig i ous 
sentimen t 
is the feeling for •.. the world as a whol e i n its for-
\vard te ndency r nisusJ ..•• 'l'he 1tmrld in it s nisus f orward 
••. g rips the finite conat i v e complex which is fitted 
I 
gl . Cf . Bri ghtman , POH , 152 . Th i s may be made .more clear 
by asktng how a n existent below the l e vel of consciousness could 
Tf c a ll n something anyth i ng , let a lone deity l 
82 . 3TD , II , 349 . a4 . S'rD , II , 349 . 
83 . Cf . 0 TD , II , 69 . 85 . STD , II , 353 . 
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to it. It excit~s r e ligion in us, and we in turn fee l 
the need of it. Sb 
I 
The l ast chapt er of oTD deals with Deit y and Value. 
Discu;ps i on of this phase of Alexander 's thou ght will be post-
poned to the later se ction on Nisus and Value . 
3 . ? roblems Re l ated to Alexander ' s Doctrine of 1hsus 
I 
The foregoing dis cussion of the g enera l idea of Al ex-
ander'
1 
s emergent evolution h as bee n necessary to provide 
I 
s uff icient background for t he detailed study of the nisus 
which 1fo llows. Of ne cessity a g r eat deal of Al exander 's 
"new-realism" will h ave to be omitted sin ce it does not bear 
directly upon the problem at hand . The problems which have 
been ~elected here are similar to those under which Ber gson's 
/ 
elan vital were examined earlier. It is hoped that i n this 
way a ,basis of co mparison will be secured for all three doc-
trine s. 
i. Th~ problem of epistemology. 
~h e problem of epistemology in this context has as its 
primary concern the method by whi ch Alexander comes to a 
knowledg e of t he e x istence and function of the nisus . How-
ever, a secondary concern i s necessary i n order to bring out 
the primar y one , viz ., the general background of Alexander's 
. I 
epistemology as such . This l atte r point will be sketched 
briefl~ f irst i n order that the f ormer may rece ive adequate 
86 . STD , II, 376-7. 
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at tent ion. 
iL) • Knovdedg e in g .2n eral. The problem of knov.rledg e in 
I 
general involves, in Alexander's thoug ht, a great deal more 
than is the direct concern of this dissertation . However , 
at leas t f01..1r aspects of his epistemol:ogy should be noted , 
viz., compresence, enjoyment and contemplation, conation, 
and apprehension of the categories and qualities . 
Now, in the first place , 11hen 
finit e s are merely connected together withi n the one 
0pa ce-TLae ••• successive, or co-existent with one another 
~ .• they are co mpresent. Such compresence involves 
hirectly or indire ctly connection by way of c ausality. 
:·J.hen one of the finites is a mind , and the other of a 
lower level, the compresence is the relation described 6 ~s consc i ousness of an object, or in general cognition. ~7 
~ogni tion , i.e. , c ornpresence of tvw finites, one of whi ch 
is a rnind , and t he other of 1-'lhich is at a lower level of qual-
ity, 1urings u p the second d istinction, viz., that of enjoy-
ment and contemplation. Wh en mind acts , it "enjoys itself, 
or ex1~eriel1ces i t self as an enjoyment. n However , the other 
finit~ existence nis experienced by the enj.oyedn or is n con-
templated." The se two, "the enjoyed and the contemplated 
are tb ~ether." 88 
I 0 
Thus Alexander is a dualist in epistemo logy as regards 
obj e ct s on a lower level than mind , but a monist with regard 
h I • · lf · .,., h ... h . d to t e m1nd or se -exper1ence. ~ or e says tr1at t e m1n 
c annot contemplate itself. Introspection, e. g ., is not con-
87 . ~TD , II, 75. 
88 . STD, II, 13; cf. ibid ., 82 . 
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t ern plat ion but i s ' 'merely experiencing our mental st ate . " 89 
The f a ct of compre sence it se lf is experienced fro m the point 
of view o f the being that is having the experien ce , although 
' for a being , suc h as a n angel, on a h i gher l evel , t his togeth-
e r ness could be se en as both to gether.90 
Th e organic aspe ct s of Alexand er's thought a re cl early 
see n in t he content i on that nt here is no act wh i ch i s not 
related to some f inite.rr 91 By nactn Alexande r means n ot only 
menta l a cts but e ven atomic acts . Howeve r, on t he l evel of 
mind , "act11 r efers to t he most universa l character of it, f or 
he says " t h ere is nothing i n th e mi nd ..• but acts .•• or process 
•... Ev e r y mental a ct i.s a conation and is nothing e l se , ex cept 
for the possible exception of fee ling . n92 lthoug h re j ecting 
feel~ng as a conation, Alexander r e c o~nizes t wo t ypes of 
conations , t he p ractical, -v~ni ch issues "in movement s vvhi ch 
tend to a lter or d estroy the obj e ct or a t least to affect 
our relat J. on to the object, '' and the spe cul ative which " ulti-
mate l y g rows out of t h e p ractically directed issue of our 
mental acts."93 In this sense, then, co gnition, which i s the 
result of t his inhib itory process, is a fo rm or aspe ct of 
8
1
9 . STD, II, 1 8 . 
90. STD , II, 21. 
91. STD , II , 117. 
92 . .3TD , II , 118 . Just why Alexand er omit s fe eling is 
r eveal~d l ate r as due to his belief that feeling i s a c har-
a cter iof life r a ther than of mind . 'l'h i s point i s int e rest-
i ng si nee i t bea r s directly on wh a t v-rill b e seen l a ter i n 
Hhit ehead as a n i mportan t do ctrine , as will a lso Alexander's 
emphasis on conation . 
93 . 3TD , II . 120 . 
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conation , or Hcona tion ••• considered i n its objective r efer-
en c e . 11 The othe r mental activities, percept ion, expectation , 
memory , an d j udgment , a re a lso forms of conat io n . 94 
One more wor d remains to be s a i d concerning the way the 
categprie s and the qual ities are apprehende d . NoY.r whi le "all 
our experience whether enjoyed or cont 2mp l ated i s p rovoked 
through t he sen s e organ s, u the apprehen sion of th ings is. 
not l i mit e d i n this way . 9 ~ Space and Time , e . g ., are both 
co ntemplated and enjoy ed nintuitivel y . n Be rgsont s intuition 
of r eal duration i s seen here , excep t that f or Al exander 
nreas on may clarify t h e intuit i on , " a point which Berg s on vmul d 
not d~irectly have g r anted . What i s the case with .Spac e and Time 
i s true as well o f the cat e gories . 96 The l e vel or quali ty 
of ma
1
teriality is !! a pprehended t h rough t he s ensation of 
resistence offe r ed t o our bodie s.97 Tho secondary qualitie s 
a r e app r ehended b y the special senses . 9g Life "is appre-
h en d ed i n ourselve s by or ganic a n d k inaesthetic sensa-
tions . " 99 r!Iin d , h owe ver, i s not c ont emp l a ted by us a t a ll. 
It i s i nwardly enjoyed . 100 Of cour se , the nex t leve l, or 
dei t y , cannot in any way at all either be enjoyed or contem-
p lated by our mind s , t h ough it can be enj oyed b:i- God . 10 1 
'94 . Cf . 3TD, II , 122 ; a l so cf . Al exander , Art.(l9ll). 
19 5. STD , II , 143 . 
96 . Cf . STD , II , 115. 
97 . Cf . ST~ , I I, l5gff . 
9 g. Cf . STD, II , 160. 
99. STD , II , 170. 
100 . Cf . STD , II , l76f . 
101. Cf . 3TD , II , 347 . 
In its general outlines , Alexander ' s epistemo logy in 
granting a positive function to intellect appears to have 
a voi ded much of t he error to which Berg~on fell victim . 
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The dualistic attitude which was no ted is open to much less 
criticism than i s t he monistic intuitionism of Bergson . 
However , and aside from me taphysica l considerat ions , t he 
contention of Al exander that mind cannot contempl ate it se lf 
s eems to be not only an · arbitrary device designed to fi t into 
a preconceived scheme , but a l so the d enial o f a f a ct of exper-
ience . Certainly mind is able, g rant ed t hat it is not a l ways 
so disp osed , to contempl ate it self , for if not, how would 
Alexander be e.ble to write so ob j ectively ab out • ..__ T lL- . 
2) . Kno'v'll edge of the n isus . Before d iscussing how the 
nisus can be knovm , it would be well to ob s erve what t he 
ni s u ::; is and the ways in vJhich Al exander refers to i t . 
The ni s us may be defined as the characteristic of the 
un :.;.verse as a whole which t ends toviard deity , or the next 
hi gher quality , since d eity is f or any l evel of quality 
the nex t hi gher one . 102 Now , Al exander, in addition to 
using the term 11 nisus , n also employs correlative terms vvhich 
either d escribe t he a ctivity of nisus or are use d s ynony-
mously with it . 
I 
I 
three classes , 
I 
psychorgica l . 
These t enns , or phrases, .full roughly into 
here aRled obj e ctive , metapho rica l, and 
The objective terms appear most infrequently 
10 2 . Cf . above ,l8$. 
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i n 3TD rr .103 
' 
l!.;xampl es of these would be : "forward move -
ment, 11 "process of r eal ization , " llprocess to1·.rards , n nemer-
g enc e,n TTprocess toi>•Tards t he emergence of , " etc . 104 J.ljeta-
phorical terms are mo re often u sed with res pect to the 
nisus. 105 The mos t common t ype of metaphor is that which 
co mpares nisus to nbirth," "pregnancy, 11 or "travail . nl06 
Other figtl.Y'es such as "flowering into, 11 n onward sweep , 11 or 
· 
11 onward pressure, 11 and 11 uni versal bent n are employed by Alex-
ander to convey the meaning of the nisus.107 The most com-
mon type of term or phrase which Alexander uses to apply to 
the nisus may , perhaps , be c a lled psychological . Terms employ-
i ng the i d ea of 11 tendencyn 1-vere the most common of these . 108 
Terms indic& ting 11 s training after '' or n straining towards , n 109 
and 11 endeavor towards" were also used.llO tt Striving ,n " effort , n 
and 11 i mpulsen were noted in his article nspinoza and Ti me 1! 111 
"Re stlessne ss," "passi on , " and 11 feeling n were also used in 
t . "th th . 112 connec 1on w1 e n1sus . Thus , it can be noted 
that nisus is app roach ed more easily by means of the 
103 . Only ten s uch occurrences were observed by the 
present writer . 
104 . Cf . 377 , 379 , 394 , 413, 428 , 429 . 
105 . At l east thirty such fi gures were no ted . 
106 . Cf . 347 , 353, 354, 378, 427 ~ 
107 . Cf . 410, 417 , 381 , 418 . 
108 . Cf . 354, 361, 364 , 366, 376 , 377 , 379, 381 , 388 , 
398 , 400 , 406 , 410, 414 . 
~09 . Cf . 361, 365 . 
D..lO . Cf . 373. 
lLil . 380 - 382 . 
112 . Cf . STD, II, 401, 408, 418 . 
' ;·' 
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analog ical and metaphoric a l avenues than by the mo re objec-
tive dr non-figurative method. 113 
Nisus can be known in two primary way s, by direct 
observation, and b y spe culation. Direct ob s ervation of nisus 
is not r evealed to sense any more than is God. The re is 
necessarily involved na larg e amount of s pe culative or re f lec-
tive i~agination. 11114 However, though nisus is not available 
to sense, i t a ppears to be subject to vJhat a pproache s imme-
diate v erif ic ation , for he says that 11 nisus ••• is a verifiable 
fact . nl l5 nrn the religi ous emotion , 11 he says, "we h ave 
the direct experience of something higher than ourselves 
which we ca ll God •••• The emotion is our g oing out or endea-
vor or striving towards this object )~_nisus·_!- tt 116 He contin-
ues: The concep t of a 
reality which is the vlhole world i n it s endeavor \~nisus} 
towards a nevv and higher emp iric a l quality than the 
highest we know is ve rified by the relig ious sentiment 
i 'tself, ••. !"whose ~! distinctive constituent is the feel-
ing of our - going out t a wa rds something not ourselves 
and g reate r and higher than ourselves, with which we 
are i n co mmunion .li7 . 
Th is religious sentiment "is a conation ••• which sets us in 
search of God Cand'i is our g rop i ng out to the reality which 
is God .rr It may either be nstirred in us dir e ctly by the 
i mpact .of the "~<'rorld with its tendency ~ nisus_/ to deity, or it 
I 
be 
1~3. The above lists of r ef e rence s are not i ntended to 
co m1flet e. They are, instead , merely sug :;es ti ve of a tendency. 
114 . STD , II, 354. 
115 . 3 TD , II , 367 . 
116 . JTD , II, 352 . 
117. STD , II , 373, Cf . Berg son here . 
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may f i:rst be felt by us as a nee d of our natu r e . " Conc lud-
i ng , h'e says , 11 In eith e r case, it is the world in i ts n isus 
forward that grips t he finite conative comp l ex which i s 
fi tt ed to i t . "ll8 
Now there is no particular organ through which the 
relig ious emotion or appetite wo r ks . Rather, it " d e p ends 
upon the whole mak e -up or c onstitution or the mind and b ody , 
and is the response o f i.t to t he whole of r eality i n its 
nisus t owards a new quality . n V>/ e a re , i n a s ense "caught" 
i n t he "onward SV~reep of Ti me , 11 a nd 11 our religious r espons e 
is a t CDnce the mark that ;,.; e are involved i n that nisus , and 
t hat our mi n d s cont r ibute in their part towar d it . nll9 
i'lhile t he n isus of t he world "mak es i ts e l f felt" in the 
r e lig ious cons c i ousness, t he "new emp iric a l qu al i ty may be 
concealed f r om the co gnitive mi nd .•• for we know no t what it 
is, no r even enjoyed , since i t is higher than mind . " l20 
However, the vvorld, an d it s nisus towar ds what i s h i gher , 
e nte rs into the con stitution o f t he i n t e llect a nd , a s impreg-
nated vhth t h i s t endency, " i t affe c ts the mi nd by ways other 
t han cognition . n1 21 
But Al exander, whi le g iving f ull pl ay to t he i ntui t ion-
ist, or 1 myst ica l approach, a s Berg son did b efore him, does 
n ot co4 it the error of his p redecessor by denyi ng a place 
t o i n t e t lect i n knowi ng the n i sus . For , he co ntinues , the 
118. 3TD , II , 376f . 120 . STD , II , 377 . 
119. STD , II , 377 . 121. STD , II , 377 . 
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'n± sus ••. affects the mind by ways ..• interpretable in the 
ways of cognition. The whole world with it s real ten-
tenc y to deity st irs in us from the depths of our nature 
a vague endeavor or desire vvh ich shadows forth it s object . 
Then intellect comes into play, and discovers in detail 
the character of "chis object, and finds at l ast what it 
~ruly is, thf ~endency of the world forward toward a 
new qualit y . 2 
In this sense, then , Alexande r beli e ves that the world with 
its nisus i s knovm. We may start with the religious feel ing , 
and, after e lab orating on it by- t.hou ght, come to the idea of 
a ttworl d big with deit y . !! Or, the reverse proc ess may take 
place~ The notion of t he speculative scheme may be the begin-
ning po int, and, after verification of this idea in our human 
exp erience, it is found to corresp ond to the reli g ious object. 123 
In evaluating the means by which the nisus c an be knmvn 
there are several salient observations to be made . Firs t, 
how can something be known the evidence for Hhich ( deity) can 
neither be contemplated nor enjoyed? Alexander himself recog -
nizes ' this problem, and he a ttempts to a nsv.rer it by not ing 
that while the future quality of actual deity is unknown and 
u nknowab le to us, and therefore cannot be 11 before our mind s 
as a matter of contempla tion, 11 we d o have before us the ac tual 
world whi ch "contains the seed of its future . ' l;24 This much 
is suggested by his speculative scheme. However, when he 
begin~ to explain just how this can enter into the expe ri-
1 
ence 
I 
122 . 
123. 
mind which is unable a priori to know any character 
STJ , II, 377 . 124. STD, II, 379 . 
Cf. STD, li, 378, 388. 
of th ~ future, Alexa nd er resort s t:.o the expe rience of 
clair'{oyance as an illustration of ·vvhat he means . In this 
way, he says, "we may supp ose that in relig ious experience 
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the v~gue future quality of de ity i s felt, not in i ts qual -
1 
ity , for that c annot be knovm, but as giving a f lavor to the 
expe rience of the who l e worl d which it does not po s sess a s 
I 
me rely~ a n obj e ct of sense or thought.n 12 5 This at best _· p:te -
sents d ifficul ti es which do not se em to be cleare d up. 
r.Dhe re is a further d ifficulty ' viz.' whether n isus is 
someth1ing p re d icable of t h e tmiverse in general only, or 
I 
whether, i f it is subj e ctively expe ri enced , as th e a b ove 
' discu~ sion se ems to indicate, it may not al s o be considered 
a character of finite mi nds as we ll. The further i hlplica-
tions iof t h is problem will be seen in the later dis cussion 
of individuality . The question here i s concerning what is 
I 
actua]ily knovm . Toward t he en d of the last ch apt e r of STD, 
Alexa~der does say that "men of transcendent g ifts of per-
f ection are ••• in their de g ree ex e mplars o f this n isus . 11 
In fact , !I e very being ••• has t h e nisus to a h i ghe r f orm in 
so fan as it contributes to t he general nisus. 1;I2 6 Thes e 
st a tements would seem to indicate that n i sus t an be both 
g eneral and particular. The chief difficulty is seen, how-
ever, if this be true to f a ct, when t h e matter arises as to 
,__wh ich pisus is exp erienced. r,.Iay it not be only t he "human !' 
I 
125. STJ , II , 379f. 
l 26 • .3TD , II, 418. 
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nisus 1 which is experienced r a t her t han the "nisus of the 
v:rorld''? If th i s is the case, and there is ce r tai nly some 
degree of possibility that it is, does not the idea of the 
gene r a l nisus , as having t he "double ba sis" of spe culative 
evidence and direct experience, lose a large part at least 
of its empirical justifi cation? 
Tha t Alexander would be hard put to extricate himself 
from t his diffic ulty may be noted by remembering that Ti me , 
whose !!restle s sness" he call s the nnisus , n is appr ehended 
"intv.:hti vely . n 127 The natural inability of imrne dia cy to 
dist iriguish by itself between subjectivity and obj ectivity 
has a1ready been n ot ed as one of t he p itfalls of the "intui-
tioni J t11 approach128 and one which beset Be r gson. 129 The only 
aid wh ic h appears available to Alexander at this point is seen 
in the appeal to speculation which might correct intuition. 13° 
Closer ins pe ction of what is meant by speculation has r evea led, 
howeve1r, that it means simply t he application by analogy 
of t he very scheme which it is desi gne d to prove. This 
proc edure , then, appears to be quite circular. The only 
appa rent alternative, admitting that nisus, or s omethi ng l ike 
it, is present at least on the individual level, is to pro-
ceed from t his empirical evidence to the more 
cept o l the nisus of the v:rorld. In follov.ring 
AlexanJ er mi ght have avoided what appears to 
I -
general con-
this procedure 
be either an 
127. STD , II, 147. 
128. Cf . ab ove, 68. 
129 . Cf . above, 13.3. 
130. Cf . above, 19.7 . 
inexp~ic ab le monistic a r gument or a case of begs ing the 
que st~ on or both . 
ii. 'l':he problem of individuality. 
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The problem of individuality , which i n the Chapter on 
Bergsbn was preceded by causality, i s here discussed first 
becaus e i t assume s greater i mportance and is p rior i n Alex-
ande~ ' s categoria l scheme. Since Alexander treats univer-
sality , particularity, and individuality together and i n that 
' 
order, it seems a dvis able to dis cus s them in that order. 
'l'he 9eneral heading 11 individuali tyn shoul d be cons i dered 
as pertaining to all three ideas. 
I 
1fhe cat egory of existen ce r efers to "identity of place 
and time , or numerical i dentity . " Un iversali t y , however, 
" is ~dentity of kind . 11 The e xistence (or subsi s tence) of a 
univ~rsal nunites its particul ars . n 11 An individual is a 
particular as determi ned by its un iversal. n While it i s 
strictly true t h at particulars and univers a l s a r e not 
':things , " and "all t h ings are i nd ividuals, 11 it i s also true 
tha t !ne very indivi dual possesses particularity which separ-
ates .it f rom others of th e same k ind ..• ; and it possesse s 
universality which converts it s ba re parti cularity into 
i nditi duality . nl3l In this se nse, then , Al exande r considers 
I 
uni vJrs ality to be a categorial feature of all things. 
Now, in des crib ing the categories , Al exander chooses 
131. STD, I , 208. 
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to cal~ t hem ''key pl ans of all empirical determi na t ion. 11 
Univer~ality it s elf "st and s fo r t h e f a ct tha t everythi ng 
has forra. 11132 The ''th ird man11 ob je ction , viz . , t hat '' the 
very name of plan or pat te rn or f orm or law implie s • . • t h e 
i dea of universa lity" i s answe r ed by not ing that t he univer-
sal is r e l ated to its particular s as an equation i s r e l a ted 
to it s instanc es .l33 
The f ollowing char act eristics, Al exander believe s , may 
·b e noted in universals: 1) they llsub s ist" in that t hey 
ex i s t only i n so far as they a r e r e alized in their particu-
l a rs, 'fill d s i nee they are n free from limitation t o a particu lar 
time 11 ;134 2) they are ''spatia- temporal , physic a l, biological, 
mental , accordin g to the l e vel of ex i stence to wh ic h t heir 
individual s belong ; 11135 3) they are "potential," since the ir 
potentiality i s a reality cons isting i n the readiness of 
Space-1 ime to adop t t hem; l36 4) they are 
fq r:mulae a ccording to which Time brings f orth particu-
l ars in a 0pace which can receive t his pl an •.• The fo r ms 
a:(e not imposed on Space.l37 But the Time vvh ich is the 
life of 3Qace brings to birth particulars in their 
i ma ge · 11 138 
' ' 
5) they have "gr eater s i gnificance" t han t heir particulars, 
althoug
1
h no more r eal i ty ; 139 6 ) they are ''alive" not petri -
f i e d, or static, changeless, immovable , _ and eternal as 
I 
Plato a f1d other ancients conceive d them , nor inventions of 
I 
13~ . STD, I, 215. 136 . Cf . JTD , I, 224· 
133 . STD, I , 218ff . 137 . As i n Pl ato ' s Tim· 
-- ' 134 . 3TD , I, 222 . 13 8 . STD , I ' 224 . 
13 5 . S 'rD , I , 222 f . 139 . S'l'D , I, 224 . 
cf . abQve,l3 . 
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the mi nd as i dealist s cont enct . l 40 Summarizing , t hen , Al exander 
conc eiv es universals to be subsistent , livin g np l a n s of rnotion , 11 
not unlike habits , which are ncorrelate d with qtlaliti es , n 
possess p otentiality ( not t he pro duct o f abstract thinking ) , 
and greater significance than their particulars . 
The g reat problem involved in universals, in fact f or 
t he ""hole i de a of indivi duality , f o:r Alexander, i s the matt er 
o f multiplicity . For universal i ty to be there must be at 
least t he p ossibility of r epetition. Why this should be the 
case must simpl y be accepted as a n emp irical fact . But, i f 
this is done , the problem is not hel ped by the ob s ervation 
that bare repetition does not actual l y exi st . If , however , 
i t i s asswned tha·c n o reason can be found i n Space-Ti me to 
expl ain r ep etition , the apparently i nso l uble p roblem remain s 
as to hovl t he r e are any particulars at all. In other 1vo r ds , 
i f there are no u n iversals v.Jh ich ar e repeated, then He should 
n ot h a v e r e ached t he con cep tion of universals. Howe ver, i f 
there were no c a t egorial p o ssibility of empirical repetition , 
then universality would not only b e unkno-vm, but non- existent .l4l 
Al e x ander is fully aware o f h i s difficulty here , and , when the 
problem reappears i n his later discussion o f value in general, 
he s uggests that mult iplicity ma y b e another of the empirical 
probl~rns 142 but he sees no poss ible way of relati n g it to 
I 
them . 1 Finit es a re g enerated within t h e matrix of Spa ce-Time 
140. STD, I, 225f . 
141 . ~TD , I , 22 af . 
142. Such as c omprese n c e , mental acts , interaction , a ppear-
ances, freedom, and valu~s . 
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by virtue of t he fact that Space a nd Ti me 
brea k each othe r up i nto d i fferences . We cannot how-
ever see •.. \vhy these f init e s shou l d exhibit a ctu.al 
r epetition in their kinds ••• I can g ive no answer, and 
until the answe r can be g iven , I must admit t hat the 
scheme of thi ngs which has been suggest ed as a hypo -
the sis , and h as so far been ve r i fied , present s a g rave 
defect; e qually so , whether t he actual multiplic i t y of 
individuals in their k i nds is ac cepted as a purely eElpir-
i cal feat ure not admi tt i ng of expl ana tion , or as an 
unsolved ernp iri cal pro blem . l43 
ntil now t he re as on f or the d iscuss ion of t he problem 
of individuality has , pe rhaps , been obscure , since l exander 
does no t d is cuss t h e relation of t he nisus to i ndividualit y . 
It wil l be r emembered that Bergson causall y connected the 
~Ja n vital to t he production o f individual s .l44 Alexande r 
does not plac e the nisus i n th :L s re l ati on ; it is confined to 
t he pr oduc tion of quality al one . More will be sa i d a bout 
I 
this l ate r . Th e import ant point to be consid ered at this 
juncture is that wh i le l exand er derive s individ :al s from 
t he mutual i nteraction of upace and Ti me , he has no explana-
tion eith er for repetition of ki nd or f or the proper atti -
tud e to be t ak en toward that repetition . It will be seen 
later t hat Whi t ehead is concerned vrith t he solution of this 
problem. 
Despite these difficu lties, Alexander attempts to defend 
his con ception o f universals as l aws against those who dis-
trus t repetition . f he f ear of ba re repe tition , in t he first 
143 . 3TD , II , 313. 
144. 0ee above ,14',9 .. 
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place, ' is g roundless since he hold s not to "exact i dentity 
but mo~ ifications vfithin limits of an i d en tical pl an of 
co nstructi on . n l 45 Se condl y , those who fear that his univer-
sals are simply "abstract g e nera lities •.• derived from their 
particHlars by a process of omiss ion , 11 a g ain mistake his 
I 
u niv e rsals for something t hey are not , and for s omething which 
is justly re pudiated . l46 
The third obj ection , and one whic h is the most profound , 
is that vrh ich leads to the doctrine of the "concrete univer-
s alu \vhich go e s b a ck to He gel . The p oint of the objec t ion is 
that universis or laws are by t h emselves purposeless , ndis -
sipateP. elements without the stability of r eal ex istence . " 
Sin ce J.t is the duty of thought to be organi c, "all t hinking 
i 
t ends 1to the concrete , defining itself into complex indi vi-
I 
du alit,y . nl47 This , of cour s e , is the f am i liar argument of 
ab s olute i d ealism . Al exande r resp onds to it by observing 
t hat t he so-called n con crete uni v ersalfl is "in f a ct not a 
univer's a l but a univer s e • .• not a l a w fulu t a ~ystem . n l 48 The 
I 
critic'ism of thi s view , then , is that it co mbines two distinct 
notio~s into one : "the union of diffe r e n t features into a 
I p lan or law which is realized wit h mod i fi cations in indivi -
dual i~nst anc es , n and nthe union into a s ys tem of different 
indiv~duals in o r by or under such a plan . " 149 Now Alexander 
I 
~45 . 
.1!46 . 
I47 . 
Cf . STD , I , 230 • 
STD , I , 231 . 
STD , I , 233 . 
148 . STD , I , 233f . 
149 . STD , I , 234 . 
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has no quarrel, particularly, with either o f thes e i deas 
as such. 'i'h e existence of organ ic wholes , such as !tin-
st an ces of a spe cie s ••. conne cted to gethe r j_nto an organic 
whole whi ch i s more than a mere whole of pa rts" may happ en; 
i t may even embrace the whole of human society . But, Alex-
ander a r gues , "we still nee d the n ot ion of a plan or l aw , 
and t h is i s vrhat is commonly c alled a universal."l50 Alex-
ander has no objection to the i dea of sy st em or organizat ion 
which h e finds eve r ywh ere in empir i c al existence and which 
is 11 pe r petually overcoming the repeti tive tendency wh ich is 
e qua lly empirical. ?T l 5l It is not , in other words, a matter 
of e ither combine universals i nto an orga nic universal 
mi nd or have no o rgan i z~tion or s ys tem at a ll. This denies 
reality to universa l s as laws by a s suming them to be abstra ct, 
and , 'in the end t he absolu t e universa l swallows all parti-
culars. H.ather , think s Alexan der, it is both universal laws 
a nd their repet i tive t endency and organiz a tion which interact 
- --
to pro du ce hi gher levels of or dered co mplex i ty . Thus , the 
particulars are as real a s their parent wh ich is then "the 
nurse and mother of a ll b ecoming .nl52 
This , it app ears, is Alexander Ts final word o n the mat -
ter. It seer.1s t hat he has called att ention to a n i mportant 
150. STD , I , 236 . 
i51. TD , I, 237 . 
152. STD, I, 236- 237 . 
208 
~~·e :::kness in the c.1b::. o lut-.e i :le <-:, l i s tic posi t i on , i n t-,h < t this 
v i ev1 rt".?;« r -: s the n c oncre 1~e 11 a SlJe c t of the n con cre t e uni\rErsc_o l n 
I 
i':! S sUJbor r) in~tted to t.he 11 univer sa l~ r a spe ct , t-.o the PJ:tent 
that re?li t y u ltimAtely consist s only of ul s tr · ct onrness , 
sition to t h is } 0~'3it ion , Ic l exander desires to r.1a ir1t :1 i ll the 
n.:;ality of pei r ti c tl L;rs c:~ 11d multipli c i ty . Tha t , on Lis 
r··· 'OUI" t1 s 0 - l _ _ ' h e c ~n1wt su;T) ly the a ns1·'8 r i s a tr i but e to hi s 
frEHl 1"::Il l~f3S and Lonesty , as vre ll a s to the f ac ts of tl1e case , 
'l!.,here is one f ina l observ :~ t i on , in conclusj_ on , Hhi ch 
re qui n::~s a. tt-,eEti on , l.l.i'lirte l y , t h e i cJ c-')a of u l timate unity . 
!;. s he:t s lJeen s ~~e n , _·:. l exc-.nd.er rega r ci s Spa c e - Ti me Jco lJ c: e:: 1 
inf in:L te l:·Iho l e o f · pA rt s . ('in c e , 'oy v i r t ue of his neP r eal-
ism, the onl y part s o f Space -Time C1 re i de, l poilt- instt~nts , 
h: n.r ing :Jy defi11i t. i on no 'i.ura t ion , they c a n have no c oni-,en t 
but ~ r8 confined to t heir for~w l c0nsti t ution of J Oi~t-
instant ~: . T~H:; coHse cp.Wilce of t h i p. s t a te of a ff ;:tir .s for 
t :r'.G -=JJWbl ew of i n :ii v i d.u_a l i ty ma y 1e s e en ill the f· .ct t.}F. t 
the o11ly ind i v i d i.l a l , i. e ., t he on l y 1,rl1 ole v.rl ich <-O, l :::;o lla s 
~12,rt s , mu s t o f c" cessi t y be the eEt i re univer~:3e of ,Jpa c e-
J l :ne . ,., . I ."'- l ex2nder lu>.s , th(;~ ll , 
f i nit e i h~.i vidual s 2. r e no t c onfi.nccl. t. •."J the r e l m of a p ~)88. r-
,::m c c , a s t hoy ure for abso lute i cle~-1 li sn , ;Jut , even \lor se , 
2 0 9 
are confined to the r ea ln1 of t:iubsi s t ence . 
l em l"0 i ,:ht. , a t l e;:1s t, have be;:pm to t ~·. ke sh ~~ ) 8 , as , J_t u il l 
lle se sn , it ri_oe s f or ~- Jhi t .::; he ~HL 
iii . ''T'he nro l et'1 of C<:l v.s :1 li ty . 
It is iE the C<Jteg ory of c a usc--j_li ty th<lt a eli !3T. i n ct ·l:Lf-
3erg;.::on . Be r gson, it. ;·ill bG 
I 
either as " tout e s t donne" or ~s t he r 0sult of the a ctivi t y 
" l . l of tl!e e .s.n V l t a • 
I 
va c i::Lla t ecl !)etvreen 2.n u lt i mat e rl u e. li s m i'1DC1 <m u l timc--1te r .oni so 
in r espe ct to causE.tli ty . :~ l exanc1. er 1 s \'·ie ~·' chffers in se•reral 
fol lO\VS • 
I 
:., • Y' -.:· ·t-Il] __ -- ' l i . e . _, a 
char ··'ct e r vhic b obtJ ins ilL c.:o1_r c ry r ec-1.1 exist e nt , r1 ll cxi sV=mt~s 
Tl "' in-P.:. COf,_lr_) _l_ P_Y_e. ,Q_: of C:,' Pc8.Ce --r-.l· ITlE' . !! 1_ 54 In V l. cq-r of t- he +''" ct t11 1::-J t <:; __ 'J - ·- -,_ • - . ,,,.. , __ , , _ , , , _ _ ._ 
-~~ l e:;("8_incler believe s that n otion c Cin e::c j_st 1·''ithout D.llY othe r 
sujs~ance than the motion , 155 no other s ubst ance thRn tl1e motion 
1 '-..-
is n ,' c essary for the c aus a l re l a tion to be . ) O Thus, ca us a lity 
l 5J . Se e ab ove , 101 
154 . 3TD, I, 269 . • 
:15 5. Cf . the c~escri )tiou of th,-.:: o rde r of th: qu2 l:i.tie s , 
2J)OVe., 1 50 . 
156 . Cf . 3~ 0 , I , 250 . 
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i s defi ne rl. as t h e rrre lat i or~ of con t tHuity be t v.•ec-n: t .i lO 1i f-
f erel1t r·1ot ir.m.s 11 •.i i. thin t he con.tinuou s systerrt o f motinn or 
3p.:-l.C(~ - Time . 11 Tho re<-1 1 c ~mse is t he n ot1 0ILS ·r] . i.cl-~ a r e con t i n -
u ecl. :Unto t he frlotio n uhi c h i s t,he e f fe ct . n1 5 '? .\.ga i n he Sft','r s , 
n c .s_usCJ. l i t y is t h us t he s ;:>atio- t empo r a l cont inu i t y of Olle 
l r.r> ~::> r e c ed. G s t ha t i n t o v..rh i ch •.. it p asf?es o r i s tra nsforne ·.-. . n J> 
lS9 
stc-·ncc.:,s . --
is t es severa l COE1monly regar d e d not ion s 1vith r espe ct to 
c 2u s ·' 1.1 ty . , .. vhi l e t h e effe c t i s a c nt inw-• n c e of tll( c 0nse , 
·:1es t roy the l ftj C ,,. .... ·ir1 tli tv ; _ , '-_) _! t ......... ./.. ...... ·' • 
l ike ~he c a u s e •.• ra r 2 l y is , an•i • •• nev e r i s i de11t ic a l 1_; j_th 
l ·~ ~ IT 16 1 I J l . t . t ne c
1
-::tn::-,e . n .s.n l_ 1 -lon , a n d b s c c:m .s e c ausali t y i s ~1 t·,en-
p o r c1 lly c rmt inu ous :.. e let.ion , /. l ex..-s n ',e r be l i eves thai; '' the 
c a use is pr ior t o . he effect .•• • I t i s i n no se~s? true th2 t 
tho f u t ure (lr.::-.,ss the p r ssent i nto it s futtF ' e condi t i on a s if 
it o per.s.t ed a f r onte . .:.11 c a usa lity is s. t erg:o . n l 6 2 I n this 
n ot 
1 57 . STD, I, 279 , 251 . 
1 5$ . ~TJ , I , 2$1 . 
1 ·-::) c-P "" T.. -I 2° ") f '"1 )'/ • J.. • ~ .J J J ) U...) o J. ~1 8 
·'• l evonder T s T)hrP <'"' o l r) r~·v 
'i6o. Ci' . ST~) , r. ;-2:: 5:· . 
1 61 . srr;·, , I , 2:.6 . 
1 6 ? ~m~ T nd6f .• • . .) J.. _, -'-' .((' • 
quo.tatio-n:s -• o.1.re parH;Jhr ase s , 
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respect, Alexander resemble s Be r g son i n his objection t o the 
claims of certain teleolog is ts that the future in some sense 
exerts a determi ning force up on events. The reason i ng under-
l y ing this objection whic h is given i n both cdses is that if 
t h i s •,vere true it v-muld f a lsify the significanc e of Ti me . 
Howe ve r , both of these views ·are defic i ent at this p oint , as 
will become clear later .163 
Two final p oint s deserve s p ecial attention . Firs t, 
Alexander c ont ends t hat the caus a l re lation is a limit ed one, 
i .e., 11 there is no causal relation be t ween the infinite 
whole a nd any of its pa rts.nl64 Thi s follows f rom the fact 
t hat 1t he univers e as a whole is not a category and , th e refore , 
cannot be a caus e. 165 Hmr1ever , i t apparentl y contradicts 
two other p rin cip les which may be more b as ic still , viz., 
l) d1at moti on i tse l f has i ts sour c e in Ti Le which is the 
" mi ndn of Space, a nd 2) t hat t he q ualitie s have their 
11 source 11 i n the n isus. Now this l att er poin t has not been 
broug ht out as yet . That wi 11 appear lat er .166 But the 
crux of the problem may still be see n i n that t he entire con -
cept o f the inf inite whole of 3pace- Ti me within which the f in-
i t e exi 0tents are genera t ed is vitiat ed if ther e cannot be 
caus al r e la t ions betvve en them. At le a st Time (a s a whole) 
as "the s ourc e of movement" ca n sca rcely be . und e rst oo d in 
that c apacity if there is n o way in wh ich Ti me c an b e cons i d -
1 63 . oee below- ChaDte r VII . 
1 64. 3TD ' I ' 2S8 . L 
165 . Cf. JTD , I, 2q0 . 
1 66 . .::le e bblow, 22:0f.Y.· 
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ered t o be a cause . Cert ainly Be rgso n wo v.l d agr ee here . 
r he other point i s closel y r elat ed t o thi s one , vi z ., 
that "no notion o f power or ne cess i ty i s contained in the con-
ce ption of causal i ty as a c ategor y . nl 67 Now sub jective expe r-
iences of causal ity do exist . But these ar e nno t the work o f 
povv-er. 11 ( Hume was r ig ht her e .) They are i nstead instances of 
causali t y o r continuous c onne ction . ( Burne was wrong here .) l68 
The same applies t o the notion of ne cessity . "The onl y nec e s -
sity whi ch philosophy can r ecognize i s that of inference . 
Bu t t h
1
ere is no necess i ty in t h ings except f a ct . n 169 r hus , 
ul t i mJte l y , causality be comes stripped of both power a nd 
necess
1i t y and is f ound to be in the l as t analysis not an 
exp l anat i on at all , but r ather a r est atement of a fa c t : 
motion! i s continuous . 
SU..nm1ar i zing , i t may be s a i d that Alexander t s theory 
r estricts causa l i t y ( except fo r incid ental phrases , such as 
r e cognition of "immanent causal i t y , " whi ch are not expanded 
further ) to scientific or me chanist i c causality . As such , it 
i 
l eaves 1 cause unr e l ated to ult imate considerati ons especially 
t hose eoncerned wi th the pr obl em of power and generation . 
i v. The problem of novelty . 
The probl em o f nov el ty rece ives its expli cit treatment 
by Al exander under the order of empirical qualities . As has 
I 
197. STD , I , 290 . 
163 . 0Tu , I , 290 . 
169 . STD , I , 291 • 
.. 
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bee n o bserved above , l 7 0 quality is t h e point a t Vihi ch ~1ovelty 
ent 3rs t he world or "emer g es . 11 For this r eas on i t would be 
we l l to preface t h e discussion o f t he proble m of n ovelty 
with so me observatio n s c oncer n ing the n ot ion of qu ali ty as 
Al exander see s it . 
l) . Quality . The idea of qual i ty has b ee ~1 presented 
somewhat briefly i n the d i s cussion of the g e ne r a l i d ea of 
Alexander ' s emergent e volution. -·Iere it was not ic ed that 
quality make s its appe aran ce i n t erms , and onl y i ::1 te r ms , 
of l e vels .l7 l In this r e s p e c t , Alexander's view corre s p ond s 
to the pa t t ern e sta bli shed b y Lloyd Morgan and others who 
have affiliated t h emselv es with t h e n emer g ent'1 e volut i on a r y 
mov anent. There a r e , howev e r , sev e r a l i mportant co nsidera-
ti ons yet to be not i c ed with respe ct t o the i d ea of quality . 
These may be group e d under the f o llowi !1g he ads : i) . Qua lity 
a nd 11 the p re c edi ng !! ; .. ) 'T'h ll • .~. e nature of quali ty ; i ii ). The 
effect s of qualit y ; i v). Ti me an d the genera tion o f qual it y . 
i). Qual i ty a nd " t he p r e c edL g . 11 It has alr eady 
been noted that t h e i d e a of quality perfo r ms a functi on akin 
i n an c i ent ph i l oso phy to t hat o f f orm i n i ts rela tion t o mat-
ter .17 2 I•:latt er, or " stuff , 11 refers to Ti th e k ind of exi s te n t 
I 
1 70 . Cf . 17 8. 
171. On at l east om~ o ccasion, ho ~t.Te ver , Al exan der s tate s 
t ha t n ovelty i s no t c onfin ed to l e v e l s , but a pplies to c rea-
t ures ! wi thin any one l ev el. He do e s no t e xploit thi s i d ea 
furth~r. Cf . Art .(l92l ), 3 82 . 
17 2 . Cf . above ,l5. 
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f rom \-h ich t he ne"~tl qual i t y eme'rges . nl73 
In thi s s ense , then , the problem ari se s as t o how 
Al exander i ntends t he i d ea of form t o be a pplied!74If he 
chooses to apply qual i ty as f orm i n the Pl ato nic sense ( as 
interp reted by Whitehead ) t o i ndi c at e potentia l ity , t hen he 
has two sources of potenti ality : pa ce- Time and qu ality . 
This mi ght be a ccept able ex cept for the absence of i ts 
correlate, a ctua lity . On the othe r hand , i f he cho oses t he 
Aristoteli an version , viz., t hat quality or f orm is actuality, 
then he ha s at hand no cohere nt mean s of r e l at i ng t -1em . There 
is no doubt but that Alexander co ns i ders each qL;_ality , on ce 
it h a s emerged , as , i n some sense at l ea s t, potent ial fo r 
succeedi ng le ve l s. 175 In this respe ct , t hen , he mi ght be 
considered as depart ing f rom the Ari s totelian f i nalism. How-
e ver, i n another s ense , each level once it h e_s emerged is 
a l s o a c tual. Here : lexander leaves t he re ader with no clear 
sta t em ent of t he precise way i n which this a ctualit y c .:m 
also be r egarded as potentia l. 
In the se cond pla ce, at t e!l. tion sh ot1~d be given t o anothe r 
distinction , the one ·whi ch obta i ns be t we en the i mmedi a t ely 
precedi1g l e v el and the rmw quality . Now on t his poi nt it 
seems qui te clea r t hat Alexander attempts to hold a pos ition 
I 17 3 • s TD ' I l ' 4 7 • 
/ 174. Cf . Ch . II , 
1 17 5. It i s interesting t o note comparisons be t we en 
\ lexander and Ar istotle . The i dea of " l evelsn is another 
striking s i mi l ari t y . Cf . ab ove , Fig. 2. 
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which maintains t he er:1ergen ce of o r de r s of finit es v1hich are 
" at on ce new and expr a ssible without residue i n terms of 
proc esses pro per to t he level f r om which t h ey emerge . nl 76 
Le t u s suppose , fo r exar~le , that the proc esses of the 
pr e cedi ng l evel may be r epr esent e d a s ~' and that the proces-
se s of t h e emergen t l e vel be termed ab . ~ ow , on this fashion , 
"t~e constellation of such processes is of such a k i nd as 
to be a new proces s ab with i ts quality B. " I n o t h er wor ds, 
the l e vel o f mi nd , e . g ., is " n6t merely vital but also 
vit a l.ul77 As he says a ga in , 
the higher quality emer ge s f rom t he lower level of e x ist -
en ce and h a s its ro ots therein , but it emerges there -
f rom , and it does not b elong to t ha t lm;rer level , but 
constitutes it s possessor a nrwsorder of ex i s t ent with 
it s specia l laws of b ehavior. f 
Thu s , it may be observed , Alexander at tempts to mai ntain 
b oth the exi sten ce of r eal (o r obje ct ive) novelty and the 
p oss i bi l ity of it s 11 expr e s s i bili ty 11 or 11 r e sol ut ion 11 179 i nt o 
simpl er te r ms , and , i ndirectly , in t e r ms of the ultimately 
simple ··pa ce - Time . 
This do ubl e contention of Alexander conta in s what is 
a ppar entl y an i mplicit cont r adi c t ion. It is s a ved f r om being 
expl i cit by t h e u se of terms wh ich onl y tend t o ameliorate 
but do not s olve t he p roblem, viz., the use o f the te rms 
nal s o11 and "m;:=; rely . 11 
I 
vhi le the full i mpl i cat i on s of this 
I 
contention cannot be t rea t ed until the later dis cussion of 
I 
I 
I 
176 . J TD, II , 45 . 
177 . 31D , II , 46 ; cf . ib i d ., 6 , 7 , 8 . 
178 . STD, II , 46. 
179 . 3T1J , II , 7 . 
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novelty and law, the semantic d iffict:..lty can be lloted here . 
It i s the contention of the present writ er that vvhen Al exan-
de r uses the phrase !!expressible i n terms ofn or 11 resoluti on 
into , n he is express i n g his desi re to show t hat there is a 
real ~onnection between the preceding and the new. It is 
the Leibni zian 11 lex continuiTT a g a in.l80 S ince, however, 
the preceding is ahmy s simpler, t h is amounts to saying that 
the n ew is alway s completely expressible or resolva ble into 
simpler terms . At p resent it does not a p p e ar at all cl e a r 
how ~his position c a n p os sibly avoid a complete den ial of 
the novelty which s u cceeding levels are suppo sed to p ossess. 
I n short sta tements that s -u_cceedin g levels are 11 a l s on but 
nnot mere l y " t h e preced i ng is a verbal qui bble designed to 
preserve what a ctual l y has been destroye d by the above men-
tioned a t tempt to p r ese rve continuity. Furth e r support f or 
this cont en tion w i ll be drawn froill Alexander's view of the 
n a ture of qualit y now to be discu ssed . 
ii). The n a ture of qtl.al it y . Quality, as Alexa nder 
uses the term, refers i n a g eneral way to the d i f ference s 
which exist a mong empirical thing s .l8l In this sense, then, 
the criterion of di f ferenc e which Alexande r uses to dis-
tinguish quality is found i n the term ll complexi t ~,- . nl82 
I 
-~---·----
I 1 80 . Cf . oTD , II , 49n. 
181. Thus t he y are distinct from t he c a tegories whi ch r e f er 
to characters which a ll ernp i r l ca l thing s h a ve in common. 
1 8 2 . Othe r terms used a re: n constellation , 11 rr collocation , 11 
S 'rD , II, 6ff . 
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He says , e . g ., t hat empiricalthings 
a re complex es of pure events or motions i n v a rious d e g rees 
of co r.!!£lexi ty •.•. As new cornplexi ty of motions come s into 
~xistence , a new quali ty emerge s, t ha t is, a new complex 
p o s s es s es as a mat ter.of obs e rved e mp iric a l fact a new 
or emer g ent quality .l83 
Fo l lowing t h is p rin ciple, then , e a ch l e vel of exist e n ce exhi-
bit s a certa i n 11 s pecific complex i ty" which is no t f ound on 
t he precedin g stage or stages. 
If i nquiry be mad e into the specifi c nature of complex-
ity, Alex ander re plies t hat this i dea include s 
no t merely complexity i n s truc t ure or c onst itution of 
the v a r i ous motions engaged, but a lso intensity, a nd 
a bove all uni .peded outlet, that i s conn e c tion wi th the 
other p roces s es or st ructur es with which t h e p rocess 
in qu es tion is organ i zed .l84 
Further, i t should b e noticed that t h e l ev e ls of conplexity 
are r e lated to eac h othe r as nhi gh ern or " lower . nl 8 5 The 
i dea here express e d i s Alexander's conviction that each sue-
ceedin g level ex emplif ies at on ce a c ertain spe cif i c complexity 
of a " hig he r st&ge . " Beyond these descriptions Alexand er 
apparently does n o t g o. He do e s n ot e nter int o what i s meant 
by· " hig her. nl86 
Two questions a r e out standing reg a rdin g t he r .e•lationsh:ip 
of quality -to c omplexity . The first quest i on which a p p lies 
to t h i s p osition has already been noted in Chapter TII, l 87 
1 83. STD, I I, 45; italics mine . 
184. >.:> TD, II , 5 . No·c.e the term 11 i ntens i t y 11 here. 
Cf . b ~low ,319. :'th1e discussion of Whitehead . ·· 
185. Cf . oTD , II , 5ff . 
186. Cf . be low , the d i scussi on of novelty and value , 2}£:ff. 
187 . Cf . a bove ,72 ... - ~. 
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viz., Vlhat reason is there to d eny that e volutiona r y d evelop-
ment may not p roc eed i n the reve rse order f rom t he comp l ex 
to the si mple, or in both ways? 'rhe r e cert a inly i s no emp ir-
ical e vidence of the e volutionar y eme r ge n c e of a ny Alexa n -
d rian l e v e l withi n the h i s tory of man , s ince ma n is the 
highe st which has actually e me r ged . And, on the co ntrary , 
if the fa cts of d e gen era tion a r e not to be i gnored entirely , 
there is a g oo d d eal of evi dence to point towa r d t he t r ans i-
tion from complex i t y to s i mpl i ty. There is, in other words, 
no rea son to narrow the application o f Hnovelty n to the sphere 
of t he nmore complex " whe n it may a l s o ap p l y to t h e 11 less com-
plex11 as v1ell. 
The second question relates to the poi nt wh ich vla s 
a ttempted i n t he preceding section . If quality (no v e lty) 
i s defined solely in terms of complex ity, t hat is one thing . 
But i f , as Alexand er a l s o s ays , on t he other hand , this same 
no vel quality is 11 comp letely resolvable, 11 or 11 exp r e ssible 
without resid ue, 11 ( note t h e emphasis here) in simpler te rms 
( and ultimately int o the completely simple qualityless Space-
Time) i t certa i n ly a ppears a s tho ugh this i n volves some co n -
tradiction. Obvi ously t he matt er r e sts upon t h e me aning of 
t he t erms !!re solvable" a nd 11 exp r e ssible.n On the fa ce of it, 
it would appear that t h ey indic a te s ome fo r m of reductionism. 
I 
I 
.!:' or t he terms 11 c ompl et e l y to resolve into 11 or to n express 
I 
vvi thou~ residue i n t e rms ofTT not to mean the s arn e thing as 
" to r e duce t o 11 is c ert a i nly to stret ch the imag i nation a 
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l ong Hay . 1 88 
iii) . Th ,:; effe cts of qual i ty . As i de f r om the 
cha racteristics of quality s u ch as u n pred i ctability and unin-
tellig ibility (which will be treated later ), quality has one 
other important effe c t . It performs the function of "mind'' 
or nsoul 11 for the lower level (or levels) . 
The re is a body or material of the l ower level , of vvhi c h 
one .pa rt is so complicated as to be endowed -vvith a nevl qual-
ity ~hich perfo:m. s to it the ?~fie~ . of ~oul gr r:lind and 
rna - be c alled vnth proper cau'Glon l 'GS Il1lnd . 1 89 
On this basis , then there is a continued ascent "to ever new 
typ es of ' soul ,' a nd in this way all existen ce is linked in a 
c ha in of aff i n ity , ... so tha t there is nothing d ead , or sense -
less i n the unive rse , Spo. ce - Ti me being itself animated . ul90 · 
~uality , in this li ght , is seen to b e as it 1e re the animat-
ing principle of the universe . 1:ihile there are d ifferences 
of quality, t here is alway s quality , e ven if it be on t he lovv-
est le vel of all , that of motion . 1 91 Quality ext ends beyond 
t he p r esently existent to taat which is n ow in the p rocess 
of coming to be or d eity . The d i s cussion of no ve lty and 
d ei ty will b e postp oned until later . 
Anothe r :poi n t , however , needs to be noted . As each 
level is superJ3ed e d by the next higher qu ality , the complex-
ity o f t h e p rec e di ng l e vel , i n some manner unexp l ained ·oy 
Alexander , 11 E:,athers itself tog ether a 21d i s expre ssed in a 
I 1 88 . Cf . \le r kme i ster , J. 03 . 
11 69 . STD , II , 68 . 
190 . dfD , II , 69 . 
191 . Cf . ST~ , II , 45 . 
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new s irnplic i t y . The emerg e n t quali ty is t he s umrai ng t ogether 
i n to a n ew t otality of t he co mpon en t ma t erials . n l 9 2 On this 
basis , t he n , t he em1Jirical quali t i e s o f t he lowe r l e v e l are 
transf or med i nto the body of t h e h i ghe r l e v e l but not i nt o 
its n ew qu a lity . 193 ~vh at i s nmi nd11 f or one leve l b e come s 
!! bo dy" f or the next . Or, putt ing i t d i ffe r ently , vrh a t i s 
e n joy e d on the lov.re r leve l c annot be enj oy ed bv.t can be on ly 
contempl at e d on t he h i ghe r l e v e l . 
iv) . 'l' i ms and the g eneration o f qualit y . ~-' lthough 
it has b e e 11 a lluded to i n t he abo ve discus sion , t he p l a c e 
has arrived a t vrhi ch t o d e a l mor e i n d eta il vvith t h e i dea of 
Ti me as t he g e l1era t or o f the qualities . " Empirica l thing s 
come i nto exi s ten c e , 11 s ay ... Alexander, 
b e caus e Space - Ti me of it s own natu r e breaks up into 
finites .••• Bu"c in a special s e nse 'l'ime is the author 
of fin itude , fo r i t is t he tran s ition intrins ic t o 
'l' i me which i n t h e fir s t p l a c e makes motion ~J os s ible , and 
s e condl y p rovide s for th e c eas eless rea rrangem en ts in 
·· pa ce t h r ou gh v.rh ic h g r oupings of motions are p oss i b le . 
Thus Al exander represents Ti me as the nprincip l e of motion 
and c han g e .•• in trut h t h e abidi n g princi ple of i mpe r man en ce 
wh i c h i s th e real creator . n194 On the surfa c e , at le a st, 
Alexander presents a vie w vvhic h strongl y resembles Ber g so n ' s 
viev.r o f dur e e reeTh both i n its pri mary p osition i n t h e scheme 
o f thing s and in its role as 11 chief a i d eTT to , i f not actually , 
~' I 
t h e elan vital . But how is Time related to t h e n isu s , the 
192. J'l':J , II , 70. 
193 . ·T, 
' 
II , 70. 
194 . STD, I I , 47 - 48. 
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chief concern of this chapter? That question must be 
clarifie d before the remaining probler:1s pe rtaining to novel ty 
are met . 
There s eems little re a son to doubt that n i sus i s a char-
acter of Time and , thus, o f the one stuf f Spa ce- Time. Alex -
an de r refers to nisus, in his most explicit sta t ements , a s 
the TT restlessness of 3pace - 'l'ime" 195 or "the r estles ::> movement 
of Time . nl96 Alexander recognizes that this concept of rest-
le ssne ss v.;h ic h h e ca lls t he n isus is in a greement 11 vvi th the 
s pirit though not all the details of Mr. Bergson ' s ~lan vital."~7 
In a ddition , as will be noted below, Al exan der also regards 
his concept as sugge stive of Whitehead 's " pa s sage of nature . nl 98 
The n isus , having be en established a s a char acter of Spa ce-
Time, and especially of Ti me , attention should now be g iven 
to the vmy in which the creative activity of the ni sus of 
Time manifests i tself . 
Attention has al ready been g iven to the fact th a t Alex-
ander describes the activity of nisus most often i n p sy cholo-
gical terms, such as something which is nt ending , n "stra ining," 
"str:j..ving , n "restless" for somet hing not yet pr esent.l99 Fur-
th ermor e, the analogy of Time a s the "mind11 of Space g ives 
a dditional psycho logical emphasis to the concept of nisus, 
since nisus is a character of Time. There is another passage 
195 . ~TD , I I , 401, 418; cf. al s o, 
196. ~TD , II , 348 . cf . Al exand er, 
197. Al exander, 1. rt. ( 1927} , 273. 
198 . Cf . i b i d ., 272 . 
l exand er? Art.(l92l), 380 . 
Art. ( 1927 F , 273 . 
199 . Cf . above,189~ 
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one which is strangely remi niscent o f Be r gs on both in co n cept 
and .i n p hraseology, i n v.rhich the activity of the n isus i s 
presented most clearly. 
Thi s n i sus is no effort on the world's part to exten d 
its bounds; suc h a not ion is unthi nkab le, for t h e uni-
verse is bound l ess ; but a cea se les s impulse to p r odu ce 
parts a:.11d a lter t he g rouping of e ve nts into thing s . 
Thing s , we h a ve seen , are clusters of events; a nd the 
world 's n i sus sustains some of these clusters and pro-
du c es others n ew by fresh combinat ions which it s trikes 
out in the heat of its desire.200 
Another similar passag e brings out the fact t hat t h e n i sus 
g oe s beyond itself only by the effecting of f r esh dis -
tributions of its motions into ne'\OI complexes of motion. 
Th i.s nisus or effort of the vwrld as a v<Jh ole ••• is fe lt · 
or sha red i n by the individual fo r ms in which it h a s 
resulted, and hence out of t hose forms, out of one l eve l 
i n the hie r a rchy of l~3ils o f e x isten c e , a new le v el of 
exi sten ce is evolved . 
The distinctly p sycholog ical overtones of these pass a g es g ive 
added emphasis to the already mounting list of evidence which 
would indicate that Alexande r con ceive s of t he creative acti-
vity ~f the n isus p rima rily as something of a p s y cholog ic a l 
natur e . Te r ms such as 1'effort 11 11 i mDulse n and especially 
' ..L - ' 
t he p h r ase '~n the heat of i t s d e s ire" a re emphatically psy-
chological. In view of these statements, it seems very d if-
fict:_ lt to i magi ne that what Alexand e r has termed only an 
analogy , i .e., the use of 11 mind 11 o n level s lower t han tha t 
of h mnan mind itself, is ac t ually only a n analogy . 
I 
1This leads t he pr esent d isc tl ssion to the obse rvation 
1
200. Al ex and er, ~rt.(l9 27}; 274. 
201. Alexan der, Art.(l92l), 3 81. 
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that t he term t:nisusfl may represant in the mind of . lexander 
a rec ognition , i f not conscious , then subc ons cious , tha t 
Space- Titne , conceived as continuity- in- succession , is not a 
sufficient explanation of t he origin of novelty , at l east 
on the higher levels. The "restlessness," "tending ," Himpulse," 
etc . , certainly connote more than mere ly continuous ;:,UCcession . 
There is i mplied in their use a certain dis satisfaction with 
samenes s . Alexander refers more that1 once to t he f a ct that 
the activity of t h e nisus is "not the me re turning of a 
squirrel i n its cage , but the nisus towards a higher birth . 11 202 
If, as h e co nt i nues , 
the nisus of the world • • • were a mere repetition of itself , 
••• 0pac e- Tirne v'rould not be what it is , a stuff i n which 
indivi dual forms are moulded , but it s elf an individual , 
••. ~ubstance , incompatible with the es sentially temporal 
nature o f real i ty . 203 
However , Alexander gi ves no r eason for thi s latter assertion 
that mere repetition is incompatible with the essentially 
temporal nature o f reality . In fact he has· said himself that 
11 the essence of Time in i t s purely temporal character is 
i its rsuccessiveness . n204 And even with the continuity supplied 
by Spa ce , it is not a t all clear that continuous successive-
ness is incompatible with repetition . Ih other vmrds , i t 
appears to the present \vriter t hat Space- Time , as continuous 
successiveness , while able to account , perhaps , for simple 
202 . STJ , II , 348 ; cf . Art . ( l 92l) , 382 . 
203 . Art . (l92l) , 382 . 
204 . ~TD , I , 45 . 
change of a mech arlica l sort, is of itself not capable of 
explaining qual ity. It may be that Alexander comes t o this 
r eal i zation i n t he l ater portions of ~TD wh ich deal with 
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deity and in his lat,e r arti cl es , and t hat hi s use of the term 
"nisus , 11 ( and it s ot er psychologi cal correlative s) is inten-
ded to supply needed support for t he hi ghe r l evels whose 
novelty would n ot adequately be accounted for by t he conce pt 
of Ti me alone . lhis contention cannot, of course, be demon-
strated, but i t is no t without a cert.ain g_."lwunt o f evidence. 
Furthe r support for th i s belief will a ppear in the s ubse -
quent discussion of value . For now, though, it must remain 
only a s upposition. 
3ummari zing the notion of quality , it has been ob s erved 
1) that quality confines its appearance to levels; 2) t hat 
although quality may be compared with the Greek i dea of 
1i formn as som ething new added to the 11 matter 11 or "stuff" of 
Spa ce-Ti me , the explanation of how t his is ac complished is 
not disclosed by Alexander; 3) tha t Alexander's cont ention 
both f or t he novelty of t h e suc ce eding qualit y and for t he 
complete expressibility of that quality in terms o f the 
lovver levels (and ultimately of .::>pa ce-Time itself), although 
cushioned somewhat by verbal gymnasti c s, s eems to cont ain 
an i rqplicit co ntradic t ion; 4) that a lthough the criterion of 
I 
qual~ty is " co mplexity , 11 th e re be i ng vari ous gr a des for the 
emergent levels, the later ones being "higher" than the 
preceding , to i nterpret novelty s olely i n terms of comp l exity 
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is unduly to narrov1 the meaning o f novelty , if n ot to con tra-
dict it co111plete l y ; 5) that sin ce quality fulfi lls the fun c-
tion of "mi nd" or "soul" i n the individual who possesses it, 
the e n tire un iverse has , as it vvere, a n ani mati ng prin c iple; 
and 6) that each nevv- qua lity, in some u nexp l a ined manne r, sums 
up the pre c edin g into a nevv simplicity , becoming the "body11 
for t he next quality ; 7) that although i t is n isus, o r the 
"restlessness o f Ti n: e 11 which is the real creator, .'' lexander 
fi nd s it impo s s ible, apparentl y , to des cri b e the creat ive 
activity of the nisus i n a n y other than psycholog ical terms; 
and 8) t h is p enc hant f or psychological d escriptives, among 
other t hings , leads to the supposition that lexa n der may 
have r ealized the i nadequacy of Ti me, as s u ch , aa an explana-
tion of the creation of novel qualit ie s , ( a t least of de ity , 
p erhap s of the h igher qua l ities) and , t o re medy this defici-
ency , t he term "nisus" ma y have been devised. 
2). 1"- i sus and the problems of novelty. One o r the p rob-
lems o f novelty , complexity , has been dis cussed already . 
There are se ve ral others which remai n to be disc u ssed. The se 
are e mergence, predictability and freedom, int e llig ibility, 
and value. 
i). Emergence . The question which is r aised here 
is whether emergence (of qualities, in Alexander' s case) 
impl ies novelty . The p revi ous d is cussion205 has indicated 
I 
I 
205. Cf . above, Ch .III, 7f.i,. 
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t h at obj e ctive novelty i mplies emerg ence, but that emergence 
ma y or may not i mply novelty . The use of t h e term "emerg e n ce," 
i n other wor ds, can be used only as a stat eme nt o f fact and 
not a s an e xplanation. 
Now Alexander offers n o more e x p lanat i on t h an tha t " qual-
ities ern erg e . 11 206 Grant e d that t he possibility of novel 
emerg ence exists , what evidence is there that such actually 
takes p l a ce? Unfortuna tely , Alexand er d oes not su pply any 
more evid e n ce t h an t he a ssertion tha t it h a s occurred . The 
closest tha t he comes to provid ing the evid e nce de sire d is 
seen i n his ana lys is of mind whic h 11 is exp eri enc e d by us as 
a set o f conne cted pro cesse s which h a ve the c haracter o f being 
mental , p os s essi ng t he quality of Tme n tali ty ,' or •.• of co n -
sci o tlsn ess . n207 I n addition , 
t hat which i s experienced f rom the i nside or en joyed a s 
a consc i ous p rocess L the alleg ed hi ,$ er quality =· , is 
a s e xpe rien ced from the outs ide ~ 08co ntemplated a neural on e :_- t he alleg ed lower quality·: . 
Hovfever muc h l~ lexander may try to affirm t h at thi s co nstitutes 
tt an emp iri c a l f c.ct, " 209 it remains , on the con tra r y , on l y a n 
hypo t hesi s , I n this contention are contai n e d l ) t he erroneous 
asswnpti on that c ontemplati on (und erstood a s invo 1 ving object -
i ve referenc e ) is n factual." This is , at best, o nl y partly 
I 
t rue~ a nd may be wholly f a lse; and 2 ) t he circular a s sump tion 
I 
of t he e x ist e::c1ce o f t h e very l e ve ls for vlh ich t he a s sertion 
206 . 
207 . 
;3TD , II , 
-TD , II , 
44. 
4. 
20 8 . STD , 
209 • .3TD , 
I I , 5 . 
II , 5f . 
is supposed to b~ evidence . For how can Alexander assert 
the factual nature of levels when the e x istence of both of 
the levels are the hypothesis itself? ~vidence must point 
I 
to hypotheses; it cannot consist of hypotheses . 
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3 ven on the supposition that novelty 1Here an e mpirical 
fact, it is hi ghly doub t f ul that it could be r ecognized a s 
such f ro 1 the mere fact of g ivenness alone . It will b e 
r emembe r ed tha t quality , as the ' mind ' of any g iven level, 
is enj oyed, accordin g to Alexander. Bateman ' s a rt i cle 210 
makes it emphatically clear t hat Alexan der has n ot shown 
why or how enjoyment c <Ll revea l 11 directionTT either of a tern-
poral or s patial natur e . If this is t rue , then enjoyment 
(cons idered as i mmediate, "Which is t he way Alexander viev.rs 
i t ) could not possibly reveal the fact that a g iven quality 
is new, i . e ., has not occurred b efore.211 
This discu ssion must not lea ve t he i mpression that Alex -
ander has the slightest d oubt about the existence of ~1ovelty . 
Znough passages have al r eady been q uot e d to make i t altogether 
clear t hat he ho l d s to it s re al i ty . 'i'he remaining r emark s 
will further be a r out this point . 212 Howe v er , it a ppears 
that Al exander has c onsidered i t enou gh either to s a y the 
magic word n emergence , 11 t o employ his H levels theory'' as 
"factua l " evi dence for it, or to assume that it could be 
in 
210 . Art .(l9 40) , 316ff . 
211 . Be r g son ,p - will b e rec a ll ed, mad e tl}e same error 
his do ct r i ne o f t h e intuitive g rasp of t he ela n vital. 
212 . Cf . below ,2T.k .. 
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g iven- i n enjoymen t , none of VJ'hich is a dequa te . 
ii) • Free dom, determinism, and predictability . 
Fre e dom i s d efi n ed by Al exander as "determination ••• i n e nj oy-
me nt, 11 and occurs nwhenever the dis t inct io n o f e n joyment and 
co ntemp l at ion •.• is fciund . n213 In t h i s sense, f ree d om i s seen 
as something which is pe r f ectly comp atible with a 11thorough 
determin ism . n 214 Now it would b e a digr e ssion i f a detai l e d 
exposition we r e made here u p on Alexander's doctrine of f ree-
dom, However, it is necessar y to n ote that a g ood c as e could 
be built for t he contention that Alexand e r ' s view of freedom 
con sign s it to the r e alm of subjective fan cy . For examp l e , 
t h e statement t hat 11 the so - called fi a t of the vdll is i n f a ct 
nothing more or l es s t han the c onsciousness that i t is 'He \'J'ho 
are co ns enting to t he act , or.that the motive adop t ed proceeds 
from t h e self or chara cter . n215 Even the choice bet we en two 
alte r natives , as experien ced by the '!high er exi stents , " is 
only a ca se of g r eater 11 plastici ty , 11 t he r u diments of volun-
tary cho ic e b ei ng s een on t he lower levels as 11 preference 11 
which i s the 11 avoiding of one f orm of stimulus a nd p ursuing 
another" ac co rding to i t s co nstitution . 216 
There a re ot her pas 3age s , on t he othe r hand , which are 
difficult to r e c oncile with t hese just s een . Fo r e xample, 
a passag e i n " Natural ? i e ty 11 warns aga inst 11 confusing the 
213. STD, II , 315. 
214 . Cf . 0TD , II , 323 . 
215 . ~TD , II , 321 . 
216 . ~TD , II , 322 ; cf. a l so t he i de a o f causality as 
''a tergo, " a b ove , 2I0 .. 
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determinate with the p urely me chanical . " For, he continues 
all behavior ... is determinate, and its fine c apacity of 
variation and spontaneity are determined by its de licately 
complex organizat ion . But not all determinate a ction i s 
me chan ical. The me chanical is simple and its responses 
broadly cons tant; the vital is highly complex , and its 
responses, thoug h definite, mQ.y: vary according to cir-
cumstances; and that is a ll. 2 ..L'( 
This woul d seem to indicate that what Alexander mean s by 
" determiffi ten is n lav-rfulne s s. n 21 8 
To say t he le ast, then , it would seem that Al exander 
is unclear about the preci se meaning of "determina te. 11 If 
it means what it seems common usag e would i mpl y , together vvi th 
many indicat ions from Alexander himself , then it would appear 
that i t me ans me chanica l determination by the past and would 
be subject to all of the difficulties v;hich t his view has to 
face. Ho\·le ver, if it means simpl y '' lawfulne ss, n then the 
que stibn of wh~ther law is causal or explanatory would be 
raised. This question is not dealt 1,11i th by Alexander. To 
obey the i mpulse of Ti me , if Time co u l d be co ns i de red the 
n firs t ca1.1s e, 11 may be the deepe r meaning which is sought. 
But v-rhy this of itself must mean that all determination must 
come from the past and cannot co me, e . g ., from the presen t, 
is n ot at all clea r. Pr esent time is certainly no less real 
than the past ! 
The quest ion of predi ct ability raises the most explicit 
dis cussion of novelty vvhi ch t h e present vvri ter finds in Alex-
217 . Art.(l9 22) , 312. 
218 . Cf . also 3fD , II , 66 , 320 . 
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ander' s writing s . In the f irst p lace, novelty may oe clas s ed 
into two g roups : a 1'prote st a i~; a inst the notion of bar e repe-
tition,n or nas imply i ng t h e i mp ossibility of pre d iction . n21 9 
In the f irst sense, " novelty ••• is not distinctive of human 
action . ff 220 Vihen , h ov-1ever, i t is said t ha t human a ction is 
"fre e , " such a s sertion s tur n on the nbelief tha t human action 
is not 1.vholly p red ic table . n 221 Now Alexand er believes tha t 
lfhuman a ction cannot wholly be pr edic t ed . 11 As evid enc e f or 
this a s sert i on , he brings out that "human nature i s a .. g rowing 
thing , and -v'lit h t he l apse o f real Time may throw up new ch a r-
acters vvhi ch c an only be known to him vrh o experiences them. 11222 
Wh ile 
i t may be p ossible to p redict , •• • from the knowledg e we 
hav e of the underly ing n eura l processes, what combina-
tion of i de as may possess a man at some future date., • • • 
the mean ing of the i d e as , the sp irit of them, the o o~~cts 
to which they refer, may be b eyond our c a lc ulat ion . 11 J 
Ev en · t he f arnous Laplac ean c a lculator , 224 char a cteristic of 
the me chanis tic r eact ion to final c au ses , coul d not predict 
ttwhat t he fu ture of the world -vvill b e . n 22 5 That this asser-
tion is true is seen by the fact t hat t h e hypothesis of the 
Lapla cean C<?-lculato r a s sume s that Ti me is u n r eal , or i n Be r g -
" son ' s phr a se, tout est d onn e . 
IT ow it mi ght be contended that unpredictability is the 
evi d e nce wh ich Ale xander g ives for t he existence o f novelty . 
219 . STD , I I , 323 . 223 . STD , II, 324-325 . 
220 . STD , II, 323. 224. Mentioned a b ove , 64 . 
221 . bTD , II , 3 24. 225. STD , II, 329 . 
2 22 . .' 'I'D ' I I , 324 . 
But ca r eful re ading of Alexander t s st a teme nts 'Shows that 
t he opposite is the case . Prediction cannot tak e p l a c e for 
the reason that novelty occurs . 226 This aside, though , it 
should be n oted that t he emphasis of Alexander u pon u npre-
231 
dictab ility for all levels except that of Space - Ti me , and even 
for e mergences with in levels , 227 is strongl y to favor the c a se 
for novelty . 
Also , i t i s 1,vell to n otice that i f the interpretation of 
d etermi nism can be co nsider ed as meaning conformity to law, 
a p o ssibility as was seen ab ove, there is n o reason to se e 
i n t his a conil i ct between unpredictability a nd de termi n ism . 22 8 
This view Al exander holds . 229 
iii) . I ntelligibility. The phra s e which Al exander 
employs to d escribe t he ohl y possible atti tud e to be taken 
tovJa r d the novel emergence of quality, including the qual ity 
of deity , is "natural p iety." 
'l'he e x istence of emergent qualities ••• is something to be 
noted , ••• under the compulsion of brut e empiric a l fa ct, 
or ••• to be accepted with the natural p~e8y of the i nve s-
tigator . It admits of no explanation . 3 . 
In th e ligh t of t his positi on , then Al exan der is very close 
, 
to t he p o s ition of Be rgson who regarded the elan vita l as 
226 . Cf . STD , II , 324 . 
227 . STD , II , 327. 
2 2 8. 0 f • 0 h • IT I , above , (6~ • 
229 . STD , II , 327 . 
230 . STD , II , 47 ; cf. Alexander, Art . (l9 22 ) . 
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ultimate l y beyond explanation and ultimately unintelligible . 
However, the type of unintelligibility differs f rom that of 
Bergson . Al exander considers the pr esenc e of nov elty a s 
someth ing which is simply g iven l'lhile Bergson co ns i dered it 
as basically opposed to intellect. Thus Alexander's view of 
the intelligibility of novelty i s f r ee f rom the conflict 
between the fact and the expl anation a lthough it does not 
pro ceed to the dire ct connecti on of the two . 
iv) . Value . The problem of value, in Alexander , 
by his ovm admiss io n , presents peculiar problems . This is 
not the p l a ce to dis cuss i n any detail the problem of value, 
th is having been done by others . 23 1 The que stions which con -
cern the present discussion are vmether there i s a ny r eason 
t o co nsider the nisus as r elated to value , and , if so , what 
that relatio n is . 
Value presents what is most likely the mo st severe 
difficulty in Alexander 's entire s ystem . Al exander says him-
s:if that ttonly i n t he c ase of v alue vms the conclusion i mper-
fe c t . n232 Th is, it wil l appear shortly, is not only t he hon-
est admission of a gr eat man , but is actually the t r uth , 
a l though the r eason he gi ves f or the Dnperfect i on , viz ., 
nour inadequate knowledge of the hi story of mate ri al th i ngs , " 
may be sub je ct to questi on. 
231 . Cf . Konvitz, ONV ; cf . also Cresswel l ' s unpublished 
doc toral dissert ation , "The ? os ition of Va lue in t he ~hilo­
so phical .:>ystern of Samuel ~lexander , 11 Cornell University , 1926 . 
232. STD , II , 333 . 
A dualism i s clea rly visib l e i n Al exander ' s treatment 
of v alue . Reco gnit i on of this dual ism is necess a r y if the 
relation o f v alue and the nisus is to be clearly seen . In 
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the first place, Alexan der decl a res value , on the bas is of 
his Space - Tiue hypothesis , to origi nate on the level o f minds 
fr om what he c alls " t he amalgarnation of the object with t h e 
hwnan a p prec iat i on of it . n2 3 3 s such , value is not a qua l ity, 
but , r ather , is ap prehend ed as 11 c oherence 11 which nsati s fiesn 
the valuing mi nd . 234 
In the se c ond place , Alexander de c lares that ttvalue does 
not beg i n at t h e human l e vel , but exis ts in its appr opriate 
form at ar:1 e a rlier level . ff 235 ''Value ex ist s , belov.,r man , ••. 
and is found in its essential features on the le v el of mere 
life . TT 236 J ust how fa r dovm the s cale below l i fe value extends 
is a matter of spe culati on . But 
the va lues strictly so -ca l led , the tertiary qualit i es , 
are but the highest instance we h 1ow of a feature of 
thing s wh i ch extends o ver a mu ch vlider r ang e , and is 
founded i n the nature of Space- Time i tse l f; and may 
even be empirically universal . 237 
These two p oi nts of v iew , as c an easily be seen , are 
consid erably diverg e n t . Alexander at t empts , however , t o 
re c on c i l e them . Values ma y be graded into instinct i ve 
values , e conomi c values , and tertiary qual i ties (t r uth , 
beauty , and g oo dness) . But , i f value in g eneral we r e t o 
233 . STD , rr , 238f . 
234 . 3TD , II , 243 . 
235 . STD , II , 273 . 
236 . STD , II , 308 . 
237 . STD, II , 311 . 
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be defined so as to apply to levels lower than life , it would 
be seen as " the pr i nciple of adaptation.t~ 2 3 8 In this sense , 
values i mply in their simplest exp ression something 
~o·1hich d oes n ot d epend u pon the living or co ns cious 
character of the sub ject of value but applies to any 
finite comp lex of s pace - time •... Adaptation i s the 
r eturn of t h ese c ompl exes out of separation from t he 
wh ole into unity v.Jith it . 239 
But the weakness , vlhic h Alex a nder recognizes , i s the fact 
that i f valuati on lfdepends u p on a da ptation , and a d a ptation is 
.•• the ir return f r om is ol ation into commun ion with the r e st 
of the finites i n Spa ce- TL1e , t1 then valuat ion "involves t he 
ex isten ce of many more or l ess closely a llied f o r ms betl·veen 
which t he co mpetition takes place •.• the empirical fact of the 
actual r epe t ition of u niversals in a multiplicit y of part icuks . n240 
It wi l l be recalled241 that Al exander c ould not explain the 
multipl icity of parti cu lars vv-hic h r eal i ze a univ ersal . Th e 
same p roblem r e curs . If i t is consi de red one of the a priori 
em p irica l p roblems , such as c ompre sen ce , freedom , etc ., he 
can see n o way of conn ecting i t wi th Space- Ti me as such . 24 2 
Thu s Al exand er has to a dmit that value is b asi c to all exi s t -
ence and that h i s n a tur alism 'V<rh ich r egards it as on l y inci -
dental has mad e i t i mpossib l e to r egard i t as such . 
With these observations in mind , the quest ions r e turn 
co ncerning value and the nisus . It is clear that if value 
~j~ : ~1B : i!: ji~ : 241 . Cf . above:f: 20' ~ . 242 . Cf . 3TD , I ,~3 1 2 . 
240 . 3 TD , II , 312 . 
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be limi te d to the l e vel of the tertiary qualities , or reflec-
ti v e consciousness, then values might cone ei vably be rel a t e d 
to the nisus as po ss ible no vel emergents within the l ev e l 
itself , perhaps constituting another level , but this vmuld 
lea ve u nexp l a ine d lower va lues s u ch as the instinctive . I f , 
on the other hand , value i s regar ded as a daptation i nvolving 
multip l i city of ind ivuals r ealizing a universal, then , as 
\ l exander admi t s , t here is l i tt le pos sibilit y of relating 
' 
va lue to .::>pace-Time unless Spa c e - Time were r egarded as possess-
i ng a v a lue p r incipl e it self. To a dmit th i s , of course , vwuld 
be to r enounc e naturalism. That Alexander is clo s e to admi t -
t {ng it may be see n b y recalling the obse rvat io n mad e ab ove, 243 
viz., t hat t he con cep t of TTnisusn an d it s other psychological 
correlatives repr esents t he r e cogn ition on the p art of Alex-
ander t hat Space- 'l' i me i s i nsuff ici ent to expl a i n the exi s t-
e n ce of novelty a t le ast on the h i gh e r le vels . Alexander's 
recogn i tion of v alue o n t h e l eve l of lif e, t oge ther with t h e 
pos sibility of value on a univ ers a l scal e e ven i n Space- Ti me 
itself , appears t o be the furth er evi d en ce needed t o s how 
that Al exander r e a l izes that his naturali s tic co n cept of 
Spac e - Ti me ne eds a v a luative p rinciple . Again it may b e 
sugg ested that the u s e o f TT nisus'' i s the way i n which t h is 
reco gnition t ake s fo r m. One more problem must be cove r e d 
before th i s suggestion c an r e c eive e nou gh suppor:b t o be con-
243 . cf. 2..2).. 
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sidered suffici ent war ranted . 
3) . Ni sus and the problems of de ity an d God . In one 
se..'1se , the concept of d eity i s an exten sion of that of qual ity , 
i.e., · it re presents a level i n the grm.vth of the un i verse 
.., rhi ch characte riz es some of t he co mplex es ge~1e rated within 
the s patia - tempo r a l matrix . In anothe r sense , howe ver , 
deity i s quite d ifferen t f r om the quali ties whic h strat i-
f ied into matte r, lif e , mi nd , e tc. That is seen in the f a ct 
t hat deity is a !! vari ab le qual i ty , 11 i.e ., it c hanges with 
the g rowth of the world in t i n:e .244 '11hus, deity i s the name 
not f or any ''ac t ual'' qual i ty , but f or any npotaYJ.t i a l " qual-
i ty . Al exander says that were d eity to be act ual , or to 
ex i s t , t hen God , or the a ctual world possessing inf i nit e 
deity, "would cease to be infinite God and b r eak u p into a 
multiplicity of finite g 6ds.n 245 Deity , t hen , is an " i nfin-
i ten a nd it i s n potential, " or 11 infinite potenti ality . n 
The t e rm !!G od , n on the other hand , is appli ed i n t wo 
ways by Alexand er: God as a ctual a nd God as deit y . God 
as actual has been seen t o b e· the whole a ctual world with 
i ts nisus ( ten dency towards) deity . God as deity i s n ot 
actua l or accompli shed but r a ther is ~he n isus towar d s the 
next higher qual i ty . These two concep t s of God, t hen , 
form two aspects of Go d 's nature in Alexander's thought . 
God as a c tual i s God ' s "body . '1 God as deity i s Go d 's 
244 . Cf . 0TD , II , 348 . 
245 . STD , II , 365 . 
"min d . 11246 God ' s body, at any stage , is rt t h e whole of 
Space- Ti me , n 247 a nd Go d ' s deity, con s equently , is "a nisus 
a nd no t an accomplishment . n248 
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Thi s , it appears , i s an at t empt to s ynthesize pantheism 
and thei sm (or what is trad i t iona lly called deism ) . "Go d , ,, 
h e d eclares , "is i mma nent i n r e s pe c t of his b ody I panthei srn ~: , 
but trans cen den t in r e s pect of h is deity fthe i sm \ . n249 
God , as emb r ac i n g th e who l e of Spac e - 'r i me , i s creative , 
but God, as d eity is nnot creative but crea ted . 11 Go d , as 
the u n ive r se as tendi n g to deity , 11 i s creative only of 
deity , " but since deity owe s it s ex i s tence to the p r e - exi s t -
i ng finit e s 1Ni t h t he ir empirica l qualities, God ' s deity , in 
t he s trict est sense, is ''not crea tor but a creat u re . 112 50 
How there are s e veral important d ifficu lties which a re 
r a ised b y th is conception . John La ird , a n ab le student of 
co s mology and close friend o f Alexander , has not ed s ome of 
them. 2 51 The y a re pr e sent e d h e r e as f ollows. 
i) . "God or deity •• • would no t b e u ltimate at a ll . n252 
J eity alon e can b e vvorsh iped, ac cording to Alex an d e r . But , 
i f wors hlp demand s t hat the obj e ct of worship be ultimate , 
as most theologians woul d say , this would b e i mpo s s i bl e on 
Alexan der ' s scheme , since d eity is alwa ys transferre d beyond 
on ce it becomes a ctual . 
246 . Cf . STD , II , 365f , 368 . 
247 . .::> 'fD , II, 366 . 
24 8 • .STD , II , 364 . 
249 . JTD , II , 396 . 
250 . ~TD , II , 3 97- 3 98. 
251 . Art . (19 42) , 146- 1 55 . 
252 . 1 rt . (1942 ) , 151 . 
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ii) • trow d o we know that deity has not already a ctually 
emerg ed? 2 53 Alexander claims that v;re don ' t know whether 
this has ha ppened or not and t ha ·t the raising of the q·uestion 
is " trivial ru1 d s cholastic.n 2 54 However, as Laird not e s with 
consi derable acuity , <'~ lexander' s whole scheme 17 is cons t ructed 
on t h e p rin ciple that "'vve do knovv that Space - Time came f irs t. n 2 55 
: ctually , observes La ird, we know nothing o f the kind . I f 
Alexander's scheme could imply p ro gre ss as vvell a s process , 
then, per ha p s, he might conceivably be corre ct i n his afore-
mentioned assumption . But it appears doubtful that anything 
more than process has been prov ed , and , therefor e , that 
higher processes mi ght co-ex ist with lmver ones 11 i mplies n o 
inconsi stency" whatever.256 
iii). HThat actual ' deity ' \'TOuld have to be finite may 
be rather too confident.n 2 57 Rather than being a conse-
quence of the distinctio n between a n e mpirical quality and 
a cate gorial character , La ird believes that nt h e proof of 
the fin itude of ( actual) ' deity ' r e sts u pon the finitude of 
t he t heatre (i.e. of the human body) in which the mental rung 
of the ladder of h istorici ty inv ari ably emerges f rom the merely 
vital rung . 112 5B 
iv) . There a re d i ffi culties \·.rith 11the whole world" as 
Stral.rll' ng to a1 el' t •1· • 2 59 ~ 1 b f · d d ~ ..:or examp e , e ore rnln eme r g e , 
253 . 
254 . 
255 . 
256 . 
Art .( l 9 42) ,l5lf . 
0 TD , I I , 3 6 5 • 
Art .( l942) , 151. 
rt . ( 19 42 ) , 15 2 • 
257 . Art .(l942 ), 152 . 
258 . Loc . cit . 
259 . Art .( l942) , 152- 3 . 
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t he \11,Jt10 l e world was stra.in ing toward deity , o r ''towa r d s t h e 
emergen ce of my Eli nd and of yours . " Now i f n 1 t 1e who l e world ' 
at this s t a ge is ' the body ' of the minds t hat ex i st , it is 
not the usua l sense . n Rather i "'c is n a watery colloid substan ce 
of s mall di mensions o.nd modera te powers . n Thu s , since the 
phrase " 'the whole worl d ' ;,..rith it s unive rsa l nisus" would 
be on l y the nr em ote and n ot •.. ' the : p rox i mate body ••. of a ny mi nd ," 
t h e s ame would b e t rue of d eit y , unless d eity " i s regarded as 
a perv as ive and not as ali lited actuality, " (as seen under ii) . 2 tD 
v) . f urther difficult y i s e n cou..'1t e r e d when the meaning 
of TThighertt a n d 11 lovvern is p r e ssed u pon l e)cande r . Laird 
su ggests t ha t t h is may be " the e ssentia l question . 112 61 I t 
~vil l be ob serve d that th i s question i s a r eturn t o t he p rob -
lem of v a lue which was discussed above . Alexander returns 
h i ms elf to t h e problem of v a lue i n the l as t Chapter o~ STJ . 
He r e , however, no f urther light is shed either on t he weaning 
of TT hig he r " o r on t he pro ol em of valu e . ttH i ghe r n r e f e rs 
not to value but 11 to t he orde r of p erfe ct ion . n 262 . nd , in 
the last analysis , perf e c t ion refers to " bigness , TI not to 
t h e "better . n2 63 
Desp i te thi s appar ent failure to c onne ct deity with 
value , l exander' s l as t pages i n 3Tl..J reveal further evid e n ce 
to support t he e a r l i e r suggestion t ha t nisus s e rve s t he pur-
2 60 . h. rt . (1942 ) , 153 . 
261 . Art .( l 9 42) , 154 ; ital. 
262 . STD , II , 410 . 
263 . Cf . Lai rd , Art .(l9 42 ), 155. 
Lai r d ' s . 
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pose of provi d ~_n6 some semblan ce of integ r ation b etv.reen t h e 
naturalism of ~ pace - Tine and the ewerg en ce of 10 vel qua lit ies . 
For he says t h a t vJhi l e the qua li ties which arise out of the 
restle ssness of .:>pace-Time dep end "on a d i ffe ren t fundam ental 
featur e from value , " yet nit is only in so far as value is 
establi s hed t hat the n i sus forward becomes effective in the 
g eneration of a nev-r quality . 11264 Further , eve r y b eing , as 
a part o f Jpace - Tiue , has value or unvalue , and has also 
" t he ni t>u s to a h i gher form i n s o far as it contribut es to 
the gener al nisus of the world . n 265 . nd , ultimately t his is 
accomplished , this cre ation of deit y is hel p ed , " in so f a r 
as throug h our g oo dne ss we are qualified t o share in t h e 
universal ben t to war ds a h i g her quality .... :fi.·Ie n of trans cend ent 
gifts of perfection are thus in their deg r ee ex emplars of this 
nisus . u 266 
The p oint which appears to be made here is that v alue s 
are not o nly iristrumental but e v en necessary to tha ac h i eve-
ment of nove l qt.Bl itie s and deity . If thi s is J, l exan d er t s 
re a l p osition , then , by i mpl ication , he has admitted that 
v alue must , i n some sense a t least, be presen t i n the parts 
of t he ultimate 0pace- 'f i L,_ e or point-instants . If t h i s v.rere 
not so , then h ow c ould n isus pro duce the f irst eme r gent qual-
ity? To a dmi t t h is , howeve r, would be t o admit that Spac e-
264 . ~TD , II , 41$ . 
26 5. Lo c . cit . 
266 . olD , II , 41S ; cf . 
g reat mys tics and saints i 
Be r gson t s dist i nct i on of the 
'L) •.LR . 
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Ti me itself co ntai n s a principle of value . Now there is no 
s u ggestion of an a s s e rtion s u ch as this on the pa rt of Alex-
an der . He al l ows this as o n l y a p os sibilit y. 267 But , as 
it appears her e , not on l y is the poss ibility asserted , but 
the a c tuality is i mpl i ed in t hese above n oted st atements . 
hat s uch a value p r inci ple , i f such c an be said to be, . is 
t he n i sus would b e i mpos sib l e to show. However, if there 
mus t be something b es i des 3pace- Time itself, o r point -instant s, 
that to wh i ch the ten1 n i sus r efers is the only r efer e n t 
t h a t Al exander has ever mentio ned whi ch c ould p ossibly be 
that some t hing . 
One o ther o b jec tion s hould be me ntioned in conclusion. 
It is " ir e c~ ed a g a i ns t the vali di t y of t he nisus as ail exp l ana-
tion of n ovel ty , eraergen ce, quality, and d e ity . Al 8xand e rts 
use of the term n i sus is 11 about as convincing as t h e vml l-
known a nswer to the ques t ion ...,vhy does op i um sen d one to se ep? 
B . l l d . . !T 2 6 S ml • f ecause lt Jas a s ee p pro r u cln g vlrtue. lne polnt, o 
course , which i s at i s sue here is that nisus i s used as an 
exp l anation of n ovelty . But Al exand er, a s has be e n s een , 
s ays t hat n ovelty is n ot ab le to be expl ainect . 269 Obviousl y 
a term, as s u c h , explains noth i ng . Ni sus i s c ons i dered 
rather as a c ha racter of something r eal, the u l tim3.te matrix 
of everything . As l ong a s Al exa nder confines himself to t h is 
interpr etation , this diffic~lty c an be av o i ded . 
267 . Cf . aoo ve ,235 . 
268 . rlo l mes , Art . (l9 29 ), 65 . 
269 . Cf . ab o ve ,2 ~6. 
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4. Summa r y and Evaluat ion 
i . The n erits of J l exander ' s epistemol ogy are s ee n in hi s avoi -
dance of Be r g son ' s d e p rec a tion of the intelle c t ; h is dual-
istic a p proac h to that which i s other t han 'self - experienc e . 
ii . Al exa n J er ' s d octrine of ind ividuality c a lls a ttentio n to 
ce r tain d efects of a bsolute i d eal ism . 
ii i. The t he o r y of c ausa lity avo i ds t he di ff ic ulty wh ich the 
th e ological e xp l anations had e n countered i n t heir use of 
fi nal causes . 
iv . i lexander ' s r e cogn ition Gf no velty as real , u npred i cta ble , 
a nd as something to be a ccep ted , presen t valuable i n s i ghts 
i nto the nature of novelty . 
v . Th e psycho l og i c a l r e fere nce s to n isus , t he recognition 
t hat va lues a re somehow relat e d to the creative proc es s , 
and the a ppa ren t re c og nit i on that values a r e ne cessa ry 
t o the activity o f t he n isus , r e vea l an appa rent t endency 
on the pa rt o f _lexander a way f rom h i s natural i s ti c p re -
suppositions . 
vi . Al exan' er ' s e p ist e mology reveals certain d efe c ts , v i z ., 
h is d e ~1 ial t hat mind can contemp l ate itself , his supposi-
tio n that nisus c an be k n ow11 moni s ticall y or intuited ,-
a nd his t endency to as sume t he nisus vln en dealing with 
i t spe culatively . 
v ii . Al exander fails to a c count adequate l y f or mu ltiplicity 
of i ndi victua ls . 
viii. Causality , by b eing stripped of bo th powe r a nd ne c e ss i t y , 
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ceases to be an explanat ion of a ~ 1ything a nd b ecomes me rely 
a statement of continuity of events . 
ix . 'l'he notion o f quality appear s to h ave certain diffi culties, 
viz . , as 11 complexi t y n it unduly limi ts t h e n otion of novel -
ty; as being completely e xpr e ssible i n terms of lmve r l e vels, 
it a p paren tly d enies novelt y . 
x . The treatment by Alexande r of the pro blem:3 of no velty 
reveals the te ndency to r egard nemergen ce 11 as ex p lanatory , 
when , in f a ct, it mere l y states a kind of event, without 
explaining it . 
xi . The theory of value r e veals a dualism in the thou~ht of 
Alexan de r which may be interpret ed as indic atins t he fa i lure 
to r e l ate value coherently with his nat ·ralia tic premises . 
x ii . 'l'he concep t of d eity as some thi n g dist i nct f r om God pre -
s en t s d i f f icu lti es whi ch a t heory of value coherently 
related t o the doctrine of nisus Itl i ght have helped him to 
a void . 
xiii . The concep t of nisus i s n ot organically relat ed to t he 
r e s t or Alexander ' s scheme . This g iv es rise to the p ossi-
bility that ~1isus is a n a dd endum desig ned to ove rcome cer-
tain d i fficu lties in t rinsic to the s cheme . 
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CH1 PT ~r1 VI 
1 . I n t rori uct ion 
i. Bi o r-r a -o~ ical s ke t ch of Al fr e d I~orth 1'lh i t ehead . 1 
Al f eC: r orth 'Thit E. h ead was bor n i n 1 261 , Februa ry 1 5 , a t 
Ramsg:a t e in the I s l e of Tha!"le t , ent , :Dn gl a n d . li e was, t he re -
f or e , t wo year s youn ger t h a n Bergs on a n d Al exande r . ~ hitehead 1 s 
f2r.1 i ly r.,·Jaf: ac t i vely engaged i n effairs conc e r ned ;,vit h etiu ca t ion , 
re1i ~i on , r.•nd Lo cal Admini strati on , b ot, h hi s f2t he r anJ hi s 
r r anclf ::Jther ha vi ng b e e n su c cessfu l s cl-Joolrnas t e r s i n a priva te 
s ctool i ~ Ramsge t e . So on a f t e r Al fr ed was b orn , his f a the r 
ga ve u. hi s s choo l wor _ f o r c l e r i c a l dut y i n t he Angli c an Church . 
Anct , altho ugh he s t i l l r e t ai n ed . is i n t s rest i n educ a t i o n , e 
r crJa i ne ci engaged in chu rch a ct i v i tie s u nti l h i s de t h in lL<;t . 
At the age of f i fte e n , Whit ehea d was sent to s chool a t 
t h e r e l i c- studded t OrlYl o f She rbor n e i n Dorcetshi r e . Hi s edu-
::: eti on c onfo rmed to t..h. e n or ma l ~t and ard of the t i me , tha t i s , 
it ·~'f,.J,f. ch i e f _ y 1evot od to t h e s tudy- of the c l as s ic s , Lati!l , 
}r eek , or..d h i s t or y , i n t er s pe rs ed vli t h ma t hemat i cs . 1'·. e a r e 
~iv ·~'1 t o u n re r s t an. t he t ~-J hitehead di s play e d a n ear l y i n t e r est 
_n ma t hJm<-1 ti c s , for he wr i t es thO>. t he -NEH3 excu sed f rom sor'le 
>f h i s Lati n poetry i ~ or d e r t o give more time to ma t hemat ics . 2 
1 . ~o st of t l~ f oll owing bi ogranh icBl ma t e r i a l i s de rived 
rom ;,hit e h er.d ' s biogra ohi ca l not e s ( i n Sc:b i l p ·o ( ed . ) , :?ArT.. ) aad 
.o 'rve ' s rt icl e i n the s a me volun1e. Pages r e f e r to t he Sch i l pp 
o l u. 1e , he r e i ne ft e r re fe r red t o as ?~rn . 
') ":)A-,., r :.... • l 1 J ;r , D • 
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During his last yea r, his energy was taken up mostly as Head of 
the Scho ol and as Ca pt ain of the Games on the Thomas Arnol d 
patt er n . 
1
:'
1hi t eh ead a cknov.;led.e-es his . indebtedness to the University 
- · · ~ . . 
of Cambridge , and especially to TriDity College where hi s 
r esi den ce co ntinued unbroken from 1880 until 1910. Here, 
although al l his l e ctures duri ng his undergr adua te days were 
c onfined to mathematics , pure and a pplied, the nincessant con-
versAtionn with frien ds , undergraduates or member s of the staff , 
fille d out the missing portions of his educati on . These di s -
cussions--on politics , reli gion , philosophy , li terc; ture--led to 
much mi s cellaneous read ing , and po s sessed a 11 Pl atonic quality 
which ~fu it ehc~ad describes a s both Hwond erful " and tr lirnitE: d i n 
its anplication to life. "3 
The ne riod from 188 5, when he became a fellow , until 1910, 
was spent teachin g a t Trinity , eventually i n the capa city of 
Senior Le cturer . 
Most discussions of I.'Jhitehead ' s activity distinguish three 
peri ods : the mathemat ical a m logical period , the pe riod of the 
phi l oso phy of physi cal science , and the metaphysical perio cl . 4 
The f i rst period (l89C-l9ll) saw his first great int ellectual 
synthe sis , the Universal Algebra, 1898 , and l ater the monumental 
3. Art .( l 941) 1 , 8 . 
4. Cf . Lowe , Art.(l94l) . 
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t hree volume 1rlor k in coll abora tion wit h Russell , Pri nc i pi a 
Mathemat ic q , 1910-1913 . The a im of this l ater work was to r eplace 
t he two sc i en ces , lo gic and mathemat i cs , by one . Iumerous a rticles 
on mat hem:=~ tics , some more important t hon others , also appea red 
duri ng thi s period . 
The second period (1911-1924 ) was, roughly , his London period . 
Whitehead came to the University College London in 1911 where he 
served i n va rious capacitie s which included hi s be i ng Dean of the 
Faculty of Scienc e in the University . The first part of this 
peri od , or wha t Lowe calls th8t of his "pre-spe cula tive epi s -
temology , r· 5 vd tne ss ed publica-:-i on of several articl es -=. Jh i ch led, 
i n 1917 , to t he book The Or ganization of Thought, .!!.duc ationa l and 
Scientific . The appear ance of the three books, Enqui ry Concerning 
th e Pri nciples of Natural Knowle~ ge, 1919, The Concept of Na ture, 
1920, and The Pri n ci nle of Relativity, 1922, are devoted to the 
one sub j ect-- a new philos ophy of natural s cien ce , with s:;_)e cial 
a pplica tions to physics . 
The third, or me t aphysical , o~rio d (19 25- 1947) witnessed 
his comi ng to America and to Harva rd Univ ersit y . The thirteen 
years EO pe nt here saw him turn tmvards an al l-i nclus i ve s peculative 
con~tructi on . Beginning wit h t he Sci ence and t he IJiodern \;;orld , 
1925, and Re ligion in the Laking, 1926, his metaphys ics r eache s 
it s ultimate exor ession in his Gifford Lectur es , Proc ess and 
Real ity, 1929. The relation of his i deas to the history of 
5 . Cf . rt .(l941) , 52 . 
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civilization is seen in the Adventures of I deas , 1933, and in 
Modes of Thought , 1938, hi s thought posse f s e s t'an E'xtra-ordinary 
l '. t .,6 va e .:n ctory Jeaut y . ·· 
Upon be coming Professor Emeritus at Harvard in 1937, he 
retir sd to relative qui et . .A lthough undergoi ng a severe illness 
he still mana ged to write t '\II]O philosophical articles, 'I·'lathemat i cs 
and t he Good , " a nd " I mmortality , " which are published in the 
.S chil p p volume .7 
Among t he honors wh i ch ~~Jhitehead rec eived , i n addition to 
s e rvi ng as President of tJ:-, e M:2themr-t ical Association { 1915-16} 
anrl the Ame rican Philosophical Association ) \ll]as the first 
receipient of the James Scott pri ze of the Fl.oyal So ci ety of 
Edi nburgh in 19 22 . In 1925, he r eceived t he Royal Soci ety's 
Sy1 v es t e r lvJe d.al and , in 1930, the Butler Medal of Columbia 
University. He b e came a Fe l low of the British Acad emy in 1931 , 
and, in 1945 , r e c e ived the Order of Merit . 
Aft er a cont i nuous and prolonged illness , Alfred North 
Whitehe ad pa ssed awav i n Cambri dg,e , Ma s sachus etts on Dec. 30, 1947 . 
I - • ~ 
i 
ii. Ba ck .e:round for the doctrine . 
The heading for this secti on might better be phrased 
11 backgro unds:' for the doctrine , s i ne e, perhaps more than in the 
cases of Ber g son and Alexa:r<.d e r, VV'hi tehe ad ' s bre a dt h of technical 
6. Lowe , Art.(l941) , 120. 
7 . 666-700 
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knowledge and interest is so extensive. At the very obvious 
risk of oYersimplification, it might be said of Whitehead's 
position generally that, like Kant, he attempts to reconcile 
the opposing claims of the empiricism and rationalism of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rather than using the 
physics of Newton, however, he is guided by the dual insights 
of the ancients, Plato and Heraclitus, and implications of 
recent developments in mathematics and physics. Thus, it is 
easily seen that many forces are brought together all of which 
are related in some degree at least with the doctrine of 
creativity. 
It is not part of the present purpose to attempt to trace 
the direct influences which have made their impression upon 
l:lhitehead's thought. 8 Nevertheless, it is true that 'Whitehead's 
statements reveal that he was not only acquainted with the 
works of Bergson .and Alexander but also "indebted" to them.9 
That their thoughts present distinct similarities is part of 
the purpose of the present study. 
Whitehead's contact with recent developments in mathematics 
and physics, together with his contact \"lith the thought of James 
and Dewey, as well as with that of the aforementioned , may , with-
out stretching the i magination to any great extent, have been the 
8. Cf. Stahl, The Influence of Bergson .on \Vhitehead, an 
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston University, 1950; cf. 
also Lowe, Art.(l949). 
9 . PR, viii, SM:W, xi. 
----- ----
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stimulus wi1ich b rought to his mind the importance of crea tivity . 
2 . Brief Ske tc h of the Philosophy of Organism 
In t he se con d chapter of Pro cess and Reality10 Whitehea d 
sing l e s out four n otions v·lh ich TT i nvo l ve some d i vergence from 
a ntecede n t phi loso phica l thought . n These are : "a ctual e ntit y , 11 
"prehension , 11 t!ne xus , Tt an~ tTthe ontologi cal princi ple . n 11 These 
conce ptions, a long with others , reflect \'lhitehead ' s conviction 
tba t "1.;-ord s and phrases rnust be s t retched tmvards a general i ty 
forei gn to thei r ord i nary usa gen if meta physical first principles 
12 
are e ver to be reach ed . In addit ion to re co gni zin g the 
deficie n cies of lan guage , \'Vh i tehea d is also keenly aware of the 
fa llaci e s which a n cient and mo dern thought alike have commi tt e d 
i n this que st . 13 As a result , there are available in Khit :::he ad 's 
works such novel . and cryptic ~hrases a s 'the fall a cy of misplaced 
concre t e nes s !! which , in va ryi ng degrees , might be called the 
pecul i a r error which philosophy h c=J s inheri ted from t he Platoni c 
a nd Aristot el i a n traditi on , and an error wh ich has viti a t e d the 
a0ove men tione d th e ologi cal exp lanat i ons . In the s e cond place , 
Whit ehead is opp osed to '! the fallacy of simple loc ationn which 
was t h e l e ga cy of the s ci enti fic reaction to final ca L-s e s . 
Furth er mor e , Whi tehead i s not i n sympathy vJi th the attempt which 
mo dern ~)hilosophy made t o re concile these two fa l lacies which 
resulted in the commi ssion of another , vi z . , nthe bifurcati on of 
10 . 
l l . 
12 . 
13 . 
Hereinaft e r referred to as PR . 
PR, 27ff . 
"PP 6 
J. .il. ' • 
Cf . PR , viii . 
nature.n In short , it is ap:)arent that Whit ehead is k e enly 
aware of some of the more obvious d i fficult i es wh ich mode rn 
I 
phi losophy has inherit ed and difficulties, as vv ell, to wh ich 
it has itself fallen victim . 
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With these -or el i min.q r y observat i ons i n mind , c:. l ook e1t the 
more positive aspects of the philosophy o f organism i s in order . 
i. The Categorica l Scheme . 
A most i nter ·;j st i ng shi ft from Al exan:::ler ' s use of the categories 
may be observed i n ~fu it ehead 's use of them . Alexander , it will be 
recalled , cons i de r ed t he!n to be "perva s ive charact ers " or charact er-
istics vJh ich al)ply universally to e~ry real t h i ng . 11+ For Whit ehead , 
on the oth er ha rrl , the cate gor i es perform the function of a "matri x 
from which true proposition s app lice)bl e to particul P.r circumstances 
ce n be derived ... bol rl.ly and TtTith rigid logi c. n1 5 Thus , the cate -
gorie s , wlrile ''not d ogmatic s t at ements of the obvious , n are , rathe r 
7 tentative formul Btions of t he ultima t e general itiesn and should 
1 f "b t d . t h t... t . . d d f'. . n 16 t .1e re ore e sta e vn. ve u most preclslon an e lnlteness . 
The Categorical Scheme has four rna i n divisions : I . The Catego ry 
)f the Ult i mate , II. Cat e gories of Existence, III. Categories of 
~xplanation , IV . Categoreal Obli gat ions . The statement of these 
~ at e gories , then , constitute , with some ·-~ erivativc notion~ , the 
::ssenc e of the philo sophy of organism. 
l) . The Cate gory of the Ul timate . "The cat egory of the 
14 . Cf. above , 176-7. 
15 . ?R , 13. 
1 6 . PR , l2f . 
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UltimBt e expresses the ,z;eneral pri :1ci p l e presup~! osed in t he 
tr1r ee rnore s 1::e cial c a t egories . It c ompri s e s the three not ions : 
ncreati ity , " Hmc.~ty ,'' ar.d Tfone , " and these t hree notions !·are the 
ultim ~t e il6tio.ns inv olved in the meaning of the synonymous te rms 
'thing ,' ' being ,' ' ent ity . ' 1' 1'7 Thus , a t the v e ry out set , the 
/ 
orinciple 1.-v ich i n :·Jhit ehe a d's parall el to the el n vital 2nd the 
nis s m,._ es its a ·:) pee r an ce . The term '' onen stands for "the 
sin F.ll leri t y of an e..n t i t y . n The t e r m nmany" st a nds fo r 11 the notion 
of ' d i sjunct ive .-i i versity ' • • • an es s ential e le ment in the conce pt 
of 'be i nr;_;; .' 11 
11 Cr ,;.s tivityn is ·t he universel of univ2rsals cl1 r 8ct Er-
izing ultim?te matt Pr of fact. It is that ultimate 
pri~c:i.ole by whi ch the ma~1y , which a r e the universe 
ri is .iuLcti v ·s l y , be come the one r· ctual oc casi on , ~tih ic h 
].s the univers e con iuct,ivelv. It l ies in the nc; t ure 
of things th t the ~any ent~r into complex unity . l5 
Further rtescripti on of cre2t ivity es ~uc h , other t han a s es sent i al 
t o the f urtl'Je r cl a.rifi ca tion of other nspe cts or' th~ c ;.::·te go:cic8l 
~ cheme will be post pone d until lat er. 
2) . Ca te gories of exist enc e . Whitehead postul <:~ tes ei g ht 
categories of existenc e : a ctua l ent itie s ( al s o t e rme d a ctua l 
occRsio ~l s) ; 1)rehensions , or c oncrete fa cts of r e l . t edne ss ; nexus, 
or ·0 blic m,s tters of fact; subj e ctive forms , or priv a te m::->tter s 
of fee t; ~ternal objects , or pur e ? Otentials f or t he s ~ecific 
~et arminnt io~ o f fact; propositions , or impure potentials for 
']_7. ;:>R , 3 J . 
1 f: • i'H , 31 . 
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t hfl s>Je cific det. er rni m-tion of mat t ~r s of f e et; wulti ?l:i.citl ,3s , 
or l)Ul' 8 disjunct ions of d iv e r se entit i es ; contrasts , or modes of 
l l. 
syntheses .:>f entit ies i n one prehens i on . / 
','.ihltehead considers th e c t egories of a ctual occasions and 
e t e r .1al ob je cts c. s po ssess ing ITa cert a i n extreme f i nalit y . n The 
othe r type ::; of exi t e11ce have na certai n indetermirw te cl a ract. <:! r . 17 
Th e cPtegory of co ntrasts include s 11 an indefinit e prog r ess i on o f 
. 20 
c etegori es ... to hi ghe r f~rc:des of contrasts . ·' 
3) • The cat egor i es of ex~)lana tion . A ' etailed a ccount of 
the t wenty- se v en c a te gories of expla1~ti on21 is neithe r oossible 
n or necessery h ere . It is hoped t het the following pa r aphr as e 
E:akes u ~) i n e 'l9CiU:::1 cy vih at is missing in completeue ss . 
The e.ctual vmrl d is a oro cess , viz. , t he b e c orning of actua l 
enti t i e s The becoming of an a ctual entit y is the con-
cre sence of many potent i als (ii ) , and also the becomi n g of novel 
pr ehensions , nexus , sut1jective forms , proposition s , multi plicities , 
a nd contras ts (iii). Potential i ty fo:c becomi ng belong s to every 
entity (iv) , therefore no tvw a ctual ent iti es or i ginate from an 
ide •1.ti cc:l universe ( v). Real poten tia l ity refers to the fact 
t hat in a g iven co::1cres ence each ent it y is rendered ful l y determi nate 
only b y that concres ence , though it i s conditioned by the correlate 
unive r se (vi) . The pure pot entials , or th e eternal object s , a re 
19 • PR , 3 2- 3 3 • 
20 . PR , 33 . 
21 . PR , 33-39 . 
22 . The number of each c a tegory i s presented i n parentheses 
a s it o c cur s • 
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realized in an actual entity by "ingression" (vii). Although 
actual entities may be described by ana lyzing (a) their pot entiality 
for 'objectification' in the becoming of other actual entities, 
and (b ) the process which constitute s its own becoming ( viii ) , 
how an actual entity becomes constitutes what an actual entity 
is (ix ) . The fir s t analysis of the actual entity discloses it to 
be a concresence of prehensions (x), ea ch one of which consists 
of (a} the 'subject' or the actual entity which is prchendi ng , 
(b) the 'datum' which is prehended, and (c) the 'subjective form' 
or how the subject prehends that datum. Prehensions whose data 
i nvolve actual entities are termed 'physical prehensions'; those 
of eternal objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions.' Conscious-
ness is not ne ce s sarily involved in the subjective form of either 
type of pr ehension (xi}. 'Positive prehensions' are te rmed 
'feelings,' and 'negative prehensions' .are said to 'eliminate 
from feeling' (xii). Many species of subjective forms exist such 
as emotions, valuations, purposes, adve rsions, aversion s, con-
sciousness, etc. ( xiii). A nexus is defined as a set of a ctual 
entities in the unity of relatedness constituted by their pre-
hension of each other ( xiv). A proposition is the unity of certain 
actual entities involved are termed the 'logica l subjects,' 
and the complex eternal ob ject is the 'predicate' (xv). A 
multiplicity consists of many entities and its unity is constituted 
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by the f a ct tha t a l l its const itu e nt s s e v erally satisfy at 
l e a s t one c ondi t i on whic h n o other en t ity satisfie s ( xvi ). 
Wha teve r i s a datum for fe el in g he s a u nity a s fe lt ( xvi i ) . 
Ev e r y conditi on to vvh ich t he proces s of becomi ng conforms i n 
a ny par t i cu l a r instance h as its r eason eithe r i n t he ch a r a ct e r 
of s om e a ctua l ent i t y i n t he a ctua l v:or l d of t ha t conc re s en c e , 
or in the cha ract e r o f t he 'subje ct vvh ich is i n t.b e pr oces s of 
concre sen ce . Thi s i s the ' ontol ogica l princ i pl e ' ( x vi ii) • The 
f undame ntal t y pes of e ntities R.re a ctua l ent i ti e s a nd e t e r nal 
obj e ct s . Other types of en tities on l y expr e ss how a ll e ntiti e s 
of t h e t wo fu ndament al type s a r e i n c ommuni t y wi th ea c h oth e r 
( xix ) • To ' func t ion' me a ns t o co nt r i but e de t e rmi nC1.ti on t o t he 
actuel ent i t i es i n th e nexus of some act u a l wor l d . ' Determine t i on ' 
i s an l y zable i nto ' defi nit ene ss ' ( s el e ct e t erna l obje ct s ) a d 
' ·()ositi on ' ( r el 2. t i v e status i n a nexus of a ctua l occas i on s ) ( ::a: ). 
An ent it y i s a ctua l v-tnen it h a s s i gni f ic a n ce f or i tself , or 
f u nct i ons i n re s pect to its own s e lf-det e rmina tion ( xxi) . n 
a ctu a l en t i t y i s self-creativ e i n the t1r o c ess o f which it t r ansforms 
it s d ive r s ity of r :::> l es i n t o one coher ent ro l e ( xx i i) . J:'h i s s elf-
fun cti oning (or 'immedi a c y ') is th e r e a l i n t e r na l consti t uti on of 
an actua l entit y ( xxii i). ' Ob j e ct j_fi cati on ' i s th e fun cti oni n g 
of one a ctua l entity i n t :he s e l f - c r e: a ti on o f an othe r a ctua l enti t y 
( xy.i v ) . Th e f i na l .. ha s e in t he pr o c es s o f conc r ecenc e co nstitut i ng 
2n ac tua l entit y , i s one co mpl ex , full y d et e r minate feeli ng . Th i s 
' s G"Gis f c.cti o·n. ,' a s it is t c:: r-med, is d et e r mi na t e (P ) a s t . o its 
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c::-e:::.tivity , a nd (c) a s t o i ts :;)r eLE::1.sion--positive or negat iv e--
of <~very it em in its universe ( x:zv) . Ea ch elemer. t in t he genetic 
nrocess of a n a ctual ent i ty has one self-cons i::J tent f u:1. cti on i n 
the f i n8 l s t isfaction ( xxvi) . There is a suc cession of phase s 
' in which new orehensions a rise by inte grRtion of pr eh e nsions in 
ante c ede:r1t phases (I xYvii) • 
4) . The categorial obl i gat ions . The nine c a.t egorial obli-
gAtions e r e : 1) subjective u n i ty ; ii) obje ctive identity; iii) 
objectiv e ~li v e r sity ; iv ) conce ptua l v a lua t i on ; v) conce ptual 
r ev8rsion ; vi) t ransmutation ; vii) sub jective harmony ; viii) 
subjective int e:nsi t y ; i x } fr e edom end det e rmina tion . These as1Je cts 
of Whitehead ' s tho ught which , i ncid entally, res emble mo3t Al exander's 
categorie .3 , wi ll be trea t ed , i n so f a r B s they cone e rn creativity , 
i n a l c t e r section . 23 
Sev er a l point s a re mentioned here , however , whic h appedr t o 
serve both a s smo.m;J ry to the c ? te Fori ca J. scheme and a s l)rel i minary 
to ,, ha t Are caJ led t he deri vi ::,~ve notions . The f i rs t of these is 
the i dea tha t co mol e t e a bstracti on i s a sel f- contra dictory notion . 24 
~Jhit e he a next al lie s his doctrine with those of Bergson nd Alexander 
in thAt fo r him , a s for them , '"becoming ' i s a cr r:a tive advance i n to 
25 
novelt y , 1' noting spe cifically tha t t.he f i rst ca tegory of explanc::. tion 
23. PR , 39- L,2 . 
2L, . Cf . Categor y of Explanati on iv. 
2 5. PR. , ~-2 . 
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ex or e sse s "tha t every ultimate a ctuality embodies in its ovm 
essence wffit Alexand er t e rms 'a princinle o f unrest,' namely 
its becoming . n26 Further, this i dea is applied to the very 
notion of an 1 entity' in the fourth category, in that ' entity ' 
means 1 'an elem8nt cont ributory to the not ion of b e coming ,' n 
an d. also , in the ei g hteenth category , "the obli g ;., tions i mnosed 
on the be coming of a ny pa rti cula r a ctual entity ari se from the 
cons titutions of other actual ent itie s . TT This i s the gene r a lized 
notion of ' relativity. 127 
I h h 'l l f . 28 d' t " t' n a ddition , t e P 1 osop1y o · or gan1sm repu l R es ne 
notion of va cuous a ctuality, or ... the noti on of a r es vera devoid 
of subje ctive immedia cy.n 29 Furthermore , it holds to the i d ea 
th et the actual entity i s "at once the subject experi encing a nd 
tr.e su.per j ect of its experiences . " This abandons t he notion of 
an 8 ctua l ent it y as the unchanging subject of change .3n Again , 
a ctual entitles '" p 3r petually pe rish' subjectively , but a re 
i n:nort a l objectively . Actuality •.• loses the fin a l causation 
which i s the int erna l p rinci ple of unrest, and it a c c, uir e s e ffi-
ci ent causation v1hereby it is a ground of obli ge. tion cha racter-
izi ng the crea tivity . n3l 
The re is, aga i n , no emergent evolution of mult i plicity , s ince 
''every statement a bout a multiplicit y i s a dis junctive st e tement 
about its indivi dual memb e rs. n32 
2b . PR , 42-3; cit. Al exander , Art.(l927L J -;. 
27 . ,R , 43. 
28 . By categories x- xi ii. 
29 . PR , L:-3 . 
30 . PR, 4 3; cf. PR, 52. Thi s posi ti on , however , i s not 
cl e ;:- rl ~r rn3inta i ne d , as s ubsequent developments show. 
31 . :?n , 44 . 
3 2. PR , 45 . 
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Lastly , the phi l osophy of organi sm is g overned by the 
belief th ~ t the subject- predictate form of propo sition , con-
c P. rned a s it i s ·.-.i th high abstractions and rarely r e levant t o 
metaphysical cles cr·i ption , i s one of the ill-effe cts wh ich has 
been nr0duced by the Ari ,s tot e lian notion of npri mary substance , n 
a.nd an e ffect 111hich subse quent thinke r s apparently have not 
re alized )3 
ii. The Derivative Noti ons . 
\'ihitehead ' s Tfderivative notions!? i nvolve fo ur qrimary ideas, 
tv-w positive ones, arrl two neg2tive ones . Positively , there is 
the "primordial n,<:1tur e of God, " and the i dea of nnexns " ; neg-
atively , t here is the d enial of the cless ical notion of time as 
nuni q ue serialit y , n and the d eni al of t he assu mption that the 
besic elements of exper~ence a re consciousness, t hought , and sense-
perc eption . Each of t hese notions i s basic to the philosophy o f 
orga.ni sm . Al so , there i s a very close connection between them 
(espe cially the i dea of God) and the doctrine of cre ativity. 
Therefor e , a brie f s ketch of the i dea of God whic h 1i1!hit ehea.d 
hol d s is i n order at this t i me . 
1). The I dea of God . Since "any ihstance of experience is 
di pol ~ r, whethe r t~t i nstance be God or a n a ctual occasion of 
the world , n34 it follows that God 's nature is di polar . \Jhit ehead 
refers to this distinction by th e t erms nprimordial!! and " con-
se(~uent 11 natures of God . The Tlpriiilordi al nature of Godn consists 
3 3 • C f . PR , Lr 5 • 
3h. PR , 5Lr. 
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i n v·.rffi t :C1e c all ~; "the unc onditi on ed co _:c ept ual v alu<J t i on of the 
entir e ;m.llti plicity of e t e r na.l objc ct s • 1735 Hi s nconsec,ue n t 
nat uT c n r esult s from h i s physic a l pr ehe::-1s i ons of the :::.eri vc:t i ve 
a. ctual entit i s s .3 6 In th i s ~:3ense , then , God ' s n .:otur e is d i pol a r . 
How , .he i mport an ce of t he i dee: o£' t he Dr irrio r di al. n tur e o 
God c;:;n be observed by noting tl:.et 11 a :'a rt f r oril God , et e r nal 
objects unreali zed i n th'~ ctua l ·,.:crld woul d b e rel o: tive l y non -
o~~i s t etlt fo r tte conc resenc e i n Tt.:tes t i on . " In oth 2r \·ro r d s , He r e 
t1 ·,e~ce not some egency , e t e rnal obj e ct s cou l d not be c on.e r ele vant 
t o a c tual ent i ti es i n co ncre s en c e . And , s L1ce a g e·1cy (thi s noti on 
of a ,2;en cy is moE.t i mportant , but it i ~; not dealt i'iith ex ,· l i citly ) 
is found o;1l y in a ctual en tities , ~ . ;hitehe~d ass.ert s "od <F' tha t 
entity , ar.··l t h u s ~ 1 t' o ssib i l. i ty v11li c h t r a ·1s c ends t em ~·o ral matte r of 
fac t hc-H; a r eal relevance to the crec::tiv e a cL V2 ~-l c e . n 37 
l'-'ior·e ~eeds to be c;aicl B. ~Jout tr~ e i mrna.11 enc e o:f Gocl ' s fii' l LLordi al 
na t ure . - hitehe2d describ e t h is. i mrr:a ,1 enc e as n&n :.1r ge to-;, Jar d s 
')8 
t he futur e baser1 u~::, on all 2 :r:Jpetit e in th e pr ::.' sent. H...i Thi s 
L11. itself :: ·"J ri . ~ c i l)le of unrss t , i nvolving r caliz:1ti on of 1.vha t is 
"Cl 
no t B.nd r'l ay b e . 11 ..J , · There i s 2. ob vi ou s s j_!dlo rity hsre bet ween 
t his i c.l':~ "" a:-td the / e lan vit a l as well . h . 40 . S t:. "e D. l S U S . Howeve r , 
3 5 . ~:R , L.,. 6 . 
36 . Cf . PR, ~Art V. 
37 . ~·,rr , L:.6 . It i s inte r e:sting to n ote t hat t h i s vicv.1 
re pres~_ts a s ober and i nGenious ett empt to ac c om)l i sh 1h2t ? l£to 
a nd !i. riE:; tot le b :)th fa il e;l to a cc ompl i sh sue c e s s full :r , viz ., to 
hrL1 g form or 1·rd.v ersaJ.s , i n t o concret e r e l evanc e t o 0-a rti Cl_~lrrs . 
Cf . abo'H: , Ch .II 
3 8 . T' E , L:-7 . 
39 . .:--:' , 4'/-l!.-. 
L:-0 . i1ote th e r efer en ce a bov e , 252· to t .he:· signi fic ence o f 
t he fir ~.t cetegor y of ex-:Jlana t i on . 
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t he m~tt cr of r ele vance 1:10uld not be r aall y met vvere it n ot for 
t he f o ct the. t 
there ca n b e only one :.wn- cleri vat iv e actual i ty , unb ounded 
by it s ~- rt;hens i ons of Ell1 2 ctual world . ' his i s t h e 
ul tir1.ste , basic a d jus tr;1:ent of the toge therne ;3 S of 
e t <::Tna l ob.ie cts on vlhich creative or d e r de')en rl. s ... It 
is the conc e.)tua l . djustment of all a ppetit e s i n the 
f - , . 4, orm o a v er s ion s ~n ~ aa ve rs1ons . ·~ 
':hit ehead desir es to e void the diffic ulties of t e r mi nology 
occa i oned by almo~ t any t e rm he mi ght se l ect . His basic category 
of n c on,ertua _ prerlension 11 a lt t oug h it is devo i d of al l su("gestive-
n ess , r 2a uire e cl. ri fic £tio~ , a nd he r e l i ze s it . The t e rm 
"a ')petition~ t e nds to n d e gr ade 1: t he I1 otion v.,rhe n a p·~lie d to more 
i n tense a p :)l ic ;.< tions . The Be r g son i an i dea of ni ntuitio;:l1! is 
clos 0ly cc .1c c~ nLdT! but "with some di.fferences . "~~ 2 \ljhit ehead 
obje cts to it on the ground the t " i ntuition , n as Bergson us e s it, 
i s i~Ore c.ki n to V·lh e, t !:·/h i tehead Cal l s !! ;hysical pur p ose . 114 J 
The term 11 envi sa 5:eme nt 1T seems to be the closest to the i dea 
1
.\fhi"c ehe ad is trying to convey , vvi thout ent a i l ing the undes ir-ed 
connotati ons . Thus , 
God ' s ' primordial nature ' is abstracted from hi s comr:ter c e 
vri t h ' parti euler s , 1 and is there f or e devoi d of t hose 'impure 1 
inte llectual cog itati ons which i nvolve p ro positions (cf . 
?a r t III ) . It is God i n abstr action , a lone wit h hi msel f. 
As 8UC ll 4 it i s a mere factor i n God , deficient i n ctu-alit y .1+ 
Turning to th e cons equent nature of God, whic h , i n ci d ent ally 
i s not EJS i mDort ant for t he pr esent dis cussion as the forme r 
as ·-:::; ct of God ' s natur e , it rr.ay be seen that the re is another s i de 
hl. l)R , Lr t . 
1,. 2 . l.)R , '1-9 . 
L:. J . Cf . ?R, J,.06f_f • 
/....4 . PR , 50 . 
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to God's natur e , vi z . , the r ea ction of the world on Cod . In 
thi s sens e, Whit che ad ma i ntai ns that God "shares r,'Ji t h every new 
creation its a ctual 1·wrld; and the concres c ent creature is 
ob jectified i n God a s a nov e l ele ment in God ' s obje ctific 2ti on 
of that a ctua l world . '~ 45 Thus , while his conc~ t>tua l natur e is 
uncha 1ged s i nc e it is alrec.dy complet e , his consequent nature 
is ncon.se quent u ::;on the creat ive advance of the v,ro rlct . n46 This 
a s oe ct of God ' s :n:.>ture i s nc onsc i ous, . .. the realiza ti on of the 
, ctual world i n t he unity of hi s nature , and through the trans-
formati on of his wisd om •.• the weavi ng of h i s physic 1 f e :~ lings 
u pon h is primordial '·7 c one e pts . n -r 
I n additi on t o bei ng consc i ous the c ons '="ouent nature of 
God is sa i d to be "det e rmine d , incomplete , c onse c, u ent, ' ever-
lasting ,' fully actual , 11 as distinct f r om the Drimordi al natur e 
which is " free, com1Jlete , prir.10rdial , ete r nal , actu2ll y defi cient, 
and 1..1.nconsci ous . 11 Fu rther , t he consequent nature nori ginc.tes 
·,; ith phys ic al experie nc e derived f rom the t emporal world , and 
then a c quires integr-::'! t i on v.Ji th the primordial .si de . n48 
I t is i mportant , f urther , to recognize that God and the 
~r·Torl cl stand i n the relation of tt contra sted op·oo<>it es . n Bo t h 
have t wo po l es of " concrescent realization--' enjoyment ' and 
' a ppetition ,' that i s , the ' ~hysical ' and the 'conceptual.' 
45 . 
Lt6 . 
~-7 . 
42 . 
PH, 
?H. , 
PR, 
Pf' ' 
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For God the conc eptu al is pr i or t o t h e ph y s ic al , for the ~or l d 
t he Ph y s ica l pol e s 49 re prior to t he conc eptual pol e s . H Thus , 
! 1 God P...nd t h e 1:' orl d stand over against e a ch other , ex pr essing 
the fi nal metaphysical truth th 2t a ppetitiv e vision a nd physical 
. t h l l . t . •t . t. !! 50 e n JoymE?n ave equ a c aun ·o prlOrl y l n cr eA lon . g r eat 
d e2 l more could be sa i d about th is -ohase of the phi l o s o:;>hy of 
organism, b ut s pa ce p r ev ent s i t , e x c e pt to i ndic at e , in c on-
clusi on , that Go d is "primordially one" a nd T'primordially manyn 
in a co nvers e s e n se in wbich the worl d is co ns i der e d as many 
and c s one • Or, in ot he r v.ror d s , cre at ion and r e li gi on e r e two 
pha s e s of a si ng le reci pr oca l process, a rocess whi c h both s tarts 
and ertrl- "1-'li t h Gcd • 5l 
2) • Th e i de a of nexu s . nNexus " has a lready be e n ci efine d 
in t he cate gorical sch eme , a s desi gnati ng "nublic matters of 
f ., 52 act . · In the d i s cuss ion of the i dea of n exus h ie h he giv e s 
in the deri v at ive noti ons , l, 'hit ehead. ca ll s a tt e ntion t o th e f a ct 
t ha t a n exu s may en joy ei t he r a ' s o c i al order ' or a ' pe r sonal 
o r d. e r .' A ne xu s of the f orm e r t y pe i s c a lle d a "soci e t y 11 a n d 
i s found •·ihE- r e some c om.mon e leme nt of f orm ( a c on1Dl ex eterna l 
obje ct) i s exempli J. ie d. in e a ch memb e r of t h e ne x u s an d is 
dE'·r i v ed from oth e r me mb er s of t h e nexus which a r e Prrt e ced e nt to 
i t s ov-m concres cen c e . 53 
49 . i)R , 528 . 52 • C f • ab ov e , 
50 . PR, 529 . 53 . PR , 51 . 
5J . :OR, 529 f f . 
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By " per s onal or der'r ~· .'h it ehea d mea nc a nexus vvhic h is b oth 
a so c iety -=-..., ~ t he genetic rela t <:l cl.n e ss of v-1hose member s 11 or ri. E.' r s 
t J.'k~ 3 e roomb A r.s ' s e ri a l ly. 1 n 5l~ Such a nexus i s called a n n e nduring 
object. '~ Some so ci et i es may , or may n ot , b e a l so en duri . g objects . 
Iv .. o s t phys i c al obje cts .fa ll i nto t h i s cla ss . 55 
'.' ) 
. ' . The deni a l of ·t,he cla ss not ion of t i me as "uni que 
s eri a l i ty . n 1'hi s ne ga tive not i on involv es t he positive a s sertion 
5::) 
which h r.:: made in hi s earl i e r 1>"ork , Sci ence and the M.o rlern ~·Torld , 
that ni n some s en se , time •.• extends beyond the s ~:l atio-t emporal 
continuum of nature . n 57 Time , i n othe r words , i s n a tomi c (,i . e . , 
e pocha l) , t h ough what is t emporali z e d i s d i visible • . • . Temoor ali-
zati on is re a lization •.• not anot he r conti nuous procec s . 11 58 Return -
i n g to th e PR, he say s , ntb e ultirPEt e metaphycic a l t rutt.. is 
atomi sm •.•• But atomi sm d. oes not e x clude compl exity , a nd univ ersal 
re 1 ~ ti vi t y . • . • The ? ro pe r bal n c e between atorni sm a.nd co nt i nui t y 
i s of i mportanc e t o s cien ce . 1t 59 
4) . Ac cor ding to the philo so ph y of organi sm the as sumpt ion 
of t he :-::hi l·.) s oph ic traditi o ~1 is erroneou s , viz ., t:bEt nconscious-
ness , t h ought , a :1 d. sens e-:oe rc e ptionn ar e the basic element s of 
experi enc e . For the ph ilo so phy of or ga n i sm '1a ny i ns t anc e of 
exnerience is dipola r , 111Thethe r th a t instance be God or e.n a ctual 
occ a s i on of th e 'ror l d . The ori ginBtion of God is fro m t h e nental 
pole , the ori E.i nati on of an Actual occasion i s from the phys ical 
54 . PR , 51 . 
5 5 . PR , 51 , 52 . 
56 . Her e i n fl fte r re fe rred t o as Slv;·.\' . 
57 . s~~·i~~ , l 81f . 
58 . S .. ,,. 1 6 5 \ l. '_'iJ ' 0 • 
59 . . ) R, 53 . 
1 ,.60 DO e . 
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iii . The Place of Cre ativity in the Phi lo sophy of Organism . 
While the ca tegor ical s ch e1:1e , pr e sented above , has menti oned 
c:cea t ivity in a v ery gene ral manner , it rema i ns to be seen just 
whnt fun ction thi ::: important co ncept plays i n the 'ietails of the 
phi loso ~hy of or g.:mism. 
1 ) . Cre :' t ivi t y and God . The f a ct that ';Jhitehe c; d makes 
creati v i t y th e cate gory of the ultimat e , r c:ther than God , is at 
onc e a s triking nov e lty . It has raised , for s ome , the question 
o f 'rvhe t he r T ~:hit ehead ' s Go d is the God of religi on . 61 It is 
needl ess to say that the pr esence in a the i 'stic vi ew of an ultimate 
wh i ch is not God repres ents a cons i der abl e d epa rtur e from most , 
i f not al l , previous cosmo logies . J3ut there seems little do ubt 
that ~·!hit ehe ad rreans exactly wha t he says whe n he says creativity 
i s the ' univ er s al of universals characteri zi ng ultima t e matter 
of f act . " Therefore , it is to this i dea tha t a tt ention must 
first turn, si nce several ooi nts need to be cl ari f ied . 
In the f i rst pl ace , it is nec essary to noti c e tha t " crea tivity 
. 1 . h . 1 . t · n 62 T 1 s not an extema a{!ency vnt 1t s own u t e r 1 or mo-lve s . o 
hold that it vvere v'rould b e to vi olete the ontologi cal princi ple 
wl1ich r ega r ds al l explanati on as g rounded in actu a l entiti es . 
In thi s resr:ect , then , '#hitehead r e ject s t he tendency on the part 
of the the olo ,e~ica l expl ana tions to r e ga r d any one of the v a rious 
60 . ?R , 56 . 
61 . Cf . El y , RA .. 'G; cf . al o , Taylor , Art . (l927 ). 
62 . PR, 339 ; ita lic s mi ne . 
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elements i nvol v ed i n creation 2 s compl etel y t r ans c endent eithe r 
t o each ot.he r or to the l'lorlcl . Al so , he i s r e a c t i ng aga i n s t t he 
cont i nua tion of th i s tendency i n the bi furcati ons 01. mo dern 
/ 3 6h 
philosophy and vi s i bl e s t i l l in Be r g son° and e ven in Al exander . · 
Second l y , it must b e i nqu i r ed in what s ense c r eati vi t y i s 
more ultimr. t e th a n God , if it is not an exter na l agen c y . In 
ans•,;e r to th i s , it is necessary to not e anothe r pri nc i pl e , viz ., 
65 
rhythm , wh ich appe ar s i n an earl y phi l o sophical work . For 
Whi teheed , r hythm is an essent i e l noti on wi th r espe ct to t he i dea 
of c rea t i v i ty . For , t ur ning nov-r t o the i dea of God , t he p r i -
mord.ial natur e of God " i s a t onc e a c r ee ture of cre ~ t i vity .:md 
a condition for creat i v i ty . It share s th i s oub l e cha ract e r wi t h 
66 
all cre"l ture s . " Not e here Fi gur e 16 . This should be taken t o 
mean t h a t creat i vity conditi ons both Gorl a nd t he cre r. t ur e s of 
the T.'Jorld . n d al so that cre ::J t i vi t y i s conditi oned both by God 
and t h s 1,vorld . I t d o es so e lt e r nat e l y or rhyt hmic a lly . The 
i mpl i c ati ons of th i s wi 11 appear a b it lat er . A par ti cul a r l y 
significan t sta t erne nt of th i s pos i t i on can be noted a b i t f a rther 
on vihE:re VJhit e head s2ys thnt 
God can be t e rmed the c r e a t or of ea ch tempor al .s.ctual 
entit y . But t he phrase i s a· t t o be mi s l eading by it s 
sugge s t l on that t he ul t i ma te c r e ~! ti vi ty of the uni v s r se 
is to be escri bed t o God ' s vol ition. The true met a-
nhys i c a l osit i on i s thet Go d i s the abori.:;i na l instance 
of t h i s creAt i vit y , a n d i s t he r e f or e t h e Abor igi nal co n-
dit i on whi ch c: ua lifi e s it s a cti on . It i s t h e func ti on 
, 
63. Elan vi tal vs . matt e r. 
64 . Sna c e --Ti me vs. n i s us. 
65 . PNI~ , 197-?.0 0 . I;Vhi tehead menti ons Bergson in th i s 
c onn. e ction , and i t rrey well be tha t he deri v es th i s i dea -~· rom 
the Fren ch t h i n k e r. 
66 . PR , iJ.-7 . 
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67 . Note here t.."'1e ttd ro p " shape . Obviously this analo gy 
does not do justi ce t o the co nc e r;t . Howev2r, ~'lhit ehead uses t he 
uhr 2.se "rl ro s of experienc en with r 8f e r ence to actual entities . 
R, 2~ • . ot e elso the "dart" as a ppli ed to cre-:1t ivity . \'lhitehe d 
himself r efers to crea tivi ty as " t he fl ying d 2rt , of wh ic h 
Lucret ius s~1e ak s , hurl e.~l beyond t he b ound s of the Kor ld . n .t.JI , 
227 . The c osi tions of the a ctual occa s i ons a r e obvi ousl y Dur e l.y 
of actuality to characterize the creativity, and 
God is the eternal primordia l character. But of 
course, there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart 
from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apar t 
from the creativity and the 't emporal creatures,' 
and no meaning to the tg~poral crea tures apart from 
'creativity' and ' God .' ~ 
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Charles Hartshorne, one of the more profound students of 
Whitehead, in commenting on this po int, maintains the position 
t hat creativity is not a causal fac t or beyond God , but rather 
that it is "the common property or generic name for a ll t he 
doing s." When Whitehead s ay s, he concludes, that creativity 
in gene r a l is wider than God, "he is ~imply pointing out .•• that 
not a ll decisions are God's decisions.n 69 But this appears to 
be only a partia l answer, correct a s it is as far a s it goes. 
For God is not only with his creatures he is also in a real 
sense related to their coming into being. Thus, God himself 
has a "superjective" nature, which "is the con ception of God 
whereby he is considered the outcome of creativity.n70 In other 
words, there is in this idea something whi ch is not cleared up 
apparently, viz., t he fact that if God's primordial nature has 
no past, the function of creativity is quite different in the 
conjectural, as is a lso the employment of lines for the primor-
dial nature of God. There is, perhaps, some justification for 
the l att er in that the two notions of conc eptual valuation a nd 
relevance a re thereby roughly indicated. The circle tradition-
ally denotes eternity. Cf., below, Fi g . 16, for the represen-
tation of the microcosmic or concrescent process. 
68 . PR , 344. 
69. Hartshorne , Art.(l94l), 528. 
70. PR, 1 35 ; cf. 522, where Go d is s a id to "acquire" a 
primordi a l nature. 
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case of God from what it is with r e spect to other actual en-
tities. Is creativity, then, as Dorothy Emmet asks, "really 
complete generality or only as far back as it is possible to 
push explanation'?n7l This is one of the more general problems 
upon which the subsequent discussion will attempt t o shed some 
light. 
Summarizing , then, it has been observed that creativity 
is more ultimate than God, although, according to the ontological 
principle, it is not to be considered independent of God. As 
such it is to be considered both as conditioning or character-
izing and as conditioned or characterized £x all creatures 
including God. 
~ith respect to the manner in which God conditions cre-
ativity, it is apparently the same as it is for other en-
tities. Therefore, these matters will be dealt vfi th to-
gether in what follows. 
2). Creativity and actual entities. To grasp t he full 
meaning which vfuitehead is trying to convey on the matter of 
the actual occasion, is a task which is not only unfeasible 
but also out of place here. Therefore, an attempt will be 
made only to sketch the main directions of his thought in 
t his matter, especially as it involves creativity. 
First of all, creativity transcends actual entities, both 
God and actual occasions, although, of cour se, in no other sense 
71. \vPO, 71. 
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t han that in vlhich any actual ent ity is causa sui, 72 and, as 
has been noted, is condi tioned by them. By this is meant that 
the process of creation is rhythmic, as has been noted. 
Next, creativity is the principle of individuality, i.e., 
the principle which relates the One to the Many. As Dorothy 
Emmet so aptly puts it: "Creation is ••• the eternal process of 
the breaking up of the One into the Many and the growing to-
gather again, in a new kind of unity, of the Many into One.u73 
Furthermore, it should be noted that creativity is "the 
principle of novelty.n74 Every actual entity "is a novel 
entity diverse from any entity in the 'many' which it unifies. 
Thu s 'creativity' introduces novelty into the content of the 
many, which are the universe disjunctively.n75 In this connec-
tion, God is what Whitehead calls "the organ of novelty.u76 
How are actual occasions created, though? To answer this 
qu e stion there are at le~st two possible approaches. It might 
be approached, in the fir s t place, from the point of view of 
the elements or components which go to make up the occasion. 
Or, secondly, it might involve an analysis of the history of 
any one of the components. Perhaps if both approaches are 
noted a more f r uitful result will be obtained in what follows. 
From the point of view of the components of the actual 
72. The t e rm "occasion" is confined to entities which 
are not God . cf. PR, 339f. 
73. WPO , 73-4. 
74. PR, 31; italics \Vnitehead's. 
75. PR, 31-2. 
76. PR, 104; italics mine. 
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occas ion, it may be briefly observed that the elements involved 
in th e concre scent process are: th e transcendent creativity , 
eterna l objects, prehensions ., and subjective aim. From this 
po i nt of view,77 then, 
the actualiti e s constituting the process of the world 
are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or 'par-
ticipation') of other things eternal obj e cts which con-
stitute the potentia lities of definit eness for any a c-
tua l exi s t ence. The thing s whi ch are tempo ral a~ise by 
t heir participation in the things which are eternal . 
The two sets a r e mediated by a thing vrhich combines the 
a ctua lity of vrhat is t emporal wi th the timelessness of 
vvhat is potenti al. This final entity is the divine ele-
ment ..• by means of which each eternal object has a def-
init e , effe ctive r e l evance to each concrescent process .?$ 
That this certainly sound s like Plato's "demiurge" who forms 
the chaotic stuff with his eyes on t he eternal. That T;lhit ehead' s 
entire cosmolo gy is, with certain exc eptions , Platoni c in quality, 
especially the Plato of the Timaeus , is one of the main points of 
77. Cf . Fi g . 16 . 
78. PR , 63-4 . 
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Do r othy "Srmne t ' s book . Here she s i de s 1/•,i t h A. E . Taylor who 
attempts to show th e same thi ng . 79 l,.'ihit ehe ad , himself, admits 
th c: t h i s l i ne of thou?ht is clos e to that su{'·gested in the 
. 60 Tlma eus. 
In a~di tion , "each a ctual entity may be conc ei ved as an 
a ct of exD ~ri ence a risi ng out o f data .•• a proc ess of ' feel i ng' 
t h e ma ny clata , so as to abso rb t hem i nto the u nit y of one 
i ndi vi c u a l ' sat i s f 2 ction . " r61 I t i s the ana l ysis of th i s 
notion of feel i ng (or positive prehension) that e ttention must 
now be given , s i nce here i s pr esent Ad most cl ea rly the D!'o c ess 
which is the a. ctu2l occasi on . Fi r s t , a p rehens ion i nvolves 
thr e e rre i n fectors . There i s t he ' s ubject' preh2ndi ng , the 
' datum ' •Hh ic h is pr ehe ::1~.e d , c:md the ' E.: ubje ct i ve form' v.,rhich i s 
l1ow the 3ubject pr ebends that detum . e2 Al so , ·t .. e :)rocess ma y 
be cha r ac t f- rize d ,gs 11 8. jJa ssa.ge from r e-ene1ction to antici pati on" 
or as po ::ses!::inc:· t,hree ~; 1::-ages i n the proc ess: of f eelinr: : (i ) 
the r eS i)Ons iv2 phas e , (ii) the su9pl emerrtal s t a?-:P. , .::> n:l ( i ii) 
. . 83 the sa t1sfa ct1 on . The f ir .t phas s , or "the phas e of pure 
r e c e ption o.I the ;:,ctual ·.-.o rld in it s r.;u i se of objective ·L atum 
I 
for r.:>ef;thetic ~ny'thesis , " is TT·the me r e r eception oi t he actua l 
I ' 
79 . Cf . ':'?0 ' 221- ?3 0 . 
~0 . Cf . ? .H. , i x , 126 , l h2-147. 
Cl. PR , 65 . .. , Fi g . 16 . oee 
(I ') Cf. :2R , 35; also cf . AGI, 227 . o~...- . 
b3. Cf . PH. , 3 ~)3ff . 
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-vvorld as multi;>l icity- of private centers of feel i ng •.• felt 2.s 
and w~ic h ere not ab s orb ed 
~; ' 
i nto the privct.e irnrnedi e cy . n'-''+ 
The second st2ge , vihich is €· ov ,~ rn ed by the qri.vate i deal, 
f i nds nthe rrw ny feelinf;: , d E:T i vat i vely felt as 2l i en , ... tr·a n s -
.. 'Jl' _t -: d into a u nity of '""~es th etic ar:.~-:>re c i. tion im~r· edi ctely :1.. e lt 
priv"~ t e . This the i~oming of ' s p)etit i on ,' ·and b~ re~son 
of this in fluz of co ne er-tual feel i ngs .• • the f eel i .n.t:s E ssume an 
t:r-errloti on~l cherc:cter . n ) This ···' "\.laG2 c-cy exhi bit ·ithc r ' e>ssthetic 
su:;p ler:ent ' or 'int elle ctua l sup-ol ement'; the former are :'bl ind 
occ sions ' ; the lotter sre '' conscious . ,. 
The thi.r G. arr.l fina l st 2ge , t hc,t of ' satisf CJ cti on , ' i s termed 
by T .'hit el1 ea d :tthe con"'c e~1tment of the crea t iv e urge by the Iulfill-
me 11t of its c0tegorcal 
Q6 
d Au1~~ nd s . 11 v This f i na l )hase alRo mi ght 
b e t houg .t of as 'ful l ~r d.e t s rmi na t e; ( a ) c.E; to it s .=encsis , (b) 
as to its objecti ve charact e r for the t rans c endent creat ivity , 
and ( c )· as to its ~rehensi on-- posit ive or ne[at iv e- - of every 
it em in it s 1mive rse . 1~ ' 7 I n addition , it i s ne c essc:ry to note 
that '' atta ined SCJ~ isfoction r ema i ns a s an element i n t he content 
of crea tiv e purpose . The r e i s , in th i s :ja} , trans cen<.Jen c e of 
th e c reativity ; ll:·.ic h effect s deter tinate ob j ectific at i ons f or 
the ren s'rJ~l of the p ro ce ss i n th e concresenc e of c. ctual i t i es 
b eyond thP t s2t i sfi ed super j ect. nL Thus i t is that the a ctual 
84 . ".)R , 323 . 8'7 • R ' 36 . , . 55 . ~'R , 3'?3 - l~ . c~e . PH , 1 3. ..L L!· • 
86 . .'R, 33 5 . 
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entity has a three-fold character: (i} that "gi ven for it 
by the pa s t"; (ii ) ttthe subjective character aimed at in its 
process of concrescence"; and (iii) 11 the superje ctive cha~a c ter, 
which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisf action 
qualifying the transcendent creati vity.n89 
Wi th this discussion of the concrescent process as it in-
valves its di vision into feeling this sketch of t he philosophy of 
organ i sm moves on to the question of the manner i n -which creativity 
is conditioned by its creatures. ~hitehead t ell s us that creativity 
is conditioned by the immediate occasion by virtue of the fact 
that "appetition ••• or immediate matter of fa~t incluning in it-
self a principle of unrest, involves realization of what is not 
and may be . 11 Thus the creativity of an occasion is conditioned 
"so as to procure, in the future , physical r ealization of the 
its mental pole.n90 We are also told that it is ''only by means of 
feelings that the subject objectively condi t ions t he creativity 
transcendent beyond itself," since 11 the subj ect is what it is in 
virtue of its feelings."9l Again, the "primary phase of simply 
physical feelings constitutes the machinery by r eason of whi ch the 
creativity transcends the world already a ctual, and yet remains 
conditioned by that actual world in its new impersonation .n92 
On the level of God, it is "divine orderirg '' whic h bring s effective 
89. PR, 134. 
90. PR, 47-8. 
91. PR, 339. 
92. PR, 362. 
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relevance of eternal objects to the concrescence in question 
which conditions creativity.93 For all creatures, it is ''ob-
jective immortality" which "constitutes the shifting character 
of creativity." 94 Viewed, then, "in conjunction" or "as a 
whole" the real objects of the actual vm rld "carry the cre-
ativity which d rives the world."95 
It is necessary to note here, however, that Whitehea d 
has not dealt in sufficient det a il with the precise manner 
in ·which creativity is "conditioned by" or "conditions" its 
creatures. It would appea'r that this very important aspect 
of the doctrine should have received more exposition. 
Summarizing , then, it has been found that creativity both 
transcends actual occasions and is conditioned by them.96 
Creativity is the principle of individuality, mediating the 
One and the Many. Also, creativity is the principle of nov-
elty in that it introduces novelty into the content of the 
many. Furthermore, creativity's creatures, including as 
they do both God a nd temporal occasions, impose cond itions 
upon creativity which bring about a "shifting" of its char-
acter by means of conceptual feelings. 
Whitehead does not sufficiently elaborate, though, 
upon the details of this process. 
93. PR, 46. 
94. PR , 47. 
95. AOI , 230-1. 
96. There is a similarity here between Aristotle's 
"matter" and creativity, in that both have no cha r a cter of 
their own but are found only in real objects which impose 
special conditions upon it. Cf. PR, 47, and above,262 • 
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3). Creativity, Societies and Nexus. \'Jhitehead' s dis-
cussion of the "hierarchies of societies composing our pres-
ent epoch" is admittedly "largely conjectural" and cons isting 
of "the more specia l possibilities of explanation consistent 
with our general cosmolo gical doctrine, but not necessitated 
by it. 97 Also, of necessity, it will be neither possible nor 
necessa ry to review here more than the salient features of 
Whitehead's doctrine of sociality. The chief reason for in-
eluding this section here is because of the tremendous im-
portanc e of objects which 'VJhitehead calls societies and 
nexus in human experience. Furthermore, if the doctrine 
of creativity can be found to apply adequately to this area 
of experi ence there will b e evidenced perhaps a good deal 
more justification for the notion. However, if it should 
not be found ade qua te h ere, there mi ght well be justification 
to question the entir~ notion of creativity at least in the 
f orm in which 'I;,Jh i tehead presents it. 
There are severa l ideas which form the background for 
this discussion. First, Whitehead considers the physical 
world a s bound to gether by "a general type of relatedness 
which constitutes it into an extensive continuum" which 
consists of "a vast nexus extending far beyond our immed-
iate epoch" but which also "constitutes the whole environ-
ment within which our epoch is set.n 98 
97. PR, 14 7. 
98. PR, 14 7-8. 
Next, there are two related but different ideas \vhich 
re quire attention. These are the 11 structured society" and 
the "unspecialized society." The structured society is a 
society 11which includes subordinate societies a nd nexus 
with a definite pattern of structural inter-relations. 11 
An example of this type of society "\'muld be a living cell. 
The subordinate society involved would be the molecule; 
the other groups of occasions involved would be termed sub-
ordinat e nexus. Other exampl e s of structured societies 
would probably be molecules, e l e ctrons, protons, crystals. 
But ga ses are not of this type, although their molecules 
are. 99 The 11 unspecialized society11 generally excludes 
11 a ny particular determination of structural pattern, 11 a 
characteristic which enables it to "adopt that special 
pattern adapted to the circumstances of the moment. 11100 
In general, however, the following "problem for 
Nat ure" arises as a r e sult of these considerations. The 
"structured society" with its high gr ade of complexity 
which is favorable for intensity of sa tisfa ction is de-
f ici ent in survival value. On the other hand , t he "un-
speci a lized society" which is high in survival va lue is 
usually unable to secure intensity of s atisf action among 
99 . Cf. PR, 151-2. 
100 . PR, 153. 
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its members. Thus, the problem for Nature is the "production 
of societi e s which are 'structured' with a high 'compl exity ,' 
and which are a t the same time 'unsp ecia lized.' In this way , 
intensity is mated with survival."lOl 
This problem has be e n solved, a ccording to Whitehead, 
in t wo way s, both of which "depe nd on that enhanc ement of 
1 1 h . h . f . . . f . 10 ~ the menta po e , w lC 1s a actor 1n 1n tens1ty o exper l ence. 
The first way he mentions elicits "a massive average objec-
ti f ication of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diver-
sities of the various members of the nexus in question." The 
second way of solving t h e problem is 
by a n initiative in conceptua l prehensions, i.e., in 
a ppetition. The purpose of this initiative is to re-
ceive the novel e l ements of the environment into ex-
plicit feeling s with such subjective forms as concil-
iate them with the complex experiences proper to the 
members of the structured society . Thus in each con-
cresc ent occasion its subjective aim ori ginates nov-
elty to match the novelty of the environment.nl03 
The former method is cha racteristic of all physical bodies, 
organic a nd inorganic, a nd marks "the f irst grade of ascent 
beyond the mere repro ductiv~ stage.'' Here is found "some 
initia~ive of co n ceptua l integration, but no origina lity 
in conceptua l prehension." Examples of these material 
bodies would be indicated by such variously c omplex socie-
ties as cry stals, rocks, planets, and suns.104 
101. PR, 154. 
102. PR , 154. 
103 . PR, 154-155. 
~04. PR, 155. 
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When the latter described method is found to be more impor-
tant, it is characteristic of structured societies which are 
called "living11 or "organic." \'Jhen the former mode is im-
portant and the second is unimportant, the society involved 
is called "inorganic.n Thus there is no absolute gap between 
the living and non-living societies,l05 and the degree of 
"life" possessed by a society is determined by the presence 
in it of living occasions, which, in turn, are "more or 
less living according to the relative importance of the 
novel factors in their final satisfaction."l06 Again, 
a single occasion is alive when the subjective aim which 
determines its process of concrescence has introduced 
a novelty of definiteness not to be found in the inher-
ited data of its primary phase. Thus novelty is intro-
duced conceptually and disturbs the inherited 'respon-
sive' adjustment of subj e ctive forms.l07 
It is now time to observe the similarity which \0hitehead's 
theory of life shows to those of Bergson and Alexander. In 
the macrocosmic view of nature, there are six types of occur-
ranees. They are of the nature of "levels" although they are 
purposely not precise. Their resemblance to Alexander's 
schemelOS is very a pparent. All the levels, stretching from 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108 . 
Cf. Bergson and Alexander who have difficulty on 
this point. 
PR, 156. 
PR, 159. 
Cf. above,~B~ .· 
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{
t't ••• there is t he an-i mal life vlith f its central direction of a soci-ety of c ells, 
{
then there l s the vegetable life 
wi . th its org2.ni zed. r epublic of 
cells , 
ALL Ii.Hllili..L LIF .G 
OTI·ill"l. THA.H 1-fUT;J\N 
ALL V0'J,:il'ABLl~ LIF~ 
{ 
ther e is the cell life yJit h 
its organized re~ublic of 
molecules , 
t here is the l2.l~f; e scale 
inorganic society of 
:r:10l ecuJ.es Tii"i:, 1 i ts pas -
sive acceptance of nec e s-
sities derived from 
spatial r elations , 
~ LL L.i\.RG~ SCAL ,. I NO?..Cho.lJIC AG<.1R..BIW 
G.! T .&3 (Al'JII-.:..:~L SIZ.:.!:: c: Ll~..i.='Jllli) 
there ~!. S the infra-
molec"Lliar activity 
nhicll has lost all 
trace of i norganic 
nature on a larg e 
scale . 1 ALL n.iFTIE T.t:.:Slld\.L Hii.PI-'ENll-TGS- -
(A'l'Git iC cc SlJ.BA'fObiC) ;iO'l' , 215 ; cf. Pi?. , 269f. 
Fi g . 1 8 - \TIUT,i;ii J.::AD 1S PHILOSOhii OF LIF.::: 
the purely biological109 to the purely physical, involves 
mutual influence, re quirement, and conn ection. 11° Fig. 17 
probably presents the idea without too much distortion. 
The process mi ght be consi dered the other way, i.e., 
from the smallest particles to the most complex: 
Ultimate particles, the proton, electron, etc., build 
up atoms, atoms build molecules, molecules build large 
collodial particles and cell constituents and para-
crystalline phases and the like, these in turn are 
organized into the living cell ••.• Cells form organs 
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a nd tissues, they combine into the functioning living 
body, and the bodies of animals, especially men, form 
social communities. As the central nervous system be-
comes more complex so mental phenomena emerge, until111 the elaborate psychological life of man is attained . 
Summarizing, then, the philosophy of organism, may be 
seen as a world-view dominated by s everal key-ideas, among 
which are generality, coherence, process, "stubborn fact," 
relatedness, and novelty. In general, the philosophy of 
orga nism finds the world to be a quantitative pluralism, 
actual entities (including God and actual occasions) being 
the basic units. But, since actual entities are not static, 
but are rather microcosmic processes further analyzable 
into feelings (prehensions) the philosophy of organism 
might be called a qualitative monism. However, from still 
another point of vi ew , vvhi tehead' s scheme must be consid-
ered as an attempt to solve the problem of actuality and 
109. Whitehead's distinction between the mental and 
the biological is not clear. 
110. Cf. Modes of Thought, 215; hereinafter this work 
is referred to as Jl.ilOT. 
111. Needham, Art.(l941),249. 
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potentiality. In this respe ct, the Platonic Ideas become 
the realm of eternal objects in the primordial nature of 
God. These are the "pure potentials." Agency, which is 
God's primordial valuation of this realm of eternal objects, 
makes the se eternal objects relevant to the concrescence 
of each novel actual occasion. In this way, actuality, or 
definiteness and unity is g iven to what before was poten-
tia lity or indefiniteness and multiplicity. The ultimate 
category, and the principle of novelty, is creativity. 
Creativity is the ultimate which is both transcendent to 
actual entities a nd is conditioned by them. In this way, 
the creative process is an ever-new process, both God and 
the World never reaching static completion, and both being 
"in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the cre-
ative advance into novelty. 11112 
3. Creativity and the Problems of Novelty 
i. The problem of epistemology. 
In the previous chapters the section dealing with the 
problem of epistemology has been concerned with the method 
or process by vrhich the particular doctrine in question is 
known or is believed to exist. This is part of the present 
concern. However, before t his part of the discussion is 
entered upon it will be nece s sary to gather up the various 
112. PR, 529. 
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characteristics or qualities which creativity is believed to 
possess in order that there may be a clear notion of what is 
being studied. 
It is interesting to note that in each of Whitehead's 
major philosophical works, S~~i, PR, and AOI, there are slight 
variations in the definition of creativity. In fact, in SWN, 
the terms are not referred to specifically at all. In this 
early philosophical work, the term which apparently carries 
the meaning of creativity is "substantial activity," and its 
correlatives, "underlying activity," "eternal activity,tr and 
"general activity.nll.3 The term "creativity" appears for 
the first time in I:Jhi tehead v'li th the appearance in 1926 of 
Reli gion in the Making, and the article "Time." When \I, hi te-
head come s to PR, he uses the more abstract notion "crea-
tivity" almost completely, lapsing only on two or three 
occasions into the use of the terms "creative action,n and 
"creative urge.nll4 By the time Whitehead writes AOI, it 
appears that there is a synthesis of t hese i deas in his 
mind, for here he uses the term "creativity" but discusses 
it less as a "principle" a nd more as a "factor of activit~~~ 
It may not be very profitable at this point to base 
any inferences upon this observation. For there may not be 
113. Cf. SMVJ , 154, 155, 23 8 , 254, 255. 
114. Cf. PR, 89 , 197, 519 . 
115. Cf. AOI, 230-231. 
any actual basis fo r this chang e in Whit ehead ' s mind . It 
mi ght not be going too far, to call attention, however, to 
the facts, and, i f t here is opportunity later, to judg e 
their meaning . The present study will, howev er , t ake the 
notion of "sub s tanti a l a ctivity" to mean r e l at ively the 
s a me t hine as i s referred to on other writing s as " crea -
tivit y . tr \•Jherever possi b l e , a tt ention will be g ive n t o t h e 
f a ct t hat i t is his early view. 
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How is th e cre~tivity known? In Cha pter III , a tt ent ion 
was d r a'tnl to t he va rious way s in wh ich nove lty mi ght be 
k n own . Th ese wer e noted as three a p proa che s , the apriorist , 
the intuitionist, a nd the empiricist . In the chapter on 
Ber g son, it was noted tha t the French t h inker emphasized 
t h e intuitionist a pproach and a pplied it to th e elan vital, 
the source of novelty. In the discussion of Samuel Alex-
ander, it vva s noted that, while he a v oided the ex treme 
empha sis upon intuition with respect to nov elty , regard i ng 
it as a n emp~rical fact, he seemed to lean upon intuition, 
especi a lly reli g ious intuition, as a means of i denti f ying 
the nisus. In the thought of Whitehead , and especially in 
his PR , he t ends toward a different method of approach. 
This will now be discussed. 
In the first place, the general po sition of Whitehe ad 
as a follower of the g eneral tradition kno~m as empiricism 
would hardly be challenged. His dependence u pon the 
empirical ideas of Locke, Hume, Descartes, 2.nd Leibniz is 
well known . vihile not opposed to the truth wh ich historical 
rationalism stood for , explicitly, nevertheless, he a l ways 
make s " concrete stubborn fact" the ultima te, the "alpha a nd 
the omega" of his investigat ion. This interpret at ion is 
borne out in the way in which the doctri ne of "substanti a l 
activity" is presented in Sl\Tv\7 . Here he says, 11 the consid-
eration of the general flux of event s leads to this ana l ysis 
into an underlying eternal energy in whose nature there st a nds 
an envisag ement of the realm of a ll e terna l objects.nll6 Ob-
viously this is a reference to the primordial nature of God, 
which has a lready been discussed. The i mportant point here 
is tha t in the S:f\1\i\f the approach is evidently empirical, that 
is, it is an inference based upon th e fact of the g eneral 
flux of events. 
When the attention turns to PR, it is not at all as 
app a rent that this 'a p proa ch is maintained. Here the term 
"creativity'' is referred to any number of times in a ma nner 
whi ch would indicate something akin to the " apriorist 11 
approach. That creativity is an "ultimate" has a lready 
been noted. 117 Also, it is referred to as "inexplicable 
by its forms"; 118 as "the general principle presupposed 
116. SMW, 154. 
117. Cf. PR, 11, 3lff. 
118 . PR , 30 . 
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in the three more special categoriesn; 119 as "the fundamental 
inescapable fact;" 120 and as "the universal of universal~~~ 
Statements such as these would seem to indicate that White-
head has in the notion of creativity something which is nee-
essary to everything which is, something which in the phrase-
ology of Alexander is a ''categorial" fe ature of things. How-
ever , it would be unfair to \'!hi tehead if he were accused of 
apriorism here. Such accusations usually carry with them 
the notion that whatever the category be which is involved 
is something which is subject only to the forms of thought. 
Whitehead has made himself eminently clear on this point, 
viz., that "all knowledge is derived from , and verified by, 
direct intuitive observation . I ac cept this axiom of em-
piricism as stated in t his general form. 11122 Light may be 
shed on the subject by noting that although the constant 
r eferences by ~· _Thitehead to creativity as a "principle" and 
a ncategory" throughout PR mi ght tend to support the idea 
that crea tivity ·is an apriori cat egory, they need not do so. 
For it is entirely possible that creativity may rather be 
an ultimate which is empiri cally verified rather than 
assumed apriori. The importance of the idea, in other words, 
may be irrelevant to the method by which it is reached. 
119. PR, 31; italics mine. 
120 . PR, 321. 
121. PR, 31. 
122. AOI , 228. 
Perhaps the best way to check this matter would be to note 
what can be found to indicate an approach other than apriori. 
In the first place, White~ead calls attention to the 
fact that for him "the s ole appeal" in the analysis of the 
components of concre scence or "the 'production of novel to-
g etherness'" is to "intuition." 123 Other passages, e spec-
i a lly those which deal with the discussion of feelings124 
tend to l end support to the intuitionist approach, viz., 
that the relation between actual entities (including , of 
cour se, what is commonly referred to as a "knowing sub-
j ect") and creativity is a n intuitive relation. 
It is quite obvious, however, that, while, on ~'Jhite-
head's principles, the creativity which is involved in 
the conceptual prehension of a given actual occasion in 
a human nexus may be f elt intuitively, this is not t h e 
identica l creativity which is spoken of a s the "category 
of the ultimate." Rather, and the same goes for the nov-
elty which may be involved in such an item of experi ence, 
the creat ivity which is th e category of th e ultimate is 
an hypothesis, and as such is dependent upon processes 
which are not found in any i mmediate experience. Bergson 
and Alexander both seemed to have some difficulty here, 
espe cially Bergson. l!.Jh itehead' s position is somewhat 
different, however, since his appeal to intuition is not 
123. PR , 32. 
124. Cf. above, 268-f. 
an absolute appeal, but rather a qualified one --one which 
starts a.nd ends with intuition, but which places analysis 
in between. 
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If creativity is not properly termed an apriori assump-
tion, since it is based upon fact, and it is not validated 
solely by intuition, since analysis is involved, it would 
appear tha t, whatever the means may be by vvhich he deter-
mines its reality, i'fuitehead has at least employed the two 
devices of "assumption" and"immediacy" in its discovery. 
Now the empiricist approach, described in Chapter III, must 
also employ these devices. Inferences are assumptions in 
that they g o beyond immediacy. But as long as they are co-
herent with immediacy they may be trusted. Whitehead does 
not appear to have involved himself in any methodological 
fallacy in this regard. Therefore, it may be inferred that 
creativity is discovered by means of the "empiricist" ap-
proach, i.e., the employment of inference coherently 
related to immediate faGt. In the case of the particular 
inference involved here, viz., tha t of creativity, the 
scope of i t s influence is taken to be such as would make 
it the ultimate category (along with "many" and "one 11 ) 
of all reality. In this sense, then, there is an assump-
tion involved the validity of which is another question 
and must be treated separately. However, with respect to 
the method apparently employed to solve the ·epistemological 
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problem, there appears ~very reason to agree with Whitehead's 
choice. 
Summarizing , then, while there are some indi cations that 
Whitehead uses the term "creativity'' as an apriori cat egory 
(at lea st in PR), these indications derive in large part from 
his use of terms rath er than from a ctual procedure. The 
fairer judgment is that his method actually is empirical and 
the use of terms is made nece ssary by the nature and i mpor-
t anc e of the concept itself, something which is quite inde-
pendent and must be examined by itself. This will be done 
in a later section. 
ii. The Problem of Causality. 
In the matter of causality, as well as in the matter of 
epistemology , 1hitehead's synthetic touch is observ ed . Wi th 
explicit referenc e to the history of thought, Whitehead 
consciously attempts to harmonize two tendencies a lready 
noted in t his dissertatio~12 5 which have overemphasized 
one aspe ct or a nother of causality. 126 Aristotle (who was 
chara cteri stic of the theological explanations) overempha-
sized -f inal causation. The scientific explanations lai~ 
too g~e~t a stress upon effici ent causation. It is White-
head's purpose to see the se two in their proper relation, 
i.e., in their role in the creative process. 
1 25 . Cf. Chapter II. 
126. Cf. PR, 12e-9. 
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In order to accomplish this synthesis, Whitehead gener-
ally regards the "ontological principle" as embracing both 
effici ent and final causation, viz., that the only reasons 
are to be found "either in the character of some actual en-
tity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the 
127 
chara cter of the subject which is in process of concrescence.u 
Briefly, the former indicates ef fici ent causation, and the 
latter final causation. Vlhitehead also finds opportunity to 
note on several occasions certain statements of Plato and 
Locke which emphasize the notion of "povver. ul28 It is 
quite apparent that the thought of Whitehead is profoundly 
influenced by this notion. One place where it is partic-
ularly felt is in th e doctrine of causality . 129 Attent ion 
will now be given to this idea in more detail. 
In view of the fact that Whitehead usually treats 
effi cient and final causation to gether , the s ame procedure 
will be followed here. 
The solution of the problem of cause is noted by White-
head as being begun by a group of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century philosophers in their discovery of two types of 
fluency, i.e., in concrescence, or "the interna l constitu-
tion of a particular existent," and in "the transition from 
particular existent to particular existent."13° Now, the 
127. PR, 36; xv111 category of explanation. 
128 . Cf. AOI, 153; PR, 28, 89f . 
129. Cf. PR , 91. 
130. PR, 320. 
former, or concrescence, "moves towards its final cause, which 
is its subjective aim; transition is the vehicle of the effi-
cient cause, v.rhich is the irnro.ortal past."l3l Again, he says, 
the 'obj ectifications' of the actual entities in the 
actual world, relative to a definite actual entity, 
constitute the efficient causes out of which that 
actual entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at~tis­
faction' constitutes the final cause, or lure, ·Whereby 
there is determinate concrescence; and that attained 
'satisfaction' remains as an element in the content 
of the creative purpose.~3~ 
This distinction may be seen in the two species of process, 
the macrocosmic, and the microcosmic. The former "effects 
the transition from the 'actual to the 'merely real'; and 
the latter process effects the growth from the real to the 
actual. The former process is efficient; the latter pro-
cess is teleological."l33 
It is of primary importance to note the way in v.rhich 
Whitehead relates creativity to this causal process. At-
tention has already been given to the belief that in the 
SJvlW Vihi tehead uses the term "substantial activity" to in-
dicate the notion later expanded in the PR into the doc-
trine of 11 creativity." It can readily be seen that if 
this belief be true, creativity stands for the factor 
of activity in the universe. Thus, it stands for the same 
idea a s the elan vital in Bergson and the "restlessness 
of Time" or the "nisus" of Alexander. Both of these 
131. PR, 320. 
132. PR, 134; cf. PR, 129. 
133. PR, 326-7. 
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predecessors of Whitehead conceived of their principle as in 
some way at least explanatory of cause, if not of everything , 
at l east of the novel aspects of thing s. Attention must now 
be given more explicitly to the manner in which creativity 
functions as cause. 
Let us consider the matter of ''efficient cause" more in 
detail. For Whitehead, God, as the principle of concretion, 
is the actual entity from which each concrescence receives 
its in~tial aim from which its self-causation starts. 134 
Hov.rever, it is the " 1 obj e ctifications' of the actual enti-
ties in th e actual world, relative to a definite actua l 
enti ty
1
, which constitute the efficient ca uses out of which 
that entity arises.l35 
Nbw, from the point of view of the new entity, this 
"obj e ctification" is referred to as the "datum" si n ce it is 
a "'settlement' which an actual entity 'finds,'" th e settle-
ment having been constituted by the "decision" of the pre-
vious actua l entities. "Thus the 'datum' is the 'd ecision 
received,' and the 'decision' is the 'decision tr~nsmitte~~~" 
Transcendent decision includes God's decision. He is 
the actual entity in virtue of which the entire mul-
tiplicity of eternal objects obtains graded relevance 
to each stage of concrescence. Apart from God t h ere 
could be no relevant novelty .... In 'transcendent de-
cision' there is transiti~p7from the past to the imEediacy of the present. ) 
134. PR , 374. 
l G5 . PR, 134; Cf. PR, 321. 
136. PR , 227. 
137. PR, 248-9. 
Thus, efficient cause may be observed as having two compon-
ents, viz., "the de~ision of God 's nature and t he decisions 
of all occ asions." These constit ute 11 that special element 
in the f lux of f orms in history , whi ch is ' gi ven' and in-
capable of rationalization beyond the fact that within it 
every component which is determinabl e is int ernally deter -
mined . nl3 S 
It is to t his 11 i nternal determination11 t hat at tention 
must now turn . The initial fact of ef f icient cause is mac -
rocosmi c. The f ina l f a ct i s microcosmic. The forme r has 
r e l evanc e to al l o ccasi ons . The l atter is pe culi a r to that 
occas ion . 139 This final cause, for Bhitehead , is sometime s 
t ermed the '' 'lure f or feeling ' •.. guiding the concr esc ence 
140 of f eelin,.,. s. n 0 It i s sometimes ca lled nsubjective atf=A~ " 
Also, it is termed "an inherent element in the feeling , 
constituting th e unity of that feeling," 142 or "a peculiar 
defini;t enessn the a ttainment of vv-hich "anima t e s a partie-
ula r process'' and then "halts its process, so that by 
tra nscendence it passes into its obj e ctive immort a lity as 
a new ob j e ctive condition added to the riches of definit e -
143 
ness atta i nable, the ' real potentia lity ' of the universe ." 
13 8 . PR , 75; Cf . 374 . 
13 9 . Cf. PR , 75-6. 
140. PR , 281. 
141 . PR, 134, 320 . 
142 . PR , 339. 
143. PR , 340 . 
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It is not possible to go into g reat d etail here r e garding 
the p l a c e of t he f i na l cause in t he concre sc ent pro cess. 
Ther e a r e , however, s evera l i d e a s which are p e culiarly r e -
lat ed to creativity wh ich require attention. In the f ir s t 
p l a c e , it is f i na l causation wh ich conditions or qu a li f ies 
th e creativity. Referring again to the notion of 11 d e ci s ion,n 
Whit ehead asserts that in addition to ntra nscendent decision ,n 
t her e is a lso "immanent decision" in which 
there is th e p rocess of ac quisition of subjective form 
and the int egration of feelings . In this process the 
creativity , universal throughout a ctua l i t y , is char a c-
terized by the datum from t he past; and it meet s t hi s · 
dead datum--universalized into a cha racter of creativ-
ity--by the vivifying novelty of subjective form S 9 -
lected from the multiplicity of pure potentia lity.nlh4 
This leads to the next idea, viz., tha t each actual 
occasio~ in Spinoza 's phrase, is cau s a sui, or tha t final 
c a usa tion is essentially fre e , or interna lly determined. 
As Wh it ehead s a ys, "the doctrine i s , t h a t each concrescence 
is to be referred to a d efinite free initi a tion and a def -
inite f ree conclusion ...• The initi a l fact is the primordial 
appetition , and the final fact is the deci s ion of emphasis, 
finally creative of the 1 s a tisfa ction . 111 145 Here is a d i s -
tinct s i milarity to Bergson with th e d ifference of emphasis 
upon final causation. 
144. PR , 249; Cf. 68 -9. 
145. PR, 75-6 ; c f . 524 . 
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Befor e leaving the problem of ca usa lity , it is n e c e s sary 
to note that, d espite his emphasis on teleology, Whitehead 
do e s not deve lop an ade qu a te do ctrine of volition. It is 
true tha t he uses the term ."de ci s ion" to indicate the id ea 
of a d eterminate condition which an a ctual entity, a fter 
a tt a ining its indivi dual s a tisfa ction, add s to th e s e t t l e -
ment of the future a n d beyond itself. 146 Wh en he s p eaks 
of life, h owever, Whitehead uses the term "aim"--as dis-
tinct f rom !!subjective aim" which applies to all occasions--
life b e ing applicable only to societies of occasions or 
n exus
1
tlo single occasion being able to be c a ll ed "living" 
in t h is sense). 148 Now aim , as a characteristic of life 
is d efined a s Tithe inclus ion of the boundless weal th of 
potenti a lity a n d th e i n clusion of that definite f a ctor of 
n ovelty which con stitutes the sele cted vray of entertaining 
tho s e data in that p rocess of unificatiod! 1 4 9 
It is quite evident, then, that a process of s e l e ction 
among alt erna tive possibi lities does exi s t in all t ype s of 
actual oc casions from th e simple actual entities ~ up through 
nexus and the higher sociological functionings of human 
b e ings . But it is a lso quite evident , fr om Whitehead ' s vi ew 
of consciousness a s " a vari a ble uncerta in e l ement which 
146. Cf. PR , 227. 
147. Cf. rJ[O T, 207. 
148 . Cf . AOI, 266. 
149 . IvlOT , 208 . 
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flick ers uncerta inly on the surface of experience, 1115° that 
the vast majority of these subj ective aims a re nunconscious , 11 
even on the human plane. Furthermor e , while , of cour se, we 
may b e 11 directly con s cious of our purpose a s directive of 
our a ct ions ,n 151 subjective aim is not to b e understood from 
t he standpoint of the conc eptual . The conceptual is but 11 one 
variable el ement in life,n 152 an example of which is the en-
tertainment of alternatives. But subjective aim selects 
from among alternatives "that way of enjoyment.n 153 It is 
a quality of life " a i med at the future, ..•• the enjoyment of 
emotion •..• which will be then.n154 
In one passage in PR, Whitehead makes a distinction 
which most .closely approaches a doctrine of the will. Here 
he di stinguish es two speci e s of physical purposes. The 
primary, or more primitive ,type, i s present in all a ctua l 
entiti es , a nd the constancy of this type of physical pur-
pose " explains the pe r sist ence of the order of nature, and 
in particular of 'enduring obj ects.'"l55 Here i s seen the 
following stage s: "(i) there is a physica l feeli ng ; (ii) the 
primary conceptua l correl a t e of the phys ica l feeling is gen-
erated, a ccordi ng to categoreal condition IV Conceptual 
Valuat i on · ; (iii) t his physical feeling is integr ated with 
150 . AOI , 325-6. 
151. MOT , 213. 
1 52 . :MOT , 229 . 
1 53. MOT , 208. 
154. MO T, 229. 
155. PR , 421. 
156 its conceptual correlate to form the physical purpose." 
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This notion comprises what Whitehead believes is meant by 
Bergson's "intuition."l57 Also, this type of purpose "endows 
the transcendent creativity with the character of adversion, 
or of aversion. If it is the former, there is generated "an 
element with some force of persistence into the future beyond 
its own subject," and is probably what is referred to in 
psychology as "impulsion," or "drive." If it is the latter, 
"the transcendent creativity assumes the character that it 
inhibits, or attenuates, the objectification of that subject 
in the guise of t hat feeling . : •. Thus adversions promote 
stability; and aversions promote change without any indication 
of the sort of change •.. the elimination of content, and t h e 
iapse into tri vi ali ty. ,,158 
The second species of physical purposes is due to t he 
"origination 9f reversions in the mental pole .... Reversions 
are the conceptions which a rise by r eason of the lure of 
contrast , as a condition f or intensity of experi ence . " l 59 
This Whitehead r epr esents as the Category of Subjective 
Intensity. The discussion of t his notion will be dealt with 
l ater in the section on value. It suffices here to note 
that there are "three stage s, the stage of pure phy sica l 
purpose, the stage of pure instinctive intuition (Bergson's 
156. PR , 422. 158 . PR, 422-3. 
157. Cf. PR , 49. 159. PR, 424. 
idea here), and stage of intellectual feelings." These 
stag es a re not sharply distinguished. 160 It may not be 
erroneous to observe here in these stages the levels which 
correspond to matter, life, and mind, in both Bergson and 
Alexander. 
Now in the doctrine of aim Whitehead make s his closest 
approach to a doctrine of volition. In no place in his 
writings could the term "will" or "volition" be found. In~ 
stead the terms "decision, 11 nselection, 11 "purpose, 11 nper-
spective ," and 11 aimn are used. In view of this fact, and 
of the above discussion, there are, it seems, two points of 
importance that arise. First, there does not seem to be a 
sufficient distinction between what in simpler languag e 
would be termed npurposive" and 11 purposefuln experience. 
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Throughout Whitehead's works one gets the idea that experien-
ces of the latter type , observed especially in the higher 
moments of human experience, are to be explained claefly in 
terms of feeling •161 More, it would seem, is required 
here in the way of clarification. Secondly, and in conse-
quence of the first point, it would also appear that suff-
icient attention is not g iven to the relation of volition 
to the individual enduring object, expecially the human 
person, in the course of his development. More will be said 
160. PR, 428 . 161. Cf . the term 11 i n -
tellectual feeling s. 11 
about this point later, as it involves the problem of in-
dividuality. 
Summarizing Whitehead's doctrine of causation, it may 
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be said that there is a complementary relationship estab-
lished between final and efficient causation. Cause, in 
other words, alternates between final and efficient. Final 
causation is always confined in its reference to the process 
of concrescence; efficient causation always refers to the 
a rea usually spoken of as "interaction," or the effect of 
one actual entity upon another, and, therefore, constitutes 
that which is "given '! . Efficient causation refers to the 
fact that indetermination has n evaporated'1 , and that deter-
mination is present; fi nal causation refers to the fact that 
creativity is qualified by the immanent decision and con-
stitutes each concrescent process a s causa sui or free. There 
are, however, certain defects in Whitehead's treatment of 
causality. These are noted as stemming from an inadequate · 
doctrine of volition. Despite the use of terms which appa-
rently convey the thought of will, there is need for more 
clarification between purposive and purposefUl experience, 
especially on the human level, and for the relation of this 
distinction to personal individuality and development. 
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· · · Th e Problem of Individuality. lll. -
The prob~em of individuality, asit is to be thought of 
in the present context, involves the notions of 11 the one and 
the ma ny 11 , and '' unity and multi plicity". It is the a im of 
the philosriphy of organism to synthesize these two notions 
so as to involve each in the other. As has already been 
noted, "many" and 11one" are considered ultimate notions, 
which , wi.th creativity, comprise the category of the ultimate. 
162 The term " one 11 stand s for 11 the singularity of an entity." 
The term 11 manyn stands fo r "the notion of disjunctive diver-
sity." Both of these terms "presup posen each oth er. 163 
Creativity is related to the two notions in that creativity 
"introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are 
the universe disjunctively." Again, it "is t hat ultimate 
principle by which the many, which are the universe dis-
juncti vely, become the one actual occmsion, v-rhich is the 
universe conjunctively . It lies in the nature of thing s 
that the many enter into complex unity. 11164 Whitehead uses 
the g eneric term nto g ether 11 to indicate the various way s in 
which the various sorts o f entities are 11 tog etherfl in a ny 
one entity . The ultimate metaphysical princip le being 
162. cr. PR, 31r. 164. PR, 31, 3 2 . 
163. PR , 31. 
the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating 
a novel entity o t her than the entities g iven in dis-
junction . . The novel entity is at onc e the toget he r-
ness of the 'many' which it finds, and also it is one 
among the disjunctive ' many ' whi ch it leaves; it is a 
novel entity , d isjunctively among the many entities 
ldh ich it s ynthesizes. The many become one and are 
increased by one . lb5 
Perhaps the most advantageous way of des cribing 
Whitehead ' s conception of the process by which unity and 
diversity are mutually transformed is to begin with the 
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fact t hat " the concept of ' God' is the way in which we 
understand t his incredible fa ct. 11166 From this point of view, 
viz., that of God, the principle of unity is h is primordial 
nature; nGod is primordial l y one , namely he is the pri-
mordial unity of relevanc e of the many potential forms . " As 
such, God is i n the process of acquiring 11 a conse quent 
multi p l icity , which the primordial character absorbs into 
its own unity . n167 
However, this i s only part of the picture . Comple -
ment a r y to the idea of God is that of the World . Pri-
mordially , the Worl d is many , i . e ., nthe many actual occasions 
with th eir physical finitude . !! li s such , the vrorl d i s in the 
process of' a c quiring na consequent unity, which is a nove l 
occ a sion a n d is abso rbed into the unity of the primordial 
character. n 1 68 
1 6 5 . PR , 32 . 
1 66 . PR , 531. 
1 67. PR , 529 . 
1 68 . PR , 5 31. 
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With this general background, at tent ion must now be 
g iven to the more detailed aspects of this pro cess. In the 
first p l a c e , some det a ils of t he idea of unity must be noted . 
Is t he unity whi ch has been des c r i bed as pri mordi a l the 
same a s that which is consequent? To answer t h i s question , 
a ttention must be directed to the fact, noted abov e , that 
th e uni ty of the primordial nature of God i s deficiently 
a ctua l. 1 69 On the other hand , the consequent uni t y of the 
actual occasion is fully a ctua l. Wh itehead somet i me s r efers 
to this t ype of unity as "syntheticn or TTaesthetic " unity . 17° 
Next, it mu s t b e noted tha t on the microcosmic sca le 
conse quent , or aesthetic, unity constitutes " individua lity,n 
which may be r eferre d to by the terms 11 monadTT or "atom. " 
Whitehead has much to say a bout individuality, especially in 
the AOI.l7l For him, individuality is always compl ex . 1 7 2 
The fa ctors in t his complexi ty include the multiplicity of 
releva nt objects out of which the oc casion a rise s . 1 73 Al so , 
i ndividuality is , in a sense, an "islandn of determina tion , 
surrounded before a n d after by relativity. 1 74 Further, 
"spontaneity, originality of decision , belong s to the essence 
of each actual oc casion . It is the supreme expression of 
individuality . "l75 Thus , a ll individualit y is novel . 
Thirdly, th e process by which individual intergr a tion 
t akes p l a c e must be noted . This proc e ss 
169 . Cf . PR, 50 , 524 . 
1 70. Cf. PR , 71, 323 . 
171. Cf . especiall y , 227 , 
235, 33 l f , 376- 381. 
172. Cf . PR , 53 . 
173 . Cf. AOI , 227 . 
174. Cf. AO I, 376 ; Cf . PR , 224 
1 75. AOI , 332 . 
is the urge imposed on the concrescent unity of that 
universe by the three categories of subjective unity, 
301 
of objective identity, and of objective diversity. The 
oneness of the universe, and the oneness of ea ch element 
in the universe, repeat thems elves to the cra ck of doom 
in the creative advance from creature to creature, e a ch 
creature including in itself the whole of history and 
exemplifying the selftdentity of things and their 
mutual diversities.l7b 
It must be noted, hovveve r , in passing that the unity of the 
whole universe and the unity of the eternal objects (primordial 
nature of God) are not one and the same. The former is con-
crete and a ctual; the latter is deficiently a ctual. 
The third category, or objective diversity, me ans that 
an actual entity is not merely one; it is also definitely 
complex. But to be definitely comple~ is to include 
definite diverse elements in definite ways ••• i.e., 
a comp l ex unity must provide for each of its components 
a real diversity of status, with a reality which bears 
the same §ense as its ov-m reality and i s peculiar to 
itself.17·1 
This third category is, howe ver, only a pa~ticular 
app+ication of the second category which expresses the fact 
that there is integration at all. "The same entity, be it 
· actual ~ entity or ·be it eternal object, cannot be felt twice 
in the 'formal constitution of one concrescence. nl78 
However, the notion of individuality is not · exhausted 
by the consideration of the atoms of experience. There is, 
in addition, the fact of societies. The views of Whitehead 
176. PR, 347-8. 
177. PR, 348. 
17 8 • PR , 3 4 7 • 
302 
on t his subject have already been discussed to some extent. 179 
Throughout his discussion of societies in PR, 136-167 and in 
AOI, 258-267, Whitehead, there is a noticeable lack of dis-
cussion of the problems which concern psychology on the human 
level. It would seem that here is an area which is de-
serving of more attention, especially since it is open to 
more direct observation than is the life of electrons. 
There is one further consideration, a bit out of place, 
perhaps, but which is inserted here since it touche s the 
matter of immediate experience. And that is the contention 
of Whitehead tha t the actual occasion endures for only one-
tenth of a second to one second.l80 It may well be that the 
preoccupation of Whitehead to the mat ters of mathematics and 
physics has made him oblivious to considerations of psychology. 
Nevertheless, there is little room for doubt but that he has 
substituted what is a pure theory of the duration of an 
electron's experience for the concrete fact of the duration 
of human experience. Modern thinkers, such as Royce, J ames, 
and Brightman, have written extensively on the subject of 
the duration of immediate experience. 181 These men all 
agree that experience is capable of spanning at least several 
seconds. 
Finally, there is the matter, entirely neglected it 
I 
179. Cf. above,372f. 
180 . Cf. AOI , 233, 247. 
181. Royce, WOI, J ames, RE , 
PIO especially. 
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appears, of the development of the society (person). Here 
is an a rea which is highly important for an adequa te under-
standing of the function of crea tivity. But perhaps it is 
expecting too much of one who has done so a dmirab l y as it is. 
Summarizing Whitehead's doctrine of individuality, it 
has been observed that a sincere and concerted effort has 
been made adequately to reconcile what many thinkers previously 
have been unable to reconcile, viz., the one and the many , or 
unity and multiplicity. v'lhi tehead goes about the task of 
this unification by including both concepts, together with 
creativity, in the category of the Ultimate. This means that 
all three notions imply each other and the three are pre-
supposed by everything else. The process by which unity and 
multiplicity are mutually transformed may be observed from 
the divine point of view by noting that God's primordial 
nature is a unity of relevance of many potential forms which 
by crea tivity leads to the acquiring of a consequent multi-
plicity which is then absorbed into the primordial unity. 
Each entity in this multiplicity, however, is also a unity 
or individual, having, in addition, the character of complex-
ity, definiteness, and novelty. 
If one were to attempt to evaluate Whitehead's treatment 
of the problem of individuality, certain merits are at once 
evident. The universe, and its components, are multiple 
unities. This tallies with experience. That individuals, as 
well a s the universe, progressively exemplify both definiteness 
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and spon'taneity is likevdse in accord with coherent analysis. 
However, there seems to be some departure from empirical fact 
when vfuitehead apparently considers individuality to be as brief 
in duration as he does. Experience, at least on the human 
level, would seem to indicate that the unit of immediate fact 
is somewhat longer than one tenth to one second duration. The 
matter of the development of the society on the level of the 
human person appears to be sadly neglected. These defects, it 
would appear, are a result of his over-emphasis upon physical 
science, and consequently, his neglect 9f psychology. 
iv. The Problem of Novelty. 
It is doubtful that a philosopher could give a more pro-
minent place in his system than that which vfuitehead has given 
to considerations which surround the problem of novelty. There-
fore, the discussion which follows is highly important for the 
doctrine of creativity. 
1}. General considerations. Before entering upon the 
more detailed discussion of the problems involved in vfuitehead's 
concept of novelty, it would be well to consider his general 
idea, the general place which it occupies in his system, and 
a few points of relevance between his view and those of Bergson 
and Aleocander. 
i}. The definition of novelty. For Whitehead, 
novelty is as ubiquitous as the entities to which it belongs. 
Whenever concrescence takes place, novelty is involved. 
Novelty, thus, is a character which indicates that any 
actual entity is "diverse from any entity in the 'many' 
h . h . t . f. . tt 182 w lC 1 unl 1es. Furthermore, novelty signifies nthe 
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togethernes s of the ' many'" which the entity finds, and also 
that "it is one among the disjunctive 'many' which it leaves.nl83 
It can readily be seen that novelty is an ultimate notion. 
For ~Jhi tehead the term "creativity" is "the principle of 
novelty" which means that "'creativity' introduces novelty 
into the content of the many, which a re the universe dis-
. . 1 "184 JUnCt1Ve Y• 
It will be noted, as the preceding discussion has 
indicated, that novelty, for w~itehead, is both objective 
and subjective.l85 It is objective in that it would be true 
that actual occasions are novel whether that fact were even 
known or not. It is subjective in that novelty is found in 
every item of experience, indeed in everything that is, 
since everything that is is an item of experience. 
It is appar ent in Wnitehead's discussion of novelty 
that there are two explanations, or accounts, of novelty. 
It is important that they be se en in their proper relation 
to each other. The fifst account (cf. category of ex-
planation v.) apparently regards the basis for novelty to 
be the fact that "no two actual entities originate from an 
182. PR, 31. 
183. PR, 32. 
184. PR, 31-2, ital. vfuite-
head's. 
185. Cf. the discussion in 
Chapter III. 
identical universe . " 1 86 The second account is that which 
emphasizes the place of the final cause in any concrescent 
process . 187 The first account obviously depends, in so far 
,. 
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as it is intended to account for novelty, upon efficient 
causa tton alone, i.e., that each entity derives its novelty 
from the novelty of its data, and so on ad infinitum. This 
view, 1 '8 at first glance, hardly differs from the view, 8 
which regarded novelty as merely the complexity of dat a 
a lready given. Furthermore, if taken by itself, it pre-
supposes, in its defi nition, conditions whi ch would forbid 
its own existence. For if efficient causation were all 
there is, what reason would there be to suppose that no two 
entities originated from an identical universe? There would 
be only one universe . But Whitehead does not intend that 
efficient ca usation be taken as t h e explanation of novelty, 
for, he says , "We re quire explanation by 'final cause.'trl89 
It is only by the employment of the idea of final causation 
that he can escape from the determinism of efficient causation 
and m~ke novelty a possibility. Thus, the fact of final cause 
makes possible the plurality of novel universes from whi ch a 
p lurality of novel actual occasions may generate. In this 
sense, then, novelty is bound up with the idea of concrescence. 
More attention will be given to this important phase of the 
186. PR , 33-4; cf. 123-4. 
1 87. Cf. above, t he dis-
cussionof causa tion, 
t he problem of. 
188 . Noted in Chapter III. 
189 . PR , 159. 
problem a bit later. 
It is interesting to note that the discussion so far has 
revealed certain important respects in which 'Whitehead's view 
of novelty differs from the views of Bergson and Alexander. 
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First of all, although in differing degrees, novelty inheres in 
all levels of reality for ~~itehead; for Bergson, it inheres 
only in the living. Secondly, novelty inheres not only in indi-
viduals (enduring objects) but also in every moment of every in-
dividual's experience, while for Alexander novelty was applica-
ble only to levels of reality, or the five or six major types 
of indivJ.duals. Thirdly, novelty is regarded by Whitehead as 
bound up1 with the idea of final causation; for Bergson final 
cause wa!s eschewed, and something between it and efficient causa-
tion was, depended upon; for Alexander novelty was completely 
divorced from the notion of cause. 
2). Creativity and the problems of novelty. It remains 
in this section to note the relation between creativity and 
the prob~e~s of novelty. 
i). Time ·and Space. For Whitehead, the concepts 
of time ~nd space, and also the more general notion of the 
creative advance, npresuppose the more general r-elationship 
of extension." In this idea Whitehead is expressing the 
notion of the nextensive continuum," an idea which is very 
similar to Alexander's Space-Time, and which Whitehead himself 
says is very near to Plato's doctrine of The Receptacle.l90 
190. Cf. AOI, 192-3. 
The relation of the extensive continuum to the transcendent 
crea tivity is not expli cit l y stated . Whitehead does say , 
t h ough, that 
this extensive continuum expr es s es the solidarity of 
all possi ble standpoints through the v.rhole process of 
the worl d . It is not a fact prior to the 'v'lorld; it is 
t he f irst determination of orde r ... i . e ., of r ea l 
potentia liix 1 arising out of the general char a cter of t he ·world. '-J-
The conclusion ~ ich he draws from t h is idea is that t h i s 
cont i nuun is "merely the potentiality for divi s i o n; a n 
l . -"f h . d . . . 11 1 92 a ctua entlty e~ e cts t _l s lVlSlon . 
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in re spect to time , this atomizat~on takes the special 
form of the ' epo cha l theory of time .' In respect to 
space , it means that every actual entity in the temporal 
world is to be credi ted with a spatial volume for its 
p ~rspective standpoint . l 9J 
Th e epo cha l theory of time i s much too involved to dis -
cuss here in any detai l. I t mu s t suffice to say that Wh ite-
head consi ders t i me to come i n "epochs" or durations , so 
that ''each actua l occasion ... defi nes one dur at ion in which it 
is includ ed . " l 94 Wh i tehead opposes t h i s theory of time to 
the classical theory 1-vhi ch assumed 1 ) "that a duration 
included t h e directly perce i v ed i mmediat e present of each 
one of its members," and 2) that "any a ctual occasi on only 
l i es in one dur a tion . " In the above describ ed manner , 
Uhitehead believes, the philosophy of org ani sm , in a gree -
ment vrith recent physic s , overcomes the d i ff icult i es wh ich 
191. 
1 92 . 
PH , 
l:JD l L ' 
l OJ . 
104 . 
1 93 . PH , 
1 91 PD '+ • - .cL ) 
105. 
191. 
Zeno 's paradoxes imposed upon the theory of time . 195 1 That 
the epochal theory of time denies is that "temporaliza tion 
309 
is ... a nother continuous pro cess." It affirms t hat " temporal-
ization is ... another continuous process." It affirms that 
"temporalization is realization .... Thus time is a tomic (i.e., 
h l) h h h . l" d . d" . "bl n 196 epoc a , t oug w at lS tempora lZe lS lVlSl e. 
Whitehead is famous for h is phrasing of the " f a lla cy 
of simple location. " The Ne1'ftonian cosrnolo gy , 1 97 with its 
" receptacle " or abso lute t heory of s pac e -time , minimized 
the factor of potentiality, and wa s the nt ho rough going 
do ctrine of 'simple location' " ·l9S Instead of simple 
location, Whitehead and modern physi c s hold that each 
physic a l thing is a modification of conditions with in space-
time , extending throughout the whole rang e. "Th ere is a 
focal region, which in common speech is where the t h ing is. 
But its influence s treams away from it with finite v e locity 
throughout the utmost r e cesses of s pace and time.nl99 
It may be observed, then, that whil e Berg son emphasized 
what mi ght be c a lled an undifferenti a ted duration, and 
Alex ander emphasized a spatia-temporal continuum which 
could be broken into an infinite number of point-instants, 
Whitehead strike s a middl e ground. For him , time endures, 
but it is a lso nan arrest .n Also, instead of opposing space 
1 95 . Cf. PR , l 05ff , SI•U , l 82ff. 197. Cf. Chapt e r II . 
196 . SivJ1V , 185. l98.PR, 113; AOI, 201 . 
1 99 . AOI, 201-202. 
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and time , as did Ber g son, or instead of trying to break them 
into infinitely small parts , as did Alexander, Wh itehead 
keeps them tog ether (vs. Bergson and ~ la Alexander), but 
gives each unit a duration (vs. Al exander and a l a Berg son). 
Incidentally, he makes possible a doctrine of indivi duality 
thereby, a doctrine which both of th ese earlier think ers 
had a goo d deal of difficulty formulatin g for t h emse lves. 
ii). Complexity and emerg ence. The two i deas of 
complexity and emergence are herewith dealt tog ether because 
neither of them are stressed very much by Whitehead. 
For the sake of the p l an which is being follovred in t h is 
disse rt ation, however, it is well that notice be given to 
the a t titude which Whitehead's opinions would tak e with 
reference to them. 
On the matter of compl ~xity , as it wi ll appear l a ter, 
there is no reaso n t o suppose that comp l exity i s any guara ntee 
of novelty, although , for Whitehead , the s impler notion of 
mult i plicity is necessary for a ny actuality . Novelty d epends 
u pon th e fus ion of multiplicity with unity or reality with 
appearance. 200 It is true that the h i gher occasions and 
societi e s of occasions are more complex than the lower 
ones. 201 But there is no aim at complexity. 
On the matter of emergence, Whitehead is an emergent ist, 
200. Cf. AOI, 270f. 
201. Cf. :f\·OT , 249. 
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but in a sense quite different from Alexander or Morgan. 
First, every actual entity is an "emergent," in that it is a 
novel entity . 202 Secondly, there a re levels in existence, 
as has been a lready shovm , but these levels are not absolute 
nor that they neces sarily follow a temporal sequence is not 
indicated by Whitehead. 203 
It mi ght be observed , then, that Whitehead is less con-
cerned wit~ the formal discussion of the ideas of emergent 
evolution and complexity than are Ber gson and Alexander. He 
shares with them, however, the basic notions of multiplicity 
and unity which in certain relations bring novel emergence 
of real individualities, which may roughly arranged in some 
semblance of levels either of types or of compl exity. 
iii). Law. The place of law in the cosmolo gical 
scheme receives a very thorough and beautiful treatment by 
Whitehead in the AO I. This discussion is so significant for 
the present discussion that a brief exposition of it seems 
in order. 
The notion of law, according to Whitehead, has received 
four different interpretations: Imr.1anence, Imposition, 
Description, and that of Conventional Interpretation. 204 
The doctrine of law as immanent implies "that the order 
of nature expresses the characters of the real things which 
202. Cf. SivjjJ , 13 5f. 
203. Cf. MOT, 215, PR , 269f. 
204. Cf . AOI , 142-177. 
jointly compose the existences to be found in nature.n 205 
In contrast, the doctrine of law as imposed adopts ''the 
alternative metaphysical doctrine of External Relations 
between the existenc e s which are the ultimate constituents 
of nature.n 206 It is obvious that the former do ctrine is 
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that commonly held by pantheists and the latter is that held 
by deists in theology. Another point, though , can be noted 
v,rith Whitehead, viz., that while the fusion in one way or an-
other of the two do ctrines of law as immanent and as imposed 
constituted the first cosmology , the second cosmology tended 
toward a fusion of law as imposed . with the t hird conception 
of law as description. 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the 
first cosmology corresponds to that generally held by the 
theological explanations of Plato , Aristotle , Plotinus, and 
Aquinas; the second cosmology corresponds to that held by 
N e~~on and is typical of the scientific reaction against 
final causes. The positivistic school of Mere Description 
is st i ll another possibility. Here the notion of chance is 
emphasized. This doctrine nat the present time rei gns 
supr eme in the domain of science." 20 7 The most recent of the 
four notions of law is that of conventional interpretation 
by which is meant '' the procedure by which free speculation 
205 . AOI, 142. 
206. AOI, 144. 
207. AOI, 159. 
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passes into an interpretation of Nature.n 208 
The position of Whitehead in this a rray of doct r ines is 
not stated explicitly in this connection. There is little 
doubt about his stand on the matter of immanence and im-
position . The eternal objects for any given actual occasion 
represent immanent law; and other actual occasions represent 
law i mposed . Also, there i s little doubt that Whitehead 
intends to neglect the law of description, for he says, 11 all 
scientific progress depends on first framing a formul a 
giving a general description of observed fa ct . " 209 Lastly , 
it may be observed that \1Jhitehead recognizes that t here is an 
element of ''convention as to the emergence into human 
consciousness of sorts of Laws of Natures. 11 210 
·It has already been noted (cf, above ) that 'Whitehead 
re gards laws as being able to emerge , t hus maki ng for what 
has been called above " functional novelty." 211 Also, there 
seems to be no discrepancy in Whitehead ' s mind between 
novelty and law, since there must be law for ther e to be 
anything real . And where there is anything real , there is 
something novel. The advantages of synthesizing the effi cient 
and final causes can be seen very clearly at this point . 
i v ) . Intelligibility . In this section attention 
will be given to the notion of v..rh i tehead ' s which is referred 
to as the principle of expl anation . As ha s been seen, t his 
is called "the ontologica l principle . n This notion appears 
208 . AOI, 173 210 . AO I, 177 
209 . AOI , 164 211 . Cf . Chapter III 
wherever considerations present t h emselves wh ich involve 
that ultimate intelligibility. For Whitehead, the onto-
logical principle indicates that there is no reason for 
anything apart from th e compos i te nature of some a ctual en-
tity.212 
Is , therefore, novelty intelli gible? Whit ehead's 
simple s t ansv.rer woul d be that we should go to some specific 
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a ctua l entity and if it is novel , th en t h at is all tha t th e r e 
is t o it . But , in reality , the answer lies deeper tha n that. 
In the last ana l y si s , t h is is a task t hat involves probing 
th e inh eritance of that entity until thought can go no 
farth er . Involved in t his procedure will be found t h e 
objective inwortalities of countless other actual entitie s , 
together with the Divine purpose. Eventuall y t hought comes 
t o the Category of t he Ultimatei t h e notions of many , one, 
a nd then o f creativity itself. Crea t i vity is the "prin-
ci p l e o f nove l t y . 11 No f urth er expl a na tion is possib l e . But 
is creativity a n a ctua l entity? it mi ght be asked. No, 
\vh it ehead answers, but it is f ound in t he compo s it e natur e of 
a ll a ctua l enti t i es . };_g a in it mi ght be asked , i:H1at is t h i s 
c r eat i vity? I t i s pure act i v ity , wi thout a char a cter of i ts 
own , but a l wa ys chara cter i zed by i ts creat ur es . 213 How 
d o es c r eat i v ity cre a t e i t s creat ur es? Th i s quest io n i s not 
a nswe r ed d i r e ct l y by Wh it ehead . The desc r i pti on of t he 
212 . Cf . Pit, 28 
213 . Cf . PR , 46-7 
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concrescent process is the closest he comes to answering it 
for actual occasions. The question is left ambiguous with 
respect to God. 
Is novelty intelligible? The answer is, Yes. Is 
creativity intelligible? If the question means: Is crea-
tivity as far back as explanation is possible, the answer 
again is, Yes. If, however, the question means: Is crea-
tivity the final explanation of everything, including God, 
the answer which Whitehead gives is somewhat unclear. It 
refers at least to the complexity of the whole real process. 
v). Value. As was only indicated in Chapter I I I, 
the problem of novelty ultima tely resolves itself into a 
question of valuation. That this is the explicit position 
of vVhi tehead .is the subject of the pre sent section. 214 
In view of the centrality of value in ~fuitehead's 
metaphysics, a complete analysi~ of his theory of value 
would necessitate a complete restatement of what has p're-
ceded. This is true because in \~itehead's words, as stated 
in S.P-1W, "'value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality 
of an event.n 215 vifith this idea in mind, .then, attention 
can only be given here to the more salient aspects of his 
value theory, especially as they involve the ideas of 
novelty and creativity. 
214. A very outstanding discussion of ltlhi tehead' s 
theory of value is herewith noted in Millard, The Place 
of Value in vVhitehead's Thought, an unpublished doctoral 
dissertation at Boston University, 1950. 
215. 136. 
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I n the fir st p lace, i~ every actual oc cas i on (or 
ne ve n t " in the languag e of .::>1''1\J} there is 11 the element o f 
value , of b eing valuabl e , of h a ving v a l ue , of be 1ng something 
wh ich is for its own sake . n '.i'hus, the actual o c cas i on is 
i n trin sic ally valua ble, and 11 realization therefore is in 
i tself the att a inmen t of va l ue . n2 1 6 
But t he re is "no s u ch t hing a s nere value . Value is 
t he outcome of limitation . " Here is tl.1e i dea tha t is ex-
• reseed i n t he concept of ind ividual i ty . "Apart from s u c h 
sha~ ing into i ndividual mat ter of fact there is no attain -
ment . " 217 Eac h unit of incti viduali ty, c onsidered as i n t rin -
sic i n itself , is extrin sic with res~ect t o other events . 
11
'.i.,here is t hus a n intrinsi c and an ext r insic reality of an 
event , namely , t he event as in its own p rehension , and the 
even t a s i n the p rehension of other events . n 218 'l'hus , t h ere 
is apparen t he r e a distinct parallel between va l ue and c a usa-
tion . Int r insic value corresponds to "~Hhat is de 1oted by 
i mmanent causal ity; extrinsic , · or instrwnental , value cor-
resp ond s to efficient c ausality . 219 Also , p roc ess , wh~ ch 
was noted au ove as a r hythmic alternation between the on e 
a n d the many a ppears i n the t heory of v a lue as the r hyt hmic 
alterna tion between i ntrinsic and ex trins ic val ue . 
216 . Si,·IVJ , 13 6 . 
217 . S1~1W , 13 6 -13 7 . 
218 . SHiiJ , 151. 
219 . Cf . t he above discussion of the problem of 
causality . 
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1 t this point the r e appears a very importan t cons idera-
tion , v iz ., t he relation of creativity to value i n the con-
cre scent process . The di s cussion wh i c r1 a ppe a rs in ShU is 
the most enlightening on thi s po i nt . Here it will be remem-
bered , creativity is not ment i oned by name , but is instead 
called "the under l y ing a c t ivity . " 
Th e point s of d iscu s s i on are fo ur in nurnber : 1) i n 
t h e 11ature of the underly i ng eternal a ctivity "there stands 
a n e nvi sa2: emen t of the realm of al l eternal obj e cts . " This 
envi sagement "is the s round o f the individuali sed thou ghts 
which emerge as thought - aspe cts g rasped within t he li f e -
h istory of t he subtl e r and more complex en during patte r ns" ; 
2 ) also in th e nature of th i s eternal act i vity "there must 
stand an envisa~ ement of all va l ues to be obtained by a 
real togetherness of eternal obje c ts , a s envi sag ed i n i deal 
sitL:a tionsn; 3) there is the "envisag eme n t of t h e actual 
matte r o f fa ct whic h must enter into the a ctual situa tion 
which is c;. ch i evable by the addition of the future" ; a !. ld 
4) thi s eternal a ctivi t y "in ab straction from a ctual i ty ••• 
is d ivorced f rom value. For the a ctu_ali ty is t he va lue . 11220 
Lat er on in Sl-·1'! , Whitehead analyzes the elements in the 
conc r e scent s i tuation: · 
Thus t h e eternal r elatedness i s the f orm-- the tf£os -- · 
- --- ' th ~; ernerg e11t act-c~al o.ccasion is tl1e su_perject of i nforrned 
v alue ; v a lue , as abst r a ct e d f rom any particu lar super-
ject ' i s the abst r a ct matter--th e u>.~ --wh i ch i s common 
220 . Slvfvi , 154- 5; ita lics mi ne . 
318 
to all a ctual occas i ons ; and the s y nthe tic a ctivity 
wh ich p rebend s v a lue l e,ss possibility int o superj i cien t 
i n forme d value i s t he substantial a ctivity . Thi s :.:>ub -
s tantia l a ctivity is t hat wh ich is omit ted in a uy anal y -
si s of the stati c facto rs in t he me t a physical situat ion . 
The a nalyzed e lemen t s of t he s i tuat i o n a re t he at t ri-
b u t es of t he substan t i al activity . 2 ~ ~ · 
It c a~1 be r eadily obse rved that i n these passag es , 
wh ich r epr es e nt the early view of Vlhitehead , t h ere i s g re a t 
s i n1ila rity to t h e Timaeus of Plat o . Thi s passag e t og ether 
with one noted j ust a b ove, clearly illustrates what mi ght 
b e called t he 11 a esthetic theory o f cre ation . n It mi ght 
al so b e n ot ed that t i1e co n cept ion of creat ivity as " a c t ivity" 
wh ich is h e re developed is almost comp letely a b a ndoned i n 
PR f or t he alt e rnative notion o f a ' p r inciple" devoid o f 
a n y charac t er ~J~rh atever , even activity . 
1 itehe ad believes that values d iffer i n i mp6rtan ce . 
Since the re i s " no such th i n g as bare value , 11 but only 
!!sp e cific value , wh ic h i s the creat e d unit of fee ling aris -
i ng out of t he s p ecifi c mod e of con cretion of t he divers e 
element s , " va lues , or occasions , may be compared " i n r esp e ct 
to the intens i veness of value" or lli n r espe ct to their 
d e n ths of actual i t y, •.. i n i mport a n ce of a c tuality . 11222 
These notions of i mportance, d e p th , i n t ensivene ss , and 
simila r notion s , appear throughout t he work s of Whiteh ead 
as objectives o f t h e creative p rocess. For example, i n 
Pn. , there is p re s e ._ted a categore a l obligat ion of "subj e c-
22 1. .. Ivivv , 23 8 ; ita lics Eli ne exce p t "supe r ject . 11 
22 2 . 1UM , 103 . 
tive aim" at "intensity of feeling ••• in the immediate sub-
ject, and ••• in the relevant future.n223 Even God , he says, 
is "indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty ••• 
r--.. 
His aim for [an immediate occasio~\ ••• is depth of satisfac-
tion ..• the evocation of intensities.n 224 
The notion of "importance," however, is on e whic h is 
not sufficiently clarified. It is not clear just what 
relation obtains between the two phases of the notion: 
"individuality of details" and "unity of the universe.n225 
Thus TTimportance" which is intended to serve as a criter-
ion of value is hindered by the fact that it involves de s-
cription of value, and thuscannot be impartial. 
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Statements which empha size intensity, etc. reveal quite 
clearly that Whitehead's entire system of value revolves 
d h . .· 226 aroun an aest et1c ax1s. It should be noted that, 
although Whitehead distinguishes levels in value, the 
levels all a ppear to be va rious degrees of syntheses be-
tween eternal objects and feeling, i.e., they are dipolar, 
and consequently there is a seeming identification of moral 
values with the aesthetic. This may be observed by noting 
numerous passages in MOT and AOI. For example, he says 
that morality is 
223. PR, 424. 
224. Pr, 160-1. 
225. Cf. MOT, 11. Cf. also Schilpp , Art.(l941), 573. 
226. Cf. r-'lillard, PVW, who develops this position. 
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t he co nt rol of proce ss so as to maximize importance 
••• the aim at greatness of experience ••• the a i m at 
t hat union of harmony, i ntensity, and vividness 
~lich_inv~~yes t he perfection of importance for that 
occaslon . ·( 
.A gai n , he s ay s that "the r eal world is good when it is 
beautiful . " 22S Furt her , i n Part IV of AOI, - -hitehead i m-
plicitly ex cludes Goodness f rom a pl ac e i n h ~ s scale of 
values sta ting that trTruth and Beauty" are the great regu-
lative properti e s ..• the ultimat e grounds fo r emphasis a nd 
·pro l ongat ion . 11229 He explici t ly excludes it later v.rhere 
he says that 11 Goodness must be deni ed a pl ace among the 
aims of art, 11 art being the 11 purposeful a dapt at i on of 
App2ara:1ce to Re alityit having "e s sentially to do with pe r-
f ec t ions attainable by purposeful adaptation of a ppearanc e 1' 
th e end of which is "Truth a nd Beauty . n23° 
It is hardly ne cessary to comment furt her on this 
point , since it has been well taken _elsewhere , 231 viz. , 
t hat to reduce moral value to aest heti ic value i s unjust i-
fied . One wishes that Whitehead had discussed t he mat ter 
. more ful ly. 
The matter of evil or disvalue is related to the pres-
ent di s cussion, since, f or Whitehead , 
(l) .•• al l a ctual ization is fi ni te ; ( 2) ••• fin itude 
i nvolves t he exclusion of alternative possibility ; 
(3) ... mental fun ctioning introduces i nt o real ization 
227 . l:IOT , 19 . 
228 . i\.OI , 345 . 
229 . AOI , 309 .It is in-
cluded, however, lower 
on the scale. 
230 . AOI , 344- 5. 
231. Cf . I'-'li lla r d , Pvw .. 
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sub jective fo r ms confo rr.1al t o rel evant a lt e r nati ve s 
excluded from the completeness of physical realization . n232 
11 The ultimate evi l in the temporal world is deeper than 
a ny s pecif ic evil. It lies i n the fact t hat t he pas t is a 
perpetual perishing . n233 Tvm t ypes of evil which are noted 
n ow and the n a re · n·triviality" a · d !!deprivation . u 234 But 
though 1 7hi t ehead r egards evil as ne cass ary i n some r esp e ct 
to a ll actuality , i n that selec ~ ion is ne cessar y to be com-
i ng , selection His at once the measure of evil, and the 
process of its eva sion ••• a process of building up a mode of 
utilization by the provision of intermediate elements i nt ro-
ducing a compl ex st r ucture of harmony ." Although t here is 
triviality , even this has a purpose in that t rivial a ctual-
it ie s may become " proper ' means ' f or t he eme r gen ce of a 
wo r ld at on ce lucid , and int rinsical l y oT iramediate vmrth. n235 
.3umnarizing , then, Hh i tehead 's theory of value , i t 
has been noted that (l) value i s bas ic to all actuality ; 
(2) value alternates between the i ntrinsic and the instru-
me ntal ; ( 3 ) creativity i n abstraction i s divorc ed f r om all 
va lue; ( 4) value i n a bstraction is the abstract matter c om-
mon to all occasions ; ( 5) value s diffe r i n i mportance , a 
notion whi ch i a i ntended t o serve as a criterion of va lue 
but the us efulness of which is limit ed as i t a l so t ends to 
23 2 . AOI, 3 3 3 . 
233 . PR, 517 . 
234. Cf . \Jh i tehead , Art. (l94l) .a,· , 679 . 
235 . Pn , 517. 
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b e a de scri pti on of it as well; ( 6 ) moral va l ue te nds to 
b e come ident i f i ed with the aesthetic; (7) evil , t hough 
ne c e ssa r y to a l l a ctualizat ion , may be tran s cended . 
vi. God , a s t he nprinciple of concretion , " t h e 
" organ of novelty , n holds a signi f icant pl a ce i n Whitehead 's 
s ys t em . A r evi ew of thi s doct rine i s hardl y ne cessa r y i n 
vi ew of t he extent of the p reviou s discu ss ion . One point 
of simila rity betill[e en t he God of Wh i tehead and t hos e of 
bot h Bergson and Al exande r i s that h e i s f i nite i n powe r . 
\vhi tehead empha s i zes t he notion of di vi ne 11 pe r suasion 11 
r a t her t h an 11 fo r c en t h roughout his v-ro r ks . 236 
Some difficultie s r ema i ning to be obse r ved , howe ver , 
s t il l r e quire a t t en t i on . Whi tehe ad asse r ts t hat God " does 
not create t he world , he s a ves i t : or mor e a c curately , h e 
i s th e poet of the wo r ld , wi t h t ende r pat i ence le adi ng it 
by his vis i on of truth , bea ut y , and g oodne ss . " 237 He has 
elsewhe r e s tat ed , 238 tha t God is i ndi fferen t to " pr eserva-
tion'' and is concerned onl y with ''dept h of sat i sfa ct ion'' and 
" e vocat ion of in te11sities . " The s e st a tements \'rould r equire, 
i t v-rould s eem s ome j us t i fi cat ion . 
Fu rther , t he aspe cts of God ' s na tur e whi ch dist ingu i sh 
h im d ras ti cal l y f r om othe r ent i t i e s a r e appa rently i nsuf f i -
ciently not ed . 239 Thes e a re (i ) ordinary ent i ti e s perish24° 
236 . Cf . especially AOI , Cfi. V. 
237. PR, 526 239 . Cf . A. H. Johnson , Art .( l 945 ) , 29l f . 
23 8 . PR, 160 - l . 240 . PR , 126 . 
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whi le God e ndures • ...,.. (i i ) 1he manner in which God s up-
pli e s the data for objectification i n actual entiti e s must be 
a manner d ifferen t from other e ntities since they have to 
pe ri sh to do so , an d he d oes not . ( iii ) God does not have 
to seek eternal ob jec ts f rom s ome other s ource as is the c as e 
with other actual entities , sin ce his primordial n a ture i n -
volves a n envisa~ ernent of t 1em all . ( iv ) God ' s subj e ctive 
aim remai ns unchanged , ·while t hat of a n ordinary ac t ual 
e ;lti t y ma y underg o chang e . Johnson wonde r s , f or example , i f 
these d i f fe ren ces to n ot n l ead one t o que stion h is [ Whit e -
h e a d ' s~l t hat ' God is n ot to be treated as an excep t ion to 
all netaphysical prin ciple s , invok ed to s ave the ir collapse . 
LI . t . . 1 • f 1 . " . ' . !! 2 42 
1 e l S -nelr cnl e exemp li lca~lon. 
In conclusion , it should a l so be n oted that t h e prec ise 
relat i on of creativity to God is ~ot mad e clear by Whitehead . 
Go d ' s tt }mrpose" i s s p ok en of243 but there is a lack of d is-
cussion as to t he rel a t ion of God ' s purpose to creativity . 
" ::J i vine ordering :r i s declar c; d t o ,; cond i ti on n creati vi ty2 44 
but ther e i s still a lac k of clarificati on here • 
. :mmrnarizing the pro bl em of novelty as treated by Wh i te -
head , the f o l l owi ng points can be noted . (l) Novelty sig -
n i f ie s " diversityn and "tog e t her ne ss . " Thu s , ( 2 ) i t a ppli e s 
to e very a ctual oc cas i on , a nd (3 ) i s i n volved with caus ation , 
particularly final causat i on . 
241 ~ F'.R , 524. 
24 2 . 1R , 52 1 . Johnson , 
1- rt .( l 945), 292 . 
( 4 ) Time is considered t o be 
243 . PR , 161 . 
244 . PR , 46 . 
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tr e pochal . 11 ( 5) The n ot i ons of compl exity and emer g ence , 
stressed by Alexander espe c ially , a re no t of muc h co n cern 
although traces of the no t ions are obs e rvable . (6) Novelty 
conforms to law since there must be law for a ny realiza-
tion . (7) Novelt y is intell i g ible si n c e i t is found i n 
actual en tit ie s . ( g ) Creativity is intellig ible i f it is 
cons i d e r ed a s f a r back a s explanation can g o , but i f it is 
press e d further the answer is no t cle a r . (9) Value ( i ) 
is bas ic to all actual i ty , ( ii ) al t ernat es betv.re en t he int rin-
s i c and th e :L nstrumental, (iii ) i s divorced from creativity 
i n a Lstrac tion , ( iv) d i ffe r s in i mportance , a criter ion which 
is on l y l i mited i n usefulness , ( v) moral v a lue t end s to b e c ome 
i d e n tifi e d with the aesthetic , ( v i) evil, though necessary 
to all a ctualizat i on , may be t ranscend ed . (10 ) Wh i tehe ad ' s 
idea of God , how-ever , as t h e n sa viorn o f the world , but who , 
as well , i s conc erned only with " i ntensity of feeling , " 
p r esents cert a in difficulties . His d i fferen ce i n many 
i mp ortant respects from othe r occas i ons r a ise s questions 
about his ult i mate functi on i n Whitehead ' s system . The p re -
cise relat i on of God t o creativity is not sufficiently 
clarified . 
vi. Summar y of t he problems related to crea t ivity . 
The above di scussion has centered large l y u pon t h e 
attempt to fit t he doctri n e of creat i vity i nto the g e n eral 
pattern wh i ch has been fol lowed in the two preceding doctrines , 
viz ., ~lan vital and nisus . There is , wi t h res p ect to crea-
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tivity , o1e outstanding point of not e which d oes not a ppl y 
so muc h to t h es e other d octrines . This poin t is t h e f a ct 
that th ere has been consid erable d i fference of opinion and 
some discussion as to Whitehead ' s pr e cise meaning with 
refe re n c e to creat i vity . Therefore , in t h i s section , atten-
tion v,rill be give n to examining some o f t h ese viev,rs a.nd to 
evaluating them in the lig ht of t h e precedin g d iscussion . 245 
Op inions as to the nat u re of creativity will be dealt wi th 
Zirst, after which an evaluation wil l be p resen te d . 
~erhaps the most persistent mi s concept ion of creat ivi t y 
i s the one which maintains t hat someh ow creativity i s 
"the ultimat e r e ality, more ultimat e i n some sense tha n 
actual entities . 11246 Johnson cit es 0tallknecht 247 i .. ietz 24 8 
' ' 
Wahl, 249 and J i d ney , 2 50 as holdi ng v a r iati ons of t h is view. 
fh is concept o f creat ivity is a natural one in view of a 
p assag e i n Slvfi:J which says t he f ollowin g : 
n t he a nalogy with Sp i noza , h is one subs tance is f or 
me t he one underly ing a ctivity of r ealizati on i ndivi du a l -
izing i tself i n a n interlocked plur al ity of wo d e s . Thus , 
con cret e fa ct is process . Its p rimary a naly sis is i n to 
245 . A. H. Johnson has been p a rticularly interested in 
correc t i ng misa p p rehensions of t hite h ead ' s views , and h as 
writ t en a number o f a rticl e s design ed to correc t ':mat h e 
cons i ders are mi s i n t e r preta tions . Cf . espe cia lly , John s on , 
Art . (l9 J a ) , 1 rt . (1945), Art.(l946 ), a nd Art .( l 951) . 
246 . Johnson , Art .(l9 45) , 280 . ~ he present d iscussion 
i s i ndebt ed to thi s articl e for many of t he f ollowing cri t icisms . 
247 . SPC, 130 . 
248 . HYBP , 61 9 . 
249 . Ar t . (l9Jl) . 
250 . Ar t .( l 936 ). 
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unJerly~u cr act ivity of pr ehen.:3 ion , and int o prehensi ve 
events • .'JX 
VJith respect to t he content ion of t hose who see i n t his 
sta tement the i dea that creativi ty (unde r lyi ng a ctivity ) 
is so1nethi:ng mo re ultimat e than actual entities , two poin ts 
must be observed . ( 1 ) tvhitehead ' s explic it position on 
~reativity , as has been stat ed252 is that '' creativity i s not 
an exte rnal agen cy with it s mm ulterior pu r pose s . Al l 
ac tua l entities shar e '~Hi th God this charac t e r is t ic of self-
causation . H253 ( 2 ) This expl i ci t st a tement leave s unsett l ed 
the i s sue oi th e precise natu r e of creativity . 
·Jnen Emmet expresses vmnJ er as to whethe r creativity 
is re a lly compl et e generality or is only a s fa r ba ck a s it 
is possible to pu s h explanatio n , 2 54 an othe r related di ff i-
culty may be not ed a s di r ected a t t he question of t he tern-
pora l origin of t he un ive r se . It is Johnson's co ntention 
here t ha t Whi tehead ' s statement settles the matter , viz . , 
that Go d "is not before all creation , but 1.vi th all creation . 112 55 
Thu s , f or exaHpl e , ii: l y 1 s contention , viz ., that God ' s pri -
mordial nature is prior t o h i s consequent nature and othe r 
actual enti ties , 2 56 i s erroneous . 2 57 There are , thou gh , 
statements i n Whitehead which are n ot so clear as the on e 
v.rh ich John son ha s quo ted . For e xample , the wo rd 17~ordial11 
251 . 3~•i\'/ , 102 - 3 . 
252 . c~ . ab ove ,261. 
253 . . H, 339 . 
2 54 . £mrne t , HPO , 71 . 
255 . PR , 521; Johnson , rt . (l945 ), 2S2 . 
256 . Cf . El y , HAWG, 14 . 
257 . Johnson , Ar t . (l945 ) , 2S2 . 
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itself conveys the notion of logical priority. God is s poken 
of as a "creature" of creativity.258 He is even declared to 
"acquire" a primordial nature. 259 Therefore, if this is not 
what M1itehead means, and it probably is not, the issue is far 
from crystal c l ear. Very likely, Emmet's supposition is 
the correct one when she wonders whether vfuitehead is try-
ing to find a logical distinction, rather than a complete 
generality. Also Johnson is probably correct when he says 
that Whitehead believes there was "no first day of crea-
tion.n260 But, it is also probably true tha t Whit ehead is 
not clear when he attempts to make the distinction between 
temporal and logical priority. One f inal example of this is 
seen in his distinction between the "eternal" primordial 
nature of God and the "everlasting" (unending but constantly 
begun) consequent nature of God. 
A further problem which is involved in the nature of 
261 
creativity, is the contention by some, including Johnson, 
that creativity is an eternal object. The above exposition. 
has already observed that in PR Whitehead almost exclusively 
refers to creativity in this manner. It is called a "uni-
versal of universals," and the "principle of novelty.n 262 
In re ply, for example, to Moxley' s difficulty over the seem-
ing 
258. 
259. 
260. 
God and 
261. 
262. 
PR, 47. 
PR, 524. 
Cf. here, PR, 528-9, the marvelous passage contrast-
the World. 
Art.(l945), 280. 
PR, 31; italics mine. 
i n g i nconsistency in \'!h i tehead betwee._ creat ivity a s un i ver-
sal (eternal ob je ct) which , apart f rom God , i ::.; i nd i stin-
gu i shabl e f r om non- ent i ty , anci y e t i s s ome t hing of ~1om God 
is a c:teature , johnson r ep l ies t hat 11 c reativity i .::> a ppl i e d 
to a n e ternal ob je ct and a lso to the e~~empl ific at ion of 
tha t ete rna l object . 11 Thu s , God " as a creature of crea-
ti vity uses t he term i n t he S•J cond sense . 112 63 !~ven if this 
be true , howe ve r , the question of t h e passag es dealin~ wi t h 
creat j_ vi t y as a n act :L vi ty a re not mad e c learer by co:1si cie r -
i n0 cre ativity as an ete rnal object . 
i ostponing f o r a moment the e valuat i o n of t hese var i ous 
vi ews , let us sumEJ a r ize the va r ious -ooL1ts of viev.r : (1) 
Creativity h a s bee11 r e g;c.<.r ded. as an rtac tua l ul t i r:1ate n chiefly 
be cau s e Whitehead uses t he phras e nun d e rly i n g a ctiv i t - , n 
espe c ial l y i n SJ\'1\. • ( 2 ) fh e functio n of creativi t y has 
been c o nfus e d with r e s pe ct to vrhe t }le r it o r i ginat es e v e r y -
t hing or vrhe t be r it is j us t p r e se n t i n e veryth ing . ( 3 ) 
Crea tivity h a been r egarded as an eternal obj ect , c h i ef l y 
due to \'ih i tehead 1 s terminology i n R. 
A su .;gested solut ion o f t he d i f ficulty may nm'i be 
of fe r ed vrhich mc:ty h elp to shed light on the problem . It 
tak e s t h e fo r m of the f ollowing hypoth e sis : 
\Jhitehead ' s opinion regarding creat ivity un derwent 
what mie;ht b e called t h r ee s t a ge ::; O J_· d evelopmen t . The f irs t , 
263 . johns on , Ar t .( l 94 5) , 281. 
or flsubstantial ac t ivity!! stage , can be seen in h is early 
philosophic a l works through the ,ji',H':i . The s e c ond stage , 
Vlh ile be g inning in RHI , becomes explicit i n PH , and might 
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be called the 11 creat i vi ty 11 stage . The third stage , in AO I 
a nc h is later lrJTit i ngs , re presents an attempt to reco n cile 
the se two p o ints of view , a nd mi ght be cal l ed t he "creative 
a ct i vityn st a g e . 
i vidence for t hes e stages has been p resen te d throughout 
t he present chapte r . The discussion v'rhich has j ust been 
noted has cal led attention to certai n mi s un derstandings of 
the meaning of creativity . Those opinions of Whitehead wh i ch 
a re based u pon passag es i n SMiiJ , espe c ia l ly the one which 'Has 
quoted , tend to see i n crea ti vi t y a 11 substantia l acti vi ty 1'1 
whic h 11 und erl i es 11 all actualities . Those v.rho base their 
opinion of Whitehead ' s vi ews upon PR , tend to se e creativity 
as a il 71 eternal object . 11 1 fur t her short dis cussion i s 
necessary to clarify the t h ird v i ew. 
F irst, in the AO I , the term tfcreativity 11 a ppears in 
t h r ee conne ctions . It is referred to as the "throbbing 
emoti on of t he past hurlin g itse l f i nto a new trans cendent 
fa ct . 1126 4 Later , i n a more sign i f i cant pas sag e , it i s 
termed llreal potentialityn where npotentialityn i s assoc i-
ated with the " p a s sive capa city!! and 11 r ea l 11 refers to t he 
notion of " real!! i n Pl a to 1 s Sophist , 'Wh i c h VJhi tehead take s 
264 . AOI , 227 . 
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to mea n t he notion of '' povie r . 112 65 Thus , i n t his pas s a g:::; , 
creat i vi t y me ans a synth esis of potenti ali ty , or capacity , 
a . d power , or efficacity . It is t hat 11 ·which drives t he 
-world . n266 The third passage attempts to emphasize t he notions 
of i mmanen ce and novelty i n conne ct i on with creativity . 2 67 
Thu s , in AOI , the r e i s a def i n i te swi ng away f r om the 
eternal - ob j e ct-notion of cr eat ivity towar d a more moderate 
view which co nne cts crea tivity vvith t he notions of powe r , 
or a ctivity , and i mmanence , as vl8 ll as reco gnizing i ts rela-
tions with potentiality and novelty . 
Turni ng next to }..-lQT , t he term '' c r eativity" as su ch "~Has 
not ab l e to be found so muc h a.s once . Inst ead the re i s used 
the phr ase fl creative activi t y . 11 For example , he s ays , 
11 p r oce ss f or its int elligibili t y involves t he notion of a 
creati ve a ctivity belonging to the v e r y es sence of each 
o c cas ion . 112 68 i-igain , he s ays , " t he creat ive a ctivi t y aims 
at preservati on of t he components and a t prese rva tion of 
i nte11s i ty . 11269 Ther e is here also consi de r able emphasis 
u pon th . " 270 e not l on oi power . 
Thus i n NOT , Whitehead seeks , as he d id in AOI , to 
associate the creative a s pe ct of things with acti vi ty 
more closely t h an he appears to have done i n PR . 
In his f i nal phi lo s ophica l writing s , Whitehe a d speaks 
265 . Cf . AOI, 153 . 
266 • .AOI , 230- l . 
267 . A.OI , 303 . 
268 . I·.'IQT , 206 . 
269 . 110T, 230 . 
270 . Cf . MOT , 163. 
of '' creat i vi t y" agai n , but this time i t is identi t i ed with 
the tt Jorl d of Activi ty . n2 71 Here the VJorld of Fact or 
Activity is considered i n ab s traction from the \Jorld of 
331 
Val ue which is identified with the tran sc endent s phere t ermed 
the neternal obje ct sn i n hi s earli er writings. 272 
One fu r ther obser vatj_ on of i mpor t ance r emai n s to be made. 
In a le cture r eprinted in his posthumously published volume , 
Essays in Science and Philosophy , 273 vJhitehead r ef ers i n a 
very i ntere sting pa s sage to the f a ct that wha t he ca lls the 
primorc i a l nat ure of God is Al exander 's nisus conceived a s 
a ctual. 
I thi nk the universe ha s a side 1vhi ch is oent a l and per-
manent. This side is that pr i me conceptua l drive which 
I ca ll the primordial nature of God. It is Al exande r 's 
ni sus con cei vea as a ctual . 274 
NolfiT the i mplication s of this st atement for t he presen t 
discus s i on are ve ry obviously i mportant. In the fir s t place, 
if the statement can be t aken literally , i t would i mp l y t ha t 
t here are t wo "drive s !T i n the vmrld . Le has a lready been ob-
served to believ e t hat creativity is t hat nwhich dri ves the 
world . n2 75 Now we firtd t ha t God ' s ) r i mordi a l nature , hithe rto 
distinguished from creativi ty, is not on l y t he Hprime con c ep-
tual dri ve 11 but corre sponds to vvhat in Al exander is the prin-
ciple of nove lty--the nisus. One wishes again that Yhitehead 
had been more explicit about the rela tion bet ween creativity 
271. Cf . e specially , Jhitehead , Ar t.(l94l) b , 694 . 
272 . Cf . ,>Jhitehead , Art.(l9~.l )b , 695 - 6 . 
273 . ~hitehead , ~SP , 114-
274 . ~;lhit ehe ad , ESP , 118 . 
275 . AO I , 230-1. 
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and the pri mordial nature of God . Despite this unclea r ness , 
it is hardly t hinkable t ha t -whitehead be l ieves tha t there 
a re two drives , or two ex. l anations of novelty i n the world. 
The problem is: How a r e we to understand what is the true 
mean i ng of c r eativity i n the light of these state~ent s and 
in the light of the a pparent shift in meaning whi ch the idea 
undergoes i n his thought? 
'I'he an sv-,;er which is he re suggested is as f ollows: \r.Jhat 
~hitehe ad r ea lly wa nts to denote by the term creativity is 
the notion of nrocess or a ctivity . This may be seen by re-
ca lling the fac t t ha t the term "activity" is used in both 
the first and l ast stages of his thought. 276 If this be the 
correct interpretation, then , when V,lbi tehead refers to crea-
tivity as the "drive of the wor l d , " he is referring to the 
notion of process with spe cial reference to t he original appe-
titian or the pri mordia l na ture of God . \fuen, also , he refers 
to process or activity a s " creat ivity" or ' " creative a ctivity , " 
he is inc l uding within process the additional notion that eath 
and every a ctua l ity is the onl y case of i ts kind in the uni-
verse . He is not trying to a ssert that creativity is anything 
real apart from a ctual entities , but that pro cess and novelty 
app l y to ever y r ea l entity and as such comprise the category 
of the ultimate . 
But the notion of activity or proc e ss , a s such , does not 
necessarily carry with it the idea of novelty . Proc e s s is not 
equi va l ent to progress . The sci entific re a ction maintained 
276 . Cf. Hartshorne , Ar t.(l950) , 40 ; Johnson , Art . (l946 ) , 
1, n4. 
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a cce pt ance of activity , proc e ss , change , without the admission 
eithe r of novelty or of .a pri nci ple of i mmanent causa lity. 
In fact , it wa s observed t hat Al exander r ea lized this truth , · 
and the possibi lity wa s suggest ed t hat t he rio tion of the 
ni sus wa s ca lcul a ted to provide bo th fo r drive and for novelty 
which t he bare not i on of even a r ea l time cou l d not supply--
in f a ct t he nisus constituted the " r ea l " aspe ct of t i me . 
I f this estimat e is relevant to the fa cts here pr esented , 
then , it may be t aken to mean t hat t he shift from the te r m 
1
'substantial (underl yi ng , or general) activity" empl oyed in 
SMH , to the employment of the t e r ms ncreati vity" and ncreative 
a ctivi ty" employed i n Rll''l , PR , l~.OI , and h OT , indi c at~s <1n 
a ttempt (pe rhap s even un con sciou s ) to i nvest t he notion of 
proc e s s or activity with ove rtones of nove l ty , and even of 
d r i ve , s i milar , pe rhaps , to the no tions of Ber gson and Alexan-
de r . This t endency , t hough , s erve s to ob sc ure unneces sarily 
the true nat ure of creativit y , or--better~- proc e ss , s incA both 
nove lty and drive ( cert a i nly the ~ormer) a re ad ecluate l y provi-
ded fo r by the anal ysis of t he proc e s s itse lf which r eve a l s 
other a s pe cts of his system . 
For mul ating , t hen , t he im~lic ati ons of the above discus-
si on , it ha s been sugge sted , if the fo r egoing anal ysis he cor-
rect, t ha t (1 ) creativity is no t a cle ar l y de fined doctrine 
in 0hitehead ' s mi nd; (2) cr eativity undergoes what mi ght be 
c lled three stages of termino logy t hroughout the course of 
tfuitehead ' s phi l osophica l deve lo pment; (3) creativity doe s 
no t correspond , in i ts true meaning , to ei ther Al exander 's 
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nisus or 3ergson's e l an vital ; but r a the r (4' creativ ity 
stand s for the r elative ly sim, le notion of process or activity , 
and , if so , is de void of the additional i mplic a tion s of no-
velty ad drive; and (5) i n order not to unde restimate the i m-
port ance of these l a tter notions , i, Jhi t ehead uses t erminology 
which inc or pora tes t ha t fo r v hich t hey s t ar d ; ( 6) this ~n~o -
c erlure , hm ever , results in unclea rnes s ,,rith re s·)P.Ct to the 
entire do ctrine , and is un ecessa r y sir ce both rove l ty and 
d rive a re ade quately provided for by other a spe cts of his 
system . 
4 . Summary and Eva l ua tion 
i . The merits of dh i t ehead 's epi stemo logy a re that he at -
t empts to follow an empi rica l approac h , by which is meant 
a synthe sis of i t ui tion and s peculation , f a ct and theory . 
ii . Causation r e ce ives a treatmen t which is more adequate 
tha either that g i ven by Be rg son or thnt gi~en by ~ l e -
xande r , serious consi deration be i n - given to the com-
· l ement ary ch· r a ctP.r of effic ient and fina l caus.:: U .on . 
iii . The problem of individua lity is empha s i zed more s t r org-
ly t han either 3er gson or ! l exander and i a Dan- os -
• L • 
chistic manner . That individua l s a re ,_ ult i ple uniti e s , 
Jr opr essively exemplifying definit ene s s and spont aneity 
is justified by coherent ana l vsis . 
i ·: . The empha sis hy I,Jhit ehe ad t ha t nove lty si _~nifi es el i -
versit r, a"t? c li e0 to ev ery r ea l ent:Lt_ , i s invo l ve j_n 
c .s usa tion , confo r ms to l av'l , and is inte lli gi ble , r c r e-
s ents sound ana l ysis. 
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v . The nepocha l theory!t of time presents a po i nt of vievv 
consistent with experi ence . 
vi . The prima cy of value to his system , while a t the same 
recognizing differences in levels of value , pl a ce s a 
high regar d upon individual self-rea li zation. 
v ii. God , a s the princ i ple of concretion, and as con serve r 
of value , ra t he r than creator, t ends to ab solve him from 
responsibi l ity fo r evil. 
viii. By considering creativi ty ultimate , ~fuitehead demonstrates 
his r espe ct for gr owt h , deve lo ment, on both the indi v i d-
ua l pl ane ·: and the social plane. 
ix. \nlh i tehe ad ' s doctrine ·of individuality r eveals a lack of 
a ttention to the facts of psychology i n his con cept of 
the durat ion of the occ a sion of experience and in hi s 
neglect of the problem of human deve lopment. 
x . The employment of importance as a criterion of value is 
of que stionabl e usefulne ss, and the i dentification of 
mora l and aesthetic value is quite unjusti fied. 
xi. Crea tivity is no t a clearl y de fined doctrine in ~vhi t e -
head 1 s mind, undergoing wha t mi ght be t e rmed three stages 
i n t e rminology. 
xii . The t rue meaning of crea tivity does not exactly corres-
- ~ pond to either Al exander's nisus or Bergson's e l an v ital, 
but rather s tands for the relatively simple notion of 
process or ac tiv ity. 
xiii. The ambiguity in t e r mi nology which r esults may stem f rom 
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~"ihi t ehead' s de sire to do ample just ice to the additional 
concepts of nove lty and dri ve (certa inly the f ormer) , 
neither of which is necessarily i mp l ied in the notion of 
proc e ss as such , and both of which are adequately prov i ded 
for by other aspe cts of hi s sys t em. 
CHA PTER VII 
£VALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
l. ~valuation 
i. The historical setting. 
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'l'he earliest ph ilosophical investigations into the prob-
lem of cosmology which are worthy of note form a group which 
provi ded vlihat might be c a lled "the theological explanations. n 
The rise of modern science, es pecially i n i ts dependence 
upon Newtonian physics, produced what has been termed 11 the 
scientific reaction to f i nal causes . " More recently , how-
ever, especially duri ng t h e last half of the nineteenth 
century an d culminating in the f irst few years of the pres-
ent century, three tendencies were observe d eac h or which 
served to foreshadow t he three major syntheses which are 
the sub je ct of the pr esent dissertation. These recent ten-
denc ie s v-rere ( l) neo-vitalism, largely the outc ome of 
deve lopments within biology, ( 2) emergent evolution , largely 
a ph ilosophica l application o f some of the insights of 
vitalism, and (3) the recent d evelopment s in physics whi ch 
produced new concepti ons of matter and space . 
I n the course of more or less continuous d iscussions 
of these and related issues which raged during the first 
thre e decades of this century , t here appe ared a gr adual 
and steadily increasing r e cognition that t he notion o f novelty 
is a t the root of t he matter . Some of the more i mportant 
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implications of novelty for the three majo r syntheses d i s-
cussed in this d i ss ertat ion are crysta l l i zed i nto several 
problems under v.rhi ch ( with others) each of these syntheses 
was examined . These prob lems a re: (1) e pistemology ; 
(2) time , ( 3) emergenc e , (4) complexity , ( 5 ) l aw , (6) pre -
dictability , (7) intelligibility , (8) value. 
ii. Cosmic factors . 
The general tendency of the theologi c a l explanations was 
observed to be two- fol d : (1) t o a3si gn the ultimate expla-
nat ion of t he world a nd a ll that i s there i n to the deity, 
and (2) to r e g ard t he world as of lesser value t han the 
d eity . Beyo n d t hese po i nt s t here was considerable di sagree-
ment . The r efore , it might be of interest to trace the s e 
di i'ferences ~rom the t h eolog i cal explanations through the 
thought o f Ber gson , Al exander , and Whitehea d . 
For Plato (o f the Timaeus) there were t hree ultimate 
fa ctors , the Pa tterns, the Receptacle , and the D emiur~e 
(co s mi c artisan) . 'l'hese elements were ind e pen d e n t of each 
othe r. Aristotle reduced the factors to two , Pure .ti'orm or 
actuality, an d matter or p otentiality . There was a third 
f a ctor , an element of 11 longing , TT which he s urrepticiously 
associates wi t h potentiality . The emanation theo r y of 
Plotinu s :has one r eal f a ctor, flthe One , 11 and an opposi n g 
but unreal factor , matter . Aquinas is content to hav e one 
fa c tor only, Deus or Go d . These views , it was observ ed , 
d isa gree d y.;i dely, then on whethe r the deity ( the Demiurg e , 
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Pure Form , the One , or God ) nee ded a nythin g other t han him-
s elf , a ny 11 stuff , n so to speak , to b ri ng about the world 
and it s processes . 
It is inte r esting, therefore, t hat i n these explana-
tions (l) there is a chrono l ogical pro gression away f rom 
plur al i ty of factors towa r d a single factor , ( 2 ) there is 
some indecision a b out d efiniteness of the fa c tors , some 
be ing uncle a r , such as Aristotle's nlonging , 11 and Plotinus' 
17 matter . 11 
In the s cientif i c re~ction to final c auses , ther e is 
n o apparent concern with the theories of ori gins . Atten-
tion is directed , rathe r, tovmrd o b servation of the \ovorld 
it self . The factors i nvolved here a re, of course , spac e, 
time , matter , and moti on. 
With the philosophy of Be r g son , however , t he re i s d is-
cernable i mmediately t he revolutionary chang e regarding 
the nature o f time as duration . Although space and matte r 
are g enerally r egarde d simil arly to the scientific r e a ction, 
the g e neral tendency of Ber gs on is t o r ega rd the u l timate 
factors as two in numbe r: (l) t he e l an vital, associ a ted 
with life and dur a tio n , and ( 2 ) matter, associa ted with 
matter and space . Thus , the re i s s e en in the dual emphasis, 
i n the i d ea of de g ene r ation , and in th e indecision abou t 
the ultimate relation of the tv.ro facto rs, a similarity to 
Plotinu s ' scheme . There is a l so seen an attemp ted synt he -
sis with the sc i entific react ion in tha t space and time 
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In :~ lexancler ' s sch~c:e , thr_; fD c tor s i-\t f i rst <tre t, t,-ro in 
11umber : (1) Spa c e - Ti n1e , a nd ( 2 ) qu a lity or rle ity . Ilo w·eve r , 
t he added n ot i on of ni su s appe a r s l a t e r. He r e the space 
nnct time of the s c ienti f ic rea c t i on a re redesi~ned i nto a 
unif ied matrix , Spa c e-: Time (in harmony .ri t h rec t,nt :leve lo l) -
ment s in physic s ) awl sr_;r··{83 the seme fw1c~. ion <: s Jt rj_st ot-, l e ' s 
nfll2,tt e r" or " stuf f . " ThG classic c.. l n otion of Hfo 1.'11n is 
t c:.l'\.eil ov e r by quality , !:.1. l~d tht:: n , eventuaLL~r , rd. SL3 <:i;::>pen rs 
to f unction m ch as d i d Aristotle ' s ·longing aattor . " 
.v1l it ehe c:F~ ' s syst e.l1, in certa i n respect s , most cle:::;p:-- J.y 
r esGmb l es P l ato in th a t t he rea l m of e t e rn a l o~Jjo cts 
cor e2)onds to t hP J l a tonic Pt:ltt~e1 'ns . Tlle~3e , i n cj_dentrll1y , 
func tion ::1 s d i d ;\.rLstot l e ' s pul~e Ela tter or -;Jotenti c=:. l i ty . 
Qt-,he r f a ctors i n ~Jli t ehe8.c1. ' s synthesis j_r~chF'le : f\ c t:.ua l 
entit i es ( Goci a 1d e:1 ll r:_es vc:rr:1e in the FOl:'l c~ , p::.~ ·_,l snsion s 
( feeling s) , <mel crec:tti ;.ri t y ( c ate·;ory of the ultima t r:o- ) . All 
a c tua l ent i t i <:; s , in ·!::,heir s tructur e a nd acl.'rentur,;s , (~Db ody 
1-1 i t hin tiH:H'ls c; l ve.s tlle Re basic f a ctors . 
I t !flay ~ ) e observed thDt the tl10 u:~ht of BeJ'i",:::on , . ·~ lex­
~ncte r , and lTilitnhe cd roprssent 8 tc-:nden c y prpgressi ue l y 
(1 ) to increase t he numb e r of co s1:1ic f :-:1 ctor s , c:.ncl ( 2) to 
integrat e~ thc::se f a ctor s Hi t h a somevJhat n od i f i ed spatia -
tempor a l r ea l m. The f irs t of the se i s obserYab l e c1S some -
wha t t he r ev e r se of the theo lo ~~ic al e x:; l <me:·tlo>ls . '_;~he 
seco.:1cl i s se e ll <:~ s ) <J :::·t of tlle uni que COiltribu:!.j_on of tllP.se 
three re c ent thinkers . 
iii. Cosmic Process. 
When the discussion turns to the manne r in which the 
cosmic pr ocess1 E1oves , an e ven g rea ter variety of opinion 
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is noted . Plato emphasized the aesthetic character of the 
process with the cosmic artisan ( Demiurge) informing the 
chaotic Re c e p tacle with the eternal Patterns . Ar i stotle , 
o n the other hand, emphasizing t h e notion of i E1inanen ce , 
sees poten tiality or matter nlongi ngtt for and "attra ctedn 
by t he perfection of Pure Fonn . Plotinus sees not only 
creation bu t a lso the eventual return of the matter which 
has emanated f rom the One . For him t h e p rocess is rhythmi c. 
Aquinas c211 see no interpretation but the one which r e g a rds 
the world as called forth by divine fiat from nothing . For 
him there really is no process of becoming . There is just 
the be c oming of the world . 
Of cours e , the sc ientific r eaction, concerned as it 
was with merely efficient causal ity, is not interested in 
the p roces s of becoming but , rather , with t he activities 
of being . The scientific notion of matter i n moti on in 
space and i n time, t empered somewhat by t he philo sophic a l 
interest in mind (usually ccinsi de red as another k ind of 
1. It must be noted that the term ttpro ces s " as here 
applied to the ancient t h eolog ians is i~tended to includ e 
ttlog i c a l pro gressionn as well as the " r eal pro g ress i onn of 
t he re cent thinkers . 
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n st,uffll ) obeyi1 g fi xed l aws W<.1_S p :r e tt~r n ucl: the ext ent of 
the cosr, o l o _:o;ic a l out l ooL un1-,i l the re c e n t t e nde n cie s S(ot 
in . 
In Be r gson , there is observed , ag~ i 1 , t.lv~ t Fn •l e :'lCY t o 
fo llow ? l otinu s . I-l c~re t h e-': con cept of r hyt hm is obs e:~_~vct b l e 
c l ee:~r ly . ', ith the adr_:i tion of t i nw a s durc:~t ion VTLich (th o, 1gh 
n ot c l e~' r +y st,3 t ed as such) i s in s ome :,;a y i·nrolv e d in the 
.; 
Ectivi ty of t he e l an v i t a l , Ber~ son avoids a sta tic p o c e ss 
, . 
t he e l .:m , iJl ~J. c h i s un c e 2 s i E c_; 1 ;.r crea te 
uu for E se e;:> ' 1 2 L0'I e l ty , ;-·in .s: lly ro l a. s e s into n a t te r ( ::-: n oth ~::r 
relati on •;,r}-:id, is not c l earl y r:k intRi ned ) . "8 c:: r g sr 11 ' s cr:> n -
ce)t of cosmi c pro c ess a l s o i nv ol ves t he a nc i ent t e n den c y 
t o rle l)re ciate the world . In h is C3 s e , however , it 8 plie s 
only t o spa ce and u atter , ti~e and life being excluded and 
ev entns lly i d eHt i f i t=; d ;.;i t:;h God . 
~l exander 's synthesis presents a so l ution of cosoic 
proc es ·~ ,,.,h ~_ c h , ~-rhi l e sti ll sL-:1i l c::r in c e rt ain r ~? ~- 1 ects t o 
~~ ri stot l e ' s ·v i ev-J in the emergr3 ~1 c e of l eve l s , shmcs gre ~ t 
si ~:J.i lctr i. ty to the sc i entifi c v i e~ ._r in t-.ha t Spa c e - Ti r"le is 
~iven b ~ sic pr i ori t y r n d C9usa l ity b e comes ~ere ly ~escri9-
t io11 of the continuit y of ·r.h e c ouse e:m t.:J. effe ct r c l c:;t·,ion . 
-~ lex~nct .-... r , hm-vc•.rer , r e c ogn izes t he Eeed of t al~in~ tine 
seriousl y e nd f o l lows ,_ '"Tt;s on ' s l e 2.d. in t J• i s r ,.., ~:one ct espe c i -
a l J y in t:S i v int; it i rreversibili t. y . Like-·. dse , he i s it. p r es3erl. 
wi th the r eality of 1ove l t y ~ nd hAn c e cr~ nt s th~ nme r 8ence 
of nov e l l ev e ls . Howeve r , pr-:: rhAps b r,c an se of recogni7.ed 
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d eficiencies in his basic p r e s uppo sitions , Alexand e r bring s 
in the n otion of t he ni sus which is t he urg e to d eity or 
quality . The re is very little, i f any , observa ble tendency 
i n Alexander to depreci ate any part of t he un iverse . t:very 
part i s necessary to the ongoing p rocess which as a whole 
is God . : l s o , there a re expl i cit sta t ement s that Al exander 
agr ees with Aristotle tha t the 1\IOrld always has b een ; n ovel 
levels eme r g e on ly within it . 
f or \Vhitehead , c osmic p rocess is real ity. The proces s 
involves t he recogni t ion o f a ll a ctuality as individual s in 
r eal tog eth er ness or fe eling-relations 1"li th each other . 
Go d ' s p r imordial nature (menta l p ole) comprising t h e unlim-
ited c onc eptual va lua tion of all pure potentials ( e ternal 
object s ) , makes t hem r e levant by creativity to each concres-
cent occasion . These a re felt con ceptually as a ppetit ion , 
requ i re integrati on accord ing to subjective a i m with the 
phy sical feeling s whi ch are d erived from the superjective 
nature or all o ther actual occ a sions ( ge neral p otentiality ) 
with their creati vity, a nd issue into the f i nal satisfa c-
tion of the g iven entity vrhich t hen pe r ishe s , t hu s quali f y-
i ng crea tivity . In tum , Go d physical l y feels the world 
( physical pole) v;ith his consequen t na ture with ten de r c are 
t hat nothing be lost . 
It i s obvi ous that Wh i tehead ' s synthe s is i s the most 
comp lex of t he th r e e . There is in t he cosmic p r o cess an 
e v e n more distinctly Pl a t onic qu a lit y tha n was d isce r nable 
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in the analysis of the cosmic factors. God is here presen-
ted not as the creator, but as the "principle of concre-
tionn who tenderly seeks to preserve va lue. He is 2. ctual, 
like al l other a ct t-Lalities , but,, i n a ddition, is the medi-
ator bet1t1een the pure potentia l ity of th e eternal and the 
general potential ity of the past in order that the new 
a ctuality of the present may come into be i ng . Further, 
there i s in the notion of creativity , certa inly a r e currence 
to t he notion of pure formless matter of Aristotle, i.e., 
the purest of potentials. The proces.s of be coming and per-
ishing of actual occasions to gether wit h t he a lternation 
between Go d 's primordial a nd conse quent natures, brings 
to mind r efe rence to the principle of rhythm which , with 
Bergson , Plotinus sm:>T . \/hitehead i ntegr a tes, i n an up-to-
da t e form, the spatia-temporal r ealm of the scientific 
reaction and the i dealistic elements in ancient and modern 
views i n his granting both a physi ca l and a mental pole to 
all actual entities includi ng God . Lastly, t he r e cognition 
that each occas i on is a n ovel entity which ne ver before 
ex i s ted sh ows a greement with both of t he rec ent t h i nkers 
with Aquinas that the world is a novelty. 
In concluding this section, then , i t is interesting to 
obs erve, with respe ct t o cosmic process, that: 
( l) The t heological explanati ons were succe i=i sful i n c allint3 
attention to several significant f a ctors in cosmic process 
which have proved he l pful t o the three recent syn thes es, 
viz., aesthetic synthesis ( Plato), attraction or i mmanent 
te leology (Aristotle) , nhythmic alternation (Plotinus), 
and the be coming of novelty (Aquinas). 
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(2) The scientific reaction was su ccessful i n emphasizing 
( a lthough it had been deal t \vith quite r egularly by others 
as well) t he notion of efficient causality. 
(3) The thr ee modern s ynth e ses dis play a c hronologically 
i n crea s i ng d egree of co mplexity in their accounts of cos-
mic p rocess. 
(4) Bergson's doctrine bears most similarity to t h e contri-
butions of Plotinus (e specially in his emphasis on r hythm), 
and to the scientific rea ction (in t he notion of efficient 
causal ity, the concept of matter as inert an d of s pace a s 
absolute) , although t here are indications of i mmanent, 
though not conscious, teleology ( Ari s totle). 
( 5) Al exander's view b ears about equal similarity to the 
s cientific reaction (in the i mportance of s pace and time) 
and to Aristotle ' s immanent teleology ( do ctrine of t he 
n isus) . Cosmic proces s as a esthetic is not co nsidered a 
valid analogy by Al exander , although quality does appear 
as rrfo rmn ( Plato an d Aristot1e) . 
(6) wn itehead 1 s conce ption is predominantly Pl atonic 
( divine med iation rather than d ivine creation), but there 
are d efinite similarities to all the othe r influences men-
tioned : to i mmanent teleology of .Aristotle (c reat ivity), 
to the r hythmic alternation of Plotinus, a nd t o the g iving 
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a place to efficient causality of t he scientif ic rea ction . 
(7) All three of the recent syntheses r e cognize the contri-
bution o f Aquinas (though not dire ctly in name) ·, viz., 
the becoming of novelty . 
iv . The problem of epi stemology. 
With the problem of epistemology, the present evalua-
tion centers around the f irs t of eight general headings 
1.vhich were noted in t he discussion of novelt y . Next , the 
two related notions of causality and individuality, a lso 
treated with the discussion of each synthe sis, are covered . 
The e valuat i on will co 11clude vri th the seven remaining prob -
lems of novelty . 
As treated i n t he above analysis , the g eneral a i m in 
the study of t he problem of epistemology was to discover 
the g eneral me tho d (o r methods) by which Bergson , Alexander , 
an d ·~J[litehead conceived their respective doctrines to be 
k.novv'Il . Also, since each not i on is closely bound up with 
t he i dea of n ovelty, the me tho d by wh i ch novelty i s kn01.m 
was involved to some extent . 
1). Be r gson , it was obs erved , employed thr e e me thods 
by \v.hich the elan vital was decla red to be known : ( i) by 
the analogy of human volition, ( ii) by infe rence f rom the 
evidence of biology , and ( iii) by the immed iat e expe rience 
of ins tinct and intuit ~ on . The firs t method was found to 
be the '\veakest chiefly because t he term volition is ambigu-
ously use d. fh e second method, that of inf erence, had the 
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greatest possibilities , but wa s n ot sufficiently exploit ed . 
The third, or t he method of in.st inct and i ntuition, v.ras 
stres se d the most by Be r gson, but p ossess ed certain intrin-
sic difficulties. 
The d efects which were obs e rved i n Berg son's a pproach 
we r e ( i) while k no111/ledg e of subje ctive cause may be immedi -
ately felt i n conscious volition, t his is insuff icient evi-
d e n ce to warrant asserting e i ther t he existence of an objec-
tive c ause itself, or the nature of this a llege d objective 
c ause ; (ii) that confusion of the nature of 1.'lill renders 
the precis e natur e of intuition most unclear; (iii) tha t 
the claim th a t the ~lan vi tal is incapa ble of genetic 
exp 0riment is t rue but irrelevant ; a nd (iv) that his g e n er-
al anti-intellectuali sm is an error that pervades his e n -
tire sy stem . 
The ch ief me rits of Ber gson 's treatment of e pist emology, 
as appl ied to the ~lan vital, a re seen in his calling atten-
tion to the facts of v.Jill, of bio logy, and of immediat e 
experie n ce . The chief error se ems to lie in not free ~ng 
e a ch of t hese g roups of f a cts f rom inherent difficult ies 
and augmenting them by f urther support. 
2) . Alexander's general e p istemology e vades the diffi-
cu lti es inherent in Be r g son, espe cially i n his g ranting a 
more positive p os i tion to intellect and in h i s avoiding 
the monistic i n t u itionism of the French phi losopher. Cer-
tain d efects, howe ver, appe ar . These a re seen (i) in his 
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de n i a l tha t mi nd can contemp l a te itself; ( i i ) in hi s sup -
positi on that n i sus can be knovm , or monistically intuited , 
--h er e is a rec urre n ce to Berg s on; and ( iii ) in his t en -
d e n cy to a ssume the ni sus wh en de aling with it s peculatively . 
The chief merit o f Alexand er's ep istemology , a s a pplied 
to t h e n isus , i s seen in his admiss i on tha t nisus i s a t 
lea ~t subjec t to spe culative processes . The chief d efect 
seems to lie in the manner in 'Which he emp loys those specu-
l at ive processes. 
3) . Wh itehead ' s e p istemology g enera lly is the mos t 
a d equ.ate of the thre e wit h r espe c t to h i s emp irical approa ch 
wnic h g ran t s a n important place to a naly sis and s p ecu lation 
vvhil e s till keep ing in touc h vri th t h e data of i mmedia te 
expe ri ence . Certain d efects , how e ver, were obs e rve d i n his 
u s e o f terms in PR , wh ich tend to leave the i mp ression that 
creati v i t y i s so me t h i ng a k in to an a priori c a t e gory . 
Smnmarizing , th en , Berg son and Al exan d er appe a r to rely 
t o a g r Ga ter ex tent than 1,\Jhit ehe a d up on the g reat e r ade-
qu a cy o f intuition a s a mean s of discove r i ng t h e ~lan vital, 
a nd t he n isu s res pe ctivel y , vklile Whitehea d de pe n d s to a 
gre a te r: ext ent u p on r a tiona l processes f or t he d i s cover y 
of crea tiv ity , while a t the same time e mploying intuition . 
In this r esp ec t White head ' s approach is g enerally the most 
a d e qu a te , although h e is gu ilty in plac e s of employ ing 
terms vi 1ich sh ow indica tions of t oo g rea t a sv.;rin g toward 
t he emp l oyme n t o f r eason . All t h r e e o f these thin kers 
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display a se rious a nd si gnificant attempt to use i i m :diate 
experience as a metho d of discove r y which will r e veal a t 
l east par t of the answer to the cosmolog ical problem. In 
this re spect they represent a dis tinct adv ance over the 
purely r at ional istic approaches of the theol og ical expla-
n a tions and scientific rea ction alike . 
v . The problem of causality . 
The prob lem o f causal i t y is bound u p , in varying degrees,· 
with all t hr ee d octrines of t h is dissertation . 
1) . Bergson e mphasized causal ity to the great est extent . 
The /elan vital , as t he Himp etv.s" behind all creati ve d evelop-
ment, 1s a just ified protest ag ainst the view t hat Tl all is 
g iven" s uch as was implied both L1 t he theolog ica l expl a -
nat ions and th e s cientific reaction . Howe ver, th e re was 
obs e rved in Berg son Ts doctrine o f cause a difficulty vvhi ch 
vva s termed a n " oscillati on between a duali s tic a nd monistic 
do ctrin e " in tha t on occasion t he "elan i s cons i dered the 
ultimate c ause o f everything including matte r , and on occas-
ion t h ey are treated as dual exp lanations of caus e . Further-
more, Be r gson's d octrine of cause t ends to deny co ns cious 
purpose to th i s causal a ge n cy , the elan vital . Be r gson is 
at tempting to avoid the extremes of fi nal c a u sality to v.rh ich 
t he sc i en ti f ic r eaction h a d s u ccumbed . In s o doing , he 
r i ghtly ca lls a ttention to the d efect of botp extremes, but 
h e fails to provid e an a dequate a lt e r nati ve . 
2 ) . Al exand er re p r esen t s , more or less , a re a c t ion 
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a gainst t he n otio n of povver i n causat ion . He is content 
to rely u pon the me t hod of re ce~ t sc ienc e ·which mer :; l y ob-
serve s cont inuity of sequence . Thi s view, i t was obse rved , 
has hardl y more t o be s ai d for i t than co u l d be s aid f or 
the 1riew O.L Ber g so n, sinc e it divorc es causali t y f r om. t he 
realm o f exp l anati on . Hov.rever , Al exander' s u se o f t he term 
"nisus , n it was sugge sted, re presents a n att empt to i nject 
t h e notion of power into his s y stem , a nd thu s s ome of the 
diffi cu lty i s al levia t ed . Still , however , ther e is no not ion 
of conscious teleology here . 
3) . In Whitehead , the i deas of effi cient and final 
causalit y ·whic h had p l agued Ber g son b ecar.1e synthe sized . 
The f orme r refe rs to the i mpac t of th e rr g i ventt aspe c t of 
exp erienc e; the 1 a tter r efe rs to the " b e c omingtt of exp er-
i enc e . Both aspe cts i rw o l ve a modificat i on of creat ivity . 
Desp i te the a ppa rent simplicity v.ri t..h which c ausat ion is 
settled , the r e are still d i f f iculti es . It is not clear at 
all j u st what part creativity p l ay s eithe r i n efficient 
or in i wnanent causal i ty . Also, in the h i gher experiences 
of human being s , t h e r e is l a ck of an a d e quate t heo ry of 
v olit ion , i'l t l east e1 s cho ic e be t v,ree n a l t e r n<St i ve s . 
Summarizin g , t h e n , i t may be observed tha t, while there 
i s attention g i ven to the problem of cau s ality , tog ethe r 
with reco gniti on o f the nee d for avoiding the extremes of 
efficient and f i nal causality , yet there i s a lack of suc-
cess in formulatin g the al ternative. Ber gs on o s c i lla tes 
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between a dual explana t ion a nd a s ing le o ne ; f earing to 
g r ant final causalit y , t he "'elan i s lit tle more than t'blind 
purp ose . " Alexande r, hoping to avoid t he p roblem , find s 
himself dr avm i n , and the r e sult is hard l y much better 
than Be r g so n 's. Wh i tehead ' s approac h i s ing en ious, and , 
no doub t, the mo s t adequate one i n many res pects . But 
here , the obscure r e lation of the creativity to causation 
and the fai lure to d evelop an adequate theory of voliti on 
weakens h i s p osition. 
vi. The pro blem of individuality . 
1) . Be r g son ' s do ctrine of indivi dualit y was apparently 
vit i a t ed by a s i mila r t ype of os c i ll a tion to th a t which 
ch a r a c te rized h i s c ausal theory . On one harid, t he produc-
tion o f individual s is s aid to requi re both the elan vital 
and matter , and , on the other hand , the ~lan vital is d e-
c lared to be t he mur c e of uni ty in indivi dua l s . The clos-
est which Be rgson co mes to solving this problem is to sug -
gest that consciousness f urnishes the clue . He does not , 
h owever , fo llow u p t h i s train of thought suffic iently to 
clarify the issue . 
2) . Alexander' s t re atment o f t he problem of individual-
ity is t he ·weakest of the t h r ee thinkers studied . He admit s 
that this phase o f his thou ght is perplexi ng to himself. 
He has emphasized the broader aspect of thing s to such an 
ex tent tha t the onl y individual wh ich i s c learly indi c 2ted 
is God , who is t he whole 1"// rl d wit h it s n isus to deity . · 
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3) . Vihit ehead presents a vie w vinich contr asts d is-
tinctly vfi th those of h :Ls two p r edecessors . Be r gson ' s 
tendency toward dual i sm , and Alexande r's tendency toward 
monism is matched by Whitehead 's pluralism . Whitehead 
makes a s incere a nd concerted effort to unite the prin-
ciples of multiplici ty and unity ""'ri thin the concrete exper-
ience of r eal i ndivi duals, including in his task the exper-
i ence of Go d as well . This view has the merits of tally-
ing with experience wh ich e mbrac es b ot h unity and multipli-
city . Also that bot h individuals and the universe display 
defi niteness and spontanei t y is in accord with coherent 
ana lysis. It appears, however , to be a d ep arture from 
empirical fact, at least on the human plane, that expe r-
ien ce is de cla red to be as short in duration as he declares 
that it is . The development of t he unified ht~an p e rson 
appears to be somev-rhat neglected . 
::lummarizing , then, it might be obs e rved that while 
Bergson ' s dual i sm prevents him from formula ting an ade quate 
theory of individuality , Alexander's monism resu lts i n 
even g reater difficulty . VJh it ehead seeks to exploit the 
on ly alternative remaining , viz ., plural ism. He is very 
su ccessful i n this re gard ~~ constructing a magn ificent 
theory. However , the theory suffers f rom lack of suffici-
ent empirical j ustifi cation on the levels lower than human 
expe rience , and from lac k of r e levance to experie11ce on the 
human level. Whitehead an d Be r gson are closer to idealism 
than is Alexander , but Alexander shows s i gns of i deal ism 
i n h i s theory of t he n isus. 
v i i . Th e problem of novelty . 
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All three thinkers , Be r g son , Al exander , and Whitehead , 
are eminently conc e rned vvith t he p roblem of novelty . It is 
here , perhaps , t hat t he l a r g est area of a g reement may be 
found in t hei r r e s pective do ctrines . It is true t hat 
each of these thinke rs emphas izes va ri ou s asp e ct s of t he 
problem , but i t still remains true that on the exist ence 
of nove l ty they stand a g reed . 
1) . Novelty a nd time . Berg son ' s writing s emphas ize 
t he r e lations between nove lty and t i me or dur at ion . He 
seems to thi nk that they n e cessar i l y impl y each other , vJhen 
actually i t i s t r ue onl y that novelty i mplies time . Berg -
son dese rve s cred i t , howeve r, f or observing the r elat ion 
wh ich does hol d , viz. , that i f t i me is n ot tak en s eriously , 
t hen no velty cannot be take n s eriously . 
Alexand er , l ikewise r e cog n i zes t h e i mportance of t i me , 
c a lling i t the "mind o f space , n and e ven g iving it three 
dimension s to co i nc i d e with the three of s pace . He r e co g -
n ize s time ' s irreversibility and assoc i ates i ts 'restle ss-
ness11 with n o velty , which he e v e n tua lly calls nn isus . n 
Whitehead , does not g ive to time quite t he same i mpor-
tance which is seen i n either Be r gson or Al exand er , choosing , 
rath e r , t o associate i t with a n 11 ex t ens i ve continumn which 
i s n atomiz ed 11 by actual i ndivi dualities . Thu s e a ch i ndi vi -
dual i s a duration or ep o ch o f time . The t r ue r eality is 
the i ndivi dual ent i ty, no t the time . But this does not mean 
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t hat Whitehe a d does n o t t ake t ime s e riou s ly . It is woven 
into the f a bric , for h i m, r athe r than bei~ t h e f a b r ic , 
as i t ':ra s f o r t hem . 
2 ) . Comt:J l exi ty and eme r ge n ce are te r ms \'lhi ch have 
more sign ificance fo r Al exander than fo r either Berg son and 
Wh itehead . Al exander ' s vi ew stres s e s the ne e d f or a ce r t ain 
c ompl exity to occur i f emerg e n c e of qual i ty or n ove lty is 
to occur . l:J erg son a nd 11Vhi tehead a dmit comp l exi t y a nd emer-
g ence o c cur , but t hese t hi nke r s d o no t co n te nd t h a t com-
p l exi t y i s re quired for nov e lty to erner g e . .i.i'u r t he r more , 
t he r e is observable i n Alexander a tend e n cy t o r e ga rd 
e me r g ence as explanat o~y , when i n f a ct it i s me re l y d es-
crip t i v e . 
3). On wh ether t he p r incipl e o f novelty c on f orms to 
l aw , the r e i s a gain at least some uncertainty . Be r g son ' s 
p os i t i on i s not v e r y st r on g since he maintains t hat the 
~ lan conforms to ''generan whi l e mat te r conforms to " l av1 . tt 
Alexan der ' s position is les s clear , since h i s do ctrine of 
c ausal i t y a v oi d s t he p roblems of law. Vh i tehead fi nd s in 
crea t i vity a nd n ovelt:1• n o p rob lem whatever . For h i m lav,r 
is b ased u p on a c tuality . Laws c ome i n to b e i ng and g o out 
of be ing; with t he a ctualities to vvhich t hey pertain . 
4) . The mat te r o f the u np r edictability o f n ovelty , 
which i s v e r y mu ch the concer11 of Be r 0 son a nd Alexander 
again, i s not the concern o f Whi t ehead . In this resp ect , 
it lllay b e n ot ed that Wh i tehe a d ' s l ac k of conc e rn stems f r om 
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his con vi ct ion that each individual is causa sui . This 
ind etermination r enders t 1e que stion of predic t ability 
merely academic . Thu s , even i f n ov e lty could be p redi cted , 
t hat pr edi ction cou l d not have a complete l y de termining 
influence on the outcome. Bergson i s very muc ~l conce rned 
v~i. t h protecting the unforeseeab i lity of th e out c ome . So 
i s Al exander. Perhaps the reason may be seen i n t he f a ilure 
of t he ir d octrine s of causality to ful l y a ppreciate the 
i mportan ce of fi nal caus es. 
5) . fhe i ssue of the ultimat e intellig i b i l ity, either 
of novelty or of the princi ple of no~elty , may be see n to 
v a r y from the mystica l i ntuiti on i sm o f Bergson , and the 
ttnatural p iety 11 of Al exand er , to a matte r which r efers to 
t he anal ysis of a c tual entit i e s i n \'ihiteheaci . The two 
f orme r men regard t heir d octrine s of novelty as somehow 
ultima t ely un intellig ible . ~-hi t ehe a d nowhere g ives this 
i mpr e ss ion . Thi s , perhaps , ma y be obse rve d as a r esult of 
vihitehead ' s employmen t of t he "ontolog i cal pri n cip le 1T t hat 
g round s a ll r easons in , or i n some phase of , actual entit i e s . 
\!he n some one fac tor , such as the e l an vi tal, n isus , or 
creati v ity , is employed as t he expl anation b a ck of novelty , 
t he re is a~ illegitima te ab s traction which resu l ts i n the 
p re d ic ament of the t h eo log ical exp l a nat i ons . v/hen n o at ten -
t ion is pai d to the ultimate fact ors, the i mpossibilit r of 
n ovelty result s as was seen i n the s ci ent i fi c reaction . 
n d equate explanat ion and intellig i bility i nvolves t h e most 
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coherent , sys tematic g en eral i zation , b a s ed on all the data , 
whi ch it is p ossible to obtain . 
6). fhe ques tion of t he p lace of v alue in the meta-
0hys ical s cheme r e ceived a proGressively more a d equate 
treatment in the three r ec e n t s yntheses . While Bergson 
r e cognized t he i mportance of value and aff irms an u l timate 
optimi sm i n spite of the f acts of e vil, h is v a lue theory 
i s n ot de veloped f urther t han th e v a gue g e neral Jr inc iple 
/ that the elan stan j s for the t riumph of value . Al exander ' s 
valu e theory i s more explic i tly treated , but it r e veals 
a il incapability of being integrat ed with h i s natural i sti c 
p ren ises . ·v·.Jhitehead f ol l oN·s the suggestion of itle:xande r 
in constructing a fact -value co n ti num. Supporte d by his 
more a dequate doctrin es of ind ividuality and c ausality , 
~hitehead ' s value theor y r e veals an i deal i stic metaphysi c s 
which is more c ohe r ent tha n that of e ithe r Be r gson or 
Alexande r . 
But, e v e11 h e re d efect s a re visible in the t ende n cy o.f 
·~vhitehead to employ the lirr i t ed notion of i r:1port ance as the 
criterion of value , and to i dentify moral va lue wi th the 
aes t hetic. 
vi i . The p robl em o f God . 
Be r gson arrived l ate at the point where he could i nte -
g r ate the i de a of God with h i s me t aphysics . Whe n he r eached 
t h is p l a ce , there was nothing muc h he could do but i denti f y 
it with h i s ~lan vital . Thus God be c ame the possessor of 
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all th e charact e ristics wh _ch b e long ed to the e lan includ-
ing i ts limi ted for e si ght and fin i te p owe r. The f a ct 
that t he d iscu ssion of the ~lan revealed lit tle i n the way 
o f e lements or s t r uc t ure is , pe r hap s , l a r g ely r e s p onsible 
for t he trouble which Be rgson has with the p rob lems related 
to intell i g i b i l ity and ind ividuality . Th e g r eat dual i s m 
between God and the adversary raises rea l problems which 
a re not sat isfactori ly an swered . 
Alexande r , on the other .hand , adopts a unique a~proach 
i n that , for him, God is "the who l e world 1,vi th i ts n i sus 
to d e i t y . " Alexand er be l i e v e s he has a voided pantheisrc1 
and theism ( dei sm ) and struck a middle g round . Actual ly , 
however , since deity is always in t he fu ture a n d never is , 
Alexander i s l ef t with a form of pa n the i s m akin t o Spinoza 
(a k i nship w:n i ch he r e c ognized ). 
Whitehead , on the other hand , a ch i e v es a remar kable 
s ynthesis b y g ivi ng God two nature s , primordial and cons e qu ent , 
or men tal and phys i cal, on t he patter n of a l l actual ent i-
ti e s . Th e r hythm whic h Be r g son ' s dualism ob se r v ed is trans -
fe rred i n part tot hese two as pects of Go d ' s nature . The 
mental and physical aspects of thing s which Al exander saw 
i n ,"'pac e-Ti me or , more adequa te l y , i n Spac e - Ti me a nd nisus , 
are eas ily discernible in the d ipolar n a ture of Whitehead ' § 
Go d . Likevfise , the consequent natu re of God , f or White-
head i s , as are both the God of Bergson and Al exander , 
limited in p owe r . Howe ve r, unlike them , Wh itehead ' s God 
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posse s ses t he cor ceptua l va l ua tion of the ent ire re a l m of 
pot enti a lity , whi ch is con side r ably more t han could be s a id 
f or t he God of eithe r of the ot hers . 
1\ compari s on , he r E; , of these con cepts of God wi t h those 
of t he theol ogi ca l expl ana tion s mi ght prove i nterest i11g . 
I n r espe ct t o f unction , Pl a t o's Demiurge and ,fuitehe ad' s 
God a r e very si milar . Both seek to pe r suade t he re cal c i tran t 
chaotic fa ctor ( empt y s pa ce or physica l f eeling s ) to t ake on 
f orm of the hi ghest possible value (beauty or har mony . Fur-
ther , Plotinus's One is a l s o most .like Ber g s o 1's God . Bot h 
be i ng s f uncti on in the manner ·of 11 emanati onn or nshoot i ng 
out . ' The s i milariti es ob s er vabl e b e tv.~eun I r i s to t l e and Al e -
xande r are not very obvious from t he point of ·v- i eH of t he 
supr e;ne transc endenc e of t he Pri me l'·'lOVer and t he su preme i m-
manen ce of pace - Ti me vJi t h i ts nisus to de i t y . Oviever , con-
sideri ng t he t wo con ception s f rom a s lightly di ffe r ent angl e , 
a striki ng s i mi l ari ty i s obse r ved . ' ristot l e con s i de r ed t he 
Pr·i rr1e l 1 ove r t o · e pure actuality . Tha t is prec i s e l y wha t 
Al exander considers God to be i n h i s system. Space , Ti me , 
a nd De i ty a r e a ll t ha t t he r e is. 
I n orde r to fac ilita t e t he summary of t he r e l a t i on s which 
obt a in be t ween t hese t hree synt he se s and t he ir historica l 
ba ckgr ound , a chart is he r e\vith pr e s ented i g ., 19) v,rh i ch 
a tt empts to tra ce t he main cosmic f a ctor s a d t ype s of co smic 
pr oce s s t oge t her with t he r ecent t endenc i e s and t hei r effe cts 
u pon t he t hr ee synt hese s . I n addition , the more i mpor t an t 
o r i gi na l contri buti ons of the r e cent synt he se s a r e a lso pr o-
j e cted ~·vi th brief comment s about ea ch . 
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" ix . . ~ lan v ita l , nisus , an d c r e a tiv i t y . 
The fi na l e v a luat i on of the thre e d octri lles .ihicl1 a r e 
tlle s ubje ct of ·tlli s rl is s e r t at ion i s 110V·I iu or d P. r . The f'ore -
;;oi11g e xposit i on , it is ho pe d , h a s s hed sot..e light on cert a i n 
c h c1.ra ct 2r i st ics of ther:: , < n d , i Hci J.ent o. l l y , u )on s or:~e of the 
more i moort ant phases of t he historic a l se t tir1g . 
I . the fir s t pl ac E:: , t h ey a r e a ll i 1" on e 1. ay or Ui lot h e r 
c olls i cl e recl t o 'e : ( l ) the ) ri11ci p l e of n ove l ty in t,he u n i -
ve r se ; ( 2 ) r e l ated i n s ome way t o a re a l irr evers i b l e tiue ; 
( 3) P~ r oa ched a t l e a st y i ntui t i on ; ( 4) i n son e f uncl.aJJlcnta l 
1:'1ay r e l ated t o a ctiv i t y a 1d/or c a u sation ; ( 5 ) conLected 
e i tho r ex·;lici t l y , or i mplicitly , -v.Ji ·th fe e ling or v ·1 lue , and , 
lwnc e , wi t h consciousness ; ( b ) i nv o l ved 1;li th t he i · ed of Uoc1 . 
Next , t here are llm ny r e s ~ ec t s in 11hich these t hree 
d octrines ma y 1Je ol:>s e rve d t o .- i ff e r f r om e ac h othe r • 
.. 'i t h r e spe ct to t he degr ee of p rorni n ense Hhicll t he 
;j oe tri e oc cu:) i e s in the net.a ph y sic s of each f!:rUl ' t. h e e l a n 
v it .:1 l i s fa out i1 fr or t , c r c-;)a ti i1 ity is next , 211 '-1 11isu s 
a pea r s t o 1)e a.u a ft e rthought ( a lthou:~:h n very v i t a. l one . ) 
li.e[:';a r d ing the ty,)e of expo s itio11 vlhich i s r i '' en 1- o ea ch 
do c t ri1 e , t h e n i sus and the ~ lan vi t a l are co1 s i derecl , f or the 
most pa rt , i n metaphoric a l l a n ; ·ua .:o~ e , ··rhi l e c ·,' c a ti v i t y is 
treated nea rl a l wa ys qu ite o l)j e ct i vely . 
Co _ce !:ning the int ·:.·ntion of the ;:; u thor .i r h r espe ct to 
the . reci s e me&n i r1g o f hi s loctrine , )Ot h :Se r g so 1 0.n . _ ~. l ex-
an de r a r e r e l a t i v e l y unequiv o cal des ite the ~aguene ss of 
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rne t c-t plw r i c <. l language ; 1,o'lli t eh e:c1 cl shows s l ;~n ,s of ::hi f ting the 
neaning of c reativity • 
.. i tl1 r efe ren c e to t~h e ma nner in vvh ic h the doctrine is 
knovm., ,he e l an vital i s ' be st knovvn throug h mystic a l intui t ion , 
t h e J.lisus tllrough reverent 112 tu:r-a l p i ety , vJhile creativity 
is ths r:1ost int~lle ctually a pproa chab l e . 
1
.1hen the part ·.·. Lich eacl1 .:)_ octri ne p l ays in c a u sat ion is 
con s i dered ' the e l an Ii t a l' which of the t hree i s most 
c lo s~C~ ly r e l a t ed t o c ause , osciihl ates bet-v1e '-'n the c a us e of 
everyt hing an J t he caus e o f just li fe ( h e rein denoted a s 
o scillation be t i·J•e: e n c aus a l woni s m an d ca usa l dualism.) 
Creat i v ity 's posit i on v.J i th re fe renc s to c ausa ti on is 11ot 
clear , .::.ltl10ugh i t i s Y' (:; l a ted in s ome way to b oth effic i ent 
a nd to fi 1a l c a u s c:. t i on . Nisus is di -~.r orc ed complete l y f rom 
c a usa tion , a l thougl1 it s r e l a ti on t o the emergenc e of level s 
o f 11ovelt y i mpli e s a t least some corwe ctio!l t o .::~ cti v i ty or 
cha n ge • 
. Jith re ference to notions more or l es s closely n ssoc -
iated v.;ith t he doctrines , ~l an ·,rit a l is r.1ost close l y re l ated 
vd t h t i me (or real d urat ion) , instinct an d int uition , li fe , 
u nforse eab l e nove lty , cons c i ousness , memory , fr e ~d om , 
mysti cism , God . Nisu s is a:3 t.:. ocia te d wit;h the !! restlessnes s 
of Time , n qu a lity , emergen c e , unpredict a bj_li ty , lithe !1ioth er 
o f :c.: l l ecoming , " n a tura l piety , deity ( or the uind of Go c~ .) 
Creativ ity is a s s o cia ted 1·Ji th s ubstantial o. cti v i ty , one , 
many , nove l t o ge t h ern e s .s , co e r e; s c Gnc e , conceptua l f EJe l i 1gs , 
., 
a nrt t c leo lo ~ic 8 l . El an v itAl is s u n ported by a sys~nm 1rl1i ch 
s t a n cls for i d e a lism ( thou~:~h not unG -:; ui "oc a l ly ) , o .tinisr' , 
? luralisn ( .ga i n e quiv oc a lly ) , th e i sm , ~n r an a ctive 
myst ici sfiL L'isus is r ~ l P.. t, ecl. to 2 s yst,er;1 I·Jhi ch , although 
n c t nre li s t i e , S f..81!1i.n .~: l y t J:nd s t01·1a r d s i deG. lisrn , recogn izes 
" '' l ues (l" n cl udl. ll"- ;·•.-: ll" 1"l. n l ]C' -r ':' ]_n ec) "1 nd is e';'l l')_J... r l· C ' 1l u n_,..,_ 
.. ~ ... ., ... - . O '-" - (.,J _ .._, !,..,._.J V C-l .... . 1-' J ) C •. - J.L.!. . - "-"' • rt. 
evP.r , '-Ihi le ~ J1i t e h ec:d ' s s y s tem i s thus t,he l''ost o.c e -:;_u r1 t e 
overa l l , it l ecm s 'coo f a r to . FJ rcl p lura lism <mr'l. h .c:f-> too littl e 
er1p i r ic e. l re l evanc e . 'Se r gson' s syst em suffc;:~ s fro! •' .o>. 
gf'n!e r <: 1 i n cohe renc e bet~·!edl basic e l em<-mts , 2nd !. l ex;:mde r ' s 
is a v i cti , of t oo g re a t coherenc e i n tha t actequate a ccount 
is ~·-..o t t~< ::en of the el i verse 3 ape c t s of th::.nr;s 2 t t he s t Dr t; 
•·Thea he fi n a l ly 2:ot to it , h e is unable to .prov i de ndetlua te 
intee;r a tion . 
La stly , a tten tion sh0uld be ~iven to cnn s i de r a tion s 
whi c h it is hoped tha t the pre sent discuss i on has hrou~ht to 
li ght 1·dth r espe ct to t h e three doctrinc~ s . ' . .Jh.:..l e t he y a l l 
appear to hav e clifficult :r ·Hith the p ro b l ems of c a u s r· lity , 
incH v i c uality , an rl. va l ue , the r ea s ons fo:r the") cUL-::'iculti8s 
may b e tra ce a ble to th e followin ~ : 
1) . "' El an v ita l . ~n pre s ent inc~ the £ J- a n v i t ~', l , Berr; son 
hA s c i v en 2n i de a ~iliich is v ery rich and exce edi n g l y pr esn a nt 
v1ith El.e nn ingful t rut-.11 . Its d i f f icu lt i es app e 2.r be c E~ us e i t 
c annot , in it s unana l yzed state , e ither carry th e~ ·re i §') lt, of a l l 
t hat i s Jl a ced u~on it or become c oherently int agr 2 t cct •dth a ll 
tha t it coes no t i11 clu de . Furthe r LG~ lysi s , espe cie lly in the 
J .! rl·· t of tl1"' -·"L ' ·11· f l. c ant ir1 .r.: 1· c._·_. '11 t s_ ·;'1·1.1· c l~ t>l•e ~- l :o,1·1 ·1.1· t ;J_l 
_j_-' " ' ' " ;:: - t;1 1 - J - - · • - ' -·- -- -
it se lf c a r ·i es , to !~C th--;r \.Ji th t h0 P. o f other rc~ c ent deve l -
O':)!l.l.ents , C.' e;:-rs ne ccssar-r if th e rl i ffj_c n l t i es c;re to '.:-e 
avoiced . 
2 I' isus . 'i'he ni sus i s <l 1 /t i0n '.rcry sinilm~ to +he 
spiri t of Bert; son ' s ~l :=m v i t ,. l . I t a c f'o nnt s 11ot only :for 
li .te , but ::- l:=o :fo. fl1at·:cr c-.r.-' n inc1 , ~ n d s t r i ves for y e t 
h:~ f:h eJ:~ l nv<3 l s . In thi s sen ."e , Pn cl hy v i rtue of t .lw f~1 c t 
tha t it i s not i 1v o l ~ect ' .i th t h s~at, i o - t 0P1:) or ;=; l clu.? lism 
of Be ~ sor1 1 s system , posse sses g r ea t er n~eau~ cy . Howeve r , 
n i sus i s ~i. o t coh e!"ent ly rc l c:.~ t ect to the rest, of th~' r~~r -::· t-. ef'1 
,,1hich is c li~n in s·,irit to i t . In adrl i tion , t he '3nrr;-
son i an pro~ lems of ind~vi ctual i ty a n c c ~ u so lit y are , i f 
·:my+J1::..ng r e ncte r ed more unc l e;Jr , ·=~l thou:~h v rl l ues r:·nd God. are 
cr. i ven rno1 e e:wli c i t mw lvs is . 
I...... '· ... 
3) . Cr eativity . I n .fuit e h eed ' s c o ctri~e o f c r Pnt i v i ty , 
t here is obse r v ed an un cert8in a t temot to ~' st r ~c t fron 
a ctno. lit.y the f· c·r. or of ;Jro c e s s or clCti v ity . .\s s ch j_t 
is e c o~·ni zed a s t h·2 cats. ory o f the l timat,e , or the 
ult i mate g::nera l i t y cha r 2 cteri z i n g ma. t t er of f -"\ Ct . ' 1. u s , 
by ,_, irtl e of rn·li t (:: he 20_ 1 s carefu l ;~1L lysis of f 0 ctor ::; , 
,q n c: l ysit=: ·.Jhich bot h 8e r 6 so11 c: n :l J~ lexande r d i d n ot a t t er •;J t , 
there i s revea l ed · a con c e .; t \. hi. ch lla s a far f'' Ore unive rsa l 
and CO!lCre t e 2-p 1li c a ti0ll t h f.l ll :ithe r e l c il Vi t a l Or 1Li ~3llS • 
The more or les r3 unana l yzed and unre l a t ed i11si ght~3 of 
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i 11 i .. l exan er , Rre, in ,."hi tt:; llead , c e.re fnll~r orPJ tnized [tnd 
synthesized i 1to a sy.st e fi: v!L ich possesses r~r.1a rkah l e 
coheren c e . The e l eme nt of Elyst e ry \.Jb ic:l··, surroun:_~.s both the 
~ lan vi t 9. l c:md the nisus , a n J. i.·.' ll"i_ ch dr8\J,s Jc:.o tl,cm t he re li ,-
ious a ttitu e , is too}letely a bsen t in c re 2tivity . The 
question of the ·or ecise n.ature of crer-; tivi ty , hm,rever , a nd 
it s .o l at i on. t o a ctual entit i es i s 11ot f re e frof'l c ertaL ~ 
E,mbie:ui ties . I t unclergoe s a~)pEJ. rently i1 threefo l d tr;:ms-
form<.< tion iE the course of :;Jhit eher.d 1 s deve lo rJr.lent , ,:::;x1d , if 
the hy?othe s is i s t r ue tha t cre2tivity re n l J.y neans the 
i --l ea of • roces s or ::~ ctivity , h i s use of terms irn lyj.ng 
no•.~e lty a nd dr i ve a s a;·l:; lied to t 1at not ion re sults only 
in amb i ui ty s i 1c e thes2 arc adequa t .e l y prov ide d for in 
the ren ~ inde r of his s ystem . 3ee Fi g . 21 . 
2 . Con clusion s 
T ·1e follovJii.l _r·· conc lu s ions appe2 r justified in liGht 
of t l1e fore g oing d i s cussi on a nd cri tic a l ev~luation: 
i . Historic a lly , the thre e doct r ines , "c l an vita l , n i sus , 
c:,ncl c r ec.tivi t y , 1ave c_ •. s i gnific ant p l a.ce ~vi thin thre e modern 
s yn.theses of the theo l or;ic e.J. and sci entific cosr::.olo ~·i es . 
ii . There is observable in the th~ught of Be r gson, Al ex-
c:~nd er , and. iJ1li t. ·=c hea r1 , . a distinct t eEden c y t o a ~;:)ron~iate in 
inve rse ch ono l og ic a l o rde r cert c:, in kl~y LOti ons of :? l 81·,o , 
.\ristotle , ~. Yld Pl otinus , c.t ll three of tht:;rn !J.akinr: use (in 
the 11otion of nolr s lty) of a rr:o cl i fie d ex n ihilo r. ~o ci-:.l~ille of 
~lquinas . 
i ii . Funct i oning , in a sense , a s c a t a l yti c agent s it thi s 
sy~_the ti c P 1"0Ccs::, , Dr e c e rtain deve l o pr.lents ;;i tllin ::: cie• c e 
i t s(-?. l f : thE:; n e o - v i t;a l ist; i c n10-remen t in bio l o ··,.y , i· .. }w r; on-
ce i1 t. of eme r gent evolution , and. the ne•J ~Jhysic s ··i +·h i t,s 
· et!F_,ha ;.:: i s u~Jon sp2.c e-tine ancl the d~n.wrni c c one ention of 
matte r . 
. ' l l tl - . . ~ l . J l v . ..\ . l.n~e Ci oc-r, r l nc s , . e Pn Vl t c-, . , Hi SUS , 
God . 
/ 
v . JG ccm v i t, c: l , a cl.octr i nc 1rh ich is exc eedin:.::; l y rich i n 
·· · io r lc. - ~' ro c ess , c a nnot , i n it s unana l yzed s t a t e , suD ·Jo!:-t 
the ··1e i ght 1rhich the syst e rn re~uiTe s of it , or 1)e c ome 
coherently int egrat ed 1. ii th a ll ;_ihi ch i t (1 oes ,,ot i 1Clucle . 
,. 
v i . '~' lan v i t a l , therefore , v.rc.s ob s c rve cl to o s cilla te b e -
t1,reen a n10ni S! :l , ,,,,h i ch VVOl'.ld a ccount f or ~rholene ss_, c>.n c~ a 
.J uali sm , uhich 1 • .roul rl ore se r ve the nov e l , J. hcin _c~ , gro1-ring , 
dee.Jer , mora v aluab l e , a n d div i ne , Hspe ct s of thin~ s . 
. . v · Vll . "·!lSUS , [: r} o c trirl8 very sird l a r to the s piri t of the.:; 
, l . -, . - . 1 e_a n Vlt[' _ , Rp~1ears J_n .q s yste m ~ ,:.tnc r: Do s sess~s ~rent e r 
c oherenc e in it s n a turnli s t i c sspe ct s Gnd pn~scntf:. furt he r 
arwl_rsj_s in the rea l m of valur0;n c:Uid Gocl. , but is r;. ot organ-
i zect cohe~ent ly wi t h the rest of the s cheoe , nn d has 
1)e cu l i a r ':iiff icu l t, i e s in the rea l ms of c a usal.i ty nn c.l i n d. i -
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viii . Hi s us , therefore , v•,G. s o b~3erved to ··)e i n t he ') 0 s :i_ t:i_rm 
o f o.n addendum to R sys te ti 'c\ l re ad y nc~ t uralistic ;nlcl t .o 
fun c tion so a s tn ov c~ rcome c ertain J i ffic ulties j_ntrinsic 
to i~hat s y s tem . 
ix . ·ere:: ti vi t y , a d octrine ·\:.Jhich c-Lp;) e a: rs in a s y stem 
f ar more a~equa te in a luost every de t il than eithe r o~ the 
other t0o , b o th in it s de~ree of ~n~ lys is an d in it~ 
coherenc e , unclerr;oes ~111 ap:)c_rent t h r eefo l d trr:msfo:~rac::.tion 
ir t .!··e cour se of ihi tehec;d r s philo sophi c Pl deve lo xHmt , ::: nd 
results in C(lnside r ,::,b l e ambi t;uity a s t o it s _re ci se na ture . 
x . Crentivity , t h e refore , i f i t !:' BC:1 1ly neans s i r•:) l y t he 
notion of process or ? ctiv ity , i s a no/tion 1~ · ic1 , in n2me 
a t l e :;.s t , carries 1prith it ,:, :: : ition [~ l i mplic e>t ions ( c:: t least 
IlOYe l t y )--implicat i ons hrhich are uwierst A.n deb l e but 
unnecessary , since they are adequ 2t ely provided f or by oth e r 
aspects of his s y s tem. 
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ABSTRACT 
The main problem of this dissertation is to compare and eval-
I 
uate critically some of the salient aspects of elan vital, nisus, 
and creativity, as treated by Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, 
and Alfred North Whitehead. A subordinate purpose is present in 
that these doctrines will be viewed in relation to important and 
interesting phases of their historical settitig. 
The Historical Setting. The earliest philosophical investi-
gations into the problem of cosmology which are worthy of note 
form a group which provided what might be called the "theological 
explanations," and consisted of the cosmologies of Plato, Aris-
totle, Plotinus, and Aquinas. The rise of modern science,' espe-
cially in its dependence upon the Newtonian physics, provided 
what has been termed "the scientific reaction to final causes." 
More recently, however, especially during the last half of the 
nineteenth century, and culminating in the first few years of 
the twentieth, three tendencies were observed each of which 
served to foreshadow respectively the three major · syntheses which 
are the main subject of the present essay: neo-vitalism, emer-
gent evolution, and developments in physics. 
In the course of more or less continuous discussions of 
these and related subjects which persisted during the first three 
decades of this century, there appeard a gradual and steadily 
increasing recognition that novelty is at the root of the matter. 
Some of the more important implications of novelty for the prob-
38i 
lem of this dissertation are crystallized into several problems 
under which (with others) each of the major syntheses is examined: 
epistemology (or how novelty may be known), time, emergence, com-
plexity, law, predictability, intelligibility, and value. 
/ Henri Bergson's Elan Vital. The celebrated doctrine of the 
~lan vital, or "life-force," is one of the outstanding features 
of Bergson's entire philosophy, and certainly is central to his 
doctrine of "creative evolution." This "vitalistic" notion is 
the ultimate explanation of life, evolution, novelty, value, and 
later becomes identified with God. Likewise, it stands for cause 
and for individuality. However, particularly in these latter 
phases of his thinking, Bergson seems to oscillate between a 
monism and a dualism, with the idea of a static and inert matter 
as the adversary of the elan. This dualism, together with too 
great a dependence upon intuition as a means of identifying the 
~lan vital, prevents an adequate synthesis. 
Samuel Alexander's Nisus. In the great work, Space, Time, 
and Deity, an exceedingly comprehensive study in emergent evolu-
tion is presented. Space-Time is considered the matrix within 
which the novel qualities of matter, life, and mind are declared 
to have emerged; for every level there is a higher level: deity. 
Time is considered as the "mindn of Space throughout the early 
parts of the work, but at the end, and in later publ ications, 
nisus afpears as the nrestlessness of Time," as "endeavorn or 
an "effort to give birth,n concepts which, to say the least, are 
idealistically oriented. Nisus, together with the idea of value, 
however, is never adequately integrated with Alexander's original 
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scheme, which leads to the suggestion that nisus is an addendum 
designed to relieve the inability of his otherwise naturalistic 
system to account for novelty. This, together with difficulty 
in causality and individuality, reveals weaknesses in his monis-
tic synthesis. 
Alfred North vVhitehead's Creativity. ~Vhitehead's great 
specul'ative ability combines with genius in mathematics and 
physics to form the background for his development of the doc-
trine of creativity. Much more complex than either previous doc-
trine, the philosophy of organism affirms the primacy of process 
on both the microcosmic and macrocosmic scale. Process involves 
recognition of reality as pluralistic, in concrete togetherness 
or feeling relations with everything else. Hence, it is axio-
centric and idealistic (panpsychi~tic}, but realistic elements are 
maintained in the dipolar conception of all actual entities inclu-
ding God. God is not creator, but is necessary for all becoming. 
All creatures, including God, are characterized by creativity, 
or the category of the ultimate. The fact that Whitehead's in-
dividuals, including God, are actual, self-created to a degree, 
self-transcending, novel, multiple unities of intrinsic and in-
strumental value gives a remarkable harmony to his view. However, 
neglect of certain aspects of ~nd±~idu?lity (especially on the 
human level), and value (especially moral value}, together with 
an appa~ent uncertainty regarding the p~ecise nature of creati-
vity, prevents his pluralistic synthesis from being entirely 
adequate. 
The conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Historically, the three doctrines, elan vital, nisus, 
and creativity, have a significant place within three modern syn-
theses of the theological and scientific cosmologies. 
2. There is observable in the thought of Bergson, Alexander, 
and lrlliitehead, a distinct tendency to appropriate in inverse 
chronological order certain key notions of Plato, Aristotle, and 
Plotinus, all three of them making use (in the notion of novelty} 
of a modified ex nlhilo doctrine of Aquinas. 
3. Functioning, in a sense, as catalytic agents in this 
synthetic process, are certain developments within science itself: 
the nee-vitalistic movement in biology, the concept of emergent 
evolution, and the new physics with its emphasis upon space-time 
and the dynamic conception of matter. 
4. All three doctrines, elan vital, nisus, and creativity, 
are related to, and represent i mportant truths about real time, 
intuition, activity, novelty, value, ' and God. 
/ 5. Elan vital, a doctrine which affords significant insights 
concerning world-process, cannot,in its unanalyzed state, support 
the weight which the system requires of it, or become coherently 
integrated with all that it does not include. 
6. Elan vital, therefore, was observed to oscillate between 
a monism, which would account for wholeness, and a dualism, which 
would p~ese~ve the novel, living, growing, deeper, more valuable, 
and divine, aspects of things. 
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7. Nisus, a doctrine very similar to the spirit of the elan 
vital, appears in a system which possesses greater coherence in 
its naturalistic aspects and presents further analysis in the 
realm of values and God, but is not organized coherently with the 
rest of the scheme, and has peculiar difficulties in the realms 
of causality and individuality. 
8. Nisus, therefore, was observed to be in the position of 
an addendum to a system already naturalistic and to function in 
such a way as to ~vercome certain difficulties intrinsic to that 
system. 
9. Creativity, a doctrine which appears in a system far more 
adequate in almost every detail than either of the other two, 
both in its degree of analysis and in its coherence, undergoes 
an apparent threefold transformation in the course of wbitehead's 
philosophical development, and results in considerable ambiguity 
as to its precise nature. 
10. Creativity, therefore, if it really means simply the 
notion of process or activity, is a notion which, certainly in 
name, carries with it additional implications (at least that of 
novelty)--implications which are understandable but unnecessary, 
since they are adequately provided for by other aspects of the 
system. 
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